

Circuit Court for Baltimore County  
Case No: C-03-CR-21-001012

UNREPORTED\*  
IN THE APPELLATE COURT  
OF MARYLAND

No. 0623

September Term, 2024

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DAMION D. MOFFETT

v.

STATE OF MARYLAND

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Arthur,  
Ripken,  
Hotten, Michele D.,  
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),

JJ.

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Opinion by Ripken, J.

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Filed: April 10, 2026

\*This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B).

In September of 2023, a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County found Damion D. Moffett (“Appellant”) guilty of first-degree murder, use of a handgun in the commission of a felony, and possession of a firearm with a disqualifying conviction. The circuit court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for first-degree murder, a consecutive 20-year term—the first five years to be served without the possibility of parole—for the use of a handgun in the commission of a felony conviction, and a concurrent ten-year term for possession of a firearm with a disqualifying conviction. In this appeal, Appellant presents the following issues for our review:<sup>1</sup>

1. Whether the trial court erred by permitting testimony that Appellant did not attend a candlelight vigil for Young or contact Young’s family immediately after the shooting.
2. Whether the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to sustain Appellant’s convictions.

For the reasons set forth below, we shall affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

### **FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND<sup>2</sup>**

In February of 2021, officers with the Baltimore County Police Department responded to the 2900 block of Yorkway in reference to several calls for shots fired in the

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<sup>1</sup> Rephrased from:

1. Did the trial court err by allowing testimony that Appellant did not attend Mr. Young’s family’s candlelight vigil or contact the family immediately after the shooting?
2. Is the evidence insufficient to sustain Appellant’s convictions?

<sup>2</sup> The following facts were adduced at trial.

area. Officer Daniel Purdie was the first officer to arrive on the scene of the shooting. Upon arrival, he observed a black Dodge Caravan with its hazard lights on. Next to the van, a woman later identified as Donetta Wilson (“Wilson”) was screaming and kneeling over a man lying on the ground. The man, later identified as Deshawnte Young (“Young”), was suffering from multiple gunshot wounds, bleeding from the head, and not breathing. Young was transported to Johns Hopkins Bayview Medical Center, where he was later pronounced dead as a result of injuries sustained from the shooting. Appellant was subsequently arrested and charged with first-degree murder, as well as other related charges associated with the shooting.

Police officers spoke with Wilson, who indicated that she was the mother of Young’s two children. She reported that Young had been outside the vehicle speaking with an individual she knew as “Damo,” whom she identified at trial as Appellant, when she heard a gunshot, ducked, and then heard a second gunshot. Although Wilson did not witness the shooting, she stated that immediately after the shooting, she observed Appellant running from the area. She indicated that Appellant fled in the direction of Dunmanway and stated that “everybody went that way.”

*Evidence adduced at trial*

At trial, Wilson testified that she and Young had driven to Yorkway on the night of the shooting to purchase marijuana. During the drive, Young was on a FaceTime video call with Appellant. Upon arrival at Yorkway, Young double-parked the vehicle, and the two waited inside until Appellant emerged from a nearby house and approached the car. Appellant tapped on the window, and Young exited the vehicle. The two men moved to

the rear of the vehicle to continue their conversation. According to Wilson, they remained there for approximately ten minutes before the shooting occurred. She could not hear the substance of their conversation, did not hear raised voices, and did not observe anyone else join them.

Several witnesses called 911 to report the shooting. Amongst them was Maria Ochoa Amaya, a resident of Yorkway, who testified that she heard arguing, looked out her window, and observed an individual wearing a jacket shoot another person before fleeing. She further testified that a woman exited the passenger side of a nearby vehicle and called for help. Ochoa's son called 911.

Autumn Henderson, who also resided on Yorkway, called 911 and later spoke with officers.<sup>3</sup> She reported that she did not see the shooter; however, she observed a delivery driver exit his vehicle to assist, and a red vehicle, possibly a Cadillac, traveling very fast down the street and around the corner.

Russell Misterka, another Yorkway resident, testified that he looked out his front window and observed approximately three to five individuals standing near a streetlight prior to the shooting. After hearing a gunshot, he looked outside again and saw individuals running in different directions. Misterka called 911, and his call was played for the jury. In the call, he reported hearing what sounded like three gunshots followed by people fleeing the area.

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<sup>3</sup> Anderson was unavailable to testify at trial. However, a recording of her 911 call, as well as clips of her interaction with police, were played for the jury.

Officer Purdie testified that Wilson described Appellant as a young Black male in his early twenties with a large nose and lips, brown eyes, clean-cut hair, wearing baggy jeans and a gray hat. Officers canvassed the area; however, they did not apprehend anyone matching that description.

Investigators recovered Young’s cell phone from the scene, along with two spent cartridge casings and one live round of ammunition located near his body. Felicia Diprinzio, a computer forensic examiner with the Baltimore County Police Department, performed a data extraction of Young’s cell phone. The data extraction revealed call and text communications between Young and Appellant, including audio messages left on the day of the shooting in which Young referenced “deans” and instructed Appellant to “bring them deans over here.”

Jonathan Thorn, a firearms examiner with the Baltimore County Police Department, testified that both of the recovered spent casings were .22 caliber Remington cartridges, and that microscopic examination indicated that they were fired from the same firearm. He stated that the live round bore markings consistent with having been “cycled through the same firearm as the other two cartridge cases.” Thorn also examined the bullet and fragment recovered from Young’s body during his autopsy; however, he was unable to determine whether they originated from the casings recovered at the scene.

Detective Christopher Needham, the lead investigator on the case, testified that he identified Appellant as a person of interest after interviewing Wilson and directed efforts to locate him. Appellant was located on February 26, 2021 and subsequently interviewed by Detective Eric Dunton, Detective Needham’s partner. The recorded interview was

played for the jury. During the interview, Appellant acknowledged arranging to meet Young to “smoke” and stated that Young initially spoke with another individual before later approaching him. Appellant stated that he met with Young, who grabbed “the deans” Appellant owed him, because “he don’t like the baby mother to know that he got pills.” Per Appellant, he then left the area, intending to go to a 7-Eleven,<sup>4</sup> but decided to go to his sister’s house instead. Appellant claimed that he observed police activity but did not learn of the shooting until the following morning. Detective Needham further testified that Appellant’s sister confirmed that Appellant arrived at her residence on the night in question, “sometime” after the shooting had occurred.

Marvin Washington, Young’s stepfather, testified that Young and Appellant were friends, and Appellant had been to his home “quite a few times.” He described an encounter occurring a few days prior to the shooting in which Appellant got out of his car and approached him and Young, who were sitting on their front porch, and stated, “boom, boom, I caught you slipping,” before continuing to walk down the street.

#### *The Convictions*

Following closing arguments, the jury deliberated and then returned a guilty verdict as to the charges of first-degree murder, use of a handgun in the commission of a felony, and possession of a firearm with a disqualifying conviction. The circuit court imposed a sentence that consisted of a period of incarceration of life without the possibility of parole

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<sup>4</sup> 7-Eleven is a global store brand that sells convenience items, food, and drinks. *Who We Are, 7-Eleven*, <https://corp.7-eleven.com/corp/our-brand-story>, archived at <https://perma.cc/7YD5-BQUR> (last visited Apr. 3, 2026).

for first-degree murder, a consecutive 20-year term, the first five years to be served without the possibility of parole, for the use of a handgun in the commission of a felony conviction, and a concurrent ten-year term for possession of a firearm with a disqualifying conviction.<sup>5</sup>

Additional facts will be incorporated as they become relevant.

## DISCUSSION

### I. THE CIRCUIT COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING TESTIMONY THAT APPELLANT DID NOT ATTEND THE CANDLELIGHT VIGILS HELD FOR YOUNG OR CONTACT THE FAMILY OF YOUNG

#### A. Additional Facts

On the third day of trial, the following colloquy occurred during the State’s direct examination of Marvin Washington:

[THE STATE]: I want to talk about after the murder. Okay? Did [Young] have a lot of family support?

[WASHINGTON]: A whole lot.

[THE STATE]: Okay. Did he have friends?

[WASHINGTON]: Mm-hmm.

[THE STATE]: Okay. What did you guys do after the shooting—

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I’m going to object, Your Honor. Can we approach?

THE COURT: You may.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I’m not sure what the relevance of this is. It’s the —what happened after the shooting does in no way go to who did the shooting. It’s—it has no relevance to fact at issue, and that is who did the

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<sup>5</sup> The parties stipulated that Appellant was prohibited from possessing a regulated firearm.

shooting. What they did afterwards, that doesn't involve my client. It is not relevant to these proceedings.

THE COURT: All right.

[THE STATE]: The State—and the State mentioned in opening statements—it's the last line of my questioning. The State believes it is relevant because now I'm going to get into the candlelight vigil, the people at the home, the phone calls.

And it is relevant that the [d]efendant, who had been at the victim's home multiple times and was sort of a family friend, doesn't go to a candlelight vigil. Doesn't make a phone call. Doesn't see the family. I mentioned it in opening. It's extremely relevant in this case based on the [d]efendant's recorded interview and the facts.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, whether he goes to a vigil or not, there could be a thousand reasons. That's—that the State mentioned it in its opening, that's on them. But the fact is it still doesn't go to show whether he went to—whether he was the one who committed the murder.

All the State's doing is asking—is going to ask the [j]ury to speculate, oh, because he didn't go to the vigil—there could be a thousand reasons why he didn't go to a vigil, but it's not relevant to prove identity or to prove any fact at issue in this case.

[THE STATE]: One thing it is relevant to is conscience [sic] of guilt[.]. So, he shoots him and doesn't go to anything else. If he didn't shoot him, (unintelligible) interview, why wouldn't he reach out to the family? Why wouldn't he go to candlelight vigil?

We can argue all you want both ways as to the relevance of it, but clearly, it's relevant. (Unintelligible.)

THE COURT: I think what has already been established through the witness testimony is that the [d]efendant knew the victim. They had—he'd been to his home and was described as some type of friendship. It's relevant what, if any, weight the [j]ury goes to give it. I think you can argue an argument, but the [c]ourt finds it's relevant.

When deciding whether something's relevant, you have to look at determining whether it's more prejudicial than probative. Is it mentioned—

are you going—did you—can you give a proffer if it's referenced at all in the statement given—

**[THE STATE]: 100 percent. It's a full conversation he has with the detectives.**

**[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, what's mentioned in (unintelligible) candlelight vigils or anything like that.**

**[THE STATE]: There is. There's a whole conversation about the vigil.**

**THE COURT: All right. If there is going to be raised in other evidence and testimonies coming in, the [c]ourt does find the relationship, if any, between the victim and the [d]efendant is relevant. Respectfully, the [c]ourt's going to overrule the objection. The [c]ourt will allow the witness to answer the question. This line of questioning, and your objection to it—the objection to this line of questioning is preserved for the record.**

[THE STATE]: Thank you, Judge.

**THE COURT: If you'd like to object again, you can. But if not, the [c]ourt would mark it as preserved for the record.**

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: (Unintelligible) objection.

[THE COURT]: So noted. Thank you.

[THE COURT]: All right. The [c]ourt will ask the State to repeat the question.

[THE STATE]: Your Honor, thank you.

So, I want to talk about after the murder. Okay? Did you and the family have a candlelight vigil for [Young]?

[WASHINGTON]: Yes.

[THE STATE]: Where was that vigil held?

[WASHINGTON]: At the shooting—on the street of the shooting.

[THE STATE]: Okay. If you know, how many candlelight vigils did you have?

[WASHINGTON]: Two.

[THE STATE]: Okay. Did the [d]efendant show up to either?

[WASHINGTON]: No.

[THE STATE]: Does the [d]efendant know where you live?

[WASHINGTON]: Yeah.

[THE STATE]: Did the [d]efendant ever come by the home to see you or your wife or the siblings?

[WASHINGTON]: No.

[THE STATE]: Did he ever call?

[WASHINGTON]: No.

[THE STATE]: Did he ever text?

[WASHINGTON]: No.

[THE STATE]: Did he ever check on anyone [of] you and your family after the shooting—

[WASHINGTON]: No.

[THE STATE]: —at all?

[WASHINGTON]: No.

(Emphasis added). On the fifth day of trial, the State offered, and the court admitted into evidence the video of Appellant’s interview with the police. During that statement, the detective asked Appellant about his actions after the murder and whether he had gone to the candlelight vigil or contacted Young’s family. Appellant responded that he had not gone to the vigil or contacted the family, though he “was going to make [his] way over there.” Defense counsel did not object.

## **B. Party Contentions**

Appellant argues that the trial judge erred by permitting Washington to testify that he did not attend the candlelight vigils held in Young’s honor or contact the family after the shooting. Specifically, he argues that his conduct following Young’s death was irrelevant and that his actions were not probative of his involvement in Young’s death. He contends further that his actions following the shooting were too ambiguous to be admissible as consciousness of guilt evidence, and the admission of such evidence was not harmless.

The State contends that, by failing to object to the subsequent admission of the same evidence in Appellant’s recorded statement to police, Appellant has waived this argument for our review. Alternatively, the State argues that the trial court acted within its discretion in admitting the evidence as consciousness of guilt. The State further argues that any error in the court’s decision to admit the evidence was harmless.

## **C. Standard of Review**

Ordinarily, we “will not decide . . . issue[s] unless [they] plainly appear[] by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court[.] Md. Rule 8-131(a). *Accord Myers v. State*, 243 Md. App. 154, 185 (2019). This preservation requirement “is a matter of basic fairness to the trial court and to opposing counsel” and is “fundamental to the proper administration of justice.” *In re Kaleb K.*, 390 Md. 502, 513 (2006) (quoting *Medley v. State*, 52 Md. App. 225, 231 (1982)).

## D. Analysis

### *i. Preservation*

Maryland Rule 4-323, which dictates the method of making objections, provides in pertinent part:

An objection to the admission of evidence shall be made at the time the evidence is offered or as soon thereafter as the grounds for objection become apparent. *Otherwise, the objection is waived. . . .*

At the request of a party or on its own initiative, the court may grant a continuing objection to a line of questions by an opposing party. For purposes of review by the trial court or on appeal, the continuing objection is effective only as to questions clearly within its scope.

Md. Rule 4-323(a)–(b) (emphasis added). When a trial court overrules an objection to the admission of evidence, the moving party must typically renew the objection “each time that a question eliciting that testimony is posed.” *Ridgeway v. State*, 140 Md. App. 49, 66 (2001). However, a trial judge has “the discretion to grant a continuing objection and thus obviates the need to object persistently to similar lines of questions that fall within the scope of the granted objection[.]” *Kang v. State*, 393 Md. 97, 119 (2006).

Here, the trial judge specifically asked the prosecutor if the issue was referenced in Appellant’s statement to police, and the prosecutor responded, “100 percent. It’s a full conversation he has with the detectives[.]” and “[t]here’s a whole conversation about the vigil.” In response, the court stated:

All right. If there is going to be raised in other evidence and testimonies coming in, the Court does find the relationship, if any, between the victim and the Defendant is relevant. Respectfully, the Court’s going to overrule the objection. The Court will allow the witness to answer the question. *This line of questioning, and your objection to it -- the objection to this line of questioning is preserved for the record.* (Emphasis added).

The trial judge’s reference to Appellant’s statement in the police interview shows that the trial judge anticipated defense counsel’s renewed objection to the admission of that evidence later in the trial and granted Appellant a continuing objection. Appellant’s statement to the detective regarding his actions following the shooting, specifically his non-attendance at the vigil, was within the scope of the continuing objection granted by the trial court. Accordingly, the issue is preserved for our review. Md. Rule 8-131(a). *Accord Myers*, 243 Md. App. at 185.

*ii. Relevance*

Generally, this Court reviews rulings on the admissibility of evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. *Portillo Funes v. State*, 469 Md. 438, 478 (2020). Whether evidence is relevant is an issue of law that we review *de novo*. *Id.* Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Md. Rule 5-401. All relevant evidence is admissible. Md. Rule 5-402. “Relevant evidence inherently has probative value.” *Newman v. State*, 236 Md. App. 533, 558 (2018).

“Once a relevancy determination is made, courts ‘are generally loath to reverse a trial court unless the evidence is plainly inadmissible under a specific rule or principle of law or there is a clear showing of an abuse of discretion.’” *Portillo Funes*, 469 Md. at 479 (quoting *Merzbacher v. State*, 346 Md. 391, 404–05 (1997)). An abuse of discretion occurs when the circuit court’s decision is “‘well removed from any center mark imagined by the reviewing court and beyond the fringe of what that court deems minimally acceptable.’”

*Devincentz v. State*, 460 Md. 518, 550 (2018) (quoting *North v. North*, 102 Md. App. 1, 14 (1994)).

“A person’s post-crime behavior often is considered relevant to the question of guilt because the particular behavior provides clues to the person’s state of mind.” *Thomas v. State*, 372 Md. 342, 352 (2002). Such evidence is admissible under Md. Rule 5-403, “not as conclusive evidence of guilt, but as a circumstance tending to show a consciousness of guilt.” *Ford v. State*, 462 Md. 3, 47 (2018) (quoting *Decker v. State*, 408 Md. 631, 640 (2009)). The types of evidence that qualify as “consciousness of guilt” evidence can take various forms. *See Decker*, 408 Md. at 640 (identifying flight after a crime, escape from confinement, use of a false name, and destruction or concealment of evidence as types of “consciousness of guilt” evidence) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Appellant relies on *Snyder* in support of his argument that his behavior after the shooting was too ambiguous to be probative of consciousness of guilt. In *Snyder*, the defendant was charged with the murder of his wife. *Snyder v. State*, 361 Md. 580, 586–87 (2000). The prosecution sought to introduce evidence of the defendant’s behavior following the murder, specifically his failure to contact the police to inquire as to the status of the police investigation. *Id.* at 588. The prosecutor argued that the defendant’s conduct was evidence of his consciousness of guilt. *Id.* The Supreme Court of Maryland held that it was error for the trial court to admit evidence of the defendant’s failure to inquire. *Id.* at 596.

The Court noted that the defendant was a suspect in his wife’s murder. *Id.* at 595. And although the defendant declined to speak about his wife’s murder prior to his arrest,

he had cooperated with the police investigation. *Id.* However, the State sought to focus on the defendant’s failure to contact the police to inquire as to the status of the murder investigation in the seven years following the murder. *Id.* at 596. Under those circumstances, the Court determined that the defendant’s failure to inquire was too equivocal to be probative of consciousness of guilt. *Id.*

Here, Appellant claims that the Court’s broad cautionary statement in *Snyder*—that a defendant’s reaction, or failure to react to a loved one’s death, should not be construed as probative of guilt, because, either way, it could be deemed as suspicious—holds true in this case. *See id.* at 598–99. However, unlike the seven years of no contact in *Snyder*, Appellant did not contact the family in the days and weeks immediately following the murder. Appellant’s behavior was particularly relevant because Appellant admitted that he was present with Young in the moments before he was shot. Further, during his police interview, Appellant discussed his relationship with Young and his familiarity with the family. Specifically, Appellant acknowledged that he and Young smoked together “probably every day” and that he had been to Young’s home and met his parents “multiple times.” During the interview, Appellant also explained why he had not visited Young’s family. He stated that he intended to visit the family after the murder, but that he had his own “stuff” going on, specifically, a job, a family, and a girlfriend, and he was “paranoid” that he could get shot too.

Moreover, the court found that the evidence adduced prior to Washington’s testimony regarding the vigils indicated that Appellant and Young knew each other and had some type of friendship, and that Appellant had visited Young’s home, thus making

the testimony relevant. Where there are alternative explanations for a defendant’s behavior that may weaken the inference that a defendant’s conduct is attributable to consciousness of guilt, that evidence should also be considered by the jury. *Jones v. State*, 213 Md. App. 483, 509 (2013) (citing *State v. Edison*, 318 Md. 541, 549 (1990)). “Simply because there is a possibility that there exists some innocent, or alternate, explanation for the conduct does not mean that the proffered evidence is *per se* inadmissible.” *Thomas v. State*, 397 Md. 557, 578 (2007).

Appellant’s version of events and his explanation for his behavior in the days following the murder were presented to the jury during the police interview. The significance, if any, of Appellant’s behavior was an issue for the jury to consider in weighing the evidence. *See, e.g., Wagner v. State*, 213 Md. App. 419, 465–66 (2013) (affirming the trial court’s admission of evidence that the defendant yelled the witness’ name while she was in an adjoining interview room to stop her from talking as evidence of consciousness of guilt). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in permitting Washington’s testimony regarding the candlelight vigils.<sup>6</sup>

## **II. THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN APPELLANT’S CONVICTIONS.**

### **A. Party Contentions**

Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because the prosecution failed to prove that he was the shooter or that he possessed a gun.

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<sup>6</sup> Because we conclude that the admission of the testimony was *not* error, we need not address argument as to whether admission of the testimony was harmless. *See State v. Hart*, 449 Md. 246, 265 (2016).

In support of his argument, Appellant points to the lack of eyewitness testimony and lack of motive, noting that the evidence suggested a third party was the shooter.

The State counters that the evidence was sufficient to sustain Appellant’s convictions. Specifically, the State maintains that the testimony presented at trial, as well as the call logs and messages between Appellant and Young, provided ample evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was the shooter.

### **B. Analysis**

In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we “examine the record solely to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” *Beckwitt v. State*, 477 Md. 398, 429 (2022) (quoting *State v. Wilson*, 471 Md. 136, 159 (2020)); accord *Jackson v. Virginia*, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). We do not weigh the evidence to determine whether the State has proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt, but rather, we inquire only as to whether there is relevant evidence sufficient to support the conviction. *Lindsey v. State*, 235 Md. App. 299, 311, *cert. denied*, 458 Md. 593 (2018). We defer to “any possible reasonable inferences” the jury could have drawn in reaching the verdict. *State v. Mayers*, 417 Md. 449, 466 (2010). This standard of review “applies to all criminal cases, regardless of whether the conviction rests upon direct evidence, a mixture of direct and circumstantial, or circumstantial evidence alone.” *Smith v. State*, 415 Md. 174, 185 (2010) (citation omitted). A conviction may be supported by circumstantial evidence alone, “provided that the circumstances support rational inferences from which the trier of fact could be

convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.” *Benton v. State*, 224 Md. App. 612, 630 (2015). *See also State v. Manion*, 442 Md. 419, 431–32 (2015); *Painter v. State*, 157 Md. App. 1, 11 (2004).

Here, the evidence adduced at trial established that on the day of the shooting, Appellant and Young were talking on the phone and exchanging messages before Young arrived on Yorkway to purchase marijuana from Appellant and receive pills he was owed. Then, Young exited the vehicle and moved to its rear to speak to Appellant about ten minutes before the shooting occurred. Wilson, who was waiting for Young inside the vehicle, testified that she heard the shooting and observed Appellant running from the scene. Likewise, she observed no one else present at the time. Ochoa, a resident on the street, testified that she saw one individual shoot another person and flee the scene. Appellant acknowledged that he met Young that night and gave him pills, but claimed that he left the area afterward and went to his sister’s residence, asserting that he was unaware of the shooting until the following morning.

In addition, Appellant attested to smoking with Young every day and knowing Young’s family to the extent that he had been to Young’s home several times and had spent the night. Nevertheless, after the shooting, Appellant did not attend either vigil held for Young or contact Young’s family. Moreover, a few days before the shooting, Appellant got out of his car and approached Washington and Young, who were sitting on their front porch, and stated, “boom, boom, I caught you slipping,” before continuing to walk down the street. Our review of the record, viewed in a light most favorable to the State, reveals

that a rational trier of fact could conclude that Appellant was the individual who shot Young. We conclude, therefore, that the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions.

**JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT  
FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY AFFIRMED.  
COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.**