

Circuit Court for St. Mary's County
Case No. C-18-FM-25-812979

UNREPORTED*

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF MARYLAND

No. 2390

September Term, 2025

MARYELLEN KAY AMMONS

v.

JOHN CHRISTOPHER LYONS

Tang,
Albright,
Raker, Irma S.
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),

JJ.

Opinion by Tang, J.

Filed: June 16, 2026

*This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B).

John Christopher Lyons (“Father”), appellee, filed a petition for a protective order against his former spouse, MaryEllen Kay Ammons (“Mother”), appellant, in the Circuit Court for St. Mary’s County, seeking relief for the parties’ minor child, born in 2011. The court granted a temporary protective order. After a hearing on December 12, 2025, the court entered a final protective order, by consent, in favor of Father and the child. Mother appealed, raising four questions, which we have consolidated and rephrased into one:¹

Did the circuit court abuse its discretion in entering a final protective order against Mother by consent?

For the reason explained below, we answer in the negative. Accordingly, we shall dismiss this appeal.²

¹ In her brief, Mother presents the following questions:

1. Did the court err by entering a protective order against Appellant by consent when Appellant did not express consent on the record and also repeatedly expressed lack of understanding of the alleged agreement?
2. Did the court err by entering a protective order in favor of Appellee when Appellee’s Petition for Protection from Child Abuse did not request such relief and the alleged agreement did not include such relief?
3. Did the court err by entering a protective order that requires Appellant to not abuse or threaten to abuse Appellee or the minor child when Appellee’s Petition for Protection from Child Abuse did not request such relief and the alleged agreement did not include such relief?
4. Was Appellant prejudiced by the entry of such protective order?

Regarding the last issue, Mother argues that she was prejudiced by the court’s erroneous entry of the final protective order by consent. Given our disposition, we need not address this issue.

² The final protective order at issue expired on June 12, 2026. However, given the stigma and the long-term collateral effects which could attach to Mother for having a

BACKGROUND

The parties divorced in 2018. They have two children, one of whom is still a minor, and is the subject of the underlying proceedings. Pursuant to the judgment of absolute divorce (Case No. C-18-FM-18-000487), the parties were awarded joint legal custody and shared physical custody of the child.

In April 2025, Father filed a motion to modify custody, seeking sole legal custody and primary physical custody of the child. The court appointed counsel to serve as the child’s counsel. While the modification request was pending, the court issued *pendente lite* orders. In August 2025, the court entered an order maintaining joint legal custody but awarded Father primary physical custody. The court subsequently issued another order in November 2025, granting Mother visitation with the child during the upcoming months, including holidays.

Petition for Protective Order

On December 3, 2025, Father, as the named petitioner, filed a Petition for Protection in the circuit court (Case No. C-18-FM-25-812979), seeking relief for the child from abuse by Mother. He stated that since October, Mother had caused “mental injury” with “[s]evere mental and psychological impact on the child directly and through [the] child’s school.” Specifically, he stated that Mother told the child that Father had sexually abused, raped, and mentally abused Mother, which caused the child to become “distracted, physically ill,

protective order entered against her, the issue is not moot. *See, e.g., Piper v. Layman*, 125 Md. App. 745, 753 (1999).

and miss school.” Mother also repeatedly contacted the school, insisting the child needed mental health and psychiatric care; she called the sheriff’s office to conduct a wellness check on the child at Father’s residence; and she called the sheriff’s office accusing Father of committing criminal offenses during the marriage. In addition, Father stated that Mother had contacted the child’s teachers, making false allegations against him and raising issues regarding “the child’s mental health issues, abuse[,] and other unsubstantiated claims, including [Father allegedly] running a sex-trafficking ring,” which caused the school to make a report to child protective services. He further stated that Mother has had police present during every exchange, which she also audio and visually recorded, all of which caused the child discomfort. Finally, he stated that Mother’s “mental decline” was causing mental harm to the child, issues with his school, and his social life, and that it was creating a “toxic environment” for the child. Father made these statements under oath.

In the petition, Father requested that Mother be ordered not to contact, attempt to contact, or harass the child; not to go to Father’s residence; and not to go to the child’s school or contact school officials or employees.

That same day, the court granted a temporary protective order, finding reasonable grounds that Mother committed “statutory abuse of child (mental).” The court ordered Mother not to contact, attempt to contact, harass, abuse, or threaten to abuse Father and the child. The court awarded Father custody of the child pending the hearing on the final protective order, which was scheduled for December 12, 2025. The court also forwarded the petition to the Department of Social Services (“DSS”) for an investigation.

Final Protective Order Hearing

On December 12, 2025, the court held a final protective order hearing. Father appeared with counsel, the child’s counsel was present, and Mother appeared pro se.

The court asked Mother if she wanted to continue the hearing for up to a week to retain counsel. She declined, stating she wished to proceed pro se. The court then took a recess to give the parties an opportunity to review the report from the DSS investigation.

When the court recalled the case, it asked Father’s counsel to clarify the relief sought in the petition to ensure that Mother was “clearly on notice” before proceeding. Counsel clarified that Father requested that Mother have no contact with the child, the child’s school, or school officials. He also requested, to the extent possible, that Mother have no contact with Father himself, because of the “repetition of scandalous” allegations she had made against him. The court asked Mother if she understood what Father was “asking for in this hearing.” Mother responded, “I understand what [Father’s counsel] just said.”

Before taking testimony, the court advised Mother that she had the option to consent to the final protective order without any finding of abuse. The court informed Mother about the difference between the entry of the order by consent as opposed to one after a contested hearing:

[Y]ou do have the option, if you choose, to have a final Protective Order entered without a finding of abuse, which means that there’s not a contested hearing, you agree to have the entry of the final protective order entered, again, without a finding of abuse if you choose to do so.

At the conclusion of a hearing, if you choose not to have that, when I hear from [Father], when I hear from you, if I find by a preponderance of the evidence that . . . the allegations are sustained, there could be an entry against you of the Protective Order with a finding that you essentially have done

something wrong. . . . Do you understand the difference between having an entry of an order without a finding of abuse versus having a contested hearing and then potentially having the [c]ourt make a finding that there was [sic] substantiated allegations? Do you understand the difference?

Mother responded, “As much as I can, sir.” The court further explained:

So, for example, at a later proceeding, it’s possible that parties will say, well, [c]ourt, take judicial notice there was a Protective Order entered against this person, right? A defense to that is, yes, there was, but it was without a finding. I mean, this [c]ourt did not find that anyone did anything wrong, it was an entry of an Order by consent. Conversely, having to say, [c]ourt, you take notice there’s a protective order, but there was a finding, right? So at later proceedings, it could be important as to how a protective order was entered, whether it was entered essentially by consent with no finding of abuse or a contested hearing where there was a finding that statutory relief was appropriate. Do you understand the difference?

Mother responded, “I do, but may I ask you questions?” She asked, “if I say ‘yes’ to the first option, does that mean that we don’t testify, no one testifies, you will make the order, and then the *pendente lite* custody exchange continues?” The court explained that an entry of a final protective order without a finding does not mean the only controlling order is the *pendente lite* order. It stated that the final protective order is a “standalone order” which would include a requirement to surrender all firearms; it would remain in effect until modified by the court.

At this time, Father’s counsel requested time to speak with his client, and the court took another recess. After about fifty minutes, Father’s counsel informed the court that the parties had reached an agreement with the assistance of the child’s counsel. Father’s counsel summarized the agreement:

So my understanding is that [*Mother*] will consent to the entry of a Protective Order without admission of wrongdoing of any kind for a period of six

months. These are the conditions—that she will have no contact with [the child’s school]; not to have any contact with administrators, teachers, counselors, et cetera. However, she will be able to provide a list to [the child’s counsel] of some concerns she has. She will be able to provide this list to [the child’s counsel], which will be forwarded to [the child’s] school counselor[.] That will be a one-time list. And then again, this will be effective for a period of six months.

(emphasis added). The court asked whether “we want 30 days to compile that list,” to which Mother responded that she was “confused.” The court then sought clarification about providing the list to the child’s counsel within thirty days. The child’s counsel stated that the parties had not discussed a specific timeframe, but she was agreeable to the 30-day period. Mother replied:

No, I’m confused because I want to make sure that it’s clear what the actual order will say. . . . I did not know it was a one-time list. Okay. My request is to be able to provide lists to [child’s counsel] and be able to provide those to the school.

After a brief pause during which the child’s counsel spoke with Mother, Father clarified that “if there’s a parent/teacher conference between now and the end of the six-month period, [Mother] will be sent a written summary of what was discussed to [the child’s counsel], to be forwarded by [the child’s counsel] to Mother.” The court addressed the child’s counsel, who responded, “Yes, Your Honor. That was my understanding of the agreement.” The court then addressed Mother, who responded, “Yes.”

The court then found “there’s a consent to an entry of an order for six months.” It recounted the agreed-upon conditions as follows:

[Mother] shall not contact or enter the school, . . . including its administrators, that the [Mother] provide a list of her concerns regarding the minor child to [the child’s counsel] within thirty days, with that list to be forwarded by [the

child’s counsel] to the school’s counselor. That if any – my words – if any parent/teacher conference occurs during the six month period, that a summary of that conference be provided to [the child’s counsel], who will then provide it to [Mother].

The child’s counsel confirmed that this was an “accurate summation” of the conditions regarding no contact with the school. When the court addressed Mother, she responded, “I’m highly disassociated . . . I trust that you’ll get it right.”

The court prepared the final protective order and adapted the “preprinted form” order. The court explained to the parties, “Within the form [order], there’s a provision where it says [‘]to have no contact with[’]. That usually refers to the Petitioner or the children. I’ve not indicated that in that space, I’ve put ‘no contact with [the child’s school] and the administrators.’ So that’s where that’s going to appear.” The court further noted that other agreed-upon conditions would be included in another section of the form order.

Entry of Final Protective Order

The court entered the final protective order effective through June 12, 2026. The first page of the form order included the following pre-printed language: “THE COURT ORDERS: That the above named respondent SHALL NOT abuse, threaten to abuse, and/or harass the protected person(s).”

The second page of the order stated that the court made the following “findings”:

- Father and the child were persons “eligible for relief,” and Father was an individual who had a child in common with the respondent (Mother);
- The “petitioner” “in the case of a . . . a minor child” was a “relative” (Father); and
- Mother “consents to the entry of a Final Protective Order without admitting the allegations in the Petition or judicial finding of abuse.”

The court ordered the following relief:

- Mother “SHALL NOT abuse, threaten to abuse” Father and the child.
- Mother “SHALL NOT contact, attempt to contact, or harass” the child’s “school and administrators.”
- Mother “SHALL STAY AWAY from” the child’s school.
- Mother “SHALL immediately surrender all firearm(s). . .”
- “Additional Conditions: [Mother] to provide [child’s counsel] a list of concerns regarding [the child] within 30 day[s], with [child’s counsel] forwarding the list to the [school] counselor. If any parent teacher conference occurs then a summary of that [sic] conference shall be provided to [child’s counsel] who will forward to [Mother.]”

On January 8, 2026, Mother noted an appeal.³

PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS

Mother contends that she did not expressly consent on the record to the entry of the final protective order. Rather, she was “confused,” “highly disassociated,” and that she

³ On January 12, 2026, more than ten days after the entry of the Final Protective Order and following the noting of her appeal, Mother filed a motion in the circuit court to vacate the final protective order pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-535. She argued that she did not “recall” agreeing to the entry of the order and that it contained terms not agreed upon by the parties. Father opposed the motion, contending, in part, that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to consider it because the appeal was pending.

The clerk’s docket entry notes that the court was taking “no action at this time; case has a pending appeal per chambers.” Indeed, when a party files a post-trial motion *more than* ten days after entry of a judgment and notes a timely appeal, the circuit court lacks jurisdiction to rule on the motion. *See Brethren Mut. Ins. Co. v. Suchoza*, 212 Md. App. 43, 63 (2013). This contrasts with situations where a post-trial motion is filed *within* ten days of the judgment while an appeal is pending. In that case, the court may rule on such a motion, and the appeal process begins only after the post-trial motion is ruled on or withdrawn. *See Md. Rule 8-202(c) Committee note; Unnamed Att’y v. Att’y Grievance Comm’n*, 303 Md. 473, 486 (1985) (“Consequently, when a motion to alter or amend an otherwise final judgment is filed within ten days after the judgment’s entry, the judgment loses its finality for purposes of appeal.”).

“trust[ed]” the court to “get it right,” all of which she claims showed a lack of understanding about the consent and the conditions agreed upon. She adds that, as a pro se litigant, it was unreasonable for her to be expected to be comfortable enough standing before a judge to speak freely; thus, her consent must be determined from affirmative words or gestures.

Assuming *arguendo* that Mother consented to the entry of the final protective order, she argues that the order included relief that she did not agree to, thus rendering the entry of the final protective order by consent erroneous. Specifically, she contends that (1) she never agreed to grant Father any relief; and (2) she did not consent to including a provision stating that Mother “shall not abuse or threaten to abuse” Father or the child—relief that Father never requested in his petition.

Father responds that Mother consented to the entry of the final protective order, and any confusion stemmed from the list of her concerns provided to the child’s counsel, not from the entry of the order by consent. He further argues that the inclusion of the challenged relief was appropriate, as the court has discretion to order relief it deems necessary to protect individuals eligible for protection from abuse. Therefore, he argues that the appeal should be dismissed because no appeal lies from a consent protective order absent fraud, coercion, or lack of jurisdiction—none of which are present in this case.

DISCUSSION

A.

Domestic Violence Act

It is helpful to first provide a general overview of the statutory framework governing the entry of a final protective order and the relief such an order can provide. Section 4-501 *et seq.* of the Family Law Article (“FL”) of the Maryland Code embodies what is known as the Domestic Violence Act, a remedial statute designed to protect victims of domestic violence. *Suter v. Stuckey*, 402 Md. 211, 231 (2007).

The purpose of the domestic abuse statute is to protect and “aid victims of domestic abuse by providing an immediate and effective” remedy. The statute provides for a wide variety and scope of available remedies designed to separate the parties and avoid future abuse. Thus, the primary goals of the statute are preventive, protective and remedial, not punitive. The legislature did not design the statute as punishment for past conduct; it was instead intended to prevent further harm to the victim.

Coburn v. Coburn, 342 Md. 244, 252 (1996) (citation omitted).

“A petitioner may seek relief from abuse by filing with a court . . . a petition that alleges abuse of any person eligible for relief by the respondent.” FL § 4-504(a)(1). A “petitioner” means “an individual who files a petition.” FL § 4-501(p)(1). A “petitioner” also includes “a person eligible for relief” or “a person related to the child” who “seek[s] relief from abuse on behalf of a minor.” FL § 4-501(p)(2)(i), (ii)(3). A “person eligible for relief” includes the “former spouse of the respondent,” “child . . . of the respondent,” and “an individual who has a child in common with the respondent.” FL § 4-501(n)(1), (4), (6).

“Abuse” is defined by various acts under FL § 4-501(b)(1).⁴ If the person for whom relief is sought is a child, “abuse” may also include “abuse of a child,” meaning “the physical or mental injury of a child under circumstances that indicate that the child’s health or welfare is harmed or at substantial risk of being harmed by . . . a parent.” FL § 5-701(b)(2)(i); FL § 5-701(b)(1)(i)(1).

A final protective order “may be issued only to a person who has filed a petition” for relief from abuse. FL § 4-506(c)(2). The statute allows a respondent to avoid a finding of abuse by consenting to the entry of a final protective order without that finding. *See* FL § 4-506. FL § 4-506(c)(1)(ii) provides that, at the final protective order hearing,

[I]f the judge finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the alleged abuse has occurred, *or if the respondent consents to the entry of a protective order*, the judge may grant a final protective order to protect any person eligible for relief from abuse.

(emphasis added).

When the court grants a final protective order, the order “may include any or all” of the relief listed under FL § 4-506(d). In relevant part, such relief may include:

- (1) order[ing] the respondent to refrain from abusing or threatening to abuse any person eligible for relief;
- (2) order[ing] the respondent to refrain from contacting, attempting to contact, or harassing any person eligible for relief;
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⁴ These acts are (i) an act that causes serious bodily harm; (ii) an act that places a person eligible for relief in fear of imminent serious bodily harm; (iii) assault in any degree; (iv) rape or sexual offense under § 3-303, § 3-304, § 3-307, or § 3-308 of the Criminal Law Article or attempted rape or sexual offense in any degree; (v) false imprisonment; (vi) stalking under § 3-802 of the Criminal Law Article; or (vii) revenge porn under § 3-809 of the Criminal Law Article. FL § 4-501(b)(1)(i)–(vii).

(14) order[ing] any other relief that the judge determines is necessary to protect a person eligible for relief from abuse.

In fashioning appropriate relief, the court does what is “reasonably necessary—*no more and no less*—to assure the safety and well-being of those entitled to relief.” *Katsenelenbogen v. Katsenelenbogen*, 365 Md. 122, 137 (2001).

B.

Consent Judgment

Consent judgments, such as the entry of a final protective order by consent, “are essentially agreements entered into by the parties which must be endorsed by the court. They have attributes of both contracts and judicial decrees.” *Suter*, 402 Md. at 225 (2007) (citation omitted). The nature of a consent judgment precludes appeal. *Id.* This is because “[t]he availability of appeal is limited to parties who are aggrieved by the final judgment” and “[a] party cannot be aggrieved by a judgment to which he or she acquiesced.” *Id.* at 224.

However, as relevant here, there is an exception: we will entertain an appeal from a consent judgment where the appealing party contends that the consent judgment was not actually consented to “because the judgment was coerced, exceeded the scope of consent, or was not within the jurisdiction of the court, or for any other reason consent was not effective.” *Id.* at 224 n.10. Therefore, the only question that can be raised from a consent order is whether, in fact, the order was entered by consent. *Dorsey v. Wroten*, 35 Md. App. 359, 361 (1977); *Barnes v. Barnes*, 181 Md. App. 390, 411 (2008). In other words, we must

examine the record to determine whether Mother consented to the entry of the final protective order.

C.

Standard of Review

We review the entry of a consent order for an abuse of discretion. *See Smith v. Luber*, 165 Md. App. 458, 469–70, 479 (2005); *see also Long v. State*, 371 Md. 72, 86 (2002) (“[A] court’s refusal to enter a consent judgment submitted by the parties is reviewable for an abuse of discretion.”); *4900 Park Heights Ave. LLC v. Cromwell Retail 1, LLC*, 246 Md. App. 1, 18 (2020) (“Although a trial court’s entry of an order reflecting a settlement is subject to an abuse of discretion standard, a court abuses its discretion if it enters an order containing terms that vary from, or otherwise fail to reflect, those to which the parties have agreed.”). An abuse of discretion occurs

[W]here no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the [trial] court; or when the court acts without any guiding rules or principles. It has also been said to exist when the ruling under consideration appears to have been made on untenable grounds, when the ruling is clearly against the logic and effect of facts and inferences before the court, when the ruling is clearly untenable, unfairly depriving a litigant of a substantial right and denying a just result, when the ruling is violative of fact and logic, or when it constitutes an untenable judicial act that defies reason and works an injustice.

Smith, 165 Md. App. at 467 (citation modified). We afford the trial court “wide latitude” and will not reverse merely because “we would not have made the same ruling as the trial court.” *Id.*

D.

Analysis

We hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in entering the final protective order against Mother by consent. The court advised Mother that she could consent to the order “without any finding of abuse” and explained the difference between a final protective order entered based on a finding of abuse and one entered by consent. Mother stated that she understood this distinction. The court clearly informed Mother about the “entry” of the final protective order by consent. Indeed, Mother demonstrated understanding by restating her comprehension of the “first option” as meaning “we don’t testify, no one testifies, *you will make the order.*” (emphasis added). Contrary to her claim that her pro se status hindered her ability to speak freely, the record shows she actively asked questions, especially about the impact the order’s entry would have on existing *pendente lite* orders in the domestic case.

Furthermore, Father’s counsel stated on the record that Mother would “consent” to the “entry” of the final protective order and summarized the conditions regarding her contact with the school. Mother’s only expressed confusion related to the list she would provide to the child’s school, not to consenting to the order’s entry without a finding of abuse. Father clarified the terms, resolving her confusion. After the child’s counsel confirmed her understanding of the agreement, Mother responded affirmatively. This response indicated her consent both to the entry of the protective order without a finding of abuse and to the conditions regarding her contact with the school. Her comments about

feeling “highly disassociated” and trusting the court to “get it right” related to the condition about her contact with the school, which came after the court summarized the parties’ agreement about this condition. These comments were not about consenting to the entry of the final protective order without a finding of abuse.

Mother’s alternative argument and related contentions also fail. She overlooks the statutory framework and remedial purpose of the Domestic Violence Act, as well as the distinction between FL § 4-506(c), which allows a respondent to consent to the entry of a protective order in lieu of a trial where abuse could be found, and FL § 4-506(d), which governs the relief a judge may grant when issuing a final protective order.

As mentioned, FL § 4-506(c)(1)(ii) states,

[I]f the judge finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the alleged abuse has occurred, *or if the respondent consents to the entry of a protective order*, the judge may grant a final protective order to protect any person eligible for relief from abuse.

(emphasis added). In other words, instead of a judicial finding that the alleged abuse occurred, the respondent may consent to the entry of a protective order—allowing her to avoid trial and a finding of abuse. The court explained this to Mother, who consented to the entry of a final protective order without a finding of abuse. The court expressly found that Mother “consents to the entry of a Final Protective Order without admitting the allegations in the Petition or judicial finding of abuse.” (emphasis added). Based on this record, we discern no abuse of discretion in entering the final protective order by consent.

Contrary to Mother’s suggestion, consent to the entry of a final protective order under FL § 4-506(c) does not limit the court to granting only the relief the respondent

agrees to under FL § 4-506(d). When a judge grants a final protective order to protect any person eligible for relief from abuse, “[t]he final protective order *may include any or all of the following relief*: (1) order the respondent to refrain from abusing or threatening to abuse any person eligible for relief.” FL § 4-506(d)(1) (emphasis added). Following the respondent’s consent under FL § 4-506(c), the plain language of FL § 4-506(d) grants the judge discretion to order the relief that the allegations reasonably warrant, limited to the options listed under FL § 4-506(d). *See Suter*, 402 Md. at 235 (in the context of a final protective order entered by consent, stating that the judge “had the power to order” relief under FL § 4-506(d)). Imposing a consent requirement would conflict with the legislative intent and policy of the Act, which mandates that the court take actions that are “reasonably necessary—*no more and no less*—to assure the safety and well-being of those entitled to relief.” *Katsenelenbogen*, 365 Md. at 137. Here, the court’s order was properly tailored to the standard of providing relief that was reasonably necessary to ensure Father’s and the child’s safety and well-being based at minimum on the statements Father made under oath in the petition. Although the parties agreed to specific relief, the court’s exercise of discretion to include additional relief did not invalidate the consent entry of the final protective order. *See id.* (explaining that the court “should not hesitate to order” “any ancillary relief provided for in the statute”). Accordingly, the court was within its authority under the statute to grant the relief of not abusing or threatening persons eligible for relief.

Mother’s contention that the entry of the final protective order by consent was erroneous because Father never requested in his petition that Mother be prohibited from

abusing or threatening to abuse Father and the child is without merit. FL § 4-504, which governs the petition’s contents, does not require the petitioner to itemize the specific relief sought. FL § 4-504(b)(1) states that the “petition shall:”

- (i) be under oath; and
- (ii) include any information known to the petitioner of:
 1. the nature and extent of the abuse for which the relief is being sought, including information known to the petitioner concerning previous injury resulting from abuse by the respondent;
 2. each previous action between the parties in any court;
 3. each pending action between the parties in any court;
 4. the whereabouts of the respondent, if known;
 5. if financial relief is requested, information known to the petitioner regarding the financial resources of the respondent; and
 6. in a case of alleged child abuse or alleged abuse of a vulnerable adult, the whereabouts of the child or vulnerable adult and any other information relating to the abuse of the child or vulnerable adult.

Although the form petition includes fields for a petitioner to specify requested relief for the petitioner’s convenience,⁵ FL § 4-504(b)(1) does not require the petitioner to detail the relief sought. Constraining the court’s ability to grant relief solely to what a petitioner requests would conflict with the plain language of FL § 4-506(d), which grants the court discretion to include relief listed under that subsection. *See id.* (“[t]he final protective order

⁵ A special ad hoc committee was created by Chief Judge Robert C. Murphy in 1992 to address concerns over implementation of the domestic violence statute. *Coburn*, 342 Md. at 254 n.9. The committee devised a uniform set of forms for utilization by both the District Court and circuit courts to implement the domestic violence law. *Id.* These forms include the petition for protection from domestic violence, child abuse, and vulnerable adult abuse. *Id.*

may include any or all of the following relief” (emphasis added)). It would also undermine the legislative policy of the Act, discussed above.

Mother’s contention that the entry of the final protective order by consent was erroneous because she never agreed to extend protection to Father is also without merit. A final protective order “may be issued only to a person who has filed a petition” for relief from abuse, as provided in FL § 4-506(c)(2). In this case, Father filed the petition. More significantly, Father was a “person eligible for relief” because he was, as the court found, “an individual who has a child in common with the respondent.” FL § 4-501(n)(6). Under FL § 4-506(c)(1)(ii), “the judge may grant a final protective order to protect *any person eligible for relief [i.e., Father]* from abuse.” (emphasis added).

For the reason stated, the court did not abuse its discretion in entering the final protective order by consent with a provision prohibiting abuse and threats of abuse against Father and the child, even though the parties agreed to other terms and Father did not explicitly request this relief.

CONCLUSION

Mother agreed to the entry of the final protective order by consent. After agreeing to the entry of the order, she was no longer an aggrieved party. Accordingly, we must dismiss this appeal. *See Barnes*, 181 Md. App. at 418–20 (“Maryland adheres to the ‘English practice’ of dismissing an appeal where the order at issue on appeal is found to be a properly entered consent order.”).

**APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE
CIRCUIT COURT FOR ST. MARY'S
COUNTY DISMISSED. COSTS TO BE PAID
BY APPELLANT.**