

Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case No. 123164012

UNREPORTED*
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF MARYLAND

No. 985

September Term, 2024

MYLES EDWARDS

v.

STATE OF MARYLAND

Arthur,
Ripken,
Hotten, Michele D.
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),

JJ.

Opinion by Arthur, J.

Filed: July 9, 2026

* This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B).

A Baltimore City jury convicted Myles Edwards of attempted first-degree murder, reckless endangerment, and an array of related firearms offenses. The Circuit Court for Baltimore City sentenced Edwards to a total of 50 years of incarceration.

He appealed. We affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

At about 7:00 p.m. on April 15, 2023, Charles Meile was shot six times in the 5400 block of Belair Road in Baltimore.

Meile testified that, just before the shooting, he had been driving on Belair Road, taking his girlfriend home. He and his girlfriend began to argue. She got out of the car in the 5400 block, refused to get back in, and began walking.

As his girlfriend attempted to cross the street, Meile saw a white Nissan Murano SUV pull up nearby. Three men were in the Murano. According to Meile, “they kept saying something out the window.”

Meile got out of his car. He seems to have had the impression that the men in the Murano were saying something about his girlfriend, because he says he told them, “She’s okay,” and, “Leave her alone.” The man in the Murano’s front passenger seat said “F you” to Meile.

Meile thought that the men were trying to get his girlfriend into the Murano. He said to her, “Look what you’re doing. You got me about to fight guys[.]”

The Murano drove off but turned around and came back a moment later. The man in the front passenger seat jumped out. Meile thought that the man was going to fight

him, but the man shot him instead.

After he was shot, Meile tried to run away. The man with the gun pursued him and continued to shoot. Meile was wounded in the hand, the foot, the back, and in each of his legs.

While Meile was running away, a fence blocked his path. He climbed the fence but shattered his ankle when he came down on the other side.

Meile said that the shooter was wearing a mask. He described the shooter as a light-skinned, slim man, shorter than six feet tall, wearing a hoodie, black pants, and black athletic shoes. He later told police that the shooter appeared to have a tattoo under his right eye. At trial, Meile identified his assailant as the person depicted in a surveillance video, taken at the time of the incident, by a camera at a nearby business.

Detective Alexander Rodriguez-Berrios investigated the crime scene. He recovered six cartridge casings, but a crime lab technician found no fingerprints on them.

Detective Rodriguez-Berrios also obtained surveillance video footage from nearby businesses, including the Asian Taste restaurant. The surveillance video from Asian Taste, timestamped 6:52 p.m., depicted Meile's black Dodge Charger and a Nissan Murano with a broken door handle. The video showed Meile running toward a fence while being pursued by another person, whom Detective Rodriguez-Berrios believed to be the shooter.

On the following day, Detective Brendan Kelly was in the vicinity of the shooting, looking for the white Nissan Murano. He observed a white Nissan SUV with Virginia tags on a side street near where the shooting occurred. A records search disclosed that

the car’s owner lives in Maryland. Because it is illegal for Maryland residents to register their vehicles in Virginia, Detective Kelly attempted to initiate a traffic stop. He activated his lights and sirens, and the Nissan came to a stop. But after the detective and his partner got out of the vehicle, the Nissan sped off. Detective Kelly and his partner elected not to pursue the Nissan. He testified, however, that he recognized the driver as Myreek Williams and that he observed the arm of a light-skinned person extending outside the front passenger-side window.¹ He took note of the Nissan’s license plate number, and he obtained a warrant for Williams’s arrest.

A few weeks later, on May 4, 2023, Detective Kelly encountered Williams on Frankford Road between Belair Road and Sinclair Lane in northeast Baltimore City. The detective placed Williams under arrest. A search incident to the arrest yielded the keys to a Nissan automobile.

Using a license plate reader, police officers located a white Nissan Murano in the 4200 block of Parkwood Street, at its intersection with Belair Road. The vehicle had a broken driver’s-side door handle.

Pursuant to a search warrant for the Murano, the police recovered a receipt from Pete’s Cycle Shop in the name of Rico Williams. The receipt was dated April 15, 2023, the day of the shooting, at approximately 4:10 p.m.

Detective Rodriguez-Berrios obtained surveillance footage from Pete’s Cycle Shop. The footage showed a vehicle bearing the same Virginia license plate as the

¹ The transcript refers to the driver as “Myreek Williams.” Edwards’s brief refers to him as “Myleek Williams.” We opt to use the spelling in the transcript.

impounded Murano, and it depicted two men inside the store: Myreek Williams and another person wearing a gray hoodie.

Using still images from that footage, Detective Rodriguez-Berrios created a flyer seeking the identity of the other man. Detective John Kim identified the man as Edwards.

Based on that identification, Detective Rodriguez-Berrios obtained a warrant for Edwards's arrest. After the police arrested Edwards and learned his cell phone number, Detective Rodriguez-Barrios obtained Edwards's cell phone records by means of a warrant to his cell phone provider.

In a custodial interrogation after his arrest, Edwards denied that he knew anyone who had a white Nissan Murano.

When shown a still image from the surveillance footage from Pete's Cycle Shop, Edwards acknowledged that one person resembled him but said he could not identify the other man, whom he claimed to know only as "Latto." Although he initially claimed that he worked every Saturday, and although April 15, 2023, was a Saturday, Edwards admitted that he must not have been working that day.

Edwards told the police that he had met Latto and others at about 4:00 or 5:00 p.m. at a parking lot on Frankford Avenue, near the 5400 block of Belair Road. Edwards said that his mother lived in that area. From there, he said, he went to a gas station on Sinclair Road, returned to the lot, and then went to his mother's house.

Edwards denied shooting anyone on Belair Road on April 15, 2023. He asked,

“What would I shoot somebody for?”

Detective Rodriguez-Berrios testified that during the interview Edwards was wearing a gray sweatshirt, which he believed resembled the shooter’s clothing. He admitted, however, that the sweatshirt worn by the shooter in the surveillance footage had a full zipper and white drawstrings, while Edwards’s sweatshirt had a quarter zipper and no drawstrings.

Matthew Wickizer, a research analyst supervisor at the Baltimore Police Department’s crime analyst unit, examined cell phone records associated with Edwards’s phone number. The analysis showed several calls between 4:16 p.m. and 4:42 p.m. on April 15, 2023, from the vicinity of Pete’s Cycle Shop. The analysis also showed several calls or events between 6:49 p.m. and 7:04 p.m. on April 15, 2023, all of which placed the phone within a mile of the shooting. Wickizer concluded that the phone was probably near the general area of the shooting when it occurred.

During voir dire, the court had asked whether any members of the venire panel had “strong views” about “possession of a regulated firearm after having been convicted of a crime of violence.” Defense counsel did not object to the question. During jury selection, however, the prosecutor pointed out that the voir dire question had tacitly informed the venire panel that Edwards had previously been convicted of a crime of violence. The court asked the parties what they wanted to do. On two occasions, defense counsel told the court that Edwards preferred to go forward with the existing panel. Defense counsel declined the court’s proposal to clarify the voir dire question by referring to the charge as possession of a regulated firearm after a disqualifying

conviction.

While the prosecution was playing the video footage that depicted the assault, the prosecutor informed the court that one of the jurors appeared to be asleep. The court immediately admonished the jurors, stating: “Please be mindful this is really an important case and try and stay awake.” Defense counsel requested no other relief.

At the end of the State’s case and at the end of all the evidence, defense counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal. At the end of the State’s case, defense counsel enunciated no grounds for the motion. At the end of all the evidence, defense argued only that the State had not produced any eyewitness testimony. The court denied the motion for judgment.

As previously stated, the jury found Edwards guilty of attempted first-degree murder, reckless endangerment, and a number of related firearms offenses. The court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 50 years of incarceration. He appealed.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Edwards presents the following three questions, which we quote:

1. Was the evidence insufficient to convince any rational trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Edwards was guilty of the crimes with which he was charged?
2. Did the lower court commit reversible error by failing to question a sleeping juror and then failing to strike that juror for missing critical testimony to the prejudice of Mr. Edwards?
3. Was it error for the trial court to *voir dire* potential jurors about whether they had strong feelings about the fact that Mr. Edwards was charged with possession of a firearm *after being convicted of a crime of violence*, when the parties had stipulated that Mr. Edwards had been so convicted and . . . the proper reference was to inform the venire that Mr. Edwards possess[ed] the

firearm as a prohibited person?

(Emphasis in original.)

For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the judgments of the circuit court.

DISCUSSION

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Edwards argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that “he was the man who shot Meile.” Citing *White v. State*, 363 Md. 150, 160 (2001), he contends that the State relied entirely on circumstantial evidence that merely ““aroused suspicion or left room for conjecture”” that he ““was the shooter.”” According to Edwards, no witness identified him as the shooter or placed him at the scene, and no forensic evidence linked him to the crime. He argues that the cell phone evidence placed his phone in the “area of the shooting at the time of the assault[.]” but did not “place him at the site of the shooting” itself.² He claims to have had an innocent explanation for being in the area of the shooting, because, he says, “his mother lived in that very neighborhood and he spent a lot of time there.”

Edwards challenges Meile’s identification of the shooter as the person who was wearing a gray hoodie in the surveillance video of the shooting. He concedes that he is shown in a gray hoodie in the video from Pete’s Cycle Shop a few hours earlier, but he

² Edwards asserts that, “at the time of the shooting, [his] phone was located .38 miles away *from the shooting*.” (Emphasis in original.) His assertion is not entirely accurate. The cell phone testimony established that Edwards’s phone was 1,995 feet, or 0.38 miles, from the site of the shooting at 6:58 p.m., six minutes after the timestamp on the surveillance video of the shooting from a nearby store and six minutes before the 911 call.

argues that his gray hoodie differs from the shooter's in that his had two white drawstrings and half-zipper while the shooter's had no drawstrings and a full zipper. In any event, he argues, "gray hoodies are ubiquitous in today's culture." He also argues that his booking photograph does not show the facial tattoo mentioned by Meile and that he was not wearing black athletic shoes at that time.

In sum, according to Edwards, "[t]he only evidence connecting [him] to the shooting was a photo of him with Myreek Williams, the man who owned a white Nissan Murano with a [broken] door handle," at Pete's Cycle Shop "at 4:10 p.m. on the day of the shooting[.]" He insists that he "was not the man who ran after and shot at Meile."

Edwards failed to preserve most of these arguments. When Edwards moved for a judgment of acquittal at the end of the State's case, his counsel made no specific argument. Instead, counsel said only that he "would submit on the motion." Moments later, after Edwards had elected not to testify and the defense had rested, defense counsel renewed the motion but stated only that "[t]here's no specific eyewitness that puts him there."

In regard to the sufficiency of the evidence, therefore, the only argument that Edwards has preserved is the one concerning the absence of eyewitness testimony. See Md. Rule 8-131(a); *see also* Md. Rule 4-324(a) (stating that a defendant moving for judgment of acquittal "shall state with particularity all reasons why the motion should be granted"). That argument fails because "[a] valid conviction may be based solely on circumstantial evidence." *State v. Smith*, 374 Md. 527, 534 (2003). "[G]enerally, proof of guilt based in whole or in part on circumstantial evidence is no different from proof of

guilt based on direct eyewitness accounts.” *Id.*³

But even if Edwards had preserved all of his arguments—which he did not do—we would not agree that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions.

In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a criminal conviction, we ask “‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, *any* rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” *McClurkin v. State*, 222 Md. App. 461, 486 (2015) (quoting *Jackson v. Virginia*, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)) (emphasis in original); accord *Stanley v. State*, 248 Md. App. 539, 564 (2020). “In applying that standard, we give ‘due regard to the [fact-finder’s] findings of facts, its resolution of conflicting evidence, and, significantly, its opportunity to observe and assess the credibility of witnesses.’” *McClurkin v. State*, 222 Md. App. at 486 (quoting *Harrison v. State*, 382 Md. 477, 488 (2004)); accord *Stanley v. State*, 248 Md. App. at 564.

Under this forgiving standard, the evidence was legally sufficient to permit a rational jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Edwards shot Meile. Viewed in

³ Edwards tacitly agrees that he did not preserve the vast majority of his arguments regarding the sufficiency of the evidence. In a footnote, however, he asserts, without explanation, that we should consider whether trial counsel’s failure to make those arguments means that he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel. Because Edwards’s brief does not contain argument in support of his position on this issue (see Md. Rule 8-504(a)(6)), we exercise our discretion to decline to address that issue. See, e.g., *Tallant v. State*, 254 Md. App. 665, 689 (2022); Md. Rule 8-504(c). In any event, the preferred method for litigating the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel is through a separate evidentiary proceeding under the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act. See, e.g., *Mosley v. State*, 378 Md. 548, 558-59 (2003).

the light most favorable to the State, the evidence showed that the assailant emerged from a white Nissan Murano with a broken door handle. When the police located and seized that vehicle, a receipt inside of it led them to Pete’s Cycle Shop, a mere 20 blocks from the site of the shooting. The video footage from Pete’s Cycle Shop showed Edwards wearing clothing that was arguably similar in some respects to the clothing worn by the assailant less than three hours later. Edwards agreed that he was one of the persons depicted in the footage from Pete’s Cycle Shop. The cell phone records showed that Edwards was in close geographic proximity to the shooting only minutes after the assailant emerged from the same white Nissan Murano that had been at Pete Cycle Shop less than three hours earlier. And the jurors could view the footage from Pete’s Cycle Shop and the footage from the shooting and decide for themselves whether the shooter and the person at the motorcycle dealer were one and the same.

Edwards’s arguments principally challenge the weight of the evidence rather than its legal sufficiency. He emphasizes the absence of DNA evidence, fingerprint evidence, or eyewitness testimony expressly identifying him as the shooter. The State, however, was not required to produce any particular category of evidence to sustain its burden. *See State v. Smith*, 374 Md. at 534. Nor do the asserted discrepancies in witness descriptions compel reversal. Those inconsistencies present issues of credibility and evidentiary weight, “tasks proper for the” jury to resolve. *Id.* at 533-34; *McClurkin v. State*, 222 Md. App. at 486. The jury determines whether the similarities between Edwards and the shooter depicted in the surveillance footage outweigh any inconsistencies in clothing details or physical description. Finally, although Edwards argues that the evidence shows

only that he was in the “general area” of the crime and claims that his mother lived nearby, the jury was not required to accept that explanation. Resolving competing inferences from the evidence is the province of the jury, not this Court. *See Smith v. State*, 415 Md. 174, 185 (2010).

In summary, the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions.

II. The Sleeping Juror

Edwards contends that the trial court “committed reversible error by failing” to investigate after the prosecutor (not defense counsel) informed the court that a juror appeared to be asleep while the State was playing the video of the shooting. He argues that “trial judges have an obligation to *sua sponte voir dire* jurors once juror misconduct that threatens the integrity of a verdict has been discovered.”

The State correctly responds that the claim is completely unpreserved because Edwards did not object to the court’s handling of the matter and did not ask the court to interview the juror, to excuse the juror and replace her with an alternate, or to afford any other form of further relief. *See* Md. Rule 8-131(a). We cannot fault the circuit court judge for failing to do something that Edwards never her asked to do.⁴

⁴ Edwards effectively concedes that defense counsel did not preserve this issue. In a single sentence in a footnote in his brief, however, Edwards asks that we review the court’s action for plain error. We decline to consider the issue because Edwards’s brief does not contain argument in support of his position. *See, e.g., Tallant v. State*, 254 Md. App. at 689; Md. Rule 8-504(c). Furthermore, even if all four of the necessary conditions for plain error review were met—and there is no argument in this case that they were—an appellate court has discretion not to decide the issue. *See Winston v. State*, 235 Md. App. 540, 567 (2018). We exercise our discretion not to review the issue in this case.

But even if Edwards had preserved his claim—and he did not—we would find no reversible error. Contrary to Edwards’s assertions, no Maryland case requires a court, on its own initiative, to investigate whether a juror has fallen asleep.

In addition, Edwards cannot meet his burden of establishing prejudice,⁵ because, as a result of his failure to object, we have no information about how long the juror may have been inattentive, what portions of the evidence she may have missed, or whether any of that evidence was favorable to the defense. *Williams v. State*, 231 Md. App. 156, 198-99 (2016). In fact, as the State argues, the defense may well not have minded that the juror was paying less than rapt attention, as she was apparently nodding off while the State was playing the video of the shooting—a crucial piece of evidence in the State’s case.

III. Voir Dire Questioning

The State charged Edwards with a number of firearms offenses, including possession of a regulated firearm after having been convicted of a crime of violence. By the time that the trial began, Edwards had stipulated that he had previously been convicted of a crime of violence.

In accordance with *Pearson v. State*, 437 Md. 350, 363 (2014), the court, during voir dire, asked the potential jurors whether they had “strong views” about the offenses with which Edwards was charged, including possession of a regulated firearm after having been convicted of a crime of violence.

⁵ *Hall v. State*, 223 Md. 158, 178 (1960); *Williams v. State*, 231 Md. App. 156, 198-99 (2016); *Wright v. State*, 24 Md. App. 309, 313 (1975).

On appeal, Edwards contends that the court erred in using the words “crime of violence” in the voir dire question and thus informing the jurors that he had previously been convicted of such a crime. Edwards, however, did not propose a voir dire question with different language; before voir dire began, he did not ask the court not to use the words “crime of violence”; and he concedes that he made no contemporaneous objection to the questions posed in voir dire. Therefore, he has not preserved the issue. *See, e.g., Lopez-Villa v. State*, 478 Md. 1, 10 (2022); Md. Rule 4-323(c).

Worse yet, the issue came to light only after a prospective juror mentioned Edwards’s prior conviction during a colloquy at the bench. At that point, the prosecutor—not defense counsel—identified the issue and asked his opposing counsel whether the defense was “making a conscious decision” to “mov[e] forward with this jury.”

After the court chastised the parties for failing to make a contemporaneous objection to the voir dire questions, defense counsel proposed to “un-stipulate”—i.e., to withdraw the stipulation that Edwards had been convicted of a crime of violence.

The court offered to excuse the jury panel and to start over with a different panel but observed that the delay might cause scheduling problems. Defense counsel discussed that option with Edwards. Edwards announced, twice, that he wanted to go forward and to “un-stipulate.”

The court offered to “make a clarification” and to tell the jurors that Edwards had been charged with “possession of a regulated firearm after a disqualifying conviction.” Defense counsel declined the offer, because it “would just draw attention” to the issue.

Ultimately, the court allowed Edwards to withdraw his stipulation that he had previously been convicted of a crime of violence. As a consequence, the State adduced evidence that in 2022 he had been convicted of second-degree assault, which is defined as a crime of violence in section 5-101(c) of the Public Safety Article of the Maryland Code (2003, 2022 Repl. Vol.).

In these circumstances, Edwards both failed to preserve his objection to the voir dire question and waived the objection.⁶

**JUDGMENTS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR BALTIMORE CITY AFFIRMED.
COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.**

⁶ As he did in his argument concerning the sufficiency of the evidence, Edwards asserts, without explanation, that the court committed plain error when it told the jury that he had been convicted of a crime of violence rather than simply a disqualifying offense. He also asserts, again without explanation, that we should consider whether he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel because trial counsel rejected “the court’s offer to strike the entire venire and start afresh.” We decline to consider both of these arguments because Edwards’s brief does not contain argument in support of his position. *See, e.g., Tallant v. State*, 254 Md. App. at 689; Md. Rule 8-504(c). We decline to exercise plain error review because we would have the discretion to do so even if all of the necessary conditions were met (*see Winston v. State*, 235 Md. App. at 567)—and we have no argument that any of them are met here. We decline to consider the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel because the preferred method for litigating that issue is through a separate evidentiary proceeding under the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act. *See, e.g., Mosley v. State*, 378 Md. at 558-59.