Circuit Court for Prince George's County
Case No. CT190711X

UNREPORTED*

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF MARYLAND

No. 268

September Term, 2024

Thomas Wilson

v.

State of Maryland

Reed,
Tang,
Wright, Alexander Jr.,
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),

JJ.

Opinion by Reed, J.

Filed: May 15, 2026

* This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B).

On July 8, 2019, Appellant, Thomas Wilson, was charged by a grand jury in Prince George's County with one count of Kidnapping a Child under 16, three counts of First-Degree Rape, three counts of Second-Degree Rape, and one count of Third-Degree Sex Offense. At Appellant's first trial, which ended in a mistrial due to a hung jury, the court granted Appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal on the three counts of First-Degree Rape, which the State consented to. A new trial was held on October 10 through 12, 2023, and the jury found Appellant guilty of one count of Kidnapping a Child under 16, three counts of Second-Degree Rape, and one count of Third-Degree Sex Offense. Following sentencing on April 2, 2024,[1] Appellant filed this timely appeal on April 5, 2024.

In bringing this appeal, Appellant presents one issue for appellate review, which we rephrase as follows:[2] Whether the evidence was sufficient to convict Appellant.

For the following reasons, we affirm the judgments of the Circuit Court for Prince George's County.

[1] The court sentenced Appellant to thirty years with all but twenty years suspended for Kidnapping a Child under 16, Count 1. For Second-Degree Rape, Count 5, Appellant was sentenced to twenty years with all but fifteen years suspended and to run consecutive to Count 1. For Second-Degree Rape, Count 6, Appellant was sentenced to twenty years, all but fifteen years suspended and consecutive to Count 5. For Second-Degree Rape, Count 7, Appellant was sentenced to twenty years, all but fifteen suspended and consecutive to Count 6. The court merged Count 8, Third-Degree Sex Offense, into Count 7. Appellant's sentence is to be followed by five years of supervised probation, including Tier 3 lifetime registration, no contact with the victim, no unsupervised contact with any minors, a mental health and substance abuse evaluation, and a psychosexual evaluation.

[2] In his brief, Appellant frames the question presented, verbatim as: "Whether evidence was sufficient to convict."

FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On the morning of January 9, 2018, twelve-year-old P.J.[3] was dropped off at Grace Brethren Christian School,[4] where she was in the seventh grade. Shortly after P.J.'s grandfather dropped her off, P.J. left the school, went to a CVS to purchase feminine products, came back to the school, and then left the school again. P.J. walked down the highway and wandered into a neighborhood. After some time walking, a man ("the assailant") in a "tarnish-gold color" SUV pulled up next to her, asked her what she was doing, asked where her parents were, and told her to get in the car. The assailant told P.J. that he was looking for his mother, who suffered from dementia, and brought P.J. to what he said was his mother's house. The assailant told P.J. that he had forgotten or lost his keys and proceeded to get a ladder from the back of the house, prop it against the house, climb up it, and enter the house through a window, then let P.J. into the home through the front door. P.J. had never been to this home before and did not see anyone else while she was in the home.

Once inside the home, P.J. and the assailant sat in the living room and watched TV. The assailant asked P.J. to see her breasts, and she lifted her shirt and bra and showed him. The assailant then told P.J. he was going to give her a "tour" of the house but brought her upstairs and only showed her his mother's bedroom and what he said was his own bedroom.

[3] P.J. is referred to by her initials because at the time of the incident she was a juvenile.

[4] This school changed its name to Clinton Grace Christian School since P.J. attended the school.

P.J. sat on the edge of the bed, and the assailant asked to see her breasts again. P.J. initially said no but complied when he asked again. He started kissing P.J. on her mouth, and P.J. tried to push him off. He then tried to pull P.J.'s sweatpants down. P.J. tried to keep her sweatpants up by holding them in place, but he eventually pulled down her sweatpants and underwear. He then forced cunnilingus on her. P.J. tried to push him off with her legs but was unsuccessful. The assailant then took off his own pants, pinned P.J.'s arms, and put his penis in her vagina. P.J. was trying to move around to "just get him out," and he eventually stopped.

Following the assault, the assailant told P.J. they had to go to Safeway to drop something off for a friend. When they were leaving the home, the assailant briefly went back in the house because he forgot something, and P.J. "just took off and ran and ended up on the side of the street again." The assailant eventually pulled up in the car next to P.J., asked her what she was doing, and she got back in the car. When they arrived at Safeway, the assailant told P.J. he would be right back, and he went inside the store. Once he was gone, P.J. got out of the car and ran. P.J. went into a Walmart and eventually fell asleep in a storage area, where she was later found by Walmart employees. The employees called their manager, who called the police, who called P.J.'s father, who came to pick her up.

Initially, P.J. did not tell anyone about the assault because she did not want to talk or think about what happened to her. About one year later, P.J. told her father that "when [she] ran away from school that there was a guy that forced [her] to have sex with him." Her father called the police, and P.J. and her father went to the police station to report the assault.

Throughout the police investigation, P.J. spoke to the police on many different occasions, providing them with details about the assault, a description of the home where the assault occurred, and a description of the assailant. Specifically, P.J. described the assailant to be Black, about five feet and nine inches tall, bald or with "barely any hair[,]" clean shaven, and between thirty and forty years old or "young-ish." P.J. also told the police that her eyes roughly came up to the assailant's chin, that she did not see any tattoos on the assailant, and that she did not notice any gaps in the assailant's teeth.

Using Google Earth, the police and P.J. were able to identify the house where they believed the assault occurred, located at an exact address on Owings Way, Prince Georges County, Maryland. When the police went to this address to investigate, they saw an extension ladder in the backyard. The police spoke with the three residents of the home: Mr. Robert Barnes, Appellant's stepfather; Mr. Thomas Wilson, Appellant; and Ms. Wilson, Mr. Barnes' wife and Appellant's mother. A detective testified at trial that he told the group "[he] was there in reference to an allegation that an underage juvenile female had been brought into the home." The detective further testified that "[Appellant] immediately protested, [and] said, 'No young girl has ever been brought into this house. My mom has dementia and we never leave.'"

The detective obtained signed consent from Mr. Barnes to look around the home[5] and proceeded to walk around and take photos. The detective testified that while he was doing so, Appellant was "[p]acing around the kitchen" and "talking out loud that he was

[5] Exhibit 17.

very stressed." The detective provided that when he was leaving the home, Mr. Barnes escorted him out and Appellant was "[i]mmediately on [the detective's] heels the entire time." The detective testified that, as he was leaving the home, he asked Appellant if there was anything he wanted to talk about, and Appellant replied that he was too stressed to talk about it.

During the police investigation, P.J. was shown a photo array including Appellant, but she was not able to identify anyone in the photos as the assailant. P.J. did not make an in-court identification of Appellant as the assailant.[6] P.J. was also shown photographs of the exterior of the home, the interior home, and various notable items within the home that were taken by the police, all of which she recognized as the home where the assault occurred.

On July 8, 2019, Appellant, Thomas Wilson, was charged by a grand jury in Prince George's County with Kidnapping a Child Under 16, Count 1; three counts of First-Degree Rape, Counts 2, 3, and 4; three counts of Second-Degree Rape, Counts 5, 6, and 7; and Third-Degree Sex Offense, Count 8. A trial was held January 13 through 17, 2020, which ended in a mistrial due to a hung jury. However, at this first trial, the court granted

[6] The following line of questioning occurred at Appellant's second trial:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And you were asked if you could identify anyone, in fact, in this very courtroom, correct?
[P.J.]: Yes.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And you were asked if you could identify the person or if you saw the person that was the person who you said assaulted you back on January the 8th – I'm sorry, January the 9th of 2018, is that correct?
[P.J.]: Yes.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. And you were not able to identify anyone, correct?
[P.J.]: Yes.

Appellant's motion for acquittal on the three counts of First-Degree Rape, Counts 2, 3, and 4, which the State consented to. A new trial was held on October 10 through 12, 2023.

P.J., the victim; Judith Vanderhoof, a counselor at Grace Brethren Christian School; Mr. Jackson, P.J.'s father; Mr. Barnes, Appellant's stepfather; Detective Visbal, a detective with Prince George's County Police Department who worked on P.J.'s case; and Special Investigator Evans, a former detective with Prince George's County Police Department who worked on P.J.'s case, all testified at Appellant's trial. Notably, P.J. recounted her assault on January 9, 2018. Additionally, P.J. was shown various photos the home police identified as the alleged location of the assault,[7] which she confirmed she recognized as the home where the assault took place.

Additionally, Mr. Barnes testified that Appellant did not have a key to his and his wife's home. He also testified that he had seen Appellant use a ladder to get inside the house before. The court ultimately ruled that Mr. Barnes was competent to testify, but some issues with his memory arose while he testified.[8] Notably, Mr. Barnes testified that when the police showed him a picture of P.J., he said he had seen her in his house before. However, this information was not expected by either party and was not in discovery. The State never highlighted or argued this identification.

[7] At trial, P.J. was shown and asked to identify Exhibits 1 through 10, all of which she confirmed to recognize as depictions of the home where her assault occurred and various objects therein.

[8] Mr. Barnes testified that he did not remember allowing detectives to take photos of his home, and that he did not remember testifying at Appellant's previous trial on the same charges in January 2020.

Appellant moved for acquittal based on a lack of identification evidence. In this motion, Appellant noted that there has been no identification of Appellant, and that the victim's description of the assailant and Appellant's actual physical description are "very different." Notably, Appellant's height is between 6'4" and 6'6", he has a space in his teeth, and he has tattoos on his arms, none of which match the description P.J. gave to the police.

The court responded to Appellant's motion saying, "taking the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, the [c]ourt finds that there is sufficient evidence that the jury can find the Defendant guilty of the charges." The court noted that Appellant's case is "clearly a circumstantial case, but circumstantial evidence is sufficient for a conviction." Therefore, the court denied Appellant's motion for acquittal.

On October 12, 2023, the jury found Appellant guilty on all Counts.[9] On April 2, 2024, the court sentenced Appellant to thirty years with all but twenty years suspended for Count 1, Kidnapping a Child under 16. For Count 5, Second-Degree Rape, Appellant was sentenced to twenty years with all but fifteen years suspended and to run consecutive to Count 1. For Count 6, Second-Degree Rape, Appellant was sentenced to twenty years, all but fifteen years suspended and consecutive to Count 5. For Count 7, Second-Degree Rape, Appellant was sentenced to twenty years, all but fifteen suspended and consecutive to

[9] Note that at Appellant's first trial, which ended in a mistrial due to a hung jury, the court granted Appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal on the three counts of First-Degree Rape, which the State consented to. These charges were not brought at the second trial.

Count 6. Finally, the court merged Count 8 into Count 7. Appellant filed a timely appeal to his conviction on April 5, 2024.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence for an underlying conviction, this Court must determine "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." *Taylor v. State*, 346 Md. 452, 457 (1997) (quoting *Jackson v. Virginia*, 443 U.S. 307, 313 (1979)).[10] In other words, this Court is only concerned with whether the State satisfied the burden of production. *Purnell v. State*, 250 Md. App. 703, 710-11 (2021) (quoting *Chisum v. State*, 227 Md. App. 118, 125 (2016)). The circuit court's judgment "will not be set aside on the evidence unless clearly erroneous[.]" *Brown v. State*, 234 Md. App. 145, 152 (2017) (quoting *Dixon v. State*, 302 Md. 447, 450-51 (1985)).

It is not this Court's role to retry the case. *See Smith v. State*, 415 Md. 174, 185 (2010). The trier of fact, *i.e.* the trial court judge or jury, had the "unique opportunity" to

[10] In *Jackson v. Virginia*, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), the United States Supreme Court established a "deferential sufficiency of the evidence standard of review[.]" *State v. McGagh*, 472 Md. 168, 193 (2021). The Supreme Court of Maryland adopted this standard, *see Howling v. State*, 478 Md. 472 (2022), and both the Supreme Court of Maryland and the Appellate Court of Maryland have continued to adhere to this standard. *See e.g. State v. Rusk*, 289 Md. 230, 240 (1981) (quoting and applying the standard set forth in *Jackson*, "whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt" *Jackson*, 443 U.S. at 319); *McGagh*, 472 Md. at 193 (stating that the court "decline[s] to deviate from the deferential sufficiency of evidence standard of review"); *Wilder v. State*, 191 Md. App. 319, 335 (2010) (quoting the standard of review for reviewing sufficiency of evidence set forth in *Jackson*, 443 U.S. at 319).

view the evidence firsthand, hear from the witnesses, and assess credibility. *Id.* (citations omitted). Further, the trier of fact had "the ability to 'choose among differing inferences that might possibly be made from a factual situation' and this Court must give deference to all reasonable inferences the fact-finder draws, regardless of whether we would have chosen a different reasonable inference." *State v. Suddith*, 379 Md. 425, 430 (2004) (quoting *State v. Smith*, 374 Md. 527, 534 (2003) (citations omitted)). As such, this Court does not re-measure the weight of evidence. *See Taylor*, 346 Md. at 465; *see also State v. Krikstan*, 483 Md. 43, 64 (2023) (providing that any conflicting possible inferences from the evidence will be resolved in the State's favor because this Court does "not second-guess the jury's determination where there are competing rational inferences available." (quoting *Smith*, 415 Md. at 183)).

Rather, this Court is only concerned with "[w]hether the verdict was supported by sufficient evidence, direct or circumstantial, which could fairly convince a trier of fact of the defendant's guilt of the offenses charged beyond a reasonable doubt." *Taylor*, 346 Md. at 465 (citations omitted). Circumstantial evidence can be the sole basis of a valid conviction. *Suddith*, 379 Md. at 430 (citing *Smith*, 374 Md. at 534) (providing that proof of guilt based on circumstantial evidence is "no different" than proof of guilt based on direct evidence). Although, "inferences made from circumstantial evidence must rest upon more than mere speculation or conjecture." *Corbin v. State*, 428 Md. 488, 514 (2012) (quoting *Smith*, 415 Md. at 184-85 (citations omitted)); *see also* Taylor, 346 Md. at 458 (citations omitted) (providing that an inference impermissibly relies on speculation when "the evidence equally supports two version of events, and a finding of guilt requires

speculation as to which of the two versions is correct").

DISCUSSION

A. Parties' Contentions

Appellant argues that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, "a *rational* juror would have a reasonable doubt [Appellant] was the assailant." Appellant relies on out-of-state cases in which courts reversed convictions based on insufficient identification evidence, to support the contention that "no rational juror could convict here" because the victim did not identify Appellant in or out-of-court and that there were substantial differences between the victim's description of the assailant and Appellant's actual physical appearance. Appellant acknowledges that "P.J. was assaulted in [Appellant's] bedroom by someone familiar with the house and who knew [Appellant's] mother had dementia." However, Appellant argues that "*where* is not *who*." Thus, Appellant asserts there was insufficient evidence to prove Appellant committed these crimes and his conviction must be vacated.

The State, Appellee, argues that the State produced circumstantial evidence of Appellant's identity as the assailant, and thus a rational trier of fact could find that Appellant committed the charged crimes. Specifically, the State argues that the evidence supported a finding that the assailant sexually assaulted P.J. in Appellant's bedroom. The State also asserts that the assailant's statements during the assault, including stating that his mother had dementia and that the bedroom where the assault occurred was his own, effectively identified Appellant as the assailant. Additionally, the State argues that the evidence supports that both assailant and Appellant did not have keys to the home, and that

both had used of a ladder to enter the home where the assault occurred. The State argues that collectively, this circumstantial evidence supports a rational inference that Appellant was the assailant, and thus Appellant's conviction should be affirmed.

B. Analysis

1. Kidnapping a Child under 16

Child Kidnapping includes, by force or fraud, kidnapping, stealing, taking, or carrying away a child under the age of 16 years old. Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 3-503(2). Therefore, in the instant case, to convict Appellant of kidnapping P.J., the State needed to prove that Appellant took or carried away P.J., that Appellant used force or threat of force to take or carry away P.J., and that P.J. was under the age of 16.

2. Second-Degree Rape

Second-Degree Rape, in relevant part, includes vaginal intercourse or another sexual act with another without their consent or with a victim under the age of 14 years old when the person performing the act is at least four years older than the victim. Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 3-304(a). "Vaginal intercourse" means genital copulation, including penetration, however slight, of the vagina and it is irrelevant if semen is emitted. Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 3-301(g)(1). A "sexual act" includes analingus; cunnilingus; fellatio; anal intercourse; an act in which an object or an individual's body part penetrates, however slight, into another's genitals or anus, and that can be reasonably construed to be for sexual arousal or gratification, or for the abuse of either party. Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 3-301(d)(1). Thus, in the present case, the State needed to prove that Appellant had vaginal intercourse with P.J. or committed a sexual act onto P.J., under the aforementioned

definitions, and that P.J. was under 14 years old at the time and that Appellant was at least four years older than P.J.

3. Third-Degree Sex Offense

In relevant part, Third-Degree Sex Offense includes engaging in sexual contact with a victim who is under 14 years-old and the perpetrator of the sexual contact is at least four years older than the victim. Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 3-307(a)(3). Sexual contact means an intentional touching of the victim's or actor's genital, anal, or other intimate area for sexual arousal or gratification, or for the abuse of either party. Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 3-301(e)(1). Thus, in the present case, the State needed to prove that Appellant had sexual contact, under the aforementioned definition, with P.J., and that P.J. was under 14 years old at the time and that Appellant was at least four years older than P.J.

4. Application to the Present Case

Here, it is undisputed that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to establish that P.J. was a victim of Child Kidnapping, Second-Degree Rape, and Third-Degree Sex Offense.[11] Specifically, it is undisputed that P.J. was twelve at the time of the assault, and Appellant was in his fifties.[12] Therefore, Appellant was clearly more than four years older than P.J., satisfying the age requirement for a conviction of Second-Degree Rape and Third-Degree Sex Offense. Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law §§ 3-304(a); 3-307(a)(3).

[11] Both Appellant and Appellee concede this point.

[12] Appellant's stepfather testified that Appellant was in his fifties, and Appellant was born in 1964.

Additionally, Appellant concedes that these crimes took place in Appellant's bedroom in his mother's home,[13] by someone familiar with the home, and by someone who knew Appellant's mother had dementia. However, Appellant argues there was insufficient evidence to establish that he perpetrated these crimes. Thus, the issue before this Court is not whether these crimes occurred, but whether there was sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Appellant perpetrated the crimes. *See Taylor*, 346 Md. at 457 (quoting *Jackson*, 443 U.S. at 313).

In addition to establishing that the assault occurred in Appellant's bedroom in Appellant's mother's home, the evidence also establishes that the assailant told P.J. that the bedroom was his own. The assailant told P.J. that the home belonged to his mother and that his mother had dementia. Appellant's mother, in fact, suffered from dementia at the time of the assault, and Appellant is his mother's only child. The evidence also shows that at the time of the assault, Appellant and Mr. Barnes were the only men who lived in the home.

Further, both the assailant and Appellant lacked keys to the home, and both entered it by taking a ladder from behind the house, propping it against the house, and climbing through Appellant's window. Specifically, P.J. testified that the assailant told her he had "forgot or lost his keys" and used a ladder to enter the home when she was assaulted. Mr.

[13] The conclusion that P.J. was assaulted in Appellant's bedroom in his mother's home was established by the description of the home and items within the home that P.J. provided the police and P.J.'s identification of photographs of Appellant's mother's home and items within the home at trial. Additionally, Appellant's stepfather also testified that the bedroom where P.J. was Appellant's bedroom.

Barnes testified that Appellant did not have keys to the home and that he had seen Appellant enter the home using a ladder before.

In its totality, the circumstantial evidence was sufficient for the jury to rationally identify Appellant as the assailant. The State did not need to show direct identification evidence of Appellant, because the circumstantial evidence that the State provided of Appellant's identity as the assailant went beyond mere speculation. *See Corbin*, 428 Md. at 514 (citing *Smith*, 415 Md. at 184-85 (citations omitted)). Meaning, the circumstantial evidence does not "equally support two versions of events" that required the jury to resort to speculation. *See Taylor*, 346 Md. at 458. Rather, from these facts, the jury could draw the fair and rational inference that Appellant kidnapped and sexually assaulted P.J.

Contrary to Appellant's argument, the lack of an in-court or out-of-court identification of Appellant and the discrepancies in P.J.'s description of the assailant and Appellant's actual physical appearance do not undermine the sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence to lead a rational juror to conclude that Appellant was the assailant beyond a reasonable doubt.

Specifically, Appellant notes that P.J. described the assailant to be between five feet and eight inches or five feet and nine inches tall, "youngish[,]" with no tattoos, with no remarkable teeth, and as driving a "tarnish-gold" car on the day of the incident. Appellant further provides that he is in fact between six feet and four inches and six feet and six inches tall, he was fifty-four years old at the time of the assault, he has a gap in his teeth, he has tattoos on his arms, and he drove a "greenish-gray" car at the time of the assault.

However, the jury was not required to give the discrepancies between P.J.'s

description of the assailant and Appellant's actual physical description controlling weight because the jury is allowed to "'choose among differing inferences that might possibly be made from a factual situation' and this Court must give deference to all reasonable inferences the fact-finder draws, regardless of whether we would have chosen a different reasonable inference." *State v. Suddith*, 379 Md. 425, 430 (2004) (quoting *State v. Smith*, 374 Md. 527, 534 (2003) (citations omitted)). This Court neither re-measures the weight of evidence, *see e.g.*, *Taylor*, 346 Md. at 465, nor "second-guess[es] the jury's determination where there are competing rational inferences available." *See Krikstan*, 483 Md. at 64 (quoting *Smith*, 415 Md. at 183). The jury was well within its right to rationally infer, based on circumstantial evidence, that Appellant was the assailant despite the lack of an in or out-of-court identification and the discrepancies between P.J.'s description of the assailant and Appellant's physical appearance. The jury may have rationally inferred that P.J.'s description, offered a year after the incident when she was twelve years old, was imprecise without thereby undermining the overall weight of the circumstantial evidence. Regardless, such inferences were within the jury's province to make as the trier of fact and supported by circumstantial evidence.

Appellant mistakenly relies on out-of-state cases that found there was insufficient evidence of identification to support a conviction. *In re As.H.*, 851 A.2d 456 (D.C. 2004); *In re R.H.M.*, 630 A.2d 705 (D.C. 1993); *People v. Hernandez*, 729 N.E.2d 65 (Ill. 2000); *Commonwealth v. Wiley*, 432 A.2d 220 (Pa. 1981). These cases do not bind this Court, and they are unpersuasive because they are significantly factually different from the present case.

In each of these cases, the underlying convictions relied on an eyewitness's testimony, rather than direct or circumstantial evidence of identification. *In re As.H.*, 851 A.2d 456 (D.C. 2004) (finding that the evidence was not sufficient to support the juvenile defendant's robbery conviction because the sole identifying witness was of a level of uncertainty that constituted reasonable doubt); *In re R.H.M.*, 630 A.2d 705 (D.C. 1993) (finding that the only eyewitness did not sufficiently identify the juvenile defendant because the witness identified three people's photographs, one of which was of the defendant, that "looked familiar" from the night of the crime); *People v. Hernandez*, 729 N.E.2d 65 (Ill. 2000) (concluding that a sole witness's uncorroborated identification, who only saw the back of the defendant's head, was insufficient to support conviction); *Commonwealth v. Wiley*, 432 A.2d 220, 225 (Pa. 1981) (finding the critical witness's identification insufficient to support conviction in the absence of "any evidence, circumstantial or other, corroborating [the witness's] identification"). In the instant case, Appellant's conviction was not based on eyewitness testimony at all, but rather on circumstantial evidence of identification. Thus, these cases do not persuade this Court's analysis.

In its totality, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to rationally infer that Appellant perpetrated the assault of P.J. The State did not need to show direct identification evidence, because the circumstantial evidence that the State provided of Appellant's identity as the assailant went beyond mere speculation. A rational trier of fact could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant committed the crimes, and thus the Circuit Court for Prince George's County's judgment was not clearly erroneous. Therefore,

Appellant's conviction should be affirmed.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the Circuit Court for Prince George's County.

JUDGMENTS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY AFFIRMED; COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.