

Circuit Court for Montgomery County
Case No. C-15-FM-22-006060

UNREPORTED*

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF MARYLAND

No. 47

September Term, 2024

KEVIN LAMONT JOHNSON

v.

CHRISTINE HEALY-JOHNSON

Arthur,
Leahy,
Eyler, Deborah S.,
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),

JJ.

Opinion by Eyler, Deborah S., J.

Filed: June 10, 2025

*This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B).

In this divorce action between Kevin Lamont Johnson (“Husband”), the appellant, and Christine Healy-Johnson (“Wife”), the appellee, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County granted Husband a monetary award of \$150,000. On appeal, Husband contends the court abused its discretion by making a monetary award that is inequitably low. We disagree and, for the reasons set forth below, shall affirm the court’s judgment.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

The merits hearing in this case was held on November 29 and 30, 2023. The following evidence was adduced.

The parties were married on October 25, 2003, in California. The marriage produced one child, “C,” born in 2006.¹ At the time of trial, C was seventeen years old and a senior in high school. Husband was fifty-eight and Wife was fifty-two.

Before the parties were married, Husband owned several pieces of real property. The parties executed a premarital agreement (“Agreement”) that, among other things, provided that each party’s property “shall be, and shall forever remain, their personal estate, including all interest, rents, and profits which may accrue from said property, and said property shall remain forever free of claim by the other.” The Agreement carved out real property Husband owned at 11424 Flowerton Place, in Germantown, stating that it would be marital property. The Agreement prohibited either party from seeking alimony should they divorce.

¹ We use the random letter “C” to refer to the parties’ child to protect his privacy.

In August 2004, the parties purchased a house on McFarlin Drive, also in Germantown, which is where they lived until they separated in 2023. Wife contributed \$20,000 toward the down payment and Husband contributed \$70,500. Over the years, Wife paid \$14,386.93 for renovations to the property. In 2015, the parties refinanced the mortgage on that property. As part of that transaction, the property, which had been titled in both parties' names, was deeded to Wife, and she became the only mortgagor.

In the meantime, in 2005, Husband sold the Flowerton Place property and received \$140,752.33 in proceeds. He testified that he used those proceeds (which were marital property) to pay household expenses.

From the time the parties were married until 2020, Husband was unemployed even though he was able to work. When Wife would ask him to get a job and contribute to the parties' household expenses, he would respond that he "didn't need to." Husband's failure to become employed during most of the marriage was a major issue between the parties. At the time of the merits hearing, Husband was working twenty hours a week as a groundskeeper for the Montgomery County Schools, earning \$20 per hour. His monthly gross income from that job was \$1,552. He also was receiving rental income of \$1,300 per month from a property he owned on Caledonia Court, in Germantown. He had owned another rental property in Germantown, on Demetrius Way, which he sold in 2021. That sale produced \$174,000 in net proceeds. Husband testified that, of that sum, \$38,000 remained.

Wife is self-employed full-time as a licensed psychologist in private practice. At the time of the merits hearing, she was earning a gross monthly salary of \$16,715 and an additional \$1,300 per month in rental income from leased office space.²

While the parties were living together, their monthly household expenses totaled \$11,806. Husband contributed \$1,500 per month toward those expenses and paid \$162.50 per month for health insurance for himself and C. Wife paid all the other household expenses, including the monthly mortgage on the marital home. She paid for her own health insurance.

The parties' testimony about how responsibilities were allocated during the marriage varied greatly. According to Husband, he and Wife "worked together" and did "a great job" raising C. He transported C to and from elementary school. During the school day, he "putted around," went to the gym, and tended to his rental properties. He also did household chores, including laundry, grocery shopping, and yardwork. According to Wife, she was C's primary caretaker. She managed his academics, attended parent teacher conferences and meetings, and took him to extracurricular activities. She did all the grocery shopping. For a time after C was born, she worked three days per week. Husband testified that he cared for C on the days Wife worked. He also claimed to have played a significant role in caring for Wife's parents by taking them shopping and to appointments. He estimated that he checked on Wife's parents twice per week.

² From documents received in evidence, it appears that that income was from a sublease of office space Wife had rented, not rent from a building she owned.

In 2017, Husband moved into the parties’ guest bedroom. The parties’ sexual relationship ended in 2019. The parties co-existed that way until April 2022, when Wife, in answer to a question posed by Husband during an argument, said she wanted to separate. Tensions in the already-failing marriage escalated after that. According to Wife, Husband became controlling and threatening. He questioned her about her daily activities and sent her video clips from their Ring camera to make the point that he was watching her. He interrupted Wife’s counseling sessions, making it difficult for her to maintain her therapy practice at home. (This was during the pandemic.) In August 2022, Wife sought a protective order against Husband after he broke into her bedroom, “jabbed [her] arm” and insisted that they talk and hug. The protective order was denied.

Wife filed a complaint for absolute divorce on October 13, 2022. Five days later, she and C moved out of the marital home into a rented apartment. Husband continued to reside in the marital home. In June 2023, he agreed to pay the monthly mortgage. He failed to do so, so Wife continued paying it. Husband filed a counter-complaint for absolute divorce, and Wife filed an amended complaint for absolute divorce.

Both parties were represented by counsel at the merits hearing. They filed a Rule 9-207 Joint Statement of Parties Concerning Marital and Non-marital Property, identifying their assets. At the close of the evidence, the court ordered the parties to submit written closing arguments and took the matter under advisement.

On February 23, 2024, the court issued a memorandum opinion and order granting the parties an absolute divorce on the ground of a six-month separation and deciding the distribution of marital property.

Before the merits hearing, the parties identified \$20,000 in household furnishings as marital property and agreed to divide that evenly. They also identified as marital property a Maryland 529 College Savings Plan, titled in Wife’s name, but agreed that those funds would be used solely for C’s education. Finally, they agreed that Wife’s \$15,705.50 non-marital share of her Variable Universal Life account also would be used solely for C’s education. Accordingly, none of those assets was included in the court’s identification and valuation of the parties’ assets, which was as follows:

Marital Property Titled in Wife

McFarlin Drive home, value \$550,000, subject to \$187,126 mortgage: net value **\$362,874**

2017 Acura SUV, value **\$11,500**

Ameriprise Retirement account, value **\$355,850**

Variable Universal Life account, total value \$31,411, marital portion **\$15,705.50**

Bank accounts, value **\$8,000**

Marital Property Titled in Husband

2003 Ford Expedition, value **\$2,000**

MCPS pension (non-vested), value **\$285.83**

Bank accounts, value **\$800**

The court found that Wife did not have any non-marital property. It identified and valued Husband’s non-marital property as follows:

Caledonia Court rental property, value \$249,700, subject to \$38,000 mortgage: net value **\$211,700**

Remaining Proceeds from 2021 sale of Demetrius Way rental property. After receiving net proceeds of \$175,000, Husband claimed to have **\$38,700** remaining.

Thus, as found by the court, the total value of the marital property was \$757,015.33, of which \$753,929.50 was titled in Wife’s name and \$3,085.83 was titled in Husband’s name. The total value of the non-marital property was \$250,400, all titled in Husband’s name.

Husband sought a monetary award of \$376,964.75, representing 50 percent of the total value of the marital property titled to Wife.³ After assessing the evidence in light of the relevant statutory factors, as we shall discuss below, the court granted Husband a marital award of \$150,000. That resulted in Wife’s having \$603,929.50 (79.78%) of the marital property and Husband’s having \$153,085.83 (20.22%) of the marital property.

In addition, the court awarded Wife attorneys’ fees of \$1,375.

Husband filed this timely appeal. We shall include additional facts in our discussion of the question presented.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the rulings of a circuit court sitting without a jury “on both the law and the evidence[,]” giving “due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Md. Rule 8-131(c); *Friedman v. Hannan*, 412 Md. 328, 335 (2010). We review the court’s factual findings for clear error. *MAS Assocs., LLC v. Korotki*, 465 Md. 457, 474-75 (2019). Finally, we review the court’s legal conclusions under a *de*

³ We note that 50 percent of the total marital property would be \$378,507.67.

novo standard of review. *Nouri v. Dadgar*, 245 Md. App. 324, 343 (2020).

A trial court’s decision to grant a monetary award, and the amount of that award, is reviewed for abuse of discretion. *Flanagan v. Flanagan*, 181 Md. App. 492, 521-22 (2008). “Under that lenient standard, the ruling ‘will not be reversed simply because the appellate court would not have made the same ruling.’” *McAllister v. McAllister*, 218 Md. App. 386, 400 (2014) (quoting *North v. North*, 102 Md. App. 1, 14 (1994)). “Instead, ‘[t]he decision under consideration has to be well removed from any center mark imagined by the reviewing court and beyond the fringe of what that court deems minimally acceptable.’” *Id.* (quoting *North*, 102 Md. App. at 14).

DISCUSSION

Husband contends the court’s findings on the statutory factors pertinent to granting a monetary award were clearly erroneous and that it abused its discretion by granting him a monetary award of \$150,000, which he maintains was “extremely inequitable[.]” Wife counters that the court’s findings were supported by the evidence, it properly assessed the statutory factors, and its decision about the amount of monetary award to grant was not an abuse of discretion.

In Maryland, when granting a divorce and determining the distribution of marital property, a court must employ a three-step process. *Abdullahi v. Zanini*, 241 Md. App. 372, 405 (2019). First, it must identify which property is marital. Md. Code (1984, 2019 Repl. Vol.), Family Law Article (“FL”) § 8-203(a); *Abdullahi*, 241 Md. App. at 405. Second, it must value the marital property. FL § 8-204(a); *Abdullahi*, 241 Md. App. at 405. Third and finally, it must decide whether distributing the marital property by title would be unfair,

and if so, decide the amount of a monetary award to grant to adjust the inequities. *See* FL § 8-205(a)(1)-(2); *Alston v. Alston*, 331 Md. 496, 506 (1993) (stating that the purpose of a monetary award “is to provide a means for the adjustment of inequities that may result from distribution of certain property in accordance with the dictates of title” (quotation marks and citation omitted)); *Abdullahi*, 241 Md. App. at 405-06. The court’s distribution of marital property need not be equal, but must be “fair and equitable.” *Long v. Long*, 129 Md. App. 554, 578 (2000).

In deciding whether a monetary award is called for and, if so, the amount, the court must consider the following factors, as relevant, set forth in FL § 8-205(b):

- “(1) the contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party to the well-being of the family;
- (2) the value of all property interests of each party;
- (3) the economic circumstances of each party at the time the award is to be made;
- (4) the circumstances that contributed to the estrangement of the parties;
- (5) the duration of the marriage;
- (6) the age of each party;
- (7) the physical and mental condition of each party;
- (8) how and when specific marital property or interest in property described in subsection (a)(2) of this section, was acquired, including the effort expended by each party in accumulating the marital property or the interest in property described in subsection (a)(2) of this section, or both;

(9) the contribution by either party of property described in § 8-201(e)(3) of this subtitle to the acquisition of real property held by the parties as tenants by the entirety^[4];

(10) any award of alimony and any award or other provision that the court has made with respect to family use personal property or the family home; and

(11) any other factor that the court considers necessary or appropriate to consider in order to arrive at a fair and equitable monetary award or transfer of an interest in property described in subsection (a)(2) of this section, or both.”

Abdullahi, 241 Md. App. at 406 (quoting FL § 8-205(b)). Although the court must consider the applicable statutory factors, the factors ““are not prioritized in any way, nor has the General Assembly mandated any particular weighing or balancing of the factors.”” *Brown v. Brown*, 195 Md. App. 72, 110 n.19 (2010) (quoting *Alston*, 331 Md. at 507).

In the case at bar, the court entertained written closing arguments and then issued a thorough eleven page opinion addressing all the issues in the case, including the pertinent FL § 8-205(b) factors. The court stated at the outset of its opinion that it had paid close attention to the witness testimony and was “attuned to the witnesses’ demeanor and

⁴ FL § 8-201(e) defines marital property as follows:

- (1) “Marital property” means the property, however titled, acquired by 1 or both parties during the marriage.
- (2) “Marital property” includes any interest in real property held by the parties as tenants by the entirety unless the real property is excluded by valid agreement.
- (3) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, “marital property” does not include property:
 - (i) acquired before the marriage;
 - (ii) acquired by inheritance or gift from a third party;
 - (iii) excluded by valid agreement; or
 - (iv) directly traceable to any of these sources.

whether their testimony was internally consistent, whether it was consistent with or corroborated by the other evidence in the case, and whether it comported with what the Court considered to be common sense.” “Based on the substance of their testimony, and their respective demeanors, [it] found [Wife] to be a more credible witness than [Husband].”

With respect to the first factor, Husband argues that the court “wholly ignored” his significant monetary and non-monetary contributions to the family. The court found that Wife “made substantial monetary and nonmonetary contributions to the well-being of the family and that those contributions outweighed [Husband’s] contributions to the family’s well-being.” On the non-monetary contribution side, the court credited Wife’s testimony that she was C’s primary caregiver and “handled all the ‘basics.’” It considered Husband’s testimony that he cared for C, particularly when Wife was working, but noted that Husband’s own description of his typical day primarily consisted of checking his rental properties, going to the gym, and “plucking around.” The court found “that [Husband’s] focus was more on himself and his interests than it was on [Wife] or their son.”⁵

On the monetary contribution side, Husband maintains the court erred by failing to credit him for his significant down payment on the McFarlin Drive home and for his converting the Flowerton Drive property from non-marital to marital property in the Agreement “without any consideration in return.” The Agreement was supported by consideration, however. *See Cannon v. Cannon*, 384 Md. 537, 556 (2005) (observing that

⁵ It is worth noting that Husband’s testimony about his non-monetary contributions to the marriage focused on the period when C was very young.

the consideration for a prenuptial agreement is the impending marriage). Moreover, the court was not required to “credit” Husband for the value of the Flowerton Drive property. “[T]he mistaken belief that a contribution of nonmarital property somehow entitles the contributor to get back the property or its value, as if the contribution is deemed to create an indebtedness for which the contributor should have a lien, is a total distortion of the [Marital Property] Act.” *Kline v. Kline*, 85 Md. App. 28, 44 (1990). Rather, the gift of non-marital property and its value merely is a factor to be considered by the court in deciding whether to grant a monetary award. *Id.*

The record shows that the court recognized that Husband contributed \$70,500 to the down payment on the family home and that Wife contributed \$20,000. The court also recognized that by the terms of the parties’ Agreement, the Flowerton Drive property was marital, and therefore the proceeds of the sale of that property, which Husband alone received, was marital property as well. The court noted Wife’s position that Husband submitted no evidence to show that the proceeds of that sale in fact were used to pay family expenses and to meet the needs of the parties. The court noted that, even if the proceeds were used for marital purposes, that “would be of little significance in analyzing the section 8-205 factors” because the proceeds were marital funds - - not Husband’s funds. Nevertheless, the court took Husband’s testimony into account in its decision making.

The court found that Wife was employed throughout the marriage and that she supported the family financially; at the same time, and for seventeen years of the marriage, Husband refused to work, even though he was capable of doing so. The court considered that, not only did Wife pay the mortgage on the family home throughout the marriage, she

continued to pay it after the separation, when she and C no longer were living there and Husband reneged on his agreement to pay it. Ultimately, the court found that “[Wife] made substantial monetary and nonmonetary contributions to the well-being of the family and that those contributions outweighed [Husband’s] contributions to the family’s well-being.”

All of these findings were supported by the evidence in the record and were not clearly erroneous.

With respect to the second factor, the value of all property interests of each party, Husband asserts that the court improperly considered his non-marital property in determining the amount of the monetary award.⁶ Specifically, he argues that it was an abuse of discretion for the court to take into account that he had received \$175,000 in sale proceeds from the Demetrius Way property two years prior to the divorce, when he only had \$38,700 of that sum remaining at the time of divorce, and that the court improperly assigned “great weight” to his ownership of the Caledonia Court property, even though it was “a fixed asset with little income[.]”

In the context of FL § 8-205(b)(2), the court must consider “‘the value of *all property interests of each party*’ . . . , which includes non-marital property.” *Flanagan*, 181 Md. App. at 534 (emphasis retained) (quoting FL § 8-205(b)(2)). Non-marital property can be considered by the court as a factor in deciding a distribution of marital property that is equitable. *Id.* at 532. In addressing Husband’s non-marital property, the court seemed

⁶ Husband also asserts that the court failed to acknowledge that Wife had \$8,000 in her bank account. This is incorrect. The circuit court specifically referenced the \$8,000 in Wife’s bank account when it identified the assets titled in Wife’s name.

skeptical about the proceeds of the Demetrius Way property, stating that Husband netted \$175,000 from the sale of that property but “[h]e claims to have only \$38,700 left from those proceeds.” Nevertheless, in calculating the amount of non-marital property titled in Husband’s name, the court only counted \$38,700. It did not fashion its monetary award on the assumption that Husband had in his possession more than that amount of the proceeds of the Demetrius Way property. With respect to the Caledonia Court property, the court merely found it was “valuable nonmarital real property, which enhances his economic circumstances[,]” and valued it at \$211,700, after subtracting the debt against it. This finding was not clearly erroneous, and we have no reason to interfere with the court’s weighing of this evidence.

Husband complains that the court gave mere “lip service” to factor three, the parties’ economic circumstances. According to Husband, the court failed to recognize the “substantial disparity” in the respective incomes of the parties and failed to credit his contributions to the care of the family, which he maintains resulted in Wife’s much greater earning capacity. He also points out that he did not seek an award of alimony despite the large disparity in income between the parties. He submits that had the court properly considered these facts, it would have weighed this factor in his favor.

Husband’s argument that the disparity in the parties’ incomes was a direct result of his non-economic contributions to the family is not supported by the record. To the contrary, the court found that Wife’s contributions to the family exceeded those of Husband’s, that Husband had refused to obtain employment for seventeen years, and that his refusal had been a source of strain on the marriage that “aggravated the fractures in the

marriage.” As noted above, the period in which Husband contributed some to the care of the parties’ child was long in the past, and the court found that Husband primarily focused on himself, not the family. And although Wife had the greater earning capacity, the parties’ future economic circumstances were not an issue because their Agreement precluded claims for alimony. In deciding a monetary award, a court may consider a spouse’s present earning capacity, but may not consider expected future earning capacity. *See Prahinski v. Prahinski*, 75 Md. App. 113, 138-39 (1988) (explaining that future earnings are appropriate for consideration in the context of an alimony award rather than equitable property distribution).⁷ Based on the evidence in the record, the circuit court’s findings about the parties’ relative incomes and economic circumstances were not clearly erroneous.

With regard to the fourth factor, Husband maintains the court placed too much weight on Wife’s evidence regarding the circumstances that contributed to estrangement, under FL § 8-205(b)(4), and in finding Wife to be the more credible witness.

The court credited Wife’s testimony that Husband’s “threatening, abusive, and harassing behavior” contributed to the deterioration of the parties’ relationship. It noted that Wife had asked Husband to move from the McFarlin Drive home after their separation so she could sell it, and he refused. The court also credited Wife’s testimony that Husband had agreed to pay the monthly mortgage on the McFarlin Drive house after she and C moved out, but reneged on that agreement. In their testimony, Wife asserted that she had

⁷ Without doubt, the fact that Husband’s earning capacity was less than Wife’s was a function of his remaining out of the workforce, not by agreement of the parties, for most of the marriage.

paid \$25,853.85 in mortgage payments since the date of separation, while Husband asserted that that sum was only \$20,833.47. The court found that the difference in the parties’ testimony about the amount Wife paid was “not particularly relevant”; but what *was* relevant was “that [Husband] was living rent-free in a home owned by [Wife] while [Wife] was making mortgage payments.”

Assessing the credibility of the witnesses and resolving conflicts in the evidence is the domain of the trial court. *See Keys v. Keys*, 93 Md. App. 677, 688 (1992) (“[E]specially in the arena of marital disputes where notoriously the parties are not in agreement as to the facts, . . . we must be cognizant of the court’s position to assess the credibility and demeanor of each witness.”). Under Md. Rule 8-131, “unless the testimony is devoid of merit, we will not substitute our judgment for the trial court’s determination of the credibility of the witnesses.” *Keys*, 93 Md. App. at 688 (citing *Colandrea v. Colandrea*, 42 Md. App. 421, 429 (1979)).

Given the evidence presented, we see no basis for setting aside the court’s determinations as to the reasons for the estrangement of the parties. *See Oliver v. Hays*, 121 Md. App. 292, 310 (1998) (explaining that it is “the exclusive responsibility of the trial court to assess the credibility of witnesses and to resolve conflicts in the evidence”).

After reviewing the evidence and analyzing the statutory factors, the court explained the basis for its decision to grant Husband a monetary award of \$150,000:

While [Wife’s] interests in marital property are more valuable than [Husband’s] interest, the [c]ourt also finds that [Wife] made greater non-monetary and monetary contributions to the well-being of the family, and that finding greatly affects the [c]ourt’s decision regarding a monetary award. Indeed, the [c]ourt finds that [Husband] began living separate and apart from

[Wife] at least as of 2017 and was pursuing his own interests and was not fully engaged in the well-being of the family. The [c]ourt finds, based on the evidence, that [Husband] was largely indifferent about the parties' marriage. In his Memorandum, at page 7, he describes his testimony: "He testified that the marriage was a marriage and that he does not know what a good or bad marriage is, but it was a marriage and it worked well until the parties had a falling out in August 2022." The [c]ourt was struck by both the substance and the tone of that testimony. When [Husband] gave that testimony, the [c]ourt thought that [Husband] had not been fully committed to the marriage. That testimony was corroborated by [Wife's] testimony and that of Mr. Toure. [Mr. Toure was a friend of Wife who helped her and C move out of the marital home and testified at the merits hearing.] The [c]ourt found Mr. Toure's testimony credible. This lack of commitment contributed greatly toward the parties' estrangement.

Similarly, [Husband's] great reluctance to find employment aggravated the fractures in the marriage. [Wife] testified about her frustration with [Husband's] failure to gain employment and how that failure damaged the marriage. [Husband's] abusive and threatening conduct, cited above [in the court's opinion], also greatly contributed to the parties' estrangement and the ultimate demise of the marriage.

In addition, while [Wife] holds legal title to most of the marital property in this case, [Husband] owns valuable nonmarital real property, which enhances his economic circumstances.

The record demonstrates that the court carefully considered the evidence and the statutory factors. After weighing the evidence of Husband's lack of commitment to the marriage and family, unemployment, and underemployment, the court determined that he bore much of the responsibility for the estrangement of the parties and the failure of the marriage. For those reasons, the court decided that a less than equal division of the marital property was warranted.

Husband argues that this Court's holdings in *Flanagan*, 181 Md. App. 492, *Long*, 129 Md. App. 554, and *Ward v. Ward*, 52 Md. App. 336 (1982), support his contention that

he should have received a greater monetary award based on the total value of the marital property. We do not agree. These cases are easily distinguishable.

In both *Flanagan* and *Long*, we vacated monetary awards that resulted in significantly disproportionate distributions of marital property. In *Flanagan*, we vacated a monetary award that “resulted in appellee’s entitlement to almost 90% of the value of the marital property,” because the court failed to give any explanation for its decision. 181 Md. App. at 522. In the case at bar, the court gave a detailed analysis of the applicable FL § 8-205 factors and explained its reasons for granting the monetary award it did. In *Long*, we vacated a monetary award that granted the wife less than 20% of the marital assets when, inconsistently, the court’s findings on many of the factors actually weighed in the wife’s favor. 129 Md. App. at 577. Here, by contrast, the factors weighed strongly against Husband. Finally, in *Ward*, the court erred because it made two monetary awards, the cumulative value of which exceeded the total value of the marital property. 52 Md. App. at 342. Nothing along those lines happened in this case.

Moreover, in *Flanagan*, *Long*, and *Ward*, the appealing spouse did not have any non-marital assets. When one spouse has substantial non-marital assets, a disproportionate award of marital property to a spouse with little or no non-marital property may be appropriate. *See, e.g., Randolph v. Randolph*, 67 Md. App. 577, 587-88 (1986) (noting that an award of more than half of the marital property to wife was not improper where husband owned non-marital property, although the court’s failure to value marital property required remand); *Brewer v. Brewer*, 156 Md. App. 77, 112 (2004) (finding no error in awarding wife a greater share of the marital property based, in part, on the court’s valuation of

husband’s non-marital assets); *Melrod v. Melrod*, 83 Md. App. 180, 197-98 (1990) (explaining, in the context of a spouse who owned substantial non-marital assets, that the court must consider “whether it would be equitable to award a greater share of marital property to the spouse owning less of the total property and having less wealth”).

In this case, the trial court carefully considered the relevant factors in FL § 8-205(b) and made a decision to grant Husband a monetary award of \$150,000 based on findings that were supported by the evidence. Husband’s monetary and non-monetary contributions to the well-being of the family were outweighed by those of Wife, his conduct contributed to the estrangement of the parties, his lesser economic circumstance was in large part a function of his refusal to become employed during the marriage, to a great extent the parties’ marital assets were a product of Wife’s having worked during the marriage, and Husband held title to non-marital assets with significant value and Wife did not. The court did not err or abuse its discretion in granting Husband the monetary award it did.

**JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT
COURT FOR MONTGOMERY
COUNTY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO
BE PAID BY THE APPELLANT.**