OFFICE of the STATE'S ATTORNEY for BALTIMORE CITY 120 East Baltimore Street | Baltimore, Maryland 21202

DIRECT DIAL 443-984-6011

January 13, 2016

VIA HAND DELIVERY

The Honorable Barry G. Williams Associate Judge Circuit Court for Baltimore City 534 Courthouse East Baltimore, MD 21202

> RE: State vs. Porter, No. 115141037 State vs. Goodson, No. 115141032 State vs. White, No. 115141036 State vs. Miller, No. 115141034 State vs. Nero, No. 115141033 State vs. Rice, No. 115141035

Dear Judge Williams,

I write on behalf of the State with regard to the trial scheduling of the above-referenced cases. The State requests that none of the cases be tried until the Court of Special Appeals resolves the *Porter* immunity appeal. After that resolution, the State requests that Porter be retried first, followed by the trials of Goodson, White, Miller, Nero, and Rice, in that order. After recounting the current schedule, I will address the reasons for the State's request.

As of now, the *Goodson* trial has been stayed. The *White* trial, now set for February 8, will likely soon be in the same or similar posture as the *Goodson* trial. Porter has filed a Notice of Appeal of your immunity order in the *White* case, and presumably that appeal will be consolidated with the previous *Porter* appeal, and the impact will be the same on the *White* case as the impact on the *Goodson* case. The Court of Special Appeals will hear argument on March 4, with its ruling presumably a reasonable time thereafter.

The *Miller* case is scheduled for March 7, and before the orders of the Court of Special Appeals, it was to be the next case tried after the *White* case. Although the *Nero* case is scheduled for February 22, and the *Rice* case for March 9, the plan was to reschedule *Nero* and *Rice* after the *Miller* case.

The State asks that *Porter* be retried before any of the other cases because that is the most practical thing to do. Retrying *Porter* first will (1) eliminate the need for a time consuming and potentially complex *Kastigar* hearing; (2) allow the State to avoid the costly redundancies of creating a "clean" team; and (3) moot virtually every objection made thus far by Porter in opposing the immunity conferred upon him. The savings in judicial and prosecutorial resources will be considerable and in the public interest.

The State has previously advised the Court of Porter's importance as a witness in the *Goodson* and *White* cases. Porter's testimony about the failure to seatbelt at the second stop is also critical to the trials of Miller, Nero and Rice. Each is charged with reckless endangerment and misconduct for failure to seatbelt Mr. Gray. The involuntary manslaughter and assault charges against Rice are also based, in part, upon the failure to seatbelt.

Also important is Porter's testimony concerning his interactions with Mr. Gray at the fourth stop. The State and its expert witnesses rely in part on Porter's evidence concerning that fourth stop to prove that Mr. Gray suffered his fatal injuries between the second and fourth stops. The defendants contend that these injuries occurred later, between the fifth and sixth stops. While not legally dispositive as to each and every charge against each defendant, where the injuries took place is important and will have impact upon the jury. It is directly implicated in the involuntary manslaughter and assault charges against Rice, and also relevant to the reckless endangerment charges against each of Miller, Nero, and Rice. If the injury happened where the State contends, it is directly traceable to the failure to seatbelt at stop two, and is therefore evidence that the conduct of Miller, Nero, and Rice "created a substantial risk of death or serious physical injury to another...." MPJI-Cr 4:26A. This is an objective test for which the actual injuries suffered are relevant: "Whether the conduct in issue has, indeed, created a substantial risk of death or serious physical injury is an issue that will be assessed objectively on the basis of the physical evidence in the case." Williams v. State, 100 Md. App. 468, 495 (1994).

Having closely observed the defense efforts in the *Porter* case to (1) assign the culpability for Mr. Gray's death to Goodson and to White, and (2) establish that Mr. Gray's injuries occurred between stops five and six, the State is persuaded of the importance of Porter's testimony in the trials of Miller, Nero, and Rice.

Finally, Goodson is charged with the most serious offenses of any of the defendants. Once Porter is first retried, for the reasons written above, it is fitting and in the public interest that Goodson be tried next. If the *Goodson* case is tried to a verdict, it may have an impact on both prosecutorial and defense decisions about the remaining cases.

Thank you for your consideration of these requests.

Very truly yours,

Michael Schatzow

Chief Deputy State's Attorney

Baltimore City State's Attorney's Office

MS/tsr

Cc: Matthew B. Fraling, III, Esquire, Via Email Marc L. Zayon, Esquire, Via Email Catherine Flynn, Esquire, Via Email Joseph Murtha, Esquire, Via Email Ivan Bates, Esquire, Via Email Michael Belsky, Esquire, Via Email Andrew Jay Graham, Esquire, Via Email Gary Proctor, Esquire, Via Email Amy Askew, Esquire, Via Email

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STATE OF MARYLAND

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR

BALTIMORE CITY CASE No. 115141033

EDWARD NERO

V.

STATE'S MOTION TO COMPEL A WITNESS TO TESTIFY PURSUANT TO SECTION 9-123 OF THE COURTS AND JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS ARTICLE

Now comes the State of Maryland, by and through Marilyn J. Mosby, the State's Attorney for Baltimore City, and pursuant to Section 9-123 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article moves this Court to issue an order requiring Officer William Porter, D.O.B. 6/26/1989, in the above-captioned case to give testimony which he is likely to refuse to give on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination. In support of this Motion, the State avers the following:

- 1. The State may call Officer William Porter to testify as a witness in the above-captioned criminal proceeding being held before this Court.
- 2. The State's Attorney for Baltimore City has determined that the testimony of Officer William Porter in the above-captioned case may be necessary to the public interest.
- 3. Officer William Porter is likely to refuse to testify in the above-captioned case on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination because he has previously stated that he would refuse on those grounds to testify in cases involving the same underlying set of events as the present matter, namely the cases of *State v. Caesar Goodson* (# 115141032) and *State v. Alicia White* (# 115141036).
- 4. The State's Attorney for Baltimore City seeks to compel Officer William Porter to testify in the above-captioned case.

Wherefore, the State requests that this Court issue an order requiring Officer William Porter in the above-captioned case to give testimony which he is likely to refuse to give on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination.

Respectfully submitted,

Marilyn J. Mosby

mail@stattorney.org

Marilyn J. Mosby (#589290) State's Attorney for Baltimore City 120 East Baltimore Street The SunTrust Bank Building Baltimore, Maryland 21202 (443) 984-6000 (telephone) (443) 984-6256 (facsimile)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 14th day of January, 2016, a copy of the State's Motion to Compel a Witness to Testify Pursuant to Section 9-123 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings article was mailed and e-mailed to:

Joseph Murtha Murtha, Psoras & Lanasa, LLC 1301 York Road, Suite 200 Lutherville, Maryland 21093 (410) 583-6969 jmurtha@mpllawyers.com Attorney for Officer William Porter

Marc L. Zayon
Roland Walker & Marc L. Zayon, P.A.
201 N. Charles Street, Suite 1700
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Attorney for Officer Edward Nero

Gary Proctor
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Baltimore, MD 21202
410-444-1500
garyeproctor@gmail.com
Attorney for Officer William Porter

Respectfully submitted,

Marilyn J. Mosby

Marilyn J. Mosby (#589290)
State's Attorney for Baltimore City
120 East Baltimore Street
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(443) 984-6256 (facsimile)
mail@stattorney.org



Having reviewed the State's Motion to Compel a Witness to Testify Pursuant to Section 9-123 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, in which the State's Attorney for Baltimore City seeks to compel Officer William Porter, D.O.B. 6/26/1989, to testify in the above-captioned criminal proceeding; finding that the State's Attorney for Baltimore City has determined that Officer William Porter may be called by the State as a witness to testify in the above-captioned criminal proceeding but that Officer William Porter is likely to refuse to testify on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; further finding that the State's Attorney for Baltimore City has determined that the testimony of Officer William Porter may be necessary to the public interest; and further finding that the State's Motion to Compel Officer William Porter's testimony complies with the requirements of Section 9-123 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, it is this _____ day of ______, 2016, by the Circuit Court for Baltimore City

ORDERED that the State's Motion to Compel a Witness to Testify Pursuant to Section 9-123 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article be and hereby is GRANTED; and it is further

Page 1 of 2

ORDERED that Officer William Porter, D.O.B. 6/26/1989, shall testify as a witness for the State in the above-captioned criminal proceeding and may not refuse to comply with this

Order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; and it is further

ORDERED that no testimony of Officer William Porter, D.O.B. 6/26/1989, compelled

pursuant to this Order and no information directly or indirectly derived from the testimony of

Officer William Porter compelled pursuant to this Order may be used against Officer William

Porter in any criminal case, except in a prosecution for perjury, obstruction of justice, or

otherwise failing to comply with this Order.

Judge

Circuit Court for Baltimore City

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STATE OF MARYLAND

* IN THE

CIRCUIT COURT FOR

BALTIMORE CITY

OFFICER EDWARD NERO

CASE NO. 115141033

DEFENDANT EDWARD NERO'S OPPOSITION TO THE STATE'S MOTION TO COMPEL A WITNESS TO TESTIFY PURSUANT TO SECTION 9-123 OF THE COURTS AND JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS ARTICLE

Defendant Edward Nero, by undersigned counsel, hereby files this Response in Opposition to the State's Motion to Compel a Witness to Testify Pursuant to Section 9-123 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. In support thereof, Defendant Nero states as follows:

- 1. On January 14, 2015, for the first time since the inception of the prosecution of these matters, the State asserted that it may call Officer William Porter to testify as a witness during the trial of Defendant Nero because Officer Porter's testimony "may be necessary to the public interest."
- Beyond this bare assertion, the State provides absolutely no proffer in its two-page Motion
 as to why Officer Porter's testimony is either material or necessary to the trial of Defendant
 Nero, or how it is necessary to serve the public interest.
- 3. This request comes days after the Court of Special Appeals' injunction staying the trial of Officer Goodson, and a likely injunction staying the trial of Sergeant White. Both injunctions are the result of the State's characterization of Officer Porter as a material and necessary witness for the trials of Officer Goodson and Sergeant White, as well as the need to clarify the issues concerning Officer Porter's compelled testimony.
- The State now attempts to place the Defendant's case in the same posture as those matters
 in an attempt to require a stay of this trial.

- 5. The State's past actions contradict the alleged need on which the present request rests. When the State was afforded the opportunity to select the order in which to call the cases in this matter, the State contended that "Defendant Porter is a necessary and material witness in the cases against **Defendants Goodson and White**, so it is imperative that Mr. Porter's trial takes place before their trials." Exhibit A, State's Letter dated September 15, 2015 (emphasis added). Consequently, the State suggested the following: "[w]ithout listing all the possible permutations, the State essentially seeks to have Mr. Porter tried before Mr. Goodson and Ms. White, to have Mr. Miller tried before Mr. Nero, and to have Mr. Miller and Mr. Nero tried before Mr. Rice." Id.
- 6. In the State's previous four trial witness lists to the Defendant, the State never once indicated that it intended to call Officer Porter as a witness. Moreover, the State has never suggested, until the filing of the present Motion, that Officer Porter's testimony was in any way necessary to the prosecution of Defendants Miller, Nero, or Lt. Rice.
- 7. In light of the State's past position, it is abundantly clear that the present Motion is nothing more than a pretext to regain control of the order of the Defendants' trials, and avoid trying the most factually and legally tenuous cases first.
- 8. However, in order to fulfill its procedural desires, the State is trampling upon the Fifth Amendment rights of Officer Porter, and placing the speedy trial rights of Defendants Miller, Nero, and Lt. Rice at peril. If the present Motion were granted, it would in essence reward the State for its tactical inadequacies and utter disrespect for the Defendants' constitutional rights.

 For these reasons, compelling Officer William Porter's testimony at the trial of the Defendant Nero is not necessary to the public interest, and the present Motion must be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

Maro LyZayon, Esquire

Roland Walker & Marc L. Zayon, P.A.

201 N. Charles Street, Suite 1700 Baltimore, Maryland 21201

(410) 727-3710

Counsel for Officer Edward Nero

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STATE OF MARYLAND

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* IN THE

CIRCUIT COURT FOR

* BALTIMORE CITY

OFFICER EDWARD NERO

CASE NO. 115141033

REQUEST FOR A HEARING

Defendant Edward Nero, by undersigned counsel, hereby requests a hearing on the State's Motion to Compel a Witness to Testify Pursuant to Section 9-123 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.

Respectfully submitted,

Marc L. Zayon Esquire

Roland Walker & Marc L. Zayon, P.A.

201 N. Charles Street, Suite 1700

Baltimore, Maryland 21201

(410) 727-3710

Counsel for Officer Edward Nero

STA	TE OF	MARY	LAND			*	INT		'OI IDT	EOD			
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this_	(day of, 20				16, by the Circuit Court for Baltimore City							
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 15th day of January, 2016, a copy of the foregoing Defendant Edward Nero's Opposition to the State's Motion to Compel a Witness to Testify Pursuant to Section 9-123 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, Request for Hearing, Proposed Order, and referenced exhibits were sent via electronic mail and mailed, first-class postage prepaid, to Janice Bledsoe, Deputy State's Attorney, Office of the State's Attorney for Baltimore City, 120 East Baltimore Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21202.



OFFICE of the STATE'S ATTORNEY for BALTIMORE CITY 120 East Baltimore Street Baltimore, Maryland 21202

DIRECT DIAL 443-984-6011

September 15, 2015

VIA HAND DELIVERY

The Honorable Barry G. Williams Associate Judge Circuit Court for Baltimore City 534 Courthouse East Baltimore, MD 21202

> Re: State v. Goodson, et al., Case Nos.: 115141032-37

Dear Judge Williams,

I write as directed concerning the order and anticipated length of trials. The anticipated length of trial does not include the time for hearing and resolving pretrial motions, the time for jury selection, nor the length of the defense cases. Because the State has not yet received discovery from any of the Defendants, the anticipated length of trial also does not include possible additional time in the State's case from meeting anticipated defenses. The State would call the cases in the following order.

- · First: William Porter, No. 115141037 Five days
- · Second: Caesar Goodson, No. 115141032 Five days
- Third: Alicia White, No. 115141036 Four days
- Fourth: Garrett Miller, No. 115141034 Three days
- Fifth: Edward Nero, No. 115141033 Three days
- Sixth: Brian Rice, No. 115141035 Four days.

Defendant Porter is a necessary and material witness in the cases against Defendants Goodson and White, so it is imperative that Mr. Porter's trial takes place before their trials. Defendant Porter's counsel has known this since before the grand jury returned indictments in these cases. On July 24, 2015, counsel for Defendants Porter and Rice were advised by the State that Porter's case would be called first, either with Defendant Rice or without him, depending on the Court's ruling on the joinder sought by the State. Presumably, counsel for Defendants Porter and Rice so advised counsel for the other defendants. In any event, counsel for all Defendants were notified that the State intended to call the Porter case first during the chambers conference with the court on September 2, 2015.

The trial date of October 13, 2015 was ordered on June 19, 2015, based on the availability of the court and all counsel. As Judge Pierson requested, we had cleared that date with Dr. Carol Allan, the Assistant Medical Examiner who conducted the autopsy. We were advised by Dr. Allan this morning that she will be out of Maryland from November 16 through November 30. The State will be ready to begin the case against Mr. Porter on October 13. Counsel for Mr. Porter has expressed his intent to seek a continuance. The State informed counsel for Mr. Porter over the past weekend that it had no objection to a continuance of Mr. Porter's case of up to three weeks, provided that his remains the first case to be tried. However, given Dr. Allan's schedule,



the State now believes that it cannot consent to a continuance beyond October 26. Given that no other Defendant is required to be ready for trial on October 13 (and the State has not received any discovery from any Defendant 30 days before October 13), a two week continuance would not unduly delay the time by which all six cases could be resolved. However, if the consequence of a continuance for Mr. Porter would be forcing the State to try a different Defendant first, then the State would vigorously oppose a continuance for Mr. Porter. Mr. Porter's counsel has been aware of the October 13 trial date for almost three months, and has known with certainty that Mr. Porter's case would be tried first for at least six weeks. In light of the long scheduled and agreed upon trial date, and the other background referenced above, Mr. Porter has no legitimate basis for a continuance, particularly one that would impact the State's traditional right to call cases in the order it chooses.

Finally, the Court directed the State to provide an alternative order in the event that Mr. Porter's case is not tried first. Without prejudice to the State's position that, in light of the facts of this case and the information in this letter, it should be able to call the cases in the order expressed above, the State's alternative order would be to try Mr. Miller first, and then, in order, Mr. Porter, Mr. Goodson, Ms. White, Mr. Nero and Mr. Rice. Without listing all the possible permutations, the State essentially seeks to have Mr. Porter tried before Mr. Goodson and Ms. White, to have Mr. Miller tried before Mr. Nero, and to have Mr. Miller and Mr. Nero tried before Mr. Rice.

Thank you for your consideration of these requests. Pursuant to your instructions, I have enclosed the transcript of each defendant's statement. I trust that this letter is clear and responsive to your direction. If you have any questions or think that a chambers conference would be useful, the State is available at the convenience of the Court.

Very truly yours,

Michael Schatzow

Chief Deputy State's Attorney
Baltimore City State's Attorney's Office

MS/tsr

Enclosures

Cc: Without Enclosures

Matthew B. Fraling, III, Esquire, Via Email Marc L. Zayon, Esquire, Via Hand Delivery Catherine Flynn, Esquire, Via Hand Delivery Joseph Murtha, Esquire, Via Email Ivan Bates, Esquire, Via Hand Delivery Michael Belsky, Esquire, Via Hand Delivery Andrew Jay Graham, Esquire, Via Hand Delivery Gary Proctor, Esquire, Via Hand Delivery STATE OF MARYLAND * IN THE

V. * CIRCUIT COURT

OFFICER EDWARD NERO * FOR BALTIMORE CITY

* CASE NO. 115141033

TO COMPEL A WITNESS TO TESTIFY PURSUANT TO SECTION 9-123 OF THE COURTS AND JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS ARTICLE

Now comes the defendant, William Porter, by and through undersigned counsel and hereby files this Opposition to the State's Motion to Compel a Witness to Testify Pursuant to Section 9-123 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. In support thereof, William Porter states the following:

1. The State has previously suggested, if not requested, that the Court consider postponing the trials of Officer Caesar Goodson, Sergeant Alicia White, Officer Garrett Miller, Officer Edward Nero, and Lieutenant Brian Rice until after the retrial of Officer William Porter. Such a suggestion was not adopted by the Court, and the trials of the remaining defendants were scheduled to proceed in the order identified. The order of the trials was disrupted after the Court of Special Appeals stayed the trial of Caesar Goodson after staying this Court's order compelling Officer Porter to testify as a witness in the trial of Officer Goodson. An order compelling the testimony of Officer Porter in the trial of Sergeant Alicia White has been appealed, and it is anticipated that the trial of Sergeant White will

be stayed upon the Court of Special Appeals staying of this Court's order compelling Officer Porter to testify as a witness for the State.

- 2. On more than one occasion the State has communicated its interest in retrying the matter of Officer Porter before trying the remaining defendants. By virtue of the Court of Special Appeals' order staying Officer Goodson's trial, and the anticipated stay of Sergeant White's trial, it appears that the State's strategy of postponing the remaining cases now involves a not previously revealed desire to have Officer Porter testify in each and every co-defendant's trial. This theory, offered for the first time in communication with the Court on January 13, 2016, suggests that Officer Porter's "testimony about the failure to seatbelt at the second stop is also critical to the trials of Miller, Nero and Rice." The problem with this representation is that a review of the trial testimony of Officer Porter reveals absolutely no testimony "about the failure to seatbelt at the second stop." The State's attempt to use Section 9-123 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article as a vehicle to obtain postponements of the trials of Officer Miller, Officer Nero and Lieutenant Rice cannot be ignored by the Court.
- 3. On January 14, 2016, for the first time in a publicly filed pleading since the inception of the prosecution of these matters, the State asserted that it "may" call Officer William Porter to testify as a witness during the trial of Defendant Nero because Officer Porter's testimony "may be necessary to the public interest."
 - 4. Beyond this bare assertion, and its factually inaccurate

representation to the Court in a separate document, the State offers no proffer in its two page motion as to why Officer Porter's testimony is either material or necessary to the trial of Defendant Nero, or how it is necessary to serve the public interest.

- 5. As noted, the request comes days after the Court of Special Appeals' injunction staying the trial of Officer Goodson, and a likely injunction staying the trial of Sergeant White. Both injunctions are the result of the State's characterization of Officer Porter as a material and necessary witness for the trials of Officer Goodson and Sergeant White, as well as the need to clarify the issues concerning Officer Porter's compelled testimony.
- The State now attempts to place Officer Nero's case in the same posture as those of Officer Goodson and Sergeant White in an attempt to require a stay of his trial.
- 7. The State's past actions contradict the alleged need on which the present request rests. When the State was afforded the opportunity to select the order in which to call the cases in this matter, the State contended that "Defendant Porter is a necessary and material witness in the cases against Defendants Goodson and White, so it is Imperative that Mr. Porter's trial takes place before their trials." Exhibit A. State's Letter dated September 15, 2015. Consequently, the State suggested the following: "[w]ithout listing all the possible permutations, the State essentially seeks to have Mr. Porter tried before Mr.

Goodson and Ms. White, to have Mr. Miller tried before Mr. Nero, and to have Mr. Mr. Miller and Mr. Nero tried before Mr. Rice." *Id*.

- 8. In the State's previous four trial witness lists to Edward Nero, the State never once indicated that it intended to call Officer Porter as a witness.

 Moreover, the State has never suggested, until the filing of the present Motion, that Officer Porter's testimony was in any way necessary to the prosecutions of Defendants Miller, Nero or Rice.
- 9. In light of the State's past position, it is abundantly clear that the present Motion is nothing more than a pretext to regain control of the order of the Defendants' trials, and avoid trying the most factually and legally tenuous cases first.
- trampling upon the Fifth Amendment rights, as well as the Article 22 rights, of Officer Porter. The State essentially seeks to take Officer Porter hostage as an unwilling witness in five trials, three of which are solely for the sake of postponing the trials until after the retrial of Officer Porter. If the present Motion is granted, it would be in essence reward the State for its tactical inadequacies and utter disrespect for the constitutional protections afforded Officer Porter.
- 11. The State's actions in the cases before the Court are without precedent. Officer Porter is being used as the designated whipping boy in the State's case against Officer Goodson and Sergeant White, and now the State seeks to torture him even more by moving to compel him to testify in the trials of

Officer Miller, Nero and Lieutenant Rice. The State does not shy away from saying that Officer Porter committed perjury in his own trial, yet they continue to think that they can sponsor his testimony in the other officers' cases, and then prosecute him for the crimes that they allege in the charging document filed in his case. This cannot be tolerated, and particularly, should not be permitted as a means to obtain a postponement of the remaining three cases and dominate the order in which the trials proceed before the Court.

- 12. The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution declares in part that "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." <u>U.S. Const., 5th Amend.</u> The Fifth Amendment creates a privilege against compelled disclosures that could implicate a witness in criminal activity and thus subject him or her to criminal prosecution. *Hoffman v. United States*, 341 US 479, 486-488, 71 S.Ct. 814, 818-819 (1951). The privilege against self-incrimination is a *constitutionally-based* privilege—not an evidentiary privilege.
- 13. To be clear: Porter is not saying that § 9-123 is unconstitutional: he is saying that it is unconstitutional as applied to this defendant in this setting. To quote Chief Judge Murphy, in his capacity as chair of the General Assembly Criminal Law Article Review Committee:

The granting of some form of immunity against prosecution arising from compelled incriminating testimony does not, of itself, cure the constitutional defect. The General Assembly may wish to explore the scope of immunity that may be required to allow compelled testimony in harmony with federal and State constitutional precedent.

See notes to Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 9-204. The General Assembly has failed to do so, so it falls to this Court to provide Officer Porter shelter from the storm.

- While Officer Porter has many valid reasons as to why he cannot be compelled to testify, the Fifth Amendment, the Sixth Amendment, Article 22, to name but three, the overarching principle is that the judicial system is built on trust and respect of the public and relies on that trust and respect for effectiveness. "It is of fundamental importance that justice should not only, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done." Rex v. Sussex Justices, 1 K.B. 256, 259 (1924). Similarly, the United States Supreme Court has said that trials themselves are "a reflection of the notion, deeply rooted in the common law, that 'justice must satisfy the appearances of justice," Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 616 (1960) (quoted source omitted), and that the perception of fairness of trials and judicial acts is essential to the effectiveness of the system itself. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring). Frankly, calling Porter as a witness in two (2) trials [OR FIVE], about the same matters upon which he faces a pending manslaughter trial, wreaks of impropriety.
- 15. On a related point, and as previously mentioned, on September 15, 2015 the State told the Court that it was "imperative" that Porter be tried first. Implicitly, maybe even explicitly, the state acknowledged in this pleading that Porter had to go first in order that he not have a Fifth Amendment Privilege. If the

State truly believes that Officer Porter can be called as a witness, with a pending manslaughter charge, why was it "imperative" that Officer Porter proceed to trial first?

- 16. Co-defendants trials are severed every day in Maryland. And yet there is not a single reported case of one co-defendant being compelled to testify against the other in the way the circuit court envisages happening here. There is a reason for that: it effectively renders constitutional protections all but meaningless.
- 17. Even if there were nothing wrong, in theory, with proceeding as the State suggests, in this case it would nevertheless be impermissible with the factual scenario that is before this Court. While it might be a closer call if the State chose to insert a clean team, give transactional immunity, or if the State called Officer Porter after his case resulted in acquittal, ultimately he would still be an impermissible witness. The bottom line is that the State, who has sole charging authority, believes he will lie about matters that are material. And all the immunity in the world cannot cure that.
- 18. For the purpose of continuity, and to ensure that previously asserted issues are again considered by the Court, and preserved for any record that may be considered by an appellate court, Officer Porter incorporates, and adopts by reference, and attaches hereto as Exhibit B, Motion to Quash Trial Subpoena of Officer William Porter, filed in the matter of *State of Maryland v. Officer Caesar Goodson*, Case Number 115141032. Undersigned counsel understands that no

subpoena has yet to be served upon Officer Porter to testify in the trial of Officer Miller, but the arguments set forth in the referenced Motion to Quash were incorporated by reference in Officer Porter's opposition to the State's Motion to Compel his testimony in Officer Goodson's case. As such, he once again requests that this Court consider those related issues in determining the impropriety of granting the State's request.

WHEREFORE, for the reasons set forth in the body of this response, and the accompanying documents, William Porter requests that this Honorable Court find that compelling his testimony at the trial of Officer Garrett Miller is not necessary to the public interest, and offends the constitutional protections affored by the Fifth Amendment and Article 22, and deny the State's Motion to Compel his testimony in the trial of Officer Garrett Miller.

Respectfully submitted.

Joseph Murtha

Murtha Psoras & Lanasa, LLC

1301 York Road, Suite 200 Lutherville, Maryland 21093

(410) 583-6969

jmurtha@mpllawyers.com

Gary E. Proctor

Law Offices of Gary E. Proctor, LLC

8 E. Mulberry Street

Baltimore, Maryland 21202

(410) 444-1500

garyeproctor@gmail.com

Attorneys for Officer William Porter

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 19th day of January, 2016, a copy of the foregoing Defendant William Porter's Opposition to the State's Motion to Compel a Witness to Testify Pursuant to Section 9-123 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, and referenced exhibits was sent via electronic mail to Janice Bledsoe, Deputy State's Attorney, Office of the State's Attorney for Baltimore City, 120 East Baltimore Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21202.

Joseph Murtha

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Exhibit A



OFFICE of the STATE'S ATTORNEY for BALTIMORE CITY 120 East Baltimore Street - Baltimore, Maryland 21202

DIRECT DIAL 443-984-6011

September 15, 2015

VIA HAND DELIVERY

The Honorable Barry G. Williams Associate Judge Circuit Court for Baltimore City 534 Courthouse East Baltimore, MD 21202

> Re: State v. Goodson, et al., Case Nos.: 115141032-37


Dear Judge Williams,

I write as directed concerning the order and anticipated length of trials. The anticipated length of trial does not include the time for hearing and resolving pretrial motions, the time for jury selection, nor the length of the defense cases. Because the State has not yet received discovery from any of the Defendants, the anticipated length of trial also does not include possible additional time in the State's case from meeting anticipated defenses. The State would call the cases in the following order.

- · First: William Porter, No. 115141037 Five days
- Second: Caesar Goodson, No. 115141032 Five days
- Third: Alicia White, No. 115141036 Four days
- Fourth: Garrett Miller, No. 115141034 Three days
- · Fifth: Edward Nero, No. 115141033 Three days
- Sixth: Brian Rice, No. 115141035 Four days.

Defendant Porter is a necessary and material witness in the cases against Defendants Goodson and White, so it is imperative that Mr. Porter's trial takes place before their trials. Defendant Porter's counsel has known this since before the grand jury returned indictments in these cases. On July 24, 2015, counsel for Defendants Porter and Rice were advised by the State that Porter's case would be called first, either with Defendant Rice or without him, depending on the Court's ruling on the joinder sought by the State. Presumably, counsel for Defendants Porter and Rice so advised counsel for the other defendants. In any event, counsel for all Defendants were notified that the State intended to call the Porter case first during the chambers conference with the court on September 2, 2015.

The trial date of October 13, 2015 was ordered on June 19, 2015, based on the availability of the court and all counsel. As Judge Pierson requested, we had cleared that date with Dr. Carol Allan, the Assistant Medical Examiner who conducted the autopsy. We were advised by Dr. Allan this morning that she will be out of Maryland from November 16 through November 30. The State will be ready to begin the case against Mr. Porter on October 13. Counsel for Mr. Porter has expressed his intent to seek a continuance. The State informed counsel for Mr. Porter over the past weekend that it had no objection to a continuance of Mr. Porter's case of up to three weeks, provided that his remains the first case to be tried. However, given Dr. Allan's schedule.



the State now believes that it cannot consent to a continuance beyond October 26. Given that no other Defendant is required to be ready for trial on October 13 (and the State has not received any discovery from any Defendant 30 days before October 13), a two week continuance would not unduly delay the time by which all six cases could be resolved. However, if the consequence of a continuance for Mr. Porter would be forcing the State to try a different Defendant first, then the State would vigorously oppose a continuance for Mr. Porter. Mr. Porter's counsel has been aware of the October 13 trial date for almost three months, and has known with certainty that Mr. Porter's case would be tried first for at least six weeks. In light of the long scheduled and agreed upon trial date, and the other background referenced above, Mr. Porter has no legitimate basis for a continuance, particularly one that would impact the State's traditional right to call cases in the order it chooses.

Finally, the Court directed the State to provide an alternative order in the event that Mr. Porter's case is not tried first. Without prejudice to the State's position that, in light of the facts of this case and the information in this letter, it should be able to call the cases in the order expressed above, the State's alternative order would be to try Mr. Miller first, and then, in order, Mr. Porter, Mr. Goodson, Ms. White, Mr. Nero and Mr. Rice. Without listing all the possible permutations, the State essentially seeks to have Mr. Porter tried before Mr. Goodson and Ms. White, to have Mr. Miller tried before Mr. Nero, and to have Mr. Miller and Mr. Nero tried before Mr. Rice.

Thank you for your consideration of these requests. Pursuant to your instructions, I have enclosed the transcript of each defendant's statement. I trust that this letter is clear and responsive to your direction. If you have any questions or think that a chambers conference would be useful, the State is available at the convenience of the Court.

Very truly yours,

Michael Schatzow

Chief Deputy State's Attorney

Baltimore City State's Attorney's Office

MS/tsr

Enclosures

Cc: Without Enclosures

Matthew B. Fraling, III, Esquire, Via Email

Marc L. Zayon, Esquire, Via Hand Delivery

Catherine Flynn, Esquire, Via Hand Delivery

Joseph Murtha, Esquire, Via Email

Ivan Bates, Esquire, Via Hand Delivery

Michael Belsky, Esquire, Via Hand Delivery

Andrew Jay Graham, Esquire, Via Hand Delivery

Gary Proctor, Esquire, Via Hand Delivery

Exhibit B

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY

STATE OF MARYLAND

V.

CRIMINAL NO. 115141032

OFFICER CAESAR GOODSON

Defendant.

...00000...

MOTION TO QUASH TRIAL SUBPOENA OF OFFICER WILLIAM PORTER

Comes NOW Witness Officer William G. Porter and hereby moves this Honorable Court to quash his trial subpoena in the case at bar, and in support thereof states as follows:

I. RELEVANT FACTS

PROCEDURAL POSTURE

Baltimore City Police Officer William Porter (hereafter "Officer Porter") has been charged with Manslaughter, Second Degree Assault, Reckless Endangerment and Misconduct in Office in Baltimore City Circuit Court Case Number 115141037. The undersigned are counsel for Porter in that case. The charges involve the in-custody death of Freddie Gray on April 12, 2015. There are six officers charged in the death of Mr. Gray: Officer Porter, Officer Caesar Goodson, Sergeant Alicia White, Officer Garrett Miller, Officer Edward Nero and Lieutenant Brian Rice. All were charged, and indicted, on the same day. As one

Judge was assigned to all six (6) cases, initially there was discussion about which case would go first.¹

On September 15, 2015 the State of Maryland, through Chief Deputy

State's Attorney Michael Schatzow wrote to the specially assigned Judge, Judge
Barry Williams, and told him that the state would be calling Officer Porter's case
first, followed by Goodson, White, Miller, Nero and Rice. Exhibit A. The state's
rationale for this was that:

Defendant Porter is a necessary and material witness in the cases against Defendants Goodson and White, so it is imperative that Porter's trial takes place before their trials. Defendant Porter's counsel has known this since before the grand jury returned indictments in these cases.

Id. The Court granted the state its wish, and Officer Porter proceeded to trial first.

THE TRIAL

Jury selection began in Officer Porter's trial on November 30, 2015.

Ultimately, the case mistried on December 16, 2015 as the jury were unable to reach a verdict as to any of the four (4) charges placed against Officer Porter.

Following the mistrial, this Court set the retrial for June 13, 2016.

During his trial, Officer Porter testified in his defense. During the state's closing argument by Ms Janice Bledsoe, and the rebuttal by Mr. Schatzow, both commented on Officer Porter's credibility, candor and truthfulness. The following

Initially the state moved to consolidate some trials, but eventually the Court found that six (6) separate trials was appropriate.

are not all of the instances when the state, in effect, called Officer Porter a perjurer, but it sets out specific examples that are germane to the decision this Court must make in relation to this Motion:

The State's Opening Closing Argument

- [A] during his testimony at trial Officer Porter stated under oath that he heard Freddie Gray say during his <u>initial arrest</u> that he could not breathe. The state's theory at trial, was that Mr. Gray had said this much later. In her closing Ms. Bledsoe stated that not one of the other witness officers testified that they heard Mr. Gray say during his initial arrest that he could not breathe and went on to assert that "you know why? 'Cause it was never said [during the initial arrest]." TS 9:53:20.² Ms. Bledsoe's assertion that it was never said leads to the inexorable conclusion that the state was accusing Officer Porter of perjury.
- [B] The reason the state believed that Mr. Gray said he could not breathe much later was because of a report of a Detective Teel, who wrote memorialized a conversation she had with Officer Porter. In arguing that Officer Porter is not to be believed, Ms. Bledsoe stated that "who has the motive to be deceitful? It's not Detective Teel. It's Officer Porter." TS 9:54:07.
- [C] Officer Porter testified that when he saw Mr. Gray in the back of the police wagon, at Druid Hill and Dolphin, he helped Mr. Gray (who was on the floor) onto

The "TS" stands for Time Stamp. The State's closing and rebuttal have yet to be transcribed, but the undersigned have watched the video, and transcribed herein, the arguments of counsel as faithfully as possible.

the bench, but that Mr. Gray had power in his legs and bore the weight of his body. In calling Porter a liar, Ms. Bledsoe stated that:

five times [Officer Porter] was asked about it, not once did he say Freddie Gray assisted himself up on the bench. Five times he used words that indicate he put Freddie Gray on the bench. Not once in any of those five times did he say, "it would be physically impossible for me to do that, I did not just put him up on then bench I couldn't do that," not once, but he told you that from the stand.

TS 9:57:40.

- [D] Officer Porter testified that he was aware that arrestees often feign injury in the hopes of avoiding a trip to jail. He testified that the term for it that many officers use is "jailitis." Ms. Bledsoe in her closing said that "this jailitis is a bunch of crap." TS 10:09:02.
- [E] Officer Porter testified that, when he saw Freddie Gray at Druid Hill and Dolphin he believed that Mr. Gray was not injured. Officer Porter further stated under oath that if he knew Mr. Gray was injured he would have sought immediate medical attention. Ms. Bledsoe, in labeling Officer Porter a perjuror stated that Porter "knew Gray was hurt badly [at Druid Hill and Dolphin], he knew he wasn't going to be accepted at Central Booking and he did nothing." TS 10:10:10.
- [F] Officer Porter testified that when Mr. Gray was loaded in the Wagon at Baker and Mount Streets, he did not know whether Mr. Gray was leg shackled or not. Ms. Bledsoe told the jury "he [Porter] knew Freddie Gray was placed into the wagon with handcuffs, leg shackles on..." TS 10:14:35.

- [G] Because of the statements of Officer Porter referenced above, Ms.

 Bledsoe argued to the jury that "there's only one reasonable conclusion, Officer

 Porter was not telling the truth about his involvement in this incident." TS

 10:15:15.
- [H] After pointing out another statement that the state believed was inconsistent, regarding what Officer Porter told a civilian named Brandon Ross, Ms. Bledsoe again stated "the only reasonable conclusion you can come to is that Ofc. Porter is not telling the truth." TS 10:18:27.
- [I] Additionally, Ms. Bledsoe argued to the jury that Officer Porter lied under oath when he stated that on April 12, 2015 he was unaware of a General Order numbered 1114. TS 10:27:08.
- [J] Officer Porter testified at trial that he believed the wagon was headed to the hospital at one point, with Mr. Gray inside of it. Ms. Bledsoe, at TS 10:39:45, stated that this was false testimony, because Officer Porter was behind the wagon and new it was headed in a different direction.

The State's Rebuttal

[K] Mr. Schatzow told the jury that "now that the defendant is on trial, he comes into court and he has lied to you about what happened." TS 1:01:15.

- [L] Less than a minute later, Mr. Schatzow repeated his assertion that "The state proved through the evidence that he [Porter] lied when he spoke to the [investigative] officers and he lied on the witness stand." TS 1:02:09.3
- [M] Mr. Schatzow stated that one of Porter's lies was "how he tried to pretend in his April 17th statement that he was too far away at stop 2, to know what was going on." TS 1:02:43.
- [N] Mr. Schatzow stated that Officer Porter misrepresented what he saw when at Baker and Mount Street, asking the jury "what was he trying to cover up, was he trying to cover up his own knowledge of what had happened there?" TS 1:03:50.
- [O] While opining on Officer Porter's credibility generally, Chief Deputy Schatzow stated that "you prove that people aren't telling you the truth by showing inconsistencies in their statements. You prove that the statements are inconsistent with each other. You prove that they're telling something that just is, makes no sense at all." TS 1:04:41.
- [P] The state's attribution of perjury to Officer Porter was far from subtle:

 [the state] proved that what he said at stop two was a lie and that this "I can't breath" nonsense that he came up with. You see what he's tried to do in his testimony, every place that he is stuck, every place that he is stuck in his April 17, and every place in his April 15

Of course, Mr. Schatzow's assertion that Officer Porter lied to the initial police officers that interviewed him, could lead to additional charges of misconduct in office and obstruction and hindering. See, for example, <u>Cover v. State</u>, 297 Md. 398, 400, 466 A.2d 1276, 1277 (1983) ("[b]oth this Court and the Court of Special Appeals have said that resisting, hindering, or obstructing an officer of the law in the performance of his duties is an offense at common law.")

statement he now comes up with some new explanation for. This business about that at stop 4 Mr. Gray used his own legs to get up. Nonsense. Five, six times on April 17, you'll see "I picked him up and I put him on the bench, I put him on the bench, I put him on the bench". You wont see anything about Freddie Gray using his own muscles, using his own legs.

TS 1:05:54.

- [Q] In response to the defense's assertion that Officer Porter's testimony was credible, Mr. Schatzow stated that "[Porter] sits here in the witness stand and he tries to come up with explanations for why he said what he said. But credibility is not an issue in this case, credibility is not an issue, not at all." TS 1:07:21.
- [R] While discussing Mr. Porter's contention that Mr. Gray said "I can't breathe" during his initial arrest, Mr. Schatzow tells the jury that the other witnesses "don't say that because it didn't happen, because it didn't happen." TS 1:08:10. If it did not happen then Officer Porter is being directly accused of perjury.
- [S] Mr. Schatzow told the jury "this is what you were told, 'you have no reason to not believe defendant Porter.' I have already given you a bunch of reasons, you've heard reason. But the biggest reason of all is he's got something at stake here ladies and gentlemen, he's got motive to lie." TS 1:12:12.
- [T] In accusing Officer Porter of lying when he said that he had very little conversation with Officer Goodson at Dolphin and Druid Hill, Mr. Schatzow stated that:

But that's like the [Baker and Mount] thing where, he can't identify his own shift commander that's sitting right in front of his face, that's

not a cover up, **that's not trying to hide the truth**, that's not trying to throw the investigators off. Naw, Naw that's not what that is.

TS 1:15:33.

While there are other examples of both prosecutors impugning William Porter's veracity, the above sets out a sufficient basis for this Motion.

The Subpoena

During Officer Porter's trial, he was handed a subpoena to testify in the trials of both Goodson and White. Exhibit B.

The Federal Investigation

Counsel have spoken with the members of the Civil Rights Division of the United States Attorney's Office that are investigating the in-custody death of Mr. Gray. As recently as October 22, 2015, the undersigned corresponded with the United States Attorneys involved in the investigation. It is standard practice for the Department of Justice not to be involved prior to the conclusion of the state prosecutions.

Counsel have had a similar experience with the witnesses. In meeting with one witness, that was called at Officer Porter's trial, the undersigned asked him a question and the response received was "the FBI also asked me that question."

As such, there is an ongoing, verifiable, Federal investigation into the conduct of Officer Porter and others with regard to the death of Freddie Gray and, at this

time, it is impossible to predict whether this will result in charges in United States

District Court.

Significantly: when Officer Porter testified at his trial the undersigned observed at least three (3) current members of the United States Attorney's Office for the District of Maryland in attendance, including the United States Attorney himself. It is therefore, surely, undeniable that Officer Porter remains in the sights of the United States.

II. RELIEF SOUGHT

Officer Porter seeks that this Court find that, notwithstanding any grant of immunity by the state, that he cannot be compelled to testify in either the Goodson or White matters, because such testimony would result in the abridgment of his rights under both the state and federal constitutions.

III. THE STATE'S PROPOSAL

On January 6, 2016 this Court proposes to hold a hearing. At said hearing, Officer Porter will assert his rights under state and federal constitutions to decline to testify at the trials of Goodson and White. Following that, the state proposes to give Porter immunity.

The immunity statute in question reads, in relevant part, as follows:

(b)(1) If a witness refuses, on the basis of the privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or provide other information in a criminal prosecution or a proceeding before a grand jury of the State, and the court issues an order to testify or provide other information under

subsection (c) of this section, the witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of the privilege against self-incrimination.

- (2) No testimony or other information compelled under the order, and no information directly or indirectly derived from the testimony or other information, may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except in a prosecution for perjury, obstruction of justice, or otherwise failing to comply with the order.
- (c)(1) If an individual has been, or may be, called to testify or provide other information in a criminal prosecution or a proceeding before a grand jury of the State, the court in which the proceeding is or may be held shall issue, on the request of the prosecutor made in accordance with subsection (d) of this section, an order requiring the individual to give testimony or provide other information which the individual has refused to give or provide on the basis of the individual's privilege against self-incrimination.
- (2) The order shall have the effect provided under subsection (b) of this section.
- (d) If a prosecutor seeks to compel an individual to testify or provide other information, the prosecutor shall request, by written motion, the court to issue an order under subsection (c) of this section when the prosecutor determines that:
- (1) The testimony or other information from the individual may be necessary to the public interest; and
- (2) The individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide other information on the basis of the individual's privilege against self-incrimination.

Md. Code § 9-123. The state believes that, under the grant of immunity conferred on by this section, Officer Porter will have no Fifth Amendment Privilege, and will have to answer the questions, under penalty of contempt.

While it is known to the Court and the parties - - but may not be by the reader of this Motion - - the state fully intends to go forward with Officer Porter's

retrial on June 13, 2016 - - but in the interim seeks to compel him as a witness in their cases against Officer Goodson and Sergeant White.

IV. PORTER CANNOT BE COMPELLED TO TESTIFY

(a) Summary of the argument

The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution declares in part that "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. Const., 5th Amend. The Fifth Amendment creates a privilege against compelled disclosures that could implicate a witness in criminal activity and thus subject him or her to criminal prosecution. *Hoffman v. United States*, 341 US 479, 486-488, 71 S.Ct. 814, 818-819 (1951). The privilege against self-incrimination is a *constitutionally-based* privilege—not an evidentiary privilege.

While Porter has many valid reasons as to why he cannot be compelled to testify, the overarching principle is that the judicial system is built on trust and respect of the public and relies on that trust and respect for effectiveness. "It is of fundamental importance that justice should not only, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done." Rex v. Sussex Justices, 1 K.B. 256, 259 (1924). Similarly, the United States Supreme Court has said that trials themselves are "a reflection of the notion, deeply rooted in the common law, that "justice must satisfy the appearances of justice," Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 616 (1960) (quoted source omitted), and that the perception of fairness of trials and judicial acts is essential to the effectiveness of the system itself. See

Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring). Frankly, calling Porter as a witness in two (2) trials, about the same matters upon which he faces a pending manslaughter trial, wreaks of improriety.

On a related point: on September 15, 2015 the state told this Court that it was "imperative" that Porter be tried first. Implicitly, maybe even explicitly, the state acknowledged in this pleading that Porter had to go first in order that he not have a Fifth Amendment Privilege. If the state truly believes that Porter can be called as a witness, with a pending manslaughter charge, why was it "imperative" that Officer Porter go first?

Concomitantly, America has racked up masses of jurisprudence in its independence. Indeed, as argued herein, Maryland had a running start with English jurisprudence pre-1776 as precedent. So, for example, plug "bear wrestling" into Westlaw and you'll find statutes from Louisiana (La. Stat. Ann. § 14:102.10), Oklahoma (Okla. Stat. Ann. Tit. 21, § 1700), Missouri (Mo. Ann. Stat. § 578.176) and Arkansas (Ark. Code Ann. § 5-62-124). You'll find cases from around the country discussing whether bear wrestling (or the undersigned's favorite: boxing with a kangaroo) constitutes animal cruelty, or is unconstitutionally vague. In short: the courts of this land have tackled almost every conceivable issue. And yet, the silence is deafening when it comes to one defendant with a pending homicide trial being compelled to testify against another defendant about the same event, over his objection. There is a reason for that: it effectively renders the Fifth Amendment all but meaningless.

(b) A grant of immunity by this Court in this case will not put Officer Porter in the same position

A grant of immunity must provide a protection coextensive with the Fifth Amendment, as required by *Kastigar*. The State attempted to impeach Officer Porter during his mistrial, and to do so, the State presented a theory during Officer Porter's trial which alleged that Officer Porter lied and attempted to cover up facts when giving a statement to police officers, and when taking the stand in his own defense. Effectively, the State wishes to compel Porter, through the farce of a grant of immunity, to lay a foundation for evidence that the State has deemed as constituting an obstruction of justice and perjury.

Perjury, of course, has no statute of limitations. Md. Crim. Code § 9-101(d). So Officer Porter can be charged with it as and when the state chooses to. It is also important to note that Md. Crim. Code § 9-101(c)(1) states that if a defendant gives two contradictory statements, the state does not have to prove which is false, it is enough that both statements under oath cannot be true. As such, if Officer Porter were to testify in Officer Goodson or Sergeant White's trial (or both) something that the state believes is inconsistent with his trial testimony, the state would not have to prove which is false, and all the immunity the state could confer would be rendered meaningless.

Further: a defendant, of course, always has a right to testify in his defense.

At the bench during Officer Porter's trial the Court went to great lengths to inform

Officer Porter of his absolute right to testify and the corresponding right to remain silent. That said "a person convicted of perjury may not testify." Md. Code 9-104. As such, calling Officer Porter as a witness in the Goodson/White trials may result in him being stripped of his ability to testify at his own trial. Again, all the immunity in the world can do nothing to alleviate this concern.

Mp. Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 9-123, "Privilege against self-incrimination provides:

- (b)(1) If a witness refuses, on the basis of the privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or provide other information in a criminal prosecution or a proceeding before a grand jury of the State, and the court issues an order to testify or provide other information under subsection (c) of this section, the witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of the privilege against self-incrimination.
- (2) No testimony or other information compelled under the order, and no information directly or indirectly derived from the testimony or other information, may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except in a prosecution for perjury, obstruction of justice, or otherwise failing to comply with the order.

(Emphasis supplied). In addition, the Supreme Court ruled in *Kastigar* that a witness may be compelled to testify when given use and derivative use immunity, if after the immunity is granted, the immunity leaves the witness in the same position, as if the witness had simply claimed the privilege. *Kastigar v. United States*, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); see also Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964) abrogated by United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666 (1998). Thus, the Maryland statute and *Kastigar* are directly inapposite to the State's theory that Officer Porter committed an obstruction of justice during his

taped statement and Officer Porter committed perjury when he took the stand in his defense at trial.

Courts have agreed, that "[t]he exception in the immunity statute allows the use of immunized testimony only in prosecutions for future perjury, future false statements, and future failure to comply with the immunity order, not for past acts." Matter of Grand Jury Proceedings of Aug., 1984, 757 F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1984). Truthful testimony under a grant of immunity may not be used to prosecute the witness for false statements made earlier. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 819 F.2d 981 (11th Cir. 1987). Thus, based on the State's blatant impeachment of Officer Porter during his trial, the State is effectively presented with a Hobson's choice. The State either has to retract their previous theory, and admit that Officer Porter was truthful, or the State has to recognize that the grant of immunity would be a farce - that is, the State's grant of immunity would be coaxing Officer Porter into committing what the State believes is perjury and an obstruction of justice, both of which are crimes that falls outside the scope of immunity granted in the immunity statute. MD. CODE, CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-123. Such a farcical grant of immunity would fly in the face of Kastigar's holding that a witness may be compelled to testify when given use and derivative use immunity, if after the immunity is granted, the immunity leaves the witness in the same position, as if the witness had simply claimed the privilege. 406 U.S. 441.

An analogous scenario is found in *United States v. Kim*, 471 F. Supp. 467 (D.D.C. 1979). *Kim* held that when a defendant was found to have given a

perjurious response to a congressional committee's question, and then that same defendant is granted use and derivative use immunity to answer the same question, such a grant was not coextensive with scope of privilege that must be provided under *Kastigar*, as it could have resulted in the infliction of criminal penalties. *U.S. v. Kim* is similar to Officer Porter's scenario in that the prosecution cannot first allege that Porter has provided perjured testimony/committed obstructions of justice, and then thereafter grant immunity to suborn the very same testimony that was allegedly perjured. To summarize: "[i]t is well-established in federal courts that the privilege against self-incrimination can properly be invoked based on fear of a perjury prosecution arising out of conflict between statements sought to be compelled and prior sworn testimony." *Johnson v. Fabian*, 735 N.W.2d 295, 310-11 (Minn. 2007) (citing other cases).

Further: each additional statement by Officer Porter would be live tweeted and reported upon, resulting in an inability to receive a fair trial. Notably, this is a matter in which 100% of the jury panel was aware of the case. Likely the same percentage of a new panel would have at least some knowledge of preceding case(s). If Officer Goodson or Sergeant White were to be acquitted it is all but inevitable that jurors would conclude that Porter - - the star witness - - was not credible. If convicted, the jurors will assume that Officer Porter has knowledge of inculpatory acts that he has now revealed when granted immunity.

Commentators will likely opine as to this regardless of the outcome of each trial.

Officer Porter's statement at his trial was unquestionably voluntary, and his statements to F.I.T. and Detective Teel were found by the Court to be voluntary. Contrarily, Officer Porter's potential statements in Officer Goodson's trial and Sgt. White's trial would not be. Officer Porter would thereby be subjected to jurors with some knowledge of the substance of his compelled statements. Parsing out whether a juror's knowledge of Officer Porter's previous testimony was from the initial voluntary statements, or the later compelled statements would not be possible in voir dire. A mini-Kastigar hearing would be required for each juror.

Moreover, in Officer Porter's trial, and any retrial, the witness were and can be sequestered. The reason for this is obvious, that each witness should testify about his or her recollection, untainted by what every other witness said. And while the Court can compel witnesses at Officer Porter's trial from learning what the other witnesses have testified to, it can scarcely prohibit people from following accounts of Officer Porter's testimony in the Goodson and White trials.

If this Court buys what the state is selling, why wouldn't a prosecutor do it in every case? It is all too common that more than one person is charged with any given homicide. Because of a host of reasons, the cases are often severed or not joined. Why would an enterprising prosecutor not say "you know what, Defendant B may testify in his trial. So I'll give him immunity and call him as a witness in Defendant A's trial. I'll see how he responds to questions, get an advance preview of what he's going to say, get a feel for how to cross him,

⁴ See the related Poindexter argument below.

whether to offer him a plea, sure I can't use what he says, but they can't make me forget it, there's no prohibition against me getting a transcript, no brainer, right?" This is exactly the kind of harm the Eighth Circuit saw, when holding that "[s]uch use could conceivably include assistance in focusing the investigation, deciding to initiate prosecution, refusing to plea-bargain, interpreting evidence, planning cross-examination, and otherwise generally planning trial strategy."

United States v. McDaniel, 482 F.2d 305, 311 (8th Cir. 1973).

A later *Kastigar* will be insufficient to remedy Officer Porter's testimony at two trials. As Officer Porter has "not yet delivered the...material, and he consistently and vigorously asserted his privilege. Here the 'cat' was not yet 'out of the bag' and reliance upon a later objection or motion to suppress would 'let the cat out' with no assurance whatever of putting it back." *Maness v. Meyers*, 419 U.S. 449, 463, 95 S. Ct. 584, 593, 42 L. Ed. 2D 574 (1975).

Should this Court give the state its imprimatur to make an end run around self-incrimination, the preceding sentence is a preview of coming attractions.

"[E]ven if the sole purpose in calling a witness is other than subterfuge, the questioning by a party of its own witness concerning an "independent area of inquiry" intended to open the door for impeachment and introduction of a prior inconsistent statement could be found improper." Walker v. State, 373 Md. 360, 386, 818 A.2d 1078, 1093 (2003)

Mr. Schatzow will surely not ask Officer Porter the same questions six months later as he did the first go around. Even if he did, it is inconceivable that

Officer Porter will answer them the same way. All good cross examination is palimpsest, it builds on what you already know. To allow the state to have two (2) more runs at Officer Porter, prior to his retrial, is anathema to our notions of the right to remain silent.

The Maryland statute on immunity states that "if a <u>witness</u> refuses...the <u>witness</u> may not refuse to comply...may be used against the <u>witness</u>...if a <u>witness</u> refuses to comply..." <u>Id.</u> (emphasis supplied). The statute is designed for people without skin in the game: witnesses. Not Officer Porter.

To be sure: there are ways of compelling someone that the state believes to be less culpable in a criminal act to testify at the other's trial. *People v. Brunner*, 32 Cal. App. 3d 908, 911, 108 Cal. Rptr. 501 (CA Ct. App. 1973). California sensibly holds that:

where, as here, the defendant properly invokes the privilege against self-incrimination in a felony proceeding and is compelled by invocation of [the California Immunity Statute] to testify to matters which tend to incriminate him as to presently charged offenses, he may not be prosecuted for them, notwithstanding that his testimony is not used against him.

People v. Campbell, 137 Cal. App. 3d 867, 187 Cal. Rptr. 340 (CA Ct. App. 1982). Accord People v. Matz, 68 Cal. App. 4th 1216, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2D 872, 875 (1998).

Again, California holds that, under its statute "The measure of what incriminates defines the offenses immunized. Thus, the inference ("link") from compelled testimony to implicated offense serves to identify and hence define the offense immunized from prosecution." People v. Campbell, 137 Cal. App. 3d 867, 874, 187 Cal. Rptr. 340 (CA Ct. App. 1982) (emphasis in the original).

(c) Porter has not been immunized federally

As this Court is aware:

The assistant United States attorney testified that she too was authorized to grant [a witness] immunity from any federal prosecution within the...District [that that Federal prosecutor practices in] based upon his testimony or the fruits thereof. She also indicated that the immunity she was offering was not immunity under the federal immunity statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001–03 (1982), which requires federal judicial approval, but rather immunity granted solely under the authority of her office and without the approval of a federal judge.

State ex rel. Munn v. McKelvey, 733 S.W.2d 765, 767 (Mo. 1987). Of course, Federal prosecutors and Judges also have the abiltiy pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001–03 to grant a more formal immunity.

Neither such Orders have been provided in this case. And that notwithstanding, as stated earlier, that the United States Department of Justice is very much aware and monitoring all that is going on in the case at bar.

As the Court is aware, and as will be discussed further later, when the United States Government becomes aware of immunized testimony it typically develops a "taint" team.⁶ The undersigned provides two (2) examples for the purposes of making a record in this case.

 the undersigned both represented correctional officers that were accused of beating an inmate. The officers, and others that worked on their shift, were compelled to testify in administrative hearings. As a result of this compelled

⁶ Sometimes the respective teams are called "clean" and "dirty."

testimony the Federal Government put a "taint" team in place. The FBI Agents and the United States Department of Justice had two prosecution teams. The first got to read everything. The compelled testimony, the information developed through other sources, all of it. The second got to read only what the first team decided was untainted. So the prosecutors did not know what was said by people compelled to answer questions. Nor were the agents actually proactively investigating the case aware what was said during the compelled statements.

2) Under Federal law a defendant in a capital case has a right to raise mental diseases and defects, not amounting to insanity, to argue that he should not receive a sentence in death. Fed. R. Crim. P. § 12.2. The wrinkle is that the Government has a right to advance notice of it, and the opportunity to get their own assessment. What if a capital defendant, not raising insanity, decides to testify at his guilt phase? Well, any prosecutor worth his salt would surely work that information into his cross. Even if a defendant doesn't testify, it could, almost inadvertently, be brought out through other witnesses. IQ scores, personality disorders, defects that go to an ability to accurately recall events, all would be fair game. So the United States Attorney's Office provides two (2) sets of attorneys. Team 1 tries the case. Team 2 receives the mental health disclosure from the defense, hires their own experts, files whatever challenges they believe may lie. And, here's the important part, Team 2 does not share anything that they are doing with Team 1 unless and until said mental health evidence becomes a factor at the penalty phase of the trial.

These two examples are provided solely to point out that there are no such dichotomous participants in this case. The same prosecutors that presented the case to the grand jury, participated in pretrial hearings, and tried Officer Porter's case are now seeking to compel his testimony in the trials of two others, and will be counsel of record when Porter round 2 commences. No walls will be erected around this testimony, the spill over effect will be instantaneous and indellible. For that reason alone this Court must disallow the calling of Officer Porter as a witness.

(d) The state would be suborning perjury

Firstly, it will surely have escaped no-one's notice that Maryland does not allow for a prosecutor or a Court to immunize perjury. Which makes sense from a societal standpoint: 'here's your immunity, now go say whatever you want' is scarcely in the public interest. So, whatever grant this Court makes will have no effect on the ability of the State of Maryland to charge Officer Porter with perjury later.

If Officer Porter is compelled to testify at Goodson trial, and were to testify differently from his own trial: it is surely axiomatic that he would have committed perjury during at least one of the trials. However, even if he testifies consistently with his previous trial: as narrated above the prosecution already believes he has committed multiple instances of perjury. And, as detailed below, what is of crucial importance is what they, the state, believe.

The state's commenting on Officer Porter's testimony would be admissible in Goodson and White's trial as an admission of a party oponent. See, for example, *Wisconsin v. Cardenas-Hernandez*, 219 Wis. 2d 516, 529, 579 N.W.2d 678, 684 (1998) (collecting cases).

Similar situations

The Tennessee Bureau of Investigation investigated a Tri-Cities attorney for perjury, after he was accused of advising one of his clients to "lie under oath" in a DUI case. The lawyer sent the following email to the client, "they won't have anyone there to testify how much you had to drink. You won't be charged with perjury. I've never seen them charge anyone with perjury, and everybody lies in criminal cases, including the cops. If you want to tell the truth, then we'll just plead guilty and you can get your jail time over with."

In State Bar of Cal. v. Jones, 208 Cal. 240, 280 P. 964 (1929), the Supreme Court of California held that a one-year suspension from practice for attorney's attempt to cause miscarriage of justice through inducing clients to give perjured testimony was not an excessive penalty.

In Premium Pet Health, LLC v. All American Proteins, LLC, et al. the Court reprimanded counsel for suborning perjury by submitting an affidavit stating that counsel did not have relevant materials, after counsel deleted all of the relevant

⁷ Available at http://crimlaw.blogspot.com/2005/12/from-dont-leave-writtenevidence-of.html

materials the day before. The judge took particular issue with this turn of events, since Bryan Cave partner Randall Miller was aware of this before he filed an affidavit that denied this, "[Miller] reviewed the Landers Affidavit and filed it ... thereby suborning perjured testimony ... Miller also failed to alert the Court or opposing counsel to the spoliation that Bryan Cave had ordered the day before, another clear violation of professional and ethical obligations."

In *Tedesco v. Mishkin*, an attorney, against whom sanctions were sought both as an attorney and as a litigant in a securities action, suborned perjury of witness in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1622 and aided and abetted witness to commit perjury in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2, 1621 by not advising witness, after hearing his proposed testimony and knowing it to be false, against testifying in that manner. *Tedesco v. Mishkin*, 629 F. Supp. 1474 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). The attorney's later telling witness to do what he had to do was insufficient to stop witness from carrying out agreement given attorney's knowledge that witness would go to drastic lengths to protect attorney. *Id*.

The harm to due process

The relevant law governing a prosecutor's use of perjured testimony is set forth in Napue v. Illinois (1959):

[l]t is established that a conviction obtained through use of false evidence, known to be such by representatives of the State, must fall

⁸ Available at http://abovethelaw.com/2015/06/biglaw-partner-and-associate-destroyed-evidence-suborned-perjury/2/.

under the Fourteenth Amendment. The same result obtains when the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears.

The principle that a State may not knowingly use false evidence, including false testimony, to obtain a tainted conviction, implicit in any concept of ordered liberty, does not cease to apply merely because the false testimony goes only to the credibility of the witness. The jury's estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence, and it is upon such subtle factors as the possible interest of the witness in testifying falsely that a defendant's life or liberty may depend.

360 U.S. 264, 269 (citations omitted.) Accordingly, *State v. Yates*, decided by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, presents a legal scenario that is analogous to that of the instant matter. 629 A.2d 807, 809 (1993). In *Yates*, the prosecutor reasonably believed that a witness presented false testimony when the witness denied any involvement in illicit drugs, and that witness' false testimony was integral to the conviction of the defendant. <u>Id.</u> The defendant's "entire defense depended on the premise that [the witness] owed [the defendant] money from a cocaine sale." <u>Id.</u> The prosecutor knew before trial that the witness had recently been indicted for drug possession, yet, the prosecutor failed to correct the witness' statement when the witness denied any involvement in illicit drugs.

Importantly, the Yates court stated that one does not need to prove that the prosecutor had actual knowledge of the uncorrected false testimony; one "need only show that the prosecutor believed [the witness'] testimony was probably false." See May v. Collins, 955 F.2d 299, 315 (5th Cir.), cert. denied. 504 U.S.

901 (1992); *United States v. Mills*, 704 F.2d 1553, 1565 (11th Cir. 1983), *cert.*Denied, 467 U.S. 1243 (1984); *cf. Giglio v. United States*, 405 U.S. 150, 154

(1972) (knowledge of one attorney in prosecutor's office attributed to other attorneys in office). The Supreme Court of New Hampshire ultimately held that a lawyer's duty of candor to the tribunal "is neglected when the prosecutor's office relies on a witness's denial of certain conduct in one case after obtaining an indictment charging the witness with the same conduct in another case." *Yates*, 629 A.2d at 809. For the prosecution to offer testimony into evidence, knowing it or believing it to be false is a violation of the defendant's due process rights. *Mills*, 704 F.2d at 1565 *citing United States v. Sutherland*, 656 F.2d 1181, 1203 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 455 U.S. 949 (1981); *United States v. Brown*, 634 F.2d 819, 827 (5th Cir. 1981). As noted by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, "the nondisclosure of false testimony need not be willful on the part of the prosecutor to result in sanctions." *Hawthorne v. United States*, 504 A.2d 580, 591 n. 26 (D.C. 1986) *citing Giglio v. United States*, 405 U.S. at 154.

The parallel rule in Maryland is Maryland Rule 16-812, Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3 "Candor Toward the Tribunal," which provides:

⁽a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:

⁽¹⁾ make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer;

⁽²⁾ fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client;

⁽⁴⁾ offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures.

So while Officer Porter one "need only show that the prosecutor believed [the witness'] testimony was probably false," he need go no further than the factual summary above to evince that both Ms. Bledsoe and Mr. Schatzow stated unambiguously that what Officer Porter said was demonstrably false.

There is no way around this

It is of no moment if the state makes claims that Officer Porter is very unlikely to be prosecuted for any statement he might make at the White / Goodson trials. That is because:

We find no justification for limiting the historic protections of the Fifth Amendment by creating an exception to the general rule which would nullify the privilege whenever it appears that the government would not undertake to prosecute. Such a rule would require the trial court, in each case, to assess the practical possibility that prosecution would result from incriminatory answers. Such assessment is impossible to make because it depends on the discretion

United States v. Miranti, 253 F.2d 135, 139 (2nd Cîr.1958) (cited with approval in Choi v. State, 316 Md. 529, 539 (1989).

Even if (which they cannot) the state could somehow confine their direct questioning to areas in which they have never levied a perjury accusation against Officer Porter, this would still not solve the issue.

This is because "a judge must allow a defendant wide latitude to crossexamine a witness as to bias or prejudices." <u>Smallwood v. State</u>, 320 Md. 300, 307-08, 577 A.2d 356, 359 (1990). Accordingly, whatever narrow focus the state may decide to employ in an attempt to cure the unconstitutional ill set out herein, nothing would bind counsel for Goodson and White from a much wider foray on cross-examination. And, in the event that Officer Porter withstands their cross with his reputation intact, the prosecutors could then become character witnesses to impugn his veracity (see further below).

To allow Porter to testify, is likely to result in him being unavailable for cross-examination. While the state may give him immunity, the defense cannot. And any new areas that they enquire into are likely to result in Porter declining to answer. No part of any statement Porter has ever given can be used if he is unavailable for cross-examination. *Crawford v. Washington*, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004); *State v. Snowden*, 385 Md. 64, 867 A.2d 314 (2005).

(e) The cases cited by the State

They do not stand for the proposition that Officer Porter can be compelled to testify

The state principally relies on *United States v. Balsys*, 524 U.S. 666, 680-682 (1998). There are several points to make about this case. Firstly, even the portions that the state relies on cannot be said to be anything more than *dicta*. The holding of *Balsys* was that "[w]e hold that concern with foreign prosecution is beyond the scope of the Self–Incrimination Clause." <u>Id.</u> at 669.

Balsys was an immigration case. Balsys was not given any immunity, and so is dissimilar to the case at bar. And Balsys' purported fear was that he might be prosecuted in "Lithuania, Israel and Germany." Id. at 670. Of course, no prosecution at that time was pending, indeed there was nothing in the record that Lithuania had had any contact with the defendant since his immigration from that country 37 years earlier. The Supreme Court distilled the issue into one sentence: could Balysis "demonstrate that any testimony he might give in the deportation investigation could be used in a criminal proceeding against him brought by the Government of either the United States or one of the States, [then] he would be entitled to invoke the privilege." Here: Officer Porter has demonstrated, conclusively, that there is an ongoing investigation by the United States.

Moreover, *Balsys* reiterates that "the requirement to provide an immunity as broad as the privilege itself." As stated herein, given that the same prosecutors will take Mr. Porter's testimony not once: but twice - - in the trials of Goodson and White, will then cross-examine Officer Porter again at his retrial, he will not, and cannot be, placed in the same position as if he had never testified. The state gets an advantage, and what Mr. Schatzow learns of Officer Porter's knowledge during the compelled testimony during the trials of Goodson and White cannot be unknown to him on June 13, 2016.

Further, what the state is in effect asking this Court to find is that as a matter of Federal law, Officer Porter's testimony at the Goodson and White trials cannot be used against him later. Respectfully, this matter is proceeding in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, and this Court cannot make such an inferential leap as to what a separate sovereign may decide in the future.

Following *Balsys*, the state next cites *United States v. Cimino*, 2014 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 155236 (10/29/14). Firstly, an unreported United States District

Court decision from another circuit is scarcely a reason for this Court to make law that flies in the face of 12 score years of Anglo-Maryland jurisprudence.

Secondly, the reluctant witness in *Cimino* was an "agent of the FBI...carrying out the controlled buys orchestrated by the Bureau." Id. at 5. This is a world away from the case at bar. While the *Cimino* witness may have had a snowball's chance in hell of being prosecuted, no matter what she said, Officer Porter has already been tried once for homicide, with another to follow anon. Lastly, in *Cimino*:

However, the immunity arguments pressed on this Court by defendant are of no relevance to the case at bar. The informant has not been immunized by anyone, for anything. She has no agreement that requires any sovereign to forbear from prosecuting her for any crimes she may commit, including crimes committed during the course of her work as an informant

Id. at 11-12. Thus, the portion cited by the state cannot be said to be anything other than unreported, non-binding, dicta. The third case in the state's trifecta of cases it cited is *United States v.*Poindexter, 698 F. Supp. 300 (D.D.C. 1988). The primary thrust of the case concerns the steps taken by grand jury members to avoid learning of immunized testimony given at Congress, prior to their returning of an indictment. That is night-and-day from what we have here. The reason Poindexter supports Officer Porter's position, however, is that:

there must be noted several administrative steps which were taken by Independent Counsel from an early date to prevent exposure of himself and his associate counsel to any immunized testimony. Prosecuting personnel were sealed off from exposure to the immunized testimony itself and publicity concerning it. Daily newspaper clippings and transcripts of testimony before the Select Committees were redacted by nonprosecuting "tainted" personnel to avoid direct and explicit references to immunized testimony. Prosecutors, and those immediately associated with them, were confined to reading these redacted materials. In addition, they were instructed to shut off television or radio broadcasts that even approached discussion of the immunized testimony. A conscientious effort to comply with these instructions was made and they were apparently quite successful. In order to monitor the matter, all inadvertent exposures were to be reported for review of their possible significance by an attorney, Douglass, who played no other role in the prosecution after the immunized testimony started...Overall, the file reflects a scrupulous awareness of the strictures against exposure and a conscientious attempt to avoid even the most remote possibility of any impermissible taint.

Id. at 312-313. It is therefore, readily apparent that the prosecution team in Poindexter went out of their way to avoid learning anything - - let alone anything of consequence - - from the immunized testimony. In the case at bar, however, there is but one prosecution team. The same people that crossed Officer Porter last time will be in the room when he is called as a witness next time, and the time after that and, potentially, a fourth time at his retrial. The state's failing to Chinese wall the different prosecutions means that they cannot now remove the indellible taint.

Even if the cases said what the state believes they say, Officer Porter has a separate right not to testify under the Maryland Declaration of Rights

Assuming, arguendo, that Murphy signaled a sea change in federal constitutional jurisprudence in its ruling that the federal constitutional privilege against self-incrimination protects a state witness against incrimination under federal and state law, and a federal witness against incrimination under state and federal law. Murphy, 378 U.S. 52, 78. Very importantly, in making its decision, the Murphy Court discussed, in detail, two English common law cases decided before 1776:

In 1749 the Court of Exchequer decided East India Co. v. Campbell, 1 Ves.Sen. 246, 27 Eng.Rep. 1010. The defendant in that case refused to 'discover' certain information in a proceeding in an English court on the ground that it might subject him to punishment in the courts of India. The court unanimously held that the privilege against self-incrimination protected a witness in an English court from being compelled to give testimony which could be used to convict him in the courts of another jurisdiction.

Id. at 58. The Supreme Court also cited Brownsword v. Edwards, 2 Ves.sen. 243, 28 Eng.Rep. 157, decided in 1750, one year after East India Co. v. Campbell, in which the defendant refused to divulge whether she was lawfully married to a certain individual, on the ground that if she admitted to the marriage she would be confessing to an act which, although legal under the common law, would

render her 'liable to prosecution in ecclesiastical court.' *Murphy*, 378 U.S. 52, 58–59. Thus, as the Supreme Court stated, *Brownsword* applied the ruling from *East India Co.* in a case involving separate systems of courts and law located within the same geographic area.

Why this matters is that the Maryland Declaration of Rights Article 5(a)(1) provides, "That the Inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the Common Law of England, . . . as existed on the Fourth day of July, seventeen hundred and seventy-six." (Emphasis supplied). Thus, pursuant to Article 5 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, Maryland common law retains the dual sovereignty doctrine in its entirety, as Maryland retains the rulings set forth in England pre-1776, providing a different protection for its citizens than its federal counterpart.

As stated *supra*, Article 22 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights¹⁰ is the state parallel to the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment. Counsel has located no case which holds that *Murphy* or *Balsys'* rulings are applicable in Maryland under Article 22 grounds.

Further support is found in *Choi v. State*, 316 Md. 529, 545, 560 A.2d 1108, 1115-16 (1989). Because while a witness may have:

waived her Fifth Amendment privilege, she certainly did not waive her privilege against compelled self-incrimination under Art. 22 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Long ago, in the leading case of *Chesapeake Club v. State*, 63 Md. 446, 457 (1885), this Court expressly rejected the waiver rule now prevailing under the Fifth Amendment and adopted the English rule that a witness's testifying

Article 22 states, "[t]hat no man ought to be compelled to give evidence against himself in a criminal case."

about a matter does not preclude invocation of the privilege for other questions relating to the same matter.

Id. This is authority for Officer Porter's contention herein that, while immunity cannot cure his Fifth Amendment concerns, it most certainly cannot assauge his Maryland rights.

Maryland retains the dual sovereignty doctrine in its entirety. *Evans v. State*, 301 Md. 45 (1984) (adopting the dual sovereignty principle as a matter of Maryland common law); see also Gillis v. State, 333 Md. 69, 73, 633 A.2d 888, 890 (1993) (holding that "[u]nder the "dual sovereignty" doctrine, separate sovereigns deriving their power from different sources are each entitled to punish an individual for the same conduct if that conduct violates each sovereignty's laws). *Bailey v. State*, 303 Md. 650, 660, 496 A.2d 665, 670 (1985) (stating that "[t]his Court has adopted, as a matter of common law, the dual sovereignty doctrine.").

Article 22 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights reads that "That no man ought to be compelled to give evidence against himself in a criminal case." Id. Under Article 22, "[t]he privilege must be accorded a liberal construction in favor of the right that it was intended to secure." Adkins v. State, 316 Md. 1, 8, 557 A.2d 203, 206 (1989).

Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, Article XII states, similarly, that no one can be "compelled to accuse, or furnish evidence against himself." And in Massachusetts "[o]nly a grant of transactional immunity" will suffice. Attorney

Gen. v. Colleton, 387 Mass. 790, 801, 444 N.E.2d 915, 921 (1982). Thus, Officer Porter could not be called, were we in Massachusetts, "so long as the witness remains liable to prosecution criminally for any matters or causes in respect of which he shall be examined, or to which his testimony shall relate." Id. at 797.

(e) The state would be making themselves witnesses

There have been only two people that called Officer Porter untruthful. It was not Officer Porter. It was not the Detective Teel, the lead investigator, to the contrary she said he was trying to be candid in her discussions with him. It was not the coroner, nor was it Dr. Lyman, who did not opine as to the reasonableness of Porter's actions. It was not any members of the jury, who presumably at least partly credited his testimony in failing to return a guilty verdict.

The only two (2) persons that have called Officer Porter a liar - - to date - - are Janice Bledsoe and Michael Schatzow. As stated, *supra*, Mr. Schatzow's greatest hits include that Porter "lied to you [the jury] about what happened... lied when he spoke to the [investigative] officers and he lied when he spoke on the witness stand;" while Ms. Bledsoe penned the one hit wonder "Officer Porter was not telling the truth about his involvement in this incident...,the only reasonable conclusion you can come to is that Ofc. Porter is not telling the truth." Id.

Coming from two deputies in the States Attorney's Office these comments are that much more significant because:

Attorneys' representations are trustworthy, the [The Supreme] Court [has] reasoned, because attorneys are officers of the court, and when they address the judge solemnly upon a matter before the court, their declarations are virtually under oath.

Lettley v. State, 358 Md. 26, 47, 746 A.2d 392, 404 (2000) (internal citations omitted).

If Officer Porter is called to testify in the Goodson and White trial there are two (2) people, and only two (2) people, that can be called to impugn his credibility, Ms. Bledsoe and Mr. Schatzow. Thus, "[i]n order to attack the credibility of a witness, a character witness may testify...that, in the character witness's opinion, the witness is an untruthful person." Md. Rule 5-608.

This presents all sorts of problems because:

MLRPC Rule 3.7(a). The policy behind this rule is succinctly stated in the Comment: "Combining the roles of advocate and witness can prejudice the opposing party and can involve a conflict of interest between the lawyer and client." MLRPC Rule 3.7 cmt. With regard to the mixing of roles, the Comment continues:

The opposing party has proper objection where the combination of roles may prejudice that party's rights in the litigation. A witness is required to testify on the basis of personal knowledge, while an advocate is expected to explain and comment on evidence given by others. It may not be clear whether a statement by an advocate-witness should be taken as proof or as an analysis of the proof.

ld.

Klupt v. Krongard, 126 Md. App. 179, 205-06, 728 A.2d 727, 740 (1999). The advocate-witness rule "assumes heightened importance in a criminal case."

Walker v. State, 373 Md. 360, 397 (2003). In short: calling Officer Porter at the

Goodson and White trials will not only result in his rights being violated, but will necessitate a quagmire in which rights are trampled on all sides in the ensuing free-for-all.

WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons and any others that appear to this Court, Officer Porter prays that the Court grant his Motion to Quash the Subpoena he received for the case at bar.

Respectfully Submitted,

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Attorneys for Officer William Porter

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 4th day of January, 2016, a copy of witness William Porter's Motion to Quash the subpoena was hand delivered to Ms.

Bledsoe at 120 E. Baltimore Street, 9th Floor, Baltimore MD 21202.

GARY E. PROCTOR

Figure And Eco SECORD

STATE OF MARYLAND

IN THE
CIRCUIT COURT FOR
BALTIMORE CITY
CASE No. 115141033

EDWARD NERO

V.

STATE'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT EDWARD NERO'S OPPOSITION TO THE STATE'S MOTION TO COMPEL A WITNESS TO TESTIFY PURSUANT TO SECTION 9-123 OF THE COURTS AND JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS ARTICLE

Now comes the State of Maryland, by and through Marilyn J. Mosby, the State's Attorney for Baltimore City; Michael Schatzow, Chief Deputy State's Attorney for Baltimore City; Janice L. Bledsoe, Deputy State's Attorney for Baltimore City; and Matthew Pillion, Assistant State's Attorney for Baltimore City; and responds herein to Defendant Edward Nero's Opposition to the State's Motion to Compel a Witness to Testify Pursuant to Section 9-123 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.

1. Background

On January 14, 2016, the State filed in the above-captioned case a Motion to Compel a Witness to Testify Pursuant to Section 9-123 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. The witness in question was Officer William Porter. The State's Motion, submitted and signed by the State's Attorney herself, averred that the State may call Officer Porter to testify against the Defendant and set forth her determinations that Officer Porter's testimony may be necessary to the public interest but that he is likely to refuse to testify on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination given his similar refusal to testify in the related cases of *State v. Caesar Goodson* and *State v. Alicia White*.

On January 15, 2016, the Defendant filed his Opposition to the State's Motion to Compel. The Defendant attacks the State's Motion as lacking an explanation of "why Officer

Porter is either necessary or material to the trial of Defendant Miller or how it is necessary to serve the public interest." Def. Opp. at 1. The Defendant argues that Officer Porter's testimony is, in fact, *not* necessary to the public interest based on his assessment of the State's reasons for filing the Motion and his view of the Motion's effect on both his and Officer Porter's constitutional rights. Def. Opp. at 2-3. As such, he urges the Court to deny the Motion.

2. The Defendant Lacks Standing to Object that it is not Necessary to the Public Interest to Compel Officer Porter to Testify as a Witness

The Defendant's Opposition should pose no barrier to this Court's granting the State's Motion to Compel because, in short, the Defendant lacks standing to object that it is not necessary to the public interest to compel Officer Porter to testify as a witness. Indeed, nowhere in CJP § 9-123's provisions does there even exist any right for the subject of the criminal prosecution—or the witness to be compelled—to file a responsive pleading or otherwise be heard to object to the merits of the State's Motion to Compel. Instead, the statute sets forth the following as the only prerequisites to a court order compelling testimony:

(c) Order requiring testimony

- (1) If an individual has been, or may be, called to testify or provide other information in a criminal prosecution or a proceeding before a grand jury of the State, the court in which the proceeding is or may be held shall issue, on the request of the prosecutor made in accordance with subsection (d) of this section, an order requiring the individual to give testimony or provide other information which the individual has refused to give or provide on the basis of the individual's privilege against self-incrimination.
- (2) The order shall have the effect provided under subsection (b) of this section.

CJP § 9-123(c) (emphasis added). Subsection (d) outlines what such a prosecutorial request should entail:

- (d) Prerequisites for order. -- If a prosecutor seeks to compel an individual to testify or provide other information, the prosecutor shall request, by written motion, the court to issue an order under subsection (c) of this section when the prosecutor determines that:
- (1) The testimony or other information from the individual may be necessary to the public interest; and
- (2) The individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide other information on the basis of the individual's privilege against self-incrimination.

CJP § 9-123(d). Absent from this subsection is any requirement that the State even file the Motion with the Clerk, much less does the statute require that the State explain in any additional detail its determination to seek immunity and then permit the defendant or the witness to argue against the grant of immunity. So long as the State's immunity request complies with the pleading requirements under subsection (d), the Court "shall issue" an immunity order. The immunity statute does not grant a defendant or a witness standing to object, nor does the statute permit the Court to consider such objections, even if made.

While Maryland's appellate courts have yet to construe CJP § 9-123 on the question of standing to object, the federal courts have had occasion to consider standing under the federal immunity statutes—which are virtually identical to Maryland's § 9-123—and have viewed them as deliberately denying standing to a defendant or witness to object to a prosecutor's immunity decision and as limiting judicial review to verifying prosecutorial compliance with the statute's formal prerequisites. In *United States v. Herman*, 589 F.2d 1191, 1200-01 (3d Cir. 1978), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected the notion that a defendant had standing to seek judicial review of the government's decision about whether it is in the "public interest" to seek compelled testimony under a grant of immunity authorized in 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-6004. The Court considered that such review would not only involve an impermissible

intrusion into prosecutorial discretion in violation of separation of powers principles but that allowing review of such objections would be contrary to the purpose of immunity statutes:

The legislative history of the immunity statutes also shows no sign of a purpose to benefit defendants. The narrow purpose of the use immunity provisions was twofold: to eliminate those federal immunity statutes that required conferral of transactional rather than use immunity and to reduce the number and complexity of immunity statutes. The shift to use immunity was intended to take advantage of the more favorable view of use immunity expressed by the Supreme Court in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 84 S. Ct. 1594, 12 L. Ed. 2d 678 (1964). See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 455-59, 92 S. Ct. 1653, 32 L. Ed. 2d 212 (1972). The clear intent of the shift to use immunity was to make it less costly for the United States Attorney to grant immunity, by allowing for fuller prosecution of both the defendant and the immunized witness. In broader perspective, it is apparent that the immunity statute was part of a massive program of legislation whose central purpose, as its opponents recognized, was to strengthen the hand of the prosecution and to weaken that of the criminal defendant, in many cases to the full extent permitted by the protections of the Bill of Rights.

Id. at 1202.

The Third Circuit also drew upon the reasoning of the Supreme Court's construction of a predecessor immunity statute in *Ullmann v. United States*, 350 U.S. 422 (1956). There the Supreme Court considered the question of whether a witness could properly request a judge to deny an immunity application that otherwise comported with the statutory pleading prerequisites, which at the time required an averment that "in the judgment of a United States Attorney, the testimony of [the] witness . . . is necessary to the public interest" and also required that the United States Attorney obtain "the approval of the Attorney General" before making an application to the court. *Id.* at 423-424. The Government argued "that the court has no discretion to determine whether the public interest would best be served by exchanging immunity from prosecution for testimony [and] that its only function is to order a witness to testify if it determines that the case is within the framework of the statute." *Id.* at 431. The

Supreme Court agreed that "[a] fair reading of [the immunity statute] does not indicate that the district judge has any discretion to deny the order on the ground that the public interest does not warrant it"; rather, the court's "duty under [the statute] is only to ascertain whether the statutory requirements are complied with by . . . the United States Attorney and the Attorney General" *Id.* at 432-34.

The reasoning of the Supreme Court and the Third Circuit holds true for CJP § 9-123. Certainly nothing within CJP § 9-123's provisions indicates that it was intended in any way to confer any rights on a defendant. The statute is a prosecutorial tool granted by the legislature requiring only a few prerequisites to its use. Here, the State's Motion to Compel unquestionably complied with § 9-123(d). The Motion was submitted in writing to the Court and signed by the State's Attorney herself, setting forth her averred determinations that Officer Porter's testimony may be necessary to the public interest but that he is likely to testify based on his prior refusal to do so in related cases. The Court needs no more before issuing its Order and, indeed, is statutorily required to issue the Order upon finding those facts properly presented. As such, the Defendant's Opposition—which does not dispute that the State has met the statutory pleading requirements—raises no cognizable objection and should not be considered by this Court.

Wherefore, the State requests that this Court grant the State's Motion to Compel a Witness to Testify Pursuant to Section 9-123 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article notwithstanding the Defendant's Opposition thereto.

Respectfully submitted,

Marilyn J. Mosby

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 20th day of January, 2016, a copy of the State's Response to Defendant Edward Nero's Opposition to the State's Motion to Compel a Witness to Testify Pursuant to Section 9-123 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article was mailed and e-mailed to:

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1

State v. Nero, Miller, Rice, White January 20, 2016 BEFORE JUDGE BARRY G. WILLIAMS

v. EDWARD MICHAEL NERO, Defendant. * * * * * * * * * * * * STATE OF MARYLAND, * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *	FOR BALTIMORE CITY 115141033 * * * * * IN THE
EDWARD MICHAEL NERO, Defendant. * * * * * * * * STATE OF MARYLAND,	BALTIMORE CITY 115141033 * * * * * IN THE
Defendant. * * * * * * * * STATE OF MARYLAND, *	115141033 * * * * * IN THE
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *	* * * * * IN THE
* * * * * * * * * STATE OF MARYLAND, **	* * * * * * IN THE
STATE OF MARYLAND,	IN THE
•	
*	
v. *	FOR
GARRETT EDWARD MILLER, *	
Defendant. *	115141034
* * * * * * *	
STATE OF MARYLAND, *	11. 11.0
v. *	CIRCUIT COURT
*	FOR
BRIAN RICE, *	BALTIMORE CITY
Defendant. *	115141035
* * * * * * * * * STATE OF MARYLAND, *	+ + * * * *
*	
v.	
ALIOTA MUTUR	
ALICIA WHITE,	BALTIMORE CITY
Defendant.	113141030

ACCUSCRIBES TRANSCRIPTION SERVICE

410-466-2033

410-494-7015

1 2	TRANSCRIPT OF OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS (Motions Hearing)			
3	BEFORE: THE HONORABLE BARRY G. WILLIAMS, JUDGE			
4	HEARING DATE: January 20, 2016			
5	APPEARANCES:			
6	For the State: MICHAEL SCHATZOW, Esquire JANICE L. BLEDSOE, Esquire			
7	MATTHEW PILLION, Esquire JOHN BUTLER, Esquire			
8				
9	For Defendant Nero: MARC L. ZAYON, Esquire ALLISON R. LEVINE, Esquire			
10	For Defendant Miller: CATHERINE FLYNN, Esquire BRANDON MEAD, Esquire			
11				
12	For Defendant Rice: MICHAEL J. BELSKY, Esquire CHAZ R. BALL, Esquire			
13	For Defendant White: IVAN I. BATES, Esquire			
14	For Defendant Porter: JOSEPH MURTHA, Esquire			
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State v. Nero, Miller, Rice, White January 20, 2016 BEFORE JUDGE BARRY G. WILLIAMS

•	MARIE OF COMPLIES		
1 2	TABLE OF CONTENTS		
3	DEFENSE EXHIBITS:	Marked	Admitted
4	Porter's Ex. 1		
5	1/13/16 Letter	44	44
б	Porter's Ex. 2		
7	Trial Testimony of Officer Porter	44	44
8			
9			
10			
11			
12			
13			
14 15			
16			
17			
18			
19			
20			
21			
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ACCUSCRIBES TRANSCRIPTION SERVICE

1	PROCEEDINGS	
2	(On the record - 02:06:52 p.m.)	
3	THE CLERK: All rise. The Circuit Court For	
4	Baltimore City, Part 31, will start the morning session.	
5	The Honorable Barry G. Williams presiding.	
6	THE COURT: The afternoon session, too.	
7	THE CLERK: Say it again?	
8	THE COURT: Maybe the afternoon session, too.	
9	Everyone can be seated.	
10	You said morning.	
11	THE CLERK: Oh, I did? Okay.	
12	THE COURT: Call the case, please.	
13	MR. SCHATZOW: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Call	
14	the case of State versus Alicia White, Number 115141036.	
15	Present on behalf of the State is myself, Michael	
16	Schatzow, Deputy State's Attorney Janice Bledsoe and	
17	Assistant State's Attorney Matthew Pillion and John	
18	Butler.	
19	THE COURT: Good afternoon.	
20	MR. SCHATZOW: Good afternoon, Your Honor.	
21	MR. PILLION: Good afternoon.	
22	MR. BATES: Good afternoon, Your Honor. My name	
23	ıs Ivan Bates. I represent Sergeant Alıcia White	
24	standing to the left of me at the trial table.	
25	THE COURT: Good afternoon. And you're here,	

too, so say --

MR. MURTHA: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Joseph Murtha on behalf of Officer Porter.

THE COURT: All right. Good afternoon to all.

Mr. Bates filed a motion to strike the Court's order compelling Officer Porter's testimony during Alicia

White's trial. Court has had an opportunity to review it. I've seen the response from the Defense.

Mr. Bates, do you want to be heard at all, sir?

MR. BATES: Yes, I do, Your Honor. First of
all, Your Honor, I would like to state that I do feel
that we do have standing. Do feel at this moment in time
this case is a little different in the sense that the
State wishes to introduce evidence that we feel is not
admissible in the trial.

One of the issues we look at, Your Honor, with this order, it states that under subsection D, Your Honor, D-1, the testimony or other information from an individual may be necessary to the public interest.

Well, Your Honor, one of the things we have to do -- before we were judges, prosecutor or defense attorneys we were lawyers, brand new lawyers. In looking at the preamble, what it states is that a lawyer shall and the legal profession in pursuing these objectives and should help the bar regulate itself in the public interest.

What is important, Your Honor, is to sit down and look at the rules of professional candor, 3.3.

THE COURT: Well, actually, Mr. Bates, what I'm more concerned about is whether or not when the Goodson matter was called, and Mr. Murtha made it clear to this Court that his client wasn't going to testify and that he made it clear, because there was a subpoena in your case also, that he wasn't going to testify in your case also, whether it was appropriate for me to allow basically the State and Mr. Murtha to make the same arguments that he made in Goodson which were appropriate to make, to make them in your case. I believe that it was appropriate, but what I will acknowledge that it was inappropriate for me not to allow you to be there. So for that, I will applopize.

MR. BATES: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: So --

MR. BATES: But Your Honor, we do feel that it's inappropriate -- we do feel that we have standing to make the arguments, some of which that Mr. Murtha may have made to the Court, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, what do you mean you have standing to make the -- what do you -- I don't understand what you're saying.

MR. BATES: Well, we feel that because the State

wishes to call Officer Porter, that as an officer of the 1 2 court, when we sit down and we see something that we view as unethical in terms of the rules of professional 3 candor, that we must bring those issues to the Court. 4 5 However, these issues directly affect my client. you sit down and look, the rules are clear. You 6 7 cannot -- in reference to false evidence, when evidence that a lawyer knows to be false is provided by a person 3 9 who is not the client, the lawyer must refuse to offer it regardless of the client's wishes. Here --10 THE COURT: So basically, Mr. Bates, what I 11 12 understand is you're saying --(Loud noise) 13 THE COURT: That's my cane falling. Don't worry 14 about it. I'll probably blame that on you, too, though. 15 MR. BATES: That's fine. I'm used to it. 16 17 THE COURT: I know you are. What you're saying is that the State is offering information and would be 18 offering information in your case that they can't offer. 19 Is that effectively what you're saying? 20 21 MR. BATES: That is effectively, Your Honor. Under the professional rules --22 THE COURT: But isn't that a trial issue? And 23 that would be for the Court to make a determination 24 25 whether it's appropriate to allow the evidence in or not,

not for you, as a lawyer -- you're talking about when we started out -- as a lawyer looking at the canons of ethics? Isn't that more appropriate?

MR. BATES: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BATES: Well, because what it states under the 9-123 that it must be for the public interest. And one of the problems we have with the public interest, the State has already called Officer Porter a liar. Based on that, it's important that the judicial system is not seen as caving in to the State's wishes in which they try to manipulate the system. What we have --

THE COURT: I'll take that as a jab at me but go ahead. Here's what I'm going to say. The Court granted the motion from the State in the Goodson matter based on the arguments that were presented, and I granted the motion in the White matter based on the arguments that were presented on that day. Goodson was here because it was pretrial motions. You were not here, as I noted, because didn't expect, candidly speaking, the Court of Special Appeals to take this case in the manner in which they did. They did. Otherwise, you would have had an opportunity at your trial to make the arguments that you wanted to make wherever I believed it would be appropriate to do so.

Under the circumstances as presented here, 1 2 again, I've already apologized to you for not allowing you to be at the hearing, but I do not believe that 3 necessarily you had a right to make any arguments at all. 4 5 But also, I do not believe that it would be appropriate to grant your motion given the circumstances that we find 6 7 ourselves in where the Court of Special Appeals has 8 accepted the Goodson matter, and they're going to have hearings in March and that I do believe that the factual 9 10 scenario and the legal issues presented in the White case 11 are extremely similar. So for those reasons, I'm going 12 to deny your motion. 13 And if at the appropriate time, when you are before me for a trial, I'm going to kind of guess that 14 you're going to have a number of arguments that you want 15 16 to make. Am I right in that? 17 MR. BATES: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: I kind of figured that. 18 for this moment --19 MR. BATES: I do have one --20 21 THE COURT: Every time you talk --22 MR. BATES: That was my fault. 23 THE COURT: -- every time you talk that thing falls. 24 25 MR. BATES: Well, that's because --

```
THE COURT: Every single time.
1
               MR. BATES: -- the cane is telling you that
2
     you're wrong on the ruling, Your Honor.
3
               THE COURT: Is that what the came is telling me?
4
5
               MR. BATES: So it falls because you're wrong.
               THE COURT: Okay. I'll accept that.
6
               MR. BATES: Respectfully. Respectfully.
7
               THE COURT: And you know I hate when lawyer say
Ŋ
9
     "respectfully" because it means the exact opposite.
               MR. BATES: I know. I know.
10
               THE COURT: The exact opposite. So your motion
11
12
     is denied.
               MR. BATES: Yes, sir. I do have one question.
13
     I guess we'll deal with scheduling at a later time
14
     period, correct?
15
               THE COURT: Absolutely.
16
               MR. BATES: Thank you, Your Honor. May I be
17
     excused?
18
               THE COURT: You don't want to stick around?
19
               MR. BATES: I'm going to stick around but just
20
     excused from the trial table.
21
               THE COURT: You can move on. Thank you.
22
               MR. BATES: Thank you.
23
               THE COURT: All right. And as long as we're
24
     still on this particular issue, I do note that,
25
```

Mr. Murtha, you filed a request for injunction pending 1 appeal in the White case. Clearly, the matter is already 2 before the Court of Special Appeals in the Goodson 3 matter. Based on the Court's rulings, I do believe that 4 under the circumstances it would be appropriate for me to 5 grant your request. I note there's no objection from the 6 State. So the injunction in the Alicia White matter, 7 that will be granted. 8 MR. MURTHA: Thank you, Your Honor. 9 THE COURT: All right. You can call the other 10 three now. 11 MR. SCHATZOW: Your Honor, just with regard to 12 that, just so I -- you're staying not just your order in 13 the case, but you're staying the trial as well? 14 THE COURT: Well, given the fact that the Court 15 of Special Appeals --16 17 MR. SCHATZOW: Yes. THE COURT: -- kind of told me that they wanted 18 that in the Goodson matter -- oh, sit down. 19 20 MR. BATES: Your Honor, just for the record, I want it to be clear that we object on behalf of Alicia 21 White. We invoke our speedy trial rights. 22 THE COURT: How about I assume that you object 23 24 to everything I do? MR. BATES: That would be perfect, Your Honor. 25

1 THE COURT: There we go. Appreciate that. A11 2 right. MR. SCHATZOW: Your Honor, do you want me to 3 call all three of the other cases now at once? 4 5 THE COURT: I do. Um-hum. MR. SCHATZOW: Very well. Your Honor, then 6 7 State would call the following three cases: State versus Miller, Number 115141034, State versus Nero, Number 8 9 115141033, and State versus Rice, Number 115141035. Again, Your Honor, on behalf of the State, Michael 10 Schatzow, Deputy State's Attorney Janice Bledsoe and 11 12 Assistant State's Attorneys Matthew Pillion and John 13 Butler. 14 THE COURT: You may as well speak first. MR. MURTHA: Thank you, Your Honor. Good 15 16 afternoon again, Your Honor. Joseph Murtha on behalf of William Porter. I will note that Officer Porter is not 17 here with the Court's permission. He has waived his 18 appearance consistent with what he has done in the past 19 20 when permitted to do so, Your Honor. MS. FLYNN: Good afternoon, Your Honor. 21 22 Catherine Flynn and Brandon Mead here on behalf of 23 Officer Miller who's standing to my right. 24 MR. ZAYON: Your Honor, good afternoon. For the record, Marc Zayon and Allison Levine present on behalf 25

of Officer Edward Nero.

MR. BELSKY: Good afternoon, Your Honor.

Michael Belsky and Chaz Ball on behalf of Lieutenant Rice
who's present and standing behind me.

THE COURT: All right. We are here because -
if you want to just sit down, however you want to set up

doesn't really matter to me. We are here because the

State has filed a request to compel Officer Porter's

testimony in the trials of Officer Miller, Nero and Rice.

Mr. Murtha, I'll hear from you.

MR. MURTHA: Thank you, Your Honor. Your Honor, this is unlike the two other cases which the Court has actually heard. In the Goodson matter, the White matter, those two individuals that were going to trial, previously the State had clearly identified that they anticipated that Officer Porter would be a material witness in both of those cases and had put us on advance notice.

And for the purpose of the record, there has been an opposition to the motion to compel that has been filed with the Court. I would adopt and incorporate by reference that document. There is an attachment. That attachment is the motion to quash the subpoena that has -- that was served in both the White and Goodson cases. I would note that no subpoena has been served in

regard to Officer Miller, Officer Nero and Lieutenant 1 2 Rice's cases, but the arguments were incorporated by reference for the purpose of the record and once --3 THE COURT: Mr. Murtha, I'm going to make your 4 gob a little bit easier at the moment. Can you proffer 5 to the Court what your client's testimony would be or 6 position would be as far as testifying in the cases of 7 Miller, Nero and Rice? 8 MR. MURTHA: If he would be called to the 9 witness stand right now, he would indicate to the Court 10 that he would invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege. 11 12 THE COURT: Thank you. You may be seated. MR. MURTHA: May I be heard at all, Your Honor? 13 THE COURT: You will at some point, but not 14 15 right now. 16 MR. MURTHA: Okay. THE COURT: State? 17 MR. SCHATZOW: Your Honor, in light of that, we 18 renew our motion to compel. The motion sets forth in the 19 20 words of the statute what the two prerequisites, that is, that the State's Attorney for Baltimore City has 21 22 determined that the testimony of Officer Porter may be necessary to the public interest. And we also assert 23 24 that the State's Attorney determined that Officer Porter is likely to refuse to testify, which his counsel has 25

just represented.

The statutory prerequisites having been met, Your Honor, we believe that the Court should grant the immunity orders. The issues raised by Mr. Porter are issues that A, the Court of Special Appeals is looking at, and B, are issues that are for the Kastigar hearing, not for this stage of the proceedings.

And with regard to the -- I don't know if you want to hear me yet on this, and if you don't, I'm sure you'll tell me. But with regard to the Defendants' motions, our -- the State's position is they have no standing to make these arguments. Their concerns, as you mentioned, are trial concerns which are to be raised at trial. They have no standing --

THE COURT: Well, as I mentioned for Mr. Bates' argument --

MR. SCHATZOW: Yes.

THE COURT: -- I didn't say anything about the others.

MR. SCHATZOW: Yes. But I think logically the same thing is true, Your Honor, when the State -- when the State wishes to have a witness immunized, obviously the Court -- only the Court has the authority to do it; the State makes the motion to the Court but we -- but in analogous situations, there's no room for the Defense.

If we're conducting a grand jury investigation, and we want to immunize a grand jury witness, we don't have to consult with a putative defendant about it.

THE COURT: We have actual Defendants here, right?

MR. SCHATZOW: We do have actual Defendants. You're right, Your Honor. But if you look at the Herman case, which we cited in the oppositions that we filed this morning to the Defendants', the three Defendants' motions, Third Circuit relying on an old Supreme Court case which was decided before there was use and derivative use immunity but based on transactional immunity, both the Supreme Court and the Third Circuit came to the same position, that the immunity statute was not designed to confer rights upon defendants. Their rights are trial rights. Their rights are not to interfere with the State's ability to make reasoned judgments about what may or may not be necessary and what may or may not be in the public interest in terms of making those, you know --

THE COURT: Well, can you proffer to the Court what's the reasoned judgment for Porter's testimony in Officer Miller's case and Officer Nero's case and Officer Rice's case?

MR. SCHATZOW: Yes, Your Honor, I can, although

1 just -- if I might for the record say, Your Honor, I'm 2 going to do that. I'm going to do it willingly but as -just for the record, as a matter of law, we don't think 3 it's necessary once the State's Attorney has made that 4 5 determination. But I'm going to proffer it. 6 THE COURT: Well, let me ask you something. 7 the State's Attorney makes the determination, but the 8 Court finds that it's a ruse and subterfuge, what would 9 the Court have to do at that point in time? MR. SCHATZOW: Well, Your Honor, that's an 10 11 interesting question. And I certainly don't want to 12 suggest that the Court is without power to deal with 13 ruses and subterfuges. That's not what we have here. 14 But it is true that both the Supreme Court of the United States and the Third Circuit have said that as long --15 16 that that is a decision that's entrusted to the State's 17 Attorney and that the -- that it would be a violation of the separation of powers to interfere with that 18 determination. 19 20 THE COURT: Okay. 21 MR. SCHATZOW: So I'm not saying that, Your 22 Honor, to insult you or because I'm not going to answer 23 your question --24 THE COURT: And you're saying it respectfully, 25 I'm sure just --

```
MR. SCHATZOW: I'm not going to use that word.
1
2
     I was going to use that but --
               THE COURT: Everyone uses it.
 3
               MR. SCHATZOW: I'll just say it with a great
 4
 5
     deal of respect. And --
               THE COURT: Thanks.
 6
               MR. SCHATZOW: -- so that's our legal position,
 7
     Your Honor.
8
               But to answer your question, to answer your
 9
     question, there are two areas --
10
               THE COURT: Okay.
11
               MR. SCHATZOW: -- in which this testimony
12
     becomes significant and in the public interest. The
13
     first is the failure to seatbelt at the second stop. And
14
     what Mr. Porter has to say about that in his papers
15
     because he was aware, Your Honor, just, you know, that
16
17
     we --
               THE COURT: Are you talking about his statement
18
     or his trial testimony?
19
20
               MR. SCHATZOW: Yes. His statement because his
21
     trial testimony --
22
               THE COURT: Okay.
                                     There was no testimony
23
               MR. SCHATZOW: -- no.
_34
     about it. But it is in the transcript that we used as a
25
     demonstrative aid during the trial of Mr. Porter. At
```

```
both pages 39 and page 71, he indicates that the --
1
 2
     Mr. Gray, the decedent --
 3
               THE COURT: And 71?
               MR. SCHATZOW: And 71, Your Honor.
 4
               THE COURT: Okay.
 5
               MR. SCHATZOW: It's very clear on 39.
 6
7
     one is a little broader, but it's clear on context.
 8
               THE COURT: Okay.
 9
               MR. SCHATZOW: Pages 39 and 71 says he was not
10
     seathelted.
               THE COURT: Um-hum.
11
               MR. SCHATZOW: The --
12
13
               THE COURT: Well, doesn't page 40 say, "But
     again, I didn't watch the entire ordeal."?
14
               MR. SCHATZOW: That's what he says then and we
15
     also -- of course, we also have the video where he's
16
17
     standing there as he's put in the wagon, and Lieutenant
     Rice is coming out of the wagon so --
18
               THE COURT: So basically what you're saying is
19
20
     you're proffering to the Court that in the case of
21
     Officer Miller, Nero and Rice, you need Porter to testify
     that he was never seatbelted in?
22
               MR. SCHATZOW: That's right, Your Honor, because
23
24
     they're all -- each of them -- each of them are charged
25
     with assault and -- just give me one second. Reckless --
```

excuse me, not assault. Take that back. Each of the three are charged with recklessness -- with reckless endangerment and misconduct for the failure to seatbelt at that stop. And in addition, Lieutenant Rice is charged with manslaughter and assault which we contend stem from the failure to seatbelt at the second stop. So that's one of the two bases, Your Honor, is the failure to seatbelt at the second stop.

THE COURT: So what's the second one?

MR. SCHATZOW: The second one is the place where the injury occurred.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHATZOW: As I'm sure you recall, there was -- the State's position, which has been relied on by both its experts and the State in proving its case, is that the injury to Mr. Gray that proved fatal took place between the second stop and the fourth stop. And the Defense has contended that the injury took place between the fifth stop and the sixth stop and that is -- the State does not contend that that's --

THE COURT: Well, I'm sorry. Excuse me one second. You said that you need Officer Porter's testimony based on his statement on pages 39 and 71?

MR. SCHATŻOW: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead.

```
So in terms of the --
               MR. SCHATZOW: Excuse me.
1
2
     and that was related to the second stop, failure to
3
     seatbelt, Your Honor.
               THE COURT: Um-hum.
 4
               MR. SCHATZOW: In terms of the place of injury,
5
    Officer --
6
               THE COURT: Well, I'm -- I got to back up.
7
     sorry. You're talking about page 71, but if you look at
8
     page 70, the question has to do with what Goodson did.
9
     So how does that have any relevance to Nero, Miller and
10
     Rice for page 70 and 71?
11
12
               MR. SCHATZOW: My recollection, Your Honor, and
     I don't have it in front of me, my recollection was
13
14
     that --
               THE COURT: I do.
15
16
               MR. SCHATZOW: I know you do. My recollection
     was that in the context of 70 and 71, they're talking
17
     about the totality, not just at the fourth stop, but the
18
     totality --
19
               THE COURT: Page 70, line 20, Detective
20
     Anderson, "So what -- what was Goodson doing? I mean,
21
     did he seatbelt him in?"
22
               Officer Porter, "Well, he -- I -- I guess
23
24
     he didn't seatbelt him after I left. No."
25
               Again, Anderson, "So he -- so he wasn't
```

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seatbelted in? Okay."
1
               Detective Teal, "Do you own a taser?"
2
               Officer Porter, "No. I don't have one."
3
               And so Detective Anderson again, down at
4
     line 11, "All right. So at no time did you see him
5
     seatbelted in?"
6
                     Right." Any further question, Detective
7
               "No.
     Anderson. That's what's there.
8
               MR. SCHATZOW: Yes, Your Honor. "So at no time
9
     did you see him seatbelted in?" Your Honor. When I was
10
     referring to, it was broader in context than just the
11
12
     second stop. He's saying at no time on that day --
     this -- page 71 is near the very end of the interview, as
13
     I recall. And so he's summing -- Detective Anderson in
14
     his question is summing up on an overall basis what is
15
     set forth in terms of --
16
               THE COURT: Well, is Detective Anderson going to
17
     testify to that, that he was summing up?
18
               MR. SCHATZOW: I can't tell you, Your Honor,
19
     that I've asked him that specific question. All I can
20
     tell you is we -- that's how we read the transcript --
21
               THE COURT: Okay.
22
               MR. SCHATZOW: -- in addition to what's on
23
24
     page 39 which is specific to the second stop.
25
               THE COURT: And page 40.
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23

State v. Nero, Miller, Rice, White January 20, 2016 BEFORE JUDGE BARRY G. WILLIAMS

1 MR. SCHATZOW: Yeah. This continues on. 2 THE COURT: Okay. 3 MR. SCHATZOW: Yes. THE COURT: Go ahead. 4 5 MR. SCHATZOW: Okay. So that's one discrete 6 area. And the second area, Your Honor, the second 7 discrete area involves the place of injury. 8 THE COURT: Okay. 9 MR. SCHATZOW: And there is a dispute, as you're well aware, that -- between the State, which contends 10 11 that the fatal injuries took place between the second 12 stop and the fourth stop, and the Defense, which contends 13 that the injuries took place between the fifth stop and the sixth stop. And part of what the State relies on and 14 part of what the State's experts rely on are Officer 15 16 Porter's description of what occurred at the fourth 17 stop --THE COURT: And you're talking about in his 18 statement or in the trial testimony? 19 20 MR. SCHATZOW: In both. 21 THE COURT: Okay. 22 MR. SCHATZOW: In both. In both. And so we 23 don't contend, Your Honor, that it is legally dispositive 24 of every single charge against each of Mr. -- Messrs. 25 Miller, Nero and Rice. But we do think it's important,

when there's a dispute like that, it's important to the jury when they start weighing how they're going to decide the case. And --

THE COURT: Well, didn't the dispute start when he gave his statement? What I'm obviously concerned with is you made it very clear to this Court when this case started back when I got involved, sometime in June, what your order was going to be and why. You made it clear that you needed Officer Porter's testimony for Goodson and for White. Whether the Court agreed with that or not was irrelevant. Doesn't matter but you made that clear. At no point at all did you ever make it clear to me -- you may have talked to the Defense attorneys, I don't know -- but you never made it clear to the Court that there would be a reason for Officer Porter to effectively testify in every single case.

So it's either the issue of you didn't know, and you didn't figure it out until after the trial, although you had his statement, or for some other reason. So I don't understand so explain.

MR. SCHATZOW: Your Honor, what you just said is accurate. We didn't take that position. But we tried to learn something from our experience in trying Mr. Porter, and we tried to learn something about what was effective in what we did, what was effective in what the Defense

did, what we tried to read into what the jury did. 1 2 we think we have the right to change our mind, Your 3 Honor. And we acknowledge we're --THE COURT: Sure. 4 5 MR. SCHATZOW: -- changing our mind. THE COURT: Okay. 6 MR. SCHATZOW: Nobody's trying to mislead you, 7 8 and we haven't tried to mislead you, and we're not 9 misleading you now. You are absolutely right in what you 10 described as the order that we presented. It's still the order that we want -- would like to try the cases in 11 ultimately. That would be a question for you and -- but 12 the --13 THE COURT: More so the Court of Special 14 15 Appeals, but we'll see about that, too. 16 MR. SCHATZOW: And the Court of Special Appeals. 17 But we do think, having watched the case play out, that it's going to become important particularly because in 18 the case of the -- of Miller, Nero and Rice, if the jury 19 20 believes and concludes that the injury happened between 21 stops two and four, I think they look at their 22 culpability in a much different way than if they believe 23 the injury happened between five and six. It may not be 24 legally dispositive, but I think it's very important for the jury. And I think that's something that got hammered 25

home to us as we looked back on our experience in the Porter case and watched the trial unfold and that's the -- those are the two reasons, Your Honor. It's as simple as that is, or whether it's complicated or simple, that's what the reasons are.

THE COURT: All right. So as far as the seatbelting, you say that you need Officer Porter's testimony. At what stop you're talking about?

MR. SCHATZOW: Two.

5

 THE COURT: Stop two. That's where the video is, correct?

MR. SCHATZOW: Correct, Your Honor. That was the -- yeah, the video with him being -- you know, where they show Mr. Gray on his knees and the leg chains on him and putting him in the van.

THE COURT: So if I understand what you're talking about there, the video showed Officer Porter closer to the van. Officer Porter indicated that he wasn't close to the van and couldn't see anything. So what is it that you need him to say?

MR. SCHATZOW: That he did not -- exactly what he says in his statement. He did not see him seatbelted in that van, and we can show where he was at the time and what his opportunity to observe was and he can -- and he'll say, we assume, if he testifies consistently with

his statement, that he was not -- he did not see him 1 2 seatbelted. 3 THE COURT: So what you're saying is you believe that the testimony that you're -- you're offering 4 5 immunity in the case of Nero, Miller and Rice for the purpose of Mr. Porter to come in and state that I never 6 7 saw them seatbelt him in; is that correct? 8 MR. SCHATZOW: At stop two. 9 THE COURT: At stop two. 10 MR. SCHATZOW: Yes. 11 THE COURT: But then we know that if we go to 12 the next page of his statement, "But again, I didn't 13 watch the entire ordeal." So my question to you is how 14 is that statement going to be admissible and relevant? 15 MR. SCHATZOW: Well, I think it will be 16 admissible and relevant because he says he didn't see him 17 and the -- didn't see him seatbelted, and the video will 18 show what his opportunity to observe was, when the 19 opportunity began, when the opportunity ended. And that 20 will allow us to prove that he was not seatbelted in 21 the --THE COURT: Well, let me stop you there. 23 does that prove that given that the video doesn't show inside the van, correct? 24

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MR. SCHATZOW: No. It doesn't show inside the

25

1 van. You're right, Your Honor. 2 THE COURT: Okay. MR. SCHATZOW: But what it shows is Lieutenant 3 Rice stepping out of the van and Mr. Porter stepping back 4 5 to allow Lieutenant Rice out of the van, and there's no 6 evidence that anybody else ever went into the van. 7 he wasn't seatbelted then at stop two, he was not seatbelted at stop two. 8 THE COURT: Well, does the video show the entire 9 time from Mr. Gray being placed into the van and 10 11 Mr. Gray -- the van door closing? 12 MR. SCHATZOW: I can't say that, Your Honor. you'll recall, I think there's some times when the video 13 14 is pointing down at the street. So I'm not going to say that it proves it to a mathematical certainty but --15 THE COURT: Well, of course. And I don't need 16 17 you to do that. What I'm trying to figure out, before I make my ruling, is what it is that you want to get 18 because --19 20 MR. SCHATZOW: Right. But --21 agree, the statute is relatively clear stating when the 22 prosecutor determines that the testimony may be necessary 23 to the public interest, the Court shall issue an order 24 requiring the individual give testimony. But I also note 25 that common sense also dictates looking at the Maryland

```
Rules, Rule 401 which defines relevant evidence,
1
     Rule 5-402 which talks about all relevant evidence is
     admissible, and things that are not relevant are not
 3
     admissible, and then the more important one, 5-403 makes
4
5
     it clear that although relevant evidence may be --
     although relevant evidence may be excluded if its
6
    probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
7
     of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading
8
9
     the jury or by considerations of undue delay. And I'm
     sure that if I let the Defendants stand up, they're going
10
     to talk about their speedy trial issues and other things.
11
               So answer that for me now.
12
13
               MR. SCHATZOW: Well, I -- in terms of speedy
     trial, Your Honor, I --
14
               THE COURT: Well, when I say answer that for me
15
     now, it really wasn't --
16
17
               MR. SCHATZOW: Oh.
               THE COURT: -- that part of it. Just saying why
18
     should I allow it?
19
20
               MR. SCHATZOW: Because we are making the
     request. We are making it in good faith. I've explained
21
22
     to you the two bases -- the two separate bases on which
23
     we have concluded that this testimony is in the public
24
     interest. And I think that these -- these are not sort
25
     of frivolous or made up arguments. They're real
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arguments, and the statute entrusts the State's
Attorney's Office to make the decision of whether it's in
the public interest. And I understand Your Honor's
desire to make sure that there's not a ruse or some
subterfuge going on here. And I assure you there isn't,
and I've explained to you why there isn't.

But once you're past that, Your Honor, then I think it's separation of powers. It's the intent of the legislature. It's the constitutional law. This is the State's Attorney's decision to make, and once they make it, and they make it in good faith, then we're done.

Now you have other issues. We're only talking right now, Your Honor, about the question of granting the motion to compel. I'm not saying that because you immunize him that means you're no longer the judge at trial; you can't make rulings on what's admissible and what's not --

THE COURT: If only.

MR. SCHATZOW: -- insofar as his testimony is -goes. But what I am saying very strongly, Your Honor,
that's premature. Those are issues that you'll decide
when he's on the witness stand, and we ask a question,
and somebody objects, and then you'll make a ruling. And
you will not hear me say that because you immunize him
then that means he -- you can't control the evidence

presented to the jury. I'm just saying that it's premature on this particular issue that's before you today right now.

THE COURT: And of course, if I grant him -- if I grant immunity in each of those cases, the next step that you've asked this Court to do is to postpone the cases.

MR. SCHATZOW: That's correct, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And tell me why I would do that.

MR. SCHATZOW: Well, for -- I think for a -- two different reasons although they're all -- they're kind of related. First off, I think and would submit to the Court that it's the most practical thing to do for these three reasons. One is if you put off these cases, we ultimately get a decision from the Court of Special Appeals, and they tell us what we're -- what to do, and we're all going to do what they tell us what to do.

Then we would have the opportunity, Your Honor -- you would have the opportunity to schedule the retrial of Mr. Porter first. And if you were to do that, Your Honor, that would have at least three impacts. It would eliminate the need for a Kastigar hearing, which could be complex, could be simple, but it could be complex, and it's going to definitely take time no matter what. It will allow the State to avoid the expense and

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problems associated with putting together a clean team
 1
     sometime before Mr. Porter testifies under immunity and
 2
 3
     those -- that's -- that is clearly in the public interest
 4
     to save --
 5
               THE COURT: Well, couldn't you have figured that
     out when you charged these six officers that you would
 6
 7
     need that, if you wanted their testimony?
               MR. SCHATZOW: Well, I don't think we assumed,
 8
 9
     Your Honor, that the first case would end in a mistrial
10
     and --
               THE COURT: Why wouldn't you assume that that's
11
12
     a possibility?
13
               MR. SCHATZOW: We did assume it was a --
               THE COURT: Mistrial, not guilty, guilty --
14
15
               MR. SCHATZOW: We did assume --
16
               THE COURT: -- those are the three options.
17
               MR. SCHATZOW: -- we did assume it was a
     possibility, Your Honor. We did assume that. And Your
18
     Honor, I know you don't think so, but we really do pay
19
     attention to what you say and you made -- when you were
20
21
     talking before, you made it fairly clear -- I know you
     weren't prejudging anything. I'm not accusing that. But
22
23
     that it would be necessary for us to have a taint team.
     And the fact -- a clean -- call it a clean team.
24
                                                        You
25
     know what I'm talking -- a team that's not exposed to the
```

1 immunized testimony. And okay, we heard you, Your Honor. The fact 2 3 is in federal --THE COURT: Well, it's not me. It's the 4 5 Court -- the Supreme Court made it clear that if you want 6 to use immunized testimony how it's done. I had nothing 7 to do with that. That goes way back. MR. SCHATZOW: Well, no. But it is true, Your 8 9 Honor, there's a split in circuits about whether -- in the federal circuits there's a split about whether the 10 11 mere fact that the prosecutor has access to the immunized 12 testimony is actual derivative use if the prosecutor 13 doesn't go out and get evidence based on that. 14 THE COURT: But of course, you have to prove that. 15 16 MR. SCHATZOW: Yes. And we'd have to prove that 17 at a Kastigar hearing. THE COURT: Right. 13 MR. SCHATZOW: And you're absolutely right. 19 20 It's much easier to prove that if you have a clean team, 21 and you don't have tainted prosecutors. So we anticipated -- we didn't anticipate, Your Honor, that we 22 23 would have such a strong impression that we needed to have a clean team because we can account, in a retrial 24 25 for Mr. Porter, of all -- for all the evidence because we

already have put the evidence in. And so that's exactly what our thinking was in response to that. So it would avoid that.

And then secondly, Your Honor, in terms of virtually every objection Mr. Porter has made, both before you and the Court of Special Appeals, if his case were tried before the others, before he was compelled to testify, virtually every one of those objections goes away.

THE COURT: There. I want to do that, don't I?
That's my concern to help the State out.

MR. SCHATZOW: No. Well, it's not to help the State out, Your Honor. It's to help --

THE COURT: I mean, yes, of course it is. It absolutely, positively -- Mr. Schatzow, it absolutely, positively is. There's no other reason for you to say that. I don't care whether you have to have a clean team or a dirty team. I don't care if you get a guilty, a not guilty, a hung jury. I don't care if the Defendants are found guilty or not guilty. That's for the process.

But for you to sit here and knowing full well that I said no, I'm not going to try Mr. Porter's case next because these other Defendants have a right to go to trial, and then for you at this later point in time to say oh, by the way, you know what, we never thought about

using Porter; we investigated this case for the time that we did; we looked at these cases; we charged the six Defendants; we never, ever thought that we'd possibly have to use Porter's testimony in every case, sounds strange to the Court.

So with all that said, yes, you should have figured this out. Yes, it's your job to do these things. You didn't do it and that's fine. This is where we are.

So sort of apologize for the outburst, but by you saying that you didn't know and that it would help you not to have a tainted team because you think that's what I'm requiring, the law requires it. It would help you so that all the concerns that Mr. Porter has would go by the wayside, not my concern. So please continue.

MR. SCHATZOW: Yes, Your Honor. I'm not trying to suggest it wasn't in the State's interest. I'm not trying to suggest that at all, Your Honor. I guess what I am trying to suggest is that it's also in the public interest if the Defendants' rights are protected to all — to have the case go with a minimum expenditure of public resources. That's all I'm trying to suggest, Your Honor. It's certainly in the State's interest, and I don't want you to interpret what I'm saying as not being in the State's interest. Of course, it is in the State's interest, but the State is not just some ordinary party

to the proceedings. We're no more important, we're no more special the Defendants are, but we're not just a private citizen making an argument. And so that's one set of reasons.

And the other set of reasons relates to the things that I said before, these two substantive areas where we think it's in the public interest to have the benefit of his testimony. And Your Honor, I hear you loud and clear and --

THE COURT: Well, I know you always do, Mr. Schatzow. You're fine.

MR. SCHATZOW: What?

THE COURT: I said I know you always do.

MR. SCHATZOW: So we do think, for the reasons I said before, those two discrete areas, that it makes sense. And you know, all I can do is say this, Judge. I think I've tried to demonstrate it. We're acting in good faith here. Whether someone, including you, thinks that we should have figured all this out earlier, I don't know what we would have -- well, I do know what we would have done differently. We would have told you in the beginning that we wanted Porter in each and every trial. That's what we would have done differently.

But we are where we are, and if somebody is going to be blamed for not having the sufficient

1 foresight, that should be me. But that's where we are, 2 and I urge you to grant these motions. They're being 3 made in good faith. They comply with the statute. They comply with the constitution. And if you have no other 4 5 questions, Your Honor, I would submit on what I've said 6 in our papers. And I would also like Your Honor to 7 8 incorporate, as Mr. Murtha did, the arguments we made in 9 the Goodson case as well as our written opposition to the 10 motion to quash filed in the Goodson and White cases. THE COURT: Very well. Well, in these cases, 11 12 you did not file a -- there's no subpoena in these cases. 13 MR. SCHATZOW: We haven't filed a subpoena, Your Honor, because --14 15 THE COURT: Okay. Just wanted to make sure. MR. SCHATZOW: -- quite frankly, because where 16 17 we are in the scheduling. THE COURT: I understand. All right. I just 18 wanted to make sure that I didn't miss something. 19 20 MR. SCHATZOW: That's accurate. We have not 21 issued the subpoenas. We assume that that part we will be able to work out with Mr. Murtha. 23 THE COURT: All right. And I do have one more 24 question.

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MR. SCHATZOW: Sure.

25

THE COURT: The issue concerning the seatbelt 1 2 again for Officer Porter, if he testifies the way you 3 want him to, are you not setting him up for perjury? MR. SCHATZOW: I don't see how, Your Honor, 4 5 because again, this whole -- the perjury --THE COURT: Well, you --6 7 MR. SCHATZOW: -- Your Honor, I would just --8 THE COURT: -- you need him to say --9 MR. SCHATZOW: -- I'd just like to get him convicted for what I've charged him with --10 THE COURT: I understand. 11 12 MR. SCHATZOW: -- before I worry about something else. You know, in terms of the way my understanding, 13 14 which I think is correct, about the way this works, we 15 cannot use his immunized testimony to prosecute him for 16 perjury that he committed before his immunized testimony if he committed such perjury. So I don't see how we're 17 setting him up for perjury. He has no Fifth Amendment 18 privilege to perjure himself. He's got to tell the 19 20 truth. THE COURT: Well, but here's the problem that I 21 Under this factual scenario that you've presented the Court, not the factual scenario for Goodson and 23 24 White, but under the scenario that you have here, 25 effectively each Defendant has a right to cross-examine

Mr. Porter, and if he wants to say something different, it kind of impacts their ability to cross. You have the ability to ask questions the way you want, but also there's a right to cross-examine. And you're saying you're granting immunity, but it seems problematic that you get to say all right, we want him to say X, and as long as he says X, everything is fine. But then when he's going to be crossed, he's going to take the Fifth. You're saying well, you know, he's saying something different now. So where are we with that?

MR. SCHATZOW: Your Honor, maybe I have a fundamental misunderstanding. I think when -- his compelled testimony is all of his testimony. In other words, if he says a stoplight was red on direct, and he says it's -- and on cross he says it was raining, I think the raining is also the subject of the compelled testimony. In other words, you're not going to let him get on the stand and say just answer the prosecutor's questions, and now you can take the Fifth for the --

THE COURT: No. I wouldn't do that.

MR. SCHATZOW: No. So my understanding is we -his immunity applies to his compelled testimony. His
compelled testimony begins when we start asking him, and
it ends when you excuse him from the witness stand. So I
don't see -- you know, so in other words, I want to be

1 clear here, Judge. Yeah. Nobody is asking you and we 2 are not giving and we are not seeking a license for him 3 to get on the stand and commit perjury. We're asking to 4 compel his truthful testimony, and we assume that the 5 testimony will be the same regardless of whether we ask 6 the questions or the Defense asks the questions. 7 THE COURT: The same consistent with this 8 statement, correct? 9 MR. SCHATZOW: Well, yes. That's our basis for 10 believing what he's going to say because he's already 11 said it. Yes. 12 THE COURT: Mr. Murtha? 13 MR. MURTHA: May we just approach very briefly? 14 And it's just a Porter issue so --15 THE COURT: That's fine. BENCH CONFERENCE 16 17 (Bench Conference begins - 02:46:16 p.m.) 18 (The parties approach the bench where the following ensues:) 19 20 THE COURT: Um-hum. 21 MR. MURTHA: Your Honor, because I know the 22 Court instructed us not to append the January 13th, 2015 23 letter to any pleading, but in the January 13th, 2015 24 letter to the Court, the representation that the State 25 made was that they were relying upon the testimony and I

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410-466-2033 410-494

E. 114

will -- if the Court has a copy of the letter --1 2 THE COURT: I do. 3 MR. MURTHA: And it's on the second page. 4 so I read and reread. It's on the second page, first 5 paragraph. And the State makes the representation not that they're relying upon the statement, but they're 6 7 relying upon his testimony. Which now there's a shifting 8 sand that, you know, adjusts the foundation upon which I 9 stand upon. 10 But I would mark as an exhibit his trial testimony for the purpose of the hearing, in light of the 11 12 representation that had been made, and just admit it to 13 show that there is literally an absence of any testimony 14 relating to whether or not Officer Porter made an 15 observation about whether Mr. Gray was seatbelted or not 16 seatbelted. THE COURT: Here's the situation that I find us 17 18 in. You're right. We do have the letter here. Which number is the September letter? I know I have it --19 20 MR. MURTHA: September the 15th I --21 THE COURT: Yeah. I'm just saying whether No. 22 it was in or not before. It's one of the few times I did 23 allow you to write me as opposed to a motion. MR. SCHATZOW: Your Honor, I believe the 24 25 September 15th letter was attached as an exhibit to --

42

State v. Nero, Miller, Rice, White January 20, 2016 BEFORE JUDGE BARRY G. WILLIAMS

```
THE COURT: I think so.
1
               MR. SCHATZOW: -- somebody's papers. I can't
2
3
     tell you --
4
               THE COURT: That's fine. Yeah, yeah.
               MR. MURTHA: It was --
5
6
               THE COURT: Okay. That's fine.
7
               MR. MURTHA: -- for scheduling. It was actually
8
     to all of -- all of the oppositions included the
9
     September the 15th letter.
10
               THE COURT: Well, here's the thing. All this
    may be in another court anyway. You effectively read
11
12
     this into the record just -- I'm not bothered by it. I'm
13
     just saying you referred to everything in here. That's
14
     fine. I'll let it be an exhibit --
15
               MR. MURTHA: Okay.
16
               THE COURT: -- that you can reference. And then
     I have no problem with it. That's all. So that's fine.
17
18
               MR. MURTHA: Thank you, Your Honor.
               THE COURT: Okay.
19
20
          (Bench Conference concluded - 02:48:12 p.m.)
21
          (The parties return to the trial tables where the
22
     following ensues:)
23
               THE COURT: So Mr. Murtha, you're making
24
     reference to what now?
25
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MR. MURTHA: Your Honor, I would ask -- and I
1
     actually have a copy; it's highlighted.
                                              It the State
2
     does not oppose the highlighted version, I could
3
     substitute it. That there be marked as Officer Porter's
4
     Exhibit A which is a January the 13th, 2016 letter.
5
               THE COURT: It will be Exhibit 1.
6
               MR. MURTHA: Exhibit 1, if I may approach.
7
8
     have stickers.
               THE COURT: Any objection to the highlighted
G
     one, or do you have a clean one over there, Mr. Schatzow?
10
               MR. MURTHA: I have --
11
               MR. SCHATZOW: Oh. Do they have -- I have a --
12
               MR. MURTHA: I have a clean one.
13
14
               THE COURT: Okay.
               MR. MURTHA: If I may approach, Your Honor.
15
                 I'm sorry. I didn't fill out these stickers.
16
     Exhibit 1.
     That would be the January the 13th, 2016 letter to the
17
     Court from Mr. Schatzow advising the Court of essentially
18
     what has just been argued.
19
               And I would note that on page 2 of that letter,
20
     in the first paragraph in the representation to the
21
     Court, the State says that they would be relying upon the
22
     testimony of Officer Porter. So in anticipation of
<u>:</u>3
     today's hearing and searching for why it would be that
24
     they would rely upon testimony that literally never
25
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addressed the issue of seatbelting I would -- I have
 1
2
     marked and asked that it be admitted as Defendant's
     Exhibit 2, and that is the trial testimony of Officer
 3
     Porter. And I would proffer that --
 4
5
               THE COURT: Any objection, just for the record?
               MR. SCHATZOW: For the letter going in? No,
 6
7
     Your Honor.
               THE COURT: And the transcript.
8
               MR. SCHATZOW: Oh, and the transcript? No, Your
9
     Honor.
10
               THE COURT: Okay. So entered.
11
12
          (Defendant Porter's Exhibits 1 and 2 are marked for
     identification and admitted into evidence.)
13
14
               MR. MURTHA: And that reason that becomes
     important is because seven days later, we're in a
15
16
     position where the State has said -- after having the
     benefit of actually reading the responsive pleadings
17
     including the responsive pleading of Officer Porter
18
     opposing the motion to compel, saying that nowhere within
19
20
     that trial transcript is there actually any testimony
     that relates to seatbelt or not seatbelting. And I think
21
     that's significant because -- and it's not always easy to
22
     make accusations of things such as pretext, subterfuge
23
     and ruses, but that's what this is.
24
25
               And the reason being is clearly the Court
```

<u>:</u>2

 had -- or excuse me, the State had communicated to the Court previously an interest in trying the cases of Officer Miller, Officer Nero and Lieutenant Rice after the retrial of Officer Porter. The Court was not inclined to do that, and I don't think there was ever a formal postponement. And then after a trial on Officer Porter, and after, not at a time of Officer Goodson's trial or Officer White's trial but only after injunctive relief had been granted by the Court of Special Appeals, does it become important for the State to actually call Officer Porter as a witness about stop two.

Now I think in the -- it will be reflected in the cross-examination by Mr. Schatzow and also in the closing arguments -- the State ridiculed Officer Porter because Officer Porter indicated when he got out of his car he couldn't see what was going on, and he was vigorously cross-examined about how close he was and then also asked why he couldn't identify who the people were. So here the State's making a representation to the Court that he's a vital material witness of a fact, one, that is never testified to, and two, where it being subject to cross-examination, the State held him in contempt for not being able to see what was actually going on. In fact, in the videotape that's being referenced by the State, he turns his back, and he actually approaches the crowd

because he engages in crowd control.

Now adopting the State's theory of the use of a Defendant as a witness, it would be much easier for the State to look down this trial table and to say you know what, stop two, who could we use? Well, let's see. We have Officer Garrett Miller's first, and what we're going to do is we're going to immunize Officer Nero, and we're going to call him because that's our theory. We want the most important witness that can testify to that. Or maybe we even immunize Lieutenant Rice because he's third.

How does Officer Porter, whose back is turned to the van before the doors close, who doesn't know whether or not he was seatbelted, become a material witness about stop two? That -- it's a disingenuous pretext for the purpose of getting a postponement. And it's actually -- it's offensive in the sense that the State stands up here and makes the representations that they do, suggesting that it really isn't for the purpose of getting a postponement.

In regard to the fourth stop, there are three officers that have actually been given immunity. Officer Novak -- and Officer Novak has been identified as a State witness. Officer Novak did not testify for the State. He's testified for the Defense. But Officer Novak

testifies very clearly of his involvement in stop two. He's already been granted immunity. He was a participant in the arrest of Mr. Gray at stop two. He had a bird's-eye view of what transpired. They had a sufficient witness who could actually testify.

In regard to the fourth stop, there's Officer Gladhill and there's Officer Wood. Those are other officers actually or Officer Gladhill, another officer --

THE COURT: And you think you have the authority to tell the State which witnesses to call?

MR. MURTHA: I can't but all these arguments are being made for the purpose of arguing that this is a pretextual effort by the State to postpone the cases and subject Officer Porter -- actually, and I've said it in the pleadings, what they want to do is they want to take him hostage for five cases, and then torture him in his own trial, having laid a minefield of suggestions that he's actually perjured himself. And as the State has acknowledged, and as the Court actually inquired in regard to the extent of cross-examination, there are limits. We have no -- we are literally powerless in regard to controlling the nature of the testimony or objecting to the air of questioning when he's called as a witness for the State and subject to cross-examination by the Defense.

So it really -- as a zealous advocate for Officer Porter, it's offensive that now he's going to be drawn into becoming a material witness when never before has he ever been recognized as a material witness.

Your Honor, I've put in our papers. In fact, paragraph 13, page 5 of the papers is a comment by Chief Judge Murphy about his observations, how the nature of the immunity that is extended by Courts and Judicial Proceedings 9-123 really isn't sufficient and suggests that the legislature expand it for the purpose of protecting people who are called as witnesses. And that's why, for all the reasons that have previously been stated, that it -- the protections are not adequate under the circumstances of this case.

The Court is now powerless. I understand the State says separation of powers. The Court actually -- once we check A, B and C, the Court has to grant it. But the Court asked very insightful questions --

THE COURT: Thanks.

MR. MURTHA: -- specifically -- and I'm always respectful, folks, so I'm not going to use --

THE COURT: There we go. There it is.

MR. MURTHA: But, well, you asked questions that I would have asked if I had the opportunity. They're questions that -- answered but aren't complete. There's

a case from 2002 that Judge Moylan actually wrote the opinion in. And it's actually Charity v. State, and it's 132 Md. App. Reports 598.

Now Charity v. State is a case where there was a Maryland State trooper who under the Whren doctrine that was announced by the Supreme Court in regard to a police officer's opportunity to actually make a traffic stop and even if there was a legitimate basis for the traffic stop that allowed them to get to the car. Previously, arguments had been made that the officer's actions were pretextual.

Well, Judge Moylan, in this case, chastises the law enforcement efforts to abuse the privilege that had been extended by the Supreme Court in Whren. And Judge Moylan says if there's a lesson to be learned from this case, it is that when the police, and in this case we can substitute prosecutors, are permitted a very broad, persistently controversial investigative prerogative, they would well be off used (sic) when not literally required to do so to exercise their prerogative with restraint and moderation, lest they lose it. In fact, he later on goes to say that should the State or law enforcement continue to push the envelope out, it may lose the goose that has laid the golden egg.

And the reason I cite the Charity case, because

it's the only case I could find where the judiciary says to the State you're right. You do have a legitimate basis for coming before the Court and saying that it was valid. But you have pushed the envelope so far out that you're at the point of exploiting the privilege that has been extended to you. And that's what we have here.

And I don't think the Court is powerless to actually just buy wholesale -- the State makes the representations, but the State also knows the history of these cases. It knows that in September of 2015, the State identified the lineup of the cases and how important it was for Officer Porter to go first because his perceived Fifth Amendment privilege. But now his Fifth Amendment privilege is disregarded, whether or not he can protect himself and his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial later on because --

THE COURT: Well, the Court of Special Appeals will determine that. I made the ruling as I did in the Goodson and White matters. I'll make a ruling in this case based on what is presented. But as far as his protections, the Court of Special Appeals has made it clear they're interested in it, and they're going to make a decision so --

MR. MURTHA: They are. But the Court, understanding all the information, can make a finding,

and that's how new case law is made all the time. The Court can make a finding that based on the history of this case and on the facts presented that it really isn't in the public interest.

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Looking down the lineup here, there could be several other witnesses who provide much more material testimony, and they could receive the benefit of use and derivative use testimony to give a much clearer observation in --

THE COURT: Well, but once again, that's not your job. That's solely within the area of the State's Attorney's Office to make a decision which witnesses they will call in their case. You have nothing to do with that. Please move on.

MR. MURTHA: That's true. But in protecting my client --

THE COURT: Which you have a right to do, obviously.

MR. MURTHA: I assert that because there's no doubt in my mind, and the Court may rule favorably for the State and say Mr. Murtha, nice try, but it just isn't enough to carry the day. But I do believe that it is a pretextual effort by the State to seek a postponement.

Now the State is actually assuming a fact that will not have been determined as of today because they

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asked for a postponement. There is a presumption that the State is making that Officer Porter, after contemplating the Court's decision, will seek injunctive relief and appeal each of the Court's orders if the Court orders him to compel. He didn't see anything at stop two. He wasn't a participant with Officer Nero and Officer Miller. So we have to assess what we're going to do next.

So the State should presume that automatically the Court's order to compel the testimony in each one of these cases automatically should result in postponement. I'm only saying that because, well, one is Mr. Proctor is out of the country right now, and we haven't assessed what Officer Porter would like to do. It very well -the logic would be that there would be injunctive relief sought and an appeal filed with the Court of Special That would be the conventional wisdom. And I'm Appeals. not saying that that's not going to happen, but I think the State has actually put the cart before the horse, so to speak, in asking for a postponement today when a critical decision has not been made that would cause the Court to believe that the cases should be postponed. That is not my argument. That's the argument for the counsel for each of the Defendants.

But I would ask the Court to find that the

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State's efforts to call Officer Porter are pretextual in nature, they are for the purpose of obtaining a postponement, and thrusting Officer Porter into being not just the first case tried but the second case tried and in the process, trampling upon his ability to ultimately have a fair trial in the future, having been subjected to the torture of being a witness in other cases. those reasons, Your Honor, I respectfully request the Court not grant the State's request in the three cases where they've sought an order compelling his testimony as a witness. Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. All right. Counsel for Miller, Nero and Rice, from my perspective, the -- I have read what you filed. The only issue I think would be appropriate -- I mean, the State disagrees you don't have any standing. I disagree with that to some degree. I will hear you solely on the issue -- want to be heard on the issue of speedy trial, if you want to be heard on that or not. MS. FLYNN: Thank you, Your Honor. Catherine Flynn on behalf of Officer Miller. THE COURT: What's your name again, ma'am? MS. FLYNN: That would be Catherine Flynn, Your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you, ma'am. Go ahead.

MS. FLYNN: Thank you. I understand the State has not actually formally requested a postponement, but essentially I guess that's why I'm here on behalf of Officer Miller.

THE COURT: Sort of.

MS. FLYNN: All right. So I want to clarify. It's my understanding that the State's position with Officer Porter is that he's a material witness in the prosecution of Officer Goodson and Sergeant White and that the failure to be able to call Officer Porter essentially guts the prosecution of Officer Goodson and Sergeant White. That's my understanding of the State's position as opposed to their position in calling Officer Porter in Officer Miller's case, that they would like to call Officer Porter. They may call Officer Porter. But they have not identified him --

THE COURT: It may be necessary to the public interest which is straight from the statute.

MS. FLYNN: Yes. But they haven't identified him in the same way that they did in the Goodson and White case as a material witness and without him they -- the prosecution would be gutted of Officer Miller.

I do want to clarify that at stop two, my client made a statement, and he was asked what he was doing at stop two, and he indicated that he was filling

out the tow tag which is the documentation regarding the arrest of Mr. Gray. He indicated he never went into the wagon and that he was outside of the wagon the entire time.

For the sake of argument, I would proffer that we could enter a stipulation about Officer Miller and the seatbelt at stop two. From what I gather, Officer Porter's testimony was that he didn't really see exactly what was going on. And it sounds to me like the State may want to call him to impeach him. But if the only issue is whether or not Officer Miller was involved in seatbelting Mr. Gray at stop two, if asked, I could enter a stipulation to that fact because Officer Miller gave a statement indicating exactly what he was doing at stop two.

The issue about stop --

THE COURT: Well, the issue that I want to hear from you has to do with postponement.

MS. FLYNN: Okay. So the State is saying that they need a postponement because they want to call -- they want to try Officer Porter's case --

THE COURT: Well, I know why they're asking.

MS. FLYNN: -- first.

THE COURT: My question for you is are you objecting to a postponement? You're scheduled for --

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MS. FLYNN: March 7th.
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               THE COURT: March 7th.
               MS. FLYNN: I was contacted by the Court last
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     week and given that date, and we are prepared to go
     forward on March 7th. We are prepared to file all of our
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     pretrial motions as required. What the State I think is
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     failing to --
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               THE COURT: And you're objecting to -- if the
     Court were to grant the motion to compel, and if the
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     Court were to stay the case and postpone all the cases,
     you're objecting to that; is that correct?
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               MS. FLYNN: Yes, Your Honor.
               THE COURT: Thank you.
                                      Next?
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               MS. FLYNN: If I could, Your Honor --
               THE COURT: Could what?
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               MS. FLYNN: The State is basically saying that
     without --
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               THE COURT: I don't want -- again, your issue --
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     your purpose here is whether you agree or not agree with
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     the postponement request.
               MS. FLYNN: I understand that, Your Honor.
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                                                           But
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     the State is saying that they need a successful
     prosecution one way or another for Officer Porter --
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               THE COURT: I don't really care what they have
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     to say about that. And I'm not being funny at all.
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MS. FLYNN: Okay. 1 THE COURT: I don't care about that because the 2 issue has to do with whether they had the right to do 3 this and the basis for it. So I've got that. 4 5 MS. FLYNN: And certainly --THE COURT: Thank you very much, ma'am. 6 7 thank you so much. 8 Next. 9 MR. ZAYON: Your Honor, thank you. Yes. obviously on behalf of Officer Nero, we would object to 10 any postponements. I'm reaffirming his right to a speedy 11 trial at this moment, and I would adopt all of the 12 13 arguments that Mr. Murtha has made as they apply to my client with regard to why we are objecting to Officer 14 Porter even being compelled as a witness in this case. 15 I think I'm set for February 22nd, and there 16 17 are some scheduling issues with regard to that separate from these issues. But I quess we can discuss that at a 18 later time or at this time, whatever Your Honor --19 THE COURT: You may want to be ready to talk. 20 21 MR. ZAYON: I'm ready when the Court's ready. THE COURT: Next. 22 MR. BELSKY: Good afternoon, Your Honor. 23 behalf of Lieutenant Rice, we are prepared for trial. 24 25 would assert our speedy trial rights and will tell this

Court under the guise of speedy trial, my client is actually suspended without pay at this point. He has four children. He has no income coming in relative to his police capacity. He's in hard times right now. He has every interest in getting this case heard at a speedy -- as speedy as possible, and we would assert our speedy trial rights. We're ready to go to trial.

THE COURT: Thank you. You can respond.

MR. SCHATZOW: Your Honor, just very briefly to clear up the record. When Mr. Murtha was referring to Mr. Novak having a bird's-eye view of the arrest at stop two, I think he meant stop one. Stop two is Baker and Mount. Presbury and Mount is where the arrest took place and where Mr. Novak was involved.

When Mr. Murtha said that Officer Gladhill and others were at stop four, stop four was Druid Hill and Dolphin. Officer Gladhill was not present. Officer Porter was the only one present other than Officer Goodson and I --

THE COURT: Well, stop four has nothing to do with this, correct, because Miller, Nero and Rice weren't there. That's just involving Goodson.

MR. SCHATZOW: Well, except it involves Miller in terms of our second point. We've heard about -- people have addressed the seatbelt. Nobody really has

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addressed the point about where the injury took place,
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     and that's why stop four is relevant for Miller, Nero and
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     Rice because, as I point out in my letter and
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     according -- the Williams case and the standard jury
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     instruction, it's relevant to the issue of reckless
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     endangerment and it's also -- it's directly relevant,
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     important to the jury because if they didn't seatbelt at
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     stop two, that was the last chance to seatbelt before the
8
     injury occurred. That's where --
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               THE COURT: And you're saying the injury
     occurred when?
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               MR. SCHATZOW: Between 2:00 and 4:00, between
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     Baker and Mount and Dolphin Hill (sic) and Druid Avenue.
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               THE COURT: But you don't know where.
     have been after stop two. It could have been after stop
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16
     three.
               MR. SCHATZOW: Possibly.
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               THE COURT: It could have been after -- or by
18
     stop four, correct?
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               MR. SCHATZOW: Could have been but yeah, by --
     we contend it happened by stop four and after stop two.
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     Yes.
23
               THE COURT: Okay.
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               MR. SCHATZOW: And the only other thing I wanted
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     to respond to -- well, two other things very briefly,
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Your Honor. When Mr. Murtha talks about paragraph 13 of his papers and what Chief Judge Murphy said when he was part of the -- speaking on behalf of the Criminal Law Article Review Committee, it's ironic because he was talking about a transactional immunity statute which he said did not go far enough to provide immunity. It wasn't constitutional because it needed to provide, in the context of the cases he's citing to, Evans and in re Criminal Investigations, because it didn't provide use and derivative use. What Chief Judge Murphy is saying there, and this goes to the substance, Your Honor, and so it completely undermines Mr. Murtha's substantive arguments because he was speaking in favor of use and derivative use immunity, and he was equating Article 22 to Section 5. And it's right there in the notes that Mr. Murtha references which are part of the comments to Section 9-204.

And, you know, the point I make about stop four, the reckless endangerment actually requires proof that the risky conduct could lead to a significant injury. And we think the proof that it did lead to a significant injury is such proof.

With regard to the speedy trial arguments, Your Honor, I would simply point out that these cases are -- I think tomorrow -- I might be off by a day or two, but I

think tomorrow is the eight month anniversary of when the grand jury indictment was returned. And while the State would love to get the cases tried quickly, and we're not asking for some inordinate delay, and I'm sure the Court of Special Appeals will move with what they consider to be promptness and speed, we are not talking, you know, we're not talking about a two-year delay. We're not talking about putting things off for --

THE COURT: Well, what happens if after the case comes back and you -- if I were to grant what you asked, you try Porter, and it's the same result?

MR. SCHATZOW: Well, you know, Your Honor, I would say that we would have to re-examine it. We recognize that your patience is not unlimited and we recognize that --

THE COURT: Certainly it is.

MR. SCHATZOW: Well, you've demonstrated it to be unlimited. I'll say that. But I'm now trying to look far into the future. And look, Judge, if the case were to mis-try two cases in a row because of hung juries on all counts, obviously we'd have to take a look -- a very serious look at it. And our ability to go back to the well repeatedly to ask for the same thing, Your Honor, is limited by the practicalities and the fact that we all live in the real world. But where we are right now, in

terms of right now, we're a day short by my calculations, although I could be off, we're a day short of being eight months out from the indictment. That is not an extraordinary long time. To the contrary, it's a pretty short time in this court for cases of this magnitude.

And so I understand the Defendants are making an objection, and I understand that that's their right to make an objection. But I don't think that they meet the four-part test for a speedy trial violation at this point, and I doubt very seriously that they will be able to when the Court promptly schedules the cases in for trial, if the Court were to grant the relief we request, and the Court of Special Appeals speaks to the issue.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. SCHATZOW: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. This Court is very clear that the State has broad power to seek immunity, and when the request is pursuant to Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings 9-123, again, as I read a number of times, and the prosecutor determines that the testimony may be necessary to the public interest, the Court shall issue an order requiring the individual to give testimony. Certainly this Court found in the White case and the Goodson case that it was appropriate based on the proffer of the State.

The State effectively argues that they don't believe they're required to proffer anything. Of course, that's for another day for someone to determine whether it's a requirement or not. The Court of Special Appeals will make it clear. The Court of Appeals or Supreme Court will make it clear whether there's a requirement for the State to proffer to the Court what the information is that they're using. Or is it simply a matter of the Court being a rubber stamp once the Ezecutive Branch says we find that it is necessary to the public interest that the Court is required to grant immunity?

I don't believe that it's that simple. I think under the circumstances presented in the White and Goodson matter, although obviously people disagree with the Court, based on the way it was presented I do believe it was appropriate. This case is a little different and may get to the same result, may not. But this is different because at no point until January 13th did the State make it clear that Miller, Nero and Rice would be cases where Mr. Porter's testimony would be needed.

Mr. Schatzow indicates that they reassessed things, and I believe that actually happened, that things were reassessed, and they made a determination. But I also do note that the request for immunity for Officer

Porter is directly tied to the State's request to postpone the matters until they can get a more favorable outcome which is what both sides want. Both sides want a favorable outcome to each of the scenarios that are presented for Porter, Goodson, White, Miller, Nero and Rice. So all sides are doing what they believe is appropriate.

This Court, looking at the evidence that the State has proffered, noting that it's for two issues, for the seatbelt issue for Nero, Miller and Rice and for the place of injury. I do note that in the January 13th letter, the State referenced that is important -- also important is Porter's testimony.

Now one could say we're splitting hairs. Is testimony trial testimony, or is testimony, a statement? Either way, I have taken the time to go through Mr. Porter's statement and to go through Mr. Porter's trial testimony. And as the State pointed out on page 39 of his statement, Mr. Porter indicates, "I never saw them seatbelt him again. But again" — to page 40, says, "But again, I didn't watch the entire ordeal." To allow the State to put that testimony in during a trial against Nero, Miller or Rice certainly would be possibly problematic with 5-403, unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury or consideration of undue

delay.

 Undue delay in relationship to the time when these cases are tried, I don't know. We have some trial scheduled for February, that's for Nero. For Miller and Rice, we are scheduled for March, and I do acknowledge that the Court of Special Appeals will not come back with its decision until obviously sometime after the arguments which are March 4th. So I don't know when those cases will come back.

But the State, in the manner in which it's seeking to immunize Mr. Porter for Miller, Nero and Rice, it does seem to this Court, candidly speaking, that it's for a dual purpose: to get the postponement that they want, to get around this Court's ruling that these cases need to continue and possibly for the reason stated, that Mr. Porter's testimony is relevant to the seatbelt issue and relevant to the place of injury.

Based on the proffer that's presented by the State and having gone through Mr. Porter's statement and Mr. Porter's trial testimony, I don't necessarily see the seatbelt issue playing out the way the State envisions it. Now does that mean that I can't grant them the request? No. It doesn't mean that. But of course, I have to assess it because again, I say 5-403 is relevant and 5-402 is relevant.

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If Mr. Porter gets on the stand and testifies
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     consistent to his statement, there may be issues, there
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     may not be. I don't know. But the issue with White and
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     Goodson was a simple one, from this Court's perspective.
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     The issue here for Miller, Nero and Rice is not simple.
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     I do not believe that based on the proffer presented by
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     the State for the seatbelt issue and the place of injury,
     the concerns that this Court has with the speedy trial
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     rights of the Defendants, the concern that this Court has
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     with the position that Mr. Porter will be placed in by
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     the request of the State and again, I guess most
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     importantly, finding that the request for immunity has
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     more to do with getting around the Court's postponement
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     request than anything else, I do not find it is
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     appropriate, and the request for immunity for Mr. Porter
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     for Miller, Nero and Rice is denied.
16
               Thank you.
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               MR. SCHATZOW: Thank you, Your Honor.
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               MP. MURTHA: Thank you, Your Honor.
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               THE COURT: Counsel, approach. All counsel
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     approach. Well, all --
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               MR. MURTHA: I'll --
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               THE COURT: One representative for each one.
     just want to quickly --
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               MR. MURTHA: Well, actually, I should --
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THE COURT: Even you. Even you. Even you.
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     It's a quick question.
                          BENCH CONFERENCE
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          (Bench Conference begins - 03:18:19 p.m.)
          (The parties approach the bench where the following
 5
 6
     ensues:)
7
               MR. ZAYON: Should be six.
3
               THE COURT: Yeah. I was just checking.
     anyone planning to respond to the motion to intervene?
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               MS. BLEDSOE: I can't hear him.
10
               MR. ZAYON: I didn't hear -- the motion?
11
               MS. BLEDSOE: I can hear --
12
               THE COURT: Is anyone planning to respond to the
13
     motion to intervene? I'm just curious.
14
               FEMALE SPEAKER: Motion to what?
15
               MS. BLEDSOE: For the media.
16
17
               MR. SCHATZOW: Oh, for the media.
               MALE SPEAKER: Intervening.
18
               MS. BLEDSOE: Oh.
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               MALE SPEAKER: No.
               THE COURT: Okay. I know someone --
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22
               MALF SPEAKER: Is --
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               THE COURT: -- had said they were so I --
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     before --
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               MR. SCHATZOW: Not at this point.
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410-466-2033

410-494-7015

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THE COURT: Okay. That's all I cared about.
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     You may as well stay here. No, we can do it on the
              I just want to -- as far as postpone, I'm not
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     postponing anything unless -- well, I'm not so --
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               MR. ZAYON: Okay.
               THE COURT: -- step back.
 6
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               MR. ZAYON: Okay.
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               THE COURT: Okay.
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               THE COURT: Okay.
          (Bench Conference concluded - 03:18:51 p.m.)
10
          (The parties return to the trial tables where the
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     following ensues:)
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               THE COURT: Let's see. Excuse me one second.
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                          BENCH CONFERENCE
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          (Bench Conference begins - 03:19:05 p.m.)
          (A woman approaches the bench where the following
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17
     ensues:)
               THE COURT: Do I have to do anything?
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               FEMALE VOICE: (Inaudible).
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               THE COURT: I did. That's what I just did.
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                                                            Ι
21
     just don't know -- I was wondering if -- okay.
          (Bench Conference concluded - 03:19:14 p.m.)
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23
          (A woman leaves the bench where the following
24
     ensues:)
25
               THE COURT: All right. Anything else from any
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1	of the parties?
2	MR. SCHATZOW: No, Your Honor.
3	THE COURT: Thank you.
4	MS. FLYNN: Yes, Your Honor.
5	MR. MURTHA: Excuse me.
6	THE COURT: What?
7	MS. FLYNN: Well, I have a trial date, and are
8	we going to schedule a motions
9	THE COURT: Yeah. We certainly are. Your trial
10	is scheduled, as far as I know, and certainly the next
11	one up is Nero. You're after Nero, and you're after
12	Miller. So as far as this Court is concerned, we're
13	continuing.
14	MR. BELSKY: I hate to do this but can we
15	THE COURT: I can't hear you.
16	MR. BELSKY: Can we approach for one second?
17	I'm sorry.
18	THE COURT: Okay. Fine.
19	BENCH CONFERENCE
20	(Bench Conference begins - 03:19:52 p.m.)
21	(The parties approach the bench where the following
22	ensues:)
23	MR. BELSKY: I apologize. Right now my trial is
24	scheduled for March 9th. I'm trying to schedule a
25	surgery at this point. Ms. Flynn's client is scheduled

to go March 7th. Am I to assume in scheduling that I'm 1 2 not going March 9th or --THE COURT: I have no clue at this point. 3 MR. BELSKY: Okay. 4 THE COURT: Right now, I'm -- all I'm more 5 6 concerned with -- all I'm more concerned with; that's not even grammatically correct. I'm more concerned with 7 8 Nero's case because that's the next one up. MR. BELSKY: Sure. 9 THE COURT: Now certainly we'll find, after we 10 deal with Nero, where are we with Miller. Is it likely 11 that it will be postponed? I don't know. But I don't 12 know the circumstances that we find ourselves in so --13 MR. BELSKY: Okay. Well, I can reach out. 14 MR. ZAYON: So let me, if I may with regard to 15 Nero, and I mean, you guys can chime in or not chime in. 16 I have no idea. But my understanding -- and it's fine. 17 18 I just have to get with my experts and get everything 19 done. 20 THE COURT: Um-hum. MR. ZAYON: But my understanding was always that 21 Nero was going after Miller. And the last time 22 23 everything was postponed, I wasn't invited to that 24 postponement party. THE COURT: You sure weren't. 25

1 MR. ZAYON: But my understanding was that's just 2 because you didn't get to me yet, and that case was going 3 to be postponed. THE COURT: And here's the issue. As I stated 4 5 from the beginning, I did not expect my ruling to go to 6 the Court of Special Appeals. I can only speak --MR. ZAYON: Well, none of us expected that, I 7 В quess. So right but --9 THE COURT: So we are where we are. We're trying these cases. We're moving forward so --10 11 MR. ZAYON: Okay. Because we've been -- are you fine with that? I mean, I guess it doesn't matter if 12 they're fine because we --13 MS. BLEDSOE: It doesn't matter what we're fine 14 15 with, clearly. MR. ZAYON: Okay. All right. 16 17 MR. BELSKY: Why don't we all talk? MS. BLEDSOE: We're not calling the shots on 18 19 this one. THE COURT: Yeah. So we'll see where we are. 20 21 So you'll be getting a scheduling -- got to send this out 22 later today. 23 MR. BELSKY: Ferhaps --MR. ZAYON: We could save you a stamp, and you 24 25 can just hand it to us.

```
THE COURT: No. We'll send it out. We'll get
 1
 2
     it to you. Okay.
               MR. BELSKY: Perhaps we all could talk and --
 3
               THE COURT: You all can do what you want. And I
 4
     don't mean that in a flippant way. I mean --
 5
 6
               MS. BLEDSOE: We know what we need to do.
 7
               THE COURT: Right.
               MS. BLEDSOE: And we'll do what we need to do.
 8
               THE COURT: And I'm sure that will happen. I'm
 9
     sure this is not the last I've heard of this. What a
10
11
     shock.
               MS. BLEDSOE: I know, Judge.
12
               THE COURT: Yeah.
13
               MS. BLEDSOE: Is what it is.
14
15
               THE COURT: Absolutely. But this will go out
     later today saying that the trial in this matter
16
17
     scheduled to begin February 22nd, 2016, barring me
     hearing anything from anyone who has more power than
18
     me -- and candidly speaking, it's only a small group of
19
20
     people who have more power than me on this issue -- if I
     hear from them, I do what they tell me to do. If I don't
21
22
     hear from them, we move forward.
23
               MS. BLEDSOE: Okay.
               MR. BELSKY: Thank you, Your Honor.
24
25
               MR. ZAYON: Understood. Okay.
```

```
MS. BLEDSOE: Thank you, Your Honor.
 1
               THE COURT: All righty.
 2
          (Bench Conference concluded - 03:22:06 p.m.)
 3
          (The parties return to the trial tables where the
 4
 5
     following ensues:)
 6
               THE COURT: Thank you everyone. Court's in
 7
     recess. You all can go. I got to clean up and also got
 8
     to stand up slowly.
 9
          (Off the record - 03:22:19 p.m.)
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24

25

Page 75

		A B B B A B A B A B A B A B A B A B A B	l
A	5:2,4 12:16,21,24	APPEARANCES	Assistant 4:17 12:12
ability 16:17 39:2,3	13:2 57:23	2:5	associated 32:1
53:5 61:22 74:13	agree 28:21 56:19,19	append 40:22	assume 11:23 26:25
able 37:22 45:23	agreed 24:10	applies 39:22	32:11,13,15,17,18
54:10 62:10	ahead 8:14 20:25	apply 57:13	37:21 40:4 70:1
absence 41:13	23:4 53:25	Appreciate 12:1	assumed 32:8
absolutely 10:16 25:9	aid 5:23 18:25	approach 40:13,18	assuming 51:24
33:19 34:15,15	air 47:23	43:7,15 66:20,21	assure 30 5
72:15	Alicia 1:22 4:14.23	67:5 69:16,21	attached 41:25
abuse 49.13	5:6 11:7.21 74:7	approaches 45:25	attachment 13.22,23
accept 10:6	Allison 2:9 12:25	68:16	attention 32:20
accepted 9:8	allow 6:9,14 7:25	appropriate 6:9,11	Attorney 4:16,17
access 33:11	27:20 28:5 29:19	6:12 7:25 8:3,25	12:11 14:21,24 17:4
account 33:24	31:25 41:23 64:21	9.5.13 11:5 53:15	17:7,17
accurate 24·22 37:20	allowed 49:9	62:24 63:17 64:7	Attorney's 30:2,10
74:12	allowing 9:2	66:15	51:12
accusations 44:23	Amendment 14:11	area 23:6,6,7 51:11	attorneys 5:21 12.12
ACCUSCRIBES	38:18 50:13,14,15	areas 18:10 36:6,15	24:13
2:18	analogous 15:25	argued 43:19	authority 15:23 47:9
accusing 32:22	Anderson 21:21,25	argues 63: I	automatically 52.9
acknowledge 6:13	22:4,8,14,17	arguing 47:12	52:11
25:3 65:5	anniversary 61:1	argument 15:16 36:3	Avenue 59:13
acknowledged 47:19	announced 49:6	52:23,23 55:5	avoid 31:25 34:3
acting 36:17	answer 17:22 18:9,9	arguments 6:10,20	aware 18:16 23:10
actions 49:11	29:12,15 39:18	8:16,17,23 9:4,15	- <u>-</u>
actual 16:4,6 33:12	answered 48:25	14:2 15:12 29:25	B 15:6 48.17
addition 20:4 22:23	anticipate 33:22	30:1 37:8 45:14	back 20:1 21:7 24:7
addressed 44:1 58:25	anticipated 13:16	47:11 49:10 57:13	26:1 28.4 33 7
59:1	33:22	60:13,23 65:7	45:25 46:12 61 10
adequate 48:13	anticipation 43:23	arrest 47:3 55:2	61:22 65:6,9 68 6
adjusts 41:8	anybody 28:6	58:11,13	Baker 58:12 59.13
admissible 5:15	anyway 42:11	Article 60:4.14	Ball 2:12 13:3
27:14,16 29:3,4	apologize 6:15 35:9 69:23	asked 22:20 31:6	Baltimore 1:4,10.16
30:16		44:2 45:18 48:18,23	1:22 4.4 14 21 74:8
admit 41:12	apologized 9:2	48:24 52:1 54:24	bar 5.25
admitted 3.3 44:2,13	App 49:3	55:12 61 10	barring 72:17
adopt 13:21 57:12	appeal 11.2 52:4,16	asking 39 23 40:1,3	Barry 2.3 4:5
adopting 46:2	Appeals 8 21 9:7	52:20 55:22 61:4	based 8:9,15,17 11.4
advance 13.17	11:3,16 15:5 25:15	asks 40:6	16.12 20.23 33 13
advising 43:18	25:16 31:16 34 6	assault 19:25 20:1.5	50:20 51 2 62:24
advocate 48:1	45:9 50 17,21 52:17	assert 14:23 51:19	63.16 65 18 66.6
affect 7:5	61:5 62 13 63:4,5	57:25 58:6	bases 20 7 29:22,22
afternoon 4:6,8.13	65:6 71 6	assess 52:7 65:24	basically 6 9 7:11
4:19.20.21,22.25	appearance 12-19	assessed 52:13	Uaskany V 7 /.11
	<u> </u>	l	I

ACCUSCRIBES TRANSCRIPTION SERVICE

19:19 56:16	Bledsoe 2:6 4:16	19:20 20:15 24:3,6	checking 67:8
basis 22:15 40:9 49:8	12:11 67:10,12,16	24:16 25:17,19 26:2	Chief 48:6 60:2,10
50:3 57:4	67:19 71:14,18 72:6	27:5 32:9 34:6,22	children 58:3
Bates 2:13 4:22,23	72:8,12,14,23 73:1	35:1,4,20 37:9	chime 70:16,16
5:5,9,10 6:3,16,18	bothered 42:12	48:14 49:1,4,12,16	Circuit 1:2,8,14,20
6:25 7:11,16,21 8:4	Branch 63:10	49:16,25 50:1,20	4:3 16:10,13 17:15
8:6 9.17,20,22,25	brand 5:22	51:1,3,13 53.4,4	74:8
10:2,5,7,10,13,17	Brandon 2:10 12:22	54:14,21 55:21	circuits 33:9,10
10:20,23 11:20,25	Brian 1:16 74:6	56:10 57:15 58:5	circumstances 9:1,6
Bates' 15:15	briefly 40:13 58:9	59:4 61:9,19 62:23	11:5 48:14 63:14
	59:25	62:24 63:17 70:8	70:13
becoming 48:3 began 27:19	i	71:2 74:4,5,6,7	cite 49:25
	bring 7:4 broad 49:17 62:17	· · ·	
beginning 36:22 71:5		cases 12:4,7 13:12,17	cited 16:8
begins 39:23 40:17	broader 19:7 22:11	13:25 14:2,7 25:11	citing 60:8
67:4 68 15 69:20	Butler 2:7 4:18 12:13	31:5,7,14 35:2	citizen 36:3
behalf 4:15 5.3 11:21	buy 50:8	37:10,11.12 45:2	City 1:4,10,16,22 4:4
12:10,16,22,25 13:3		47:13,16 50 10,11	14:21 74:8
53:21 54:3 57:10,24	C 48:17	52:11,22 53:7,9	clarify 54:6,23
60:3	calculations 62:1	56:10 60:8,24 61:3	clean 32:1,24,24
believe 6:12 9:3,5,9	call 4:12,13 7:1 11:10	61:20 62:5,11 63:21	33:20,24 34:17
11:4 15:3 25:22	12:4,7 32:24 45:10	65:3.8.14 71:10	43:10.13 73:7
27:3 41:24 51:22	46:8 47:10 51:13	Catherine 2:10 12:22	clear 6:5,7 7:6 11:21
52:22 63:2,13,16,23	53:1 54:10,15,15	53:20,23	19:6.7 24:6.8.11,12
64:6 66:6	55:10,20	cause 52:21	24:14 28:21 29:5
believed 8:24	called 6:5 8:9 14:9	caving 8:11	32:21 33:5 36:9
believes 25:20	47:23 48:11	certainly 17:11 35:22	40:1 50:22 58:10
believing 40:10	calling 54:13 71:18	57:5 61:16 62:23	62:16 63:5,6,20
Belsky 2:11 13:2,3	candidly 8.20 65:12	64:23 69:9.10 70:10	clearer 51:8
57:23 69:14,16,23	72:19	certainty 28:15	clearly 11:2 13:15
70.4,9,14 71:17,23	candor 6:2 7:4	CERTIFICATE	32:3 44:25 47:1
72 3.24	cane 7:14 10:2,4	74:1	71:15
bench 40.16,17,18	canons 8:2	certify 74:2,10	CLERK 4:3,7,11
42.20 67.3,4,5	canons 8.2 capacity 58 4	CET 2:15	client 6:6 7:5,9 51:16
68:10,14,15,16,22	car 45:16 49.9	chains 26:14	54:24 57:14 58:1
68:23 69.19,20,21	care 34:17,18,19	chance 59:8	69:25
73:3	56:24 57:2	change 25:2	client's 7:10 14:6
benefit 36:8 44:17	cared 68:1	changing 25:5	close 26:19 45 17
51:7	carry 51:22	charge 23:24	46:13
best 74-13	cart 52:19	charged 19 24 20 2.5	closer 26.18
bird's-47:3 bird's-eye 58:11	case 4:12,14 5:13 6:7	32.6 35:2 38:10 Charity 49:2.4,25	closing 28.11 45:14 clue 70:3
bit 14:5	6:8,12 7:19 8:21	charity 49:2.4,25	come 27:6 65:6,9
blame 7:15	9:10 11:2,14 16:8	Chaz 2:12 13:3	
	16:11,23,23,24		comes 61.10
blamed 36 25	10.11,00,00,00	check 48:17	coming 19:18 50 3
		<u> </u>	<u> </u>

		<u></u>	
58:3	constitution 37:4	11:3,10,15,15,18,23	65:6,12 66:8,9,20
comment 48:6	constitutional 30:9	12:1,5,14 13:5,12	66:23 67:1,8,13,21
comments 60:16	60:7	13:21 14:4,6,10,12	67:23 68:1,6,8,9,13
commit 40:3	consult 16:3	14:14,17 15:3,5,15	68:18,20,25 69:3,6
committed 38:16,17	contacted 56:3	15:18,23,23,24 16:4	69:9,12,15,18 70:3
Committee 60:4	contained 74:11	16:10,13,21,21 17:6	70:5,10,20,25 71:4
common 28:25	contemplating 52:3	17:8,9,12,14,20,24	71.6,9,20 72:1,4,7,9
communicated 45:1	contempt 45:22	18:3,6,11,18.22	72:13,15 73:2,6
compel 13:8,20 14.19	contend 20:5,20	19:3,5,8,11,13,19	74.8
30:14 40:4 44:19	23:23 59:21	19:20 20:9,12,21,25	Court's 5:5 11:4
52:5,10 56:9	contended 20:18	21:4,7,15,20 22:17	12:18 52:3,4,10
compelled 34:7 39:13	contends 23:10,12	22:22,25 23:2,4,8	57:21 65:14 66:4.13
39:16,22,23 57:15	CONTENTS 3:1	23:18,21 24:4,6,10	73:6
compelling 5:6 53:10	context 19.7 21:17	24:14 25:4,6,14,14	Courts 48:8 62:18
complete 48:25	22:11 60:8	25:16 26:6,10,16	Criminal 60:3.9
completely 60:12	continue 35:14 49:23	27:3,9,11,22 28:2,9	critical 52:21
complex 31 23,24	65:15	28:16,23 29:15.18	cross 39:2,15
complicated 26:4	continues 23:1	30:18 31:4,6,9,13	cross-examination
comply 37:3,4	continuing 69:13	31:15 32:5,11,14,16	45:13,22 47:20,24
concern 34:11 35:14	contrary 62:4	33:4,5,5,14,18 34:6	cross-examine 38:25
66.9	control 30:25 46·1	34:10.14 35:5 36:10	39:4
concerned 6:4 24:5	controlling 47:22	36:13 37:11,15,18	cross-examined
69:12 70:6,6,7	controversial 49:18	37:23 38:1,6,8,11	45:17
concerning 38:1	conventional 52:17	38:21.23 39:20 40:7	crossed 39:8
concerns 15:12,13	convicted 38:10	40:12,15,20,22,24	crowd 45:25 46:1
35:13 66:8	copy 41:1 43:2	41:1,2,17,21 42:1,4	culpability 25:22
concluded 29:23	correct 10:15 26:11	42:6,10,11,16,19,23	curious 67:14
42:20 68:10,22 73:3	26:12 27:7,24 31:8	43:6,9,14,18,18,22	
concludes 25:20	38:14 40:8 56:11	44:5,8,11,25 45:2,4	D
conduct 60:20	58:21 59:19 70:7	45:9,19 47:9,19	D 5:17
conducting 16:1	counsel 14:25 52 24	48:15,16,17,18,19	D-1 5:18
confer 16:15	53:12 66:20.20	48:22 49:6,14 50:3	D-5742·15
Conference 40:16.17	country 52:13	50:7,17,17,21,24	danger 29:7
42:20 67:3,4 68:10	counts 61:21	51:2,10,17,20 52:4	date 2:4 56:4 69:7
68:14,15,22 69:19	course 19:16 28:16	52:16,22,25 53:9,12	day 8:18 22:12 51:22
69:20 73:3	31:4 33:14 34:14	53:22,25 54:5,17	60:25 62:1,2 63:3
confusion 29:8 64 24	35:24 63:2 65:23	55:17.22,24 56:2,3	days 44:15
consider 61:5	court 1 2.8,14,20 4:3	56:8.9.10.13.15.18	deal 10:14 17 12 18:5 70:11
consideration 64:25	4.6.8.12.19,25 5:4.7	56:24 57:2,6.20,22	decedent 19 2
considerations 29 9	6.3.6,17,21,22 7:2,4	58:1.8.20 59:10,14	decide 24:2 30:21
consistent 12:19 40:7	7:11,14,17,23,24	59:18.23 61:4.9,16	decided 16:11
66:2	8:5.13,14,20 9:7,18	62:5,11,12,13,14,16	decision 17:16 30 2
consistently 26:25	9:21,23 10:1,4,6,8	62:16,21,23 63:4.5	30:10:31:15:50:23
constitutes 74:13	10:11,16,19,22,24	63:6,7,9,11,16 64:8	30 10 31.13 30 23
	l		I

	1	1	
51:12 52:3,21 65:7	31:11 39:1,10 63:17		exhibit 41:10,25
defendant 1:5,11,17	63:19	eight 61:1 62:2	42:14 43:5,6,7,16
1:23 2:8,10,11,13	differently 36:21,23	either 24:17 64:16	44:3
2:14 16:3 38:25	digital 2:24 74:9	eliminate 31:22	Exhibits 3:3 44:12
44:12 46:3	direct 39:14	endangerment 20:3	expand 48:10
Defendant's 44:2	direction 74:11	59:6 60:19	expect 8:20 71:5
defendants 16:4,6,15	directly 7:5 59:6 64:1	ended 27:19	expected 71:7
29:10 34:19,23 35:3	dirty 34:18	ends 39:24	expenditure 35:20
36:2 52:24 62:6	disagree 53:16 63:15	enforcement 49:13	expense 31:25
66:9	disagrees 53:15	49:23	experience 24:23
Defendants' 15:10	discrete 23:5.7 36:15	engages 46:1	26:1
16:9,9 35:19	discuss 57:18	ensues 40:19 42:22	experts 20:15 23:15
defense 3:3 5:8,21	disingenuous 46:15	67:6 68:12,17,24	70:18
15:25 20:18 23:12	dispositive 23:23	69:22 73:5	explain 24:20
24:13,25 40:6 46:25	25:24	enter 55:6,12	explained 29:21 30:6
47:25	dispute 23:9 24:1,4	entered 44:11	exploiting 50:5
defines 29:1	disregarded 50:14	entire 19:14 27:13	exposed 32:25
definitely 31:24	doctrine 49:5	28:9 55:3 64 :21	extended 48:8 49:14
degree 53:16	document 13:22	entrusted 17:16	50:6
delay 29:9 61:4,7	documentation 55:1	entrusts 30:1	extent 47:20
65:1.2	doing 21:21 54:25	envelope 49:23 50:4	extraordinary 62:4
demonstrate 36:17	55:14 64:6	envisions 65:21	extremely 9:11
demonstrated 61:17	Dolphin 58:17 59:13	equating 60:14	eye 47:4
demonstrated 61:17 demonstrative 18:25	Dolphin 58:17 59:13	equating 60:14 Esquire 2:6,6,7,7,8,9	_
			F
demonstrative 18:25 denied 10:12 66:16 deny 9:12	door 28:11	Esquire 2:6,6,7,7,8,9	F fact 11 15 32:24 33:2
demonstrative 18:25 denied 10:12 66:16 deny 9:12 Deputy 4:16 12:11	door 28:11 doors 46:13 doubt 51:20 62:10 drawn 48:3	Esquire 2:6,6,7,7,8,9 2:10,10,11,12,13,14	F fact 11 15 32:24 33:2 33:11 45 20,23 48:5
demonstrative 18:25 denied 10:12 66:16 deny 9:12 Deputy 4:16 12:11 derivative 16:12	door 28:11 doors 46:13 doubt 51:20 62:10 drawn 48:3 Druid 58:16 59:13	Esquire 2:6,6,7,7,8,9 2:10,10,11,12,13,14 essentially 43:18	F fact 11 15 32:24 33:2 33:11 45 20.23 48:5 49:21 51 24 55:13
demonstrative 18:25 denied 10:12 66:16 deny 9:12 Deputy 4:16 12:11 derivative 16:12 33:12 51:8 60:10,14	door 28:11 doors 46:13 doubt 51:20 62:10 drawn 48:3	Esquire 2:6,6,7,7,8,9 2:10,10,11,12,13,14 essentially 43:18 54:3,11 ethics 8:3 Evans 60:8	F
demonstrative 18:25 denied 10:12 66:16 deny 9:12 Deputy 4:16 12:11 derivative 16:12 33:12 51:8 60:10,14 described 25:10	door 28:11 doors 46:13 doubt 51:20 62:10 drawn 48:3 Druid 58:16 59:13 dual 65:13	Esquire 2:6,6,7,7,8,9 2:10,10,11,12,13,14 essentially 43:18 54:3,11 ethics 8:3 Evans 60:8 evidence 5 14 7:7,7	F fact 11 15 32:24 33:2 33:11 45 20,23 48:5 49:21 51 24 55:13 61:24 facts 51:3
demonstrative 18:25 denied 10:12 66:16 deny 9:12 Deputy 4:16 12:11 derivative 16:12 33:12 51:8 60:10,14 described 25:10 description 23:16	door 28:11 doors 46:13 doubt 51:20 62:10 drawn 48:3 Druid 58:16 59:13 dual 65:13	Esquire 2:6,6,7,7,8,9 2:10,10,11,12,13,14 essentially 43:18 54:3,11 ethics 8:3 Evans 60:8 evidence 5 14 7:7,7 7:25 28:6 29 1,2,5,6	F fact 11 15 32:24 33:2 33:11 45 20,23 48:5 49:21 51 24 55:13 61:24 facts 51:3 factual 9:9 38:22,23
demonstrative 18:25 denied 10:12 66:16 deny 9:12 Deputy 4:16 12:11 derivative 16:12 33:12 51:8 60:10,14 described 25:10 description 23:16 designed 16:15	door 28:11 doors 46:13 doubt 51:20 62:10 drawn 48:3 Druid 58:16 59:13 dual 65:13 	Esquire 2:6,6,7,7,8,9 2:10,10,11,12,13,14 essentially 43:18 54:3,11 ethics 8:3 Evans 60:8 evidence 5 14 7:7,7 7:25 28:6 29 1,2,5,6 30:25 33:13,25 34:1	F fact 11 15 32:24 33:2 33:11 45 20,23 48:5 49:21 51 24 55:13 61:24 facts 51:3 factual 9:9 38:22,23 failing 56.7
demonstrative 18:25 denied 10:12 66:16 deny 9:12 Deputy 4:16 12:11 derivative 16:12 33:12 51:8 60:10,14 described 25:10 description 23:16 designed 16:15 desire 30:4	door 28:11 doors 46:13 doubt 51:20 62:10 drawn 48:3 Druid 58:16 59:13 dual 65:13 E earlier 36:19 easier 14:5 33:20	Esquire 2:6,6,7,7,8,9 2:10,10,11,12,13,14 essentially 43:18 54:3,11 ethics 8:3 Evans 60:8 evidence 5 14 7:7,7 7:25 28:6 29 1.2.5,6 30:25 33:13,25 34:1 44:13 64:8	F fact 11 15 32:24 33:2 33:11 45 20.23 48:5 49:21 51 24 55:13 61:24 facts 51:3 factual 9:9 38:22,23 failing 56.7 failure 18:14 20:3,6,7
demonstrative 18:25 denied 10:12 66:16 deny 9:12 Deputy 4:16 12:11 derivative 16:12	door 28:11 doors 46:13 doubt 51:20 62:10 drawn 48:3 Druid 58:16 59:13 dual 65:13 E earlier 36:19 easier 14:5 33:20 46:3	Esquire 2:6,6,7,7,8,9 2:10,10,11,12,13,14 essentially 43:18 54:3,11 ethics 8:3 Evans 60:8 evidence 5 14 7:7,7 7:25 28:6 29 1,2,5,6 30:25 33:13,25 34:1 44:13 64:8 Ex 3:4,6	F fact 11 15 32:24 33:2 33:11 45 20,23 48:5 49:21 51 24 55:13 61:24 facts 51:3 factual 9:9 38:22,23 failing 56.7 failure 18:14 20:3,6,7 21 2 54:10
demonstrative 18:25 denied 10:12 66:16 deny 9:12 Deputy 4:16 12:11 derivative 16:12 33:12 51:8 60:10,14 described 25:10 description 23:16 designed 16:15 desire 30:4 Detective 21:20 22 2 22:4,7,14,17	door 28:11 doors 46:13 doubt 51:20 62:10 drawn 48:3 Druid 58:16 59:13 dual 65:13 E earlier 36:19 easier 14:5 33:20 46:3 easy 44:22	Esquire 2:6,6,7,7,8,9 2:10,10,11,12,13,14 essentially 43:18 54:3,11 ethics 8:3 Evans 60:8 evidence 5 14 7:7,7 7:25 28:6 29 1,2,5,6 30:25 33:13,25 34:1 44:13 64:8 Ex 3:4,6 exact 10:9,11	F fact 11 15 32:24 33:2 33:11 45 20,23 48:5 49:21 51 24 55:13 61:24 facts 51:3 factual 9:9 38:22,23 failing 56.7 failure 18:14 20:3,6,7 21 2 54:10 fair 50:16 53:6
demonstrative 18:25 denied 10:12 66:16 deny 9:12 Deputy 4:16 12:11 derivative 16:12	door 28:11 doors 46:13 doubt 51:20 62:10 drawn 48:3 Druid 58:16 59:13 dual 65:13 E earlier 36:19 easier 14:5 33:20 46:3 easy 44:22 Edward 1:4,10 13:1	Esquire 2:6,6,7,7,8,9 2:10,10,11,12,13,14 essentially 43:18 54:3,11 ethics 8:3 Evans 60:8 evidence 5 14 7:7,7 7:25 28:6 29 1,2,5,6 30:25 33:13,25 34:1 44:13 64:8 Ex 3:4,6 cxact 10:9,11 exactly 26 21 34:1	F fact 11 15 32:24 33:2 33:11 45 20,23 48:5 49:21 51 24 55:13 61:24 facts 51:3 factual 9:9 38:22,23 failing 56.7 failure 18:14 20:3,6,7 21 2 54:10 fair 50:16 53:6 fairly 32:21
demonstrative 18:25 denied 10:12 66:16 deny 9:12 Deputy 4:16 12:11 derivative 16:12 33:12 51:8 60:10,14 described 25:10 description 23:16 designed 16:15 desire 30:4 Detective 21:20 22 2 22:4,7,14,17 determination 7:24 17:5,7,19 63:24	door 28:11 doors 46:13 doubt 51:20 62:10 drawn 48:3 Druid 58:16 59:13 dual 65:13 	Esquire 2:6,6,7,7,8,9 2:10,10,11,12,13,14 essentially 43:18 54:3,11 ethics 8:3 Evans 60:8 evidence 5 14 7:7,7 7:25 28:6 29 1,2,5,6 30:25 33:13,25 34:1 44:13 64:8 Ex 3:4,6 exact 10:9,11 exactly 26 21 34:1 55:8,14	F fact 11 15 32:24 33:2 33:11 45 20.23 48:5 49:21 51 24 55:13 61:24 facts 51:3 factual 9:9 38:22,23 failing 56.7 failure 18:14 20:3,6,7 21 2 54:10 fair 50:16 53:6 fairly 32:21 faith 29:21 30:11
demonstrative 18:25 denied 10:12 66:16 deny 9:12 Deputy 4:16 12:11 derivative 16:12	door 28:11 doors 46:13 doubt 51:20 62:10 drawn 48:3 Druid 58:16 59:13 dual 65:13 	Esquire 2:6,6,7,7,8,9 2:10,10,11,12,13,14 essentially 43:18 54:3,11 ethics 8:3 Evans 60:8 evidence 5 14 7:7,7 7:25 28:6 29 1,2,5,6 30:25 33:13,25 34:1 44:13 64:8 Ex 3:4,6 cxact 10:9,11 exactly 26 21 34:1 55:8,14 excluded 29 6	F fact 11 15 32:24 33:2 33:11 45 20.23 48:5 49:21 51 24 55:13 61:24 facts 51:3 factual 9:9 38:22,23 failing 56.7 failure 18:14 20:3,6,7 21 2 54:10 fair 50:16 53:6 fairly 32:21 faith 29:21 30:11 36 18 37:3
demonstrative 18:25 denied 10:12 66:16 deny 9:12 Deputy 4:16 12:11 derivative 16:12	door 28:11 doors 46:13 doubt 51:20 62:10 drawn 48:3 Druid 58:16 59:13 dual 65:13 E earlier 36:19 easier 14:5 33:20 46:3 easy 44:22 Edward 1:4,10 13:1 74:3,5 effective 24:24,25 effectively 7:20,21	Esquire 2:6,6,7,7,8,9 2:10,10,11,12,13,14 essentially 43:18 54:3,11 ethics 8:3 Evans 60:8 evidence 5 14 7:7,7 7:25 28:6 29 1,2,5,6 30:25 33:13,25 34:1 44:13 64:8 Ex 3:4,6 cxact 10:9,11 exactly 26 21 34:1 55:8,14 excluded 29 6 excuse 20:1,21 21.1	F fact 11 15 32:24 33:2 33:11 45 20.23 48:5 49:21 51 24 55:13 61:24 facts 51:3 factual 9:9 38:22,23 failing 56.7 failure 18:14 20:3,6,7 21 2 54:10 fair 50:16 53:6 fairly 32:21 faith 29:21 30:11 36 18 37:3 falling 7:14
demonstrative 18:25 denied 10:12 66:16 deny 9:12 Deputy 4:16 12:11 derivative 16:12	door 28:11 doors 46:13 doubt 51:20 62:10 drawn 48:3 Druid 58:16 59:13 dual 65:13 	Esquire 2:6,6,7,7,8,9 2:10,10,11,12,13,14 essentially 43:18 54:3,11 ethics 8:3 Evans 60:8 evidence 5 14 7:7,7 7:25 28:6 29 1,2.5,6 30:25 33:13,25 34:1 44:13 64:8 Ex 3:4,6 exact 10:9,11 exactly 26 21 34:1 55:8,14 excluded 29 6 excuse 20:1,21 21.1 39:24 45:1 68:13	F fact 11 15 32:24 33:2 33:11 45 20.23 48:5 49:21 51 24 55:13 61:24 facts 51:3 factual 9:9 38:22,23 failing 56.7 failure 18:14 20:3.6,7 21 2 54:10 fair 50:16 53:6 fairly 32:21 faith 29:21 30:11 36 18 37:3 falling 7:14 falls 9 24 10.5
demonstrative 18:25 denied 10:12 66:16 deny 9:12 Deputy 4:16 12:11 derivative 16:12	door 28:11 doors 46:13 doubt 51:20 62:10 drawn 48:3 Druid 58:16 59:13 dual 65:13 	Esquire 2:6,6,7.7,8,9 2:10,10,11,12,13,14 essentially 43:18 54:3,11 ethics 8:3 Evans 60:8 evidence 5 14 7:7,7 7:25 28:6 29 1,2,5,6 30:25 33:13,25 34:1 44:13 64:8 Ex 3:4,6 cxact 10:9,11 exactly 26 21 34:1 55:8,14 excluded 29 6 excuse 20:1,21 21.1 39:24 45:1 68:13 69:5	F fact 11 15 32:24 33:2 33:11 45 20,23 48:5 49:21 51 24 55:13 61:24 facts 51:3 factual 9:9 38:22,23 failing 56.7 failure 18:14 20:3.6,7 21 2 54:10 fair 50:16 53:6 fairly 32:21 faith 29:21 30:11 36 18 37:3 falling 7:14 falls 9 24 10.5 false 7:7,8
demonstrative 18:25 denied 10:12 66:16 deny 9:12 Deputy 4:16 12:11 derivative 16:12 33:12 51:8 60:10,14 described 25:10 description 23:16 designed 16:15 desire 30:4 Detective 21:20 22 2 22:4,7,14,17 determination 7:24 17:5,7.19 63:24 determine 50:18 63:3 determined 14:22,24 51:25 determines 28:22 62:20	door 28:11 doors 46:13 doubt 51:20 62:10 drawn 48:3 Druid 58:16 59:13 dual 65:13 	Esquire 2:6,6,7.7,8,9 2:10,10,11,12,13,14 essentially 43:18 54:3,11 ethics 8:3 Evans 60:8 evidence 5 14 7:7,7 7:25 28:6 29 1,2,5,6 30:25 33:13,25 34:1 44:13 64:8 Ex 3:4,6 exact 10:9,11 exactly 26 21 34:1 55:8,14 excluded 29 6 excuse 20:1,21 21.1 39:24 45:1 68:13 69:5 excused 10:18,21	F fact 11 15 32:24 33:2 33:11 45 20,23 48:5 49:21 51 24 55:13 61:24 facts 51:3 factual 9:9 38:22,23 failing 56.7 failure 18:14 20:3.6,7 21 2 54:10 fair 50:16 53:6 fairly 32:21 faith 29:21 30:11 36 18 37:3 falling 7:14 falls 9 24 10.5 false 7:7,8 far 14:7 26:6 50:4,20
demonstrative 18:25 denied 10:12 66:16 deny 9:12 Deputy 4:16 12:11 derivative 16:12 33:12 51:8 60:10,14 described 25:10 description 23:16 designed 16:15 desire 30:4 Detective 21:20 22 2 22:4,7,14,17 determination 7:24 17:5,7.19 63:24 determine 50:18 63:3 determined 14:22,24 51:25 determines 28:22 62:20 dictates 28 25	door 28:11 doors 46:13 doubt 51:20 62:10 drawn 48:3 Druid 58:16 59:13 dual 65:13 	Esquire 2:6,6,7,7,8,9 2:10,10,11,12,13,14 essentially 43:18 54:3,11 ethics 8:3 Evans 60:8 evidence 5 14 7:7,7 7:25 28:6 29 1,2.5,6 30:25 33:13,25 34:1 44:13 64:8 Ex 3:4,6 exact 10:9,11 exactly 26 21 34:1 55:8,14 excluded 29 6 excuse 20:1,21 21.1 39:24 45:1 68:13 69:5 excused 10:18,21 Executive 63:10	F fact 11 15 32:24 33:2 33:11 45 20.23 48:5 49:21 51 24 55:13 61:24 facts 51:3 factual 9:9 38:22,23 failing 56.7 failure 18:14 20:3,6,7 21 2 54:10 fair 50:16 53:6 fairly 32:21 faith 29:21 30:11 36 18 37:3 falling 7:14 falls 9 24 10.5 false 7:7,8 far 14:7 26:6 50:4,20 60:6 61:19 68:3
demonstrative 18:25 denied 10:12 66:16 deny 9:12 Deputy 4:16 12:11 derivative 16:12 33:12 51:8 60:10,14 described 25:10 description 23:16 designed 16:15 desire 30:4 Detective 21:20 22 2 22:4,7,14,17 determination 7:24 17:5,7.19 63:24 determine 50:18 63:3 determined 14:22,24 51:25 determines 28:22 62:20	door 28:11 doors 46:13 doubt 51:20 62:10 drawn 48:3 Druid 58:16 59:13 dual 65:13 	Esquire 2:6,6,7.7,8,9 2:10,10,11,12,13,14 essentially 43:18 54:3,11 ethics 8:3 Evans 60:8 evidence 5 14 7:7,7 7:25 28:6 29 1,2,5,6 30:25 33:13,25 34:1 44:13 64:8 Ex 3:4,6 exact 10:9,11 exactly 26 21 34:1 55:8,14 excluded 29 6 excuse 20:1,21 21.1 39:24 45:1 68:13 69:5 excused 10:18,21	F fact 11 15 32:24 33:2 33:11 45 20,23 48:5 49:21 51 24 55:13 61:24 facts 51:3 factual 9:9 38:22,23 failing 56.7 failure 18:14 20:3.6,7 21 2 54:10 fair 50:16 53:6 fairly 32:21 faith 29:21 30:11 36 18 37:3 falling 7:14 falls 9 24 10.5 false 7:7,8 far 14:7 26:6 50:4,20

fatal 20:16 23:11	57:1,5 69:4,7	23:4 27:11 33:13	Gray 19:2 20:16
fault 9:22	Flynn's 69:25	34:23 35:13,20	26:14 28:10,11
favor 60:13	folks 48:21	48:22 50:12 53:25	41:15 47:3 55:2,12
favorable 64:2,4	following 12:7 40:18	56:4 58:7 60:6	great 18:4
favorably 51:20	42:22 67:5 68:12,16	61:22 64:16,17 70:1	group 72:19
February 57:16 65:4	68:23 69:21 73:5	71:5 72:15 73:7	guess 9:14 10:14
72:17 74:16	foresight 37·1	goes 30:20 33:7 34:8	21:23 35:17 54:3
federal 33:3,10	formal 45:6	49:22 60:11	57:18 66:11 71:8,12
feel 5:11,12,14 6:18	formally 54:2	going 6:6,8 8:14 9:8	guilty 32:14,14 34:18
6:19,25	forth 14:19 22:16	9:11,14,15 10:20	34:19,20,20
FEMALE 67:15	forward 56:5 71:10	13:14 14:4 17:2,2,5	guise 58:1
68:19	72:22	17:22 18:1,2 22:17	guts 54:11
fifth 14:11 20:19	found 34:20 62:23	24:2,8 25:18 27:14	gutted 54:22
23:13 38:18 39:8,19	foundation 41.8	28:14 29:10 30:5	guys 70:16
50:13,14	four 25:21 58:3,16,16	31:17,24 34:22	5 -, 5 , 5 , 5 , 5 , 5 , 5 , 5 , 5 , 5 , 5
figure 24:18 28:17	58:20 59:2,19,21	36:25 39:8,8,17	<u></u> . H
figured 9:18 32:5	60:19	40:10 44:6 45:16,23	hairs 64:14
35:7 36:19	four-part 62:9	46:6,7,8 48:2,21	hammered 25:25
file 37:12 56:5	fourth 20:17 21:18	50:22 52:7,18 55:9	hand 71:25
filed 5:5 11:1 13:8,21	23:12,16 46:21 47:6	69:8 70:2,22 71:2	happen 52:18 72 9
16:8 37:10,13 52:16	frankly 37:16	golden 49:24	happened 25:20,23
53:14	frivolous 29:25	good 4:13,19,20,21	59:21 63:23
fill 43:16	front 21:13	4:22,25 5:2,4 12:15	happens 61:9
filling 54:25	full 34:21	12:21,24 13:2 29:21	hard 58.4
find 9:6 41:17 50:1	fundamental 39:12	30:11 36:17 37:3	hate 10:8 69:14
52:25 63:10 66:14	funny 56:25	57:23	he'll 26:25
70:10,13	further 22:7	Goodson 6:4,11 8:15	hear 13:10 15:9
finding 50:25 51:2	future 53:6 61:19	8:18 9:8 11:3,19	30:24 36:8 53:17
66:12		13:13,24 21:9,21	55:17 67:10.11.12
finds 17:8	G	24:9 37:9,10 38:23	69:15 72:21,22
fine 7:16 35:8 36:11	G 2:3 4:5	50:19 54:9,11,20	heard 5:9 13:13
39:7 40:15 42:4,6	Garrett 1:10 46:6	58:19,22 62:24	14:13 33:2 53:17.18
42:14,17 69:18	74:4	63:15 64:5 66:4	58:5,24 72:10 74:8
70:17 71:12,13,14	gather 55:7	Goodson's 45:7	hearing 2:2,4 9:3
first 5:10 12:14 18:14	getting 46:16,20 58.5	goose 49:24	15.6 31:22 33.17
31:12,20 32:9 41.4	66:13 71.21	grammatically 70:7	41:11 43:24 72:18
43:21 46:6 50 12	give 19:25 28:24 51:8	grand 16 1,2 61 2	hearings 9:9
53:4 55:23	62:22	grant 9 6 11:6 15 3	Heaver 2:19
five 25.23 47:16	given 9:6 11:15 27:23	31:4,5 37.2 48:17	held 45:22
flippant 72:5	46:22 56:4	53:9 56 9 61:10	help 5:25 34:11,12,13
Flynn 2:10 12:21,22	giving 40:2	62:12 63:11 65:22	35:10,12
53:20,21,23,23 54:1	Gladhill 47:7,8 58:15	granted 8:14,16 11:8	hereunto 74:15
54:6,19 55:19.23	58:17	45:9 47:2	Herman 16:7
56:1,3,12,14,16,21	go 8:13 12:1 20:25	granting 30:13 39:5	highlighted 43:2,3,9
		<u> </u>	<u> </u>

Page 80

Hill 58:16 59:13	immunity 15:4 16:12	52:15	24:17 28:23 31:2
history 50:9 51:2	16:13,14 27:5 31:5	injuries 23:11,13	38:1 40:14 44:1
home 26:1	32:2 39:5,22 46:22	injury 20:11,16,18	53:14,17,18 55:11
Honor 4·13,20,22 5:2	47:2 48:8 60:5,6,14	21:5 23:7 25:20,23	55:16,17 56:18 57:3
5:10,11,16,18,20	62:17 63:12,25	59:1,9,10 60:21,22	59:5 62:13,21 64:10
6:1,18,21 7:21 8:4	66:12,15	64:11 65:17 66:7	65:16,21 66.3,5,7
9:17 10.3,17 11:9	immunize 16:2 30:15	inordinate 61:4	71:4 72:20
11:12,20,25 12:3,6	30.24 46:7,10 65:11	inquired 47:19	issued 37:21
12:10,15,16,20,21	immunized 15:22	inside 27:24,25	issues 5:16 7:4,5 9:10
12:24 13:2,11,11	33:1,6,11 38:15,16	insightful 48:18	15:4,5,6 29:8,11
14:13,18 15:3,21	impacts 31:21 39:2	insofar 30:19	30:12,21 57:17,18
16:7,25 17:1,10.22	impeach 55·10	instructed 40:22	64:9,25 66:2
18:8,16 19:4,23	important 6:1 8:10	instruction 59:5	Ivan 2:13 4:23
20:7,24 21:3,12	23.25 24.1 25:18,24	insult 17:22	
22:9,10.19 23:6.23	29.4 36:1 44.15	intent 30:8	J J
24:21 25:3 26:3,12	45:10 46:9 50:12	interest 5:19,25 8:7,8	J 2:11
28:1,12 29:14 30:7	59:7 64:12,13	14:23 16:19 18:13	jab 8:13
30:13,20 31.8,19,21	importantly 66:12	28:23 29:24 30:3	Janice 2:6 4:16 12:11
32:9,18.19 33:2.9	impression 33:23	32:3 35:16,19,22,24	January 2:4 40:22,23
33:22 34:4,13 35:15	inappropriate 6:13	35:25 36:7 45:2	43:5,17 63:19 64:11
35:17,22 36.8 37:5	6 19	51:4 54:18 58:5	74:8
37:7.14 38:4.7	Inaudible 68:19	62:21 63:11	job 14:5 35:7 51:11
39:11 40:21 41:24	inclined 45 5	interested 50:22	John 2:7 4:17 12:12
42:18 43:1.15 44:7	included 42:8	interesting 17:11	Joseph 2:14 5:2
44:10 48:5 53:8,11	including 36:18	interfere 16:17 17:18	12:16
53:20,24 56:12,14	44:18	interpret 35:23	judge 2:3 30:15
56:21 57:9,19,23	income 58:3	intervene 67:9,14	36:16 40:1 48:7
58:9 60:1,11,24	incorporate 13:21	Intervening 67:18	49:1,12,14 60:2,10
61:12,23 62:15	37:8	interview 22:13	61:19 72 12
66:18,19 69:2,4	incorporated 14:2	introduce 5:14	judges 5.21
72:24 73:1	indicate 14:10	investigated 35:1	judgment 16:22
Honor's 30:3	indicated 26:18	investigation 16.1	judgments 16-18
Honorable 2:3 4:5	45:15 54:25 55:2	Investigations 60:9	judicial 8·10 48 8
horse 52:19	indicates 19:1 63:22	investigative 49:18	62:18
hostage 47:16	64:19	invited 70.23	judiciary 50:1
hung 34:19 61:20	indicating 55:14	invoke 11:22 14:11	June 24.7
_	indictment 61:2 62:3	involved 24:7 55:11	juries 61 20
i	individual 5:19	58:14	jury 16-1.2-24:2-25-1
idea 70:17	28:24 62:22	involvement 47:1	25:19,25 29 9 31 1
identification 44:13	individuals 13:14	involves 23:7 58:23	34:19 59 4,7 61:2
identified 13:15	information 5:18	involving 58:22	64:25
44.72 60.11 64.14	7.18,19 50:25 63:8	ironic 60:4	· · ·
46:23 50:11 54:16	7.1.0(t · t 0.2t 05.0		
54:19 identify 45:18	injunction 11:1,7	irrelevant 24:11	K Karen 2:15

ACCUSCRIBES TRANSCRIPTION SERVICE

	l	1	
Kastigar 15:6 31:22	41:1,18,19,25 42:9	manner 8:21 65:10	19:21 21:10 23:25
33:17	43:5,17,20 44:6	manslaughter 20:5	25:19 27:5 45:3
kind 9:14,18 11:18	59:3 64 :12	Marc 2:8 12:25	52:7 53:13,21 54:4
31:11 39:2	Levine 2:9 12:25	March 9:9 56:1,2,5	54:22 55:6,11,13
knees 26:14	liar 8:9	65:5,8 69:24 70:1,2	58:21,23 59:2 63:20
know 7:17 10:8,10,10	license 40:2	mark 41:10	64:5,10,23 65:4,11
15:8 16:20 18:16	Lieutenant 13:3 14:1	marked 3:3 43:4 44:2	66:5,16 69:12 70:11
21:16 24:14,17	19:17 20:4 28:3,5	44.12	70:22 74:5,22
26:13 27:11 32:19	45:3 46:10 57:24	Maryland 1:1,7,13	Miller's 16:23 46:6
32:21,25 34:25	light 14:18 41:11	1:19 2:21 28:25	54:14
35:10 36:10,13,16	limited 61:24	49:5 62:18 74:3,4,5	mind 25:2,5 51:20
36:19,20 38:13 39:9	limits 47:21	74:7	minefield 47.17
39:25 40:21 41:8,19	line 21:20 22:5	material 13:16 45:20	minimum 35:20
46:4,13 55:22 59:14	lineup 50:11 51:5	46:14 48:3,4 51:6	mis-try 61:20
60:18 61:6,12 65:3	literally 41:13 43:25	54:8,21	misconduct 20:3
65:8 66:3 67:21	47:21 49:19	mathematical 28:15	mislead 25.7,8
68:21 69:10 70:12	little 5:13 14:5 19:7	matter 6:5 8:15,17	misleading 25:9 29:8
70:13 72:6,12	63:17	9.8 11.2,4,7,19 13:7	64:25
knowing 34:21	live 61:25	13:13,13 17:3 24:11	mistrial 32:9,14
knows 7:8 50:9,10	logic 52:15	31:24 63:9,15 71:12	misunderstanding
	logically 15:20	71:14 72:16 74:3	39:12
L L	long 10:24 17:15	matters 50:19 64:2	moderation 49:21
L 2.6,8	39:7 62:4	Matthew 2:7 4:17	moment 5:12 9:19
laid 47:17 49 24	longer 30:15	12:12	14:5 57:12
law 17:3 30:9 35:12	look 5:16 6:2 7:6	Md 49:3	month 61:1
49:13,22 51:1 60:3	16:7 21:8 25:21	Mead 2:10 12:22	months 62:3
lawyer 5:23 7:8,9 8.1 8:2 10:8	46:4 61:18,19,21,22	mean 6:22 21:21	morning 4:4,10 16:9
	looked 26:1 35:2	34:14 53:15 65:22	motion 5:5 8:15,17
lawyers 5:22,22 lead 60:20,21	looking 5:22 8:2 15:5	65:23 70:16 71:12	9:6,12 10:11 13:20
learn 24 23,24	28:25 51:5 64:8	72:5,5	13:23 14:19,19
learn 24 23,24 learned 49:15	lose 49:21,24	means 10:9 30:15,25	15:24 30:14 37:10
learned 49:13	loud 7:13 36:9	meant 58:12	41:23 44:19 56:9
left 4:24 21:24	love 61:3	media 2:24 67:16,17	67:9,11,14,15
leg 26:14	Lutherville 2:21	74:9	motions 2:2 8:19
legal 5:24 9:10 18:7	. M	meet 62:8	15:11 16:10 37:2
legally 23·23 25·24	ma'am 53:22.25 57 6	mentioned 15:13,15	56:6 69.8
legislature 30:9	57:6	mere 33:11	Mount 58.13,13
48:10	magnitude 62.5	Messrs 23:24	59 13
legitimate 49:8 50:2	making 16:20 29:20	met 15:2	move 10:22 51:14
lesson 49:15	29:21 36 3 42 23	Michael 1 4 2:6,11 4:15 12:10 13:3	61:5 72·22
lest 49:21	45:19 52:2 62 6	74:3	moving 71:10
let's 46:5 68:13	MALE 67:18,20,22	74:3 Miller 1:10 2:10 12:8	Moylan 49:1,12,15 Murphy 48:7 60:2,10
letter 3:5 40:23,24	manipulate 8:12		Murtha 2:14 5:2.3
		12:23 13:9 14:1,8	IVEUI (IIA & 14 J Z,J
	<u> </u>		<u></u>

6:5,10,20 11:1,9	55:2 64:19	14:24 16:23,23,23	opposed 41:23 54:13
12:15,16 13:10,11	new 5:22 51:1	19:21 20:22 21:6,23	opposing 44:19
14:4,9,13,16 37:8	nice 51:21	22:3 23:15 24:9,15	opposite 10:9,11
37:22 40:12,13,21	Nobody's 25:7	26:7,17,18 38:2	opposition 13:20
41:3,20 42:5,7,15	noise 7:13	41:14 43:4,23 44:3	37:9
42:18,23 43:1,7,11	note 10:25 11:6	44:18 45:3,3,4,6,7,8	oppositions 16:8 42:8
43:13,15 44:14	12:17 13:25 28:24	45:11,14,15 46:6,7	options 32:16
47:11 48:20,23	43:20 63:25 64:11	46:12,22,23,24,25	ordeal 19:14 27:13
50:24 51:15,19,21	noted 8:19	47:6,7,8,8,14 48:2	64:21
57:13 58:10,15 60:1	notes 60:15	50:12 52:2,6,7,14	order 5:5,17 11:13
60:16 66:19,22,25	notice 13:18	53:1,3,21 54:4,8,9	24:8 25:10,11 28:23
69:5	noting 64:9	54:10,11,13,14,15	52:10 53:10 62:22
Murtha's 60:12	Novak 46:23,23,24	54:15,22 55:6,7,11	orders 15:4 52:4,5
	46:25 58:11,14	55:13.21 56:23	ordinary 35:25
N	number 4:14 9:15	57·10.14 58:15.17	outburst 35.9
name 4:22 53:22	12:8,8,9 41:19	58:17.18 63:25	outcome 64:3,4
74:16	62:19 74:4,5,6,7	officer's 49:7,10	outside 55:3
nature 47:22 48:7		officers 32:6 46:22	outweighed 29:7
53:2	0	47:8	overall 22:15
near 22:13	object 11:21,23 57:10	official 2:1 74:13	
necessarily 9:4 65:20	objecting 47:23	oh 4:11 11:19 29:17	P
necessary 5:19 14.23	55:25 56:8,11 57:14	34:25 43:12 44:9	p.m 4:2 40:17 42:20
16:18 17:4 28:22	objection 11.6 34:5	67:17,19	67:4 68:10.15,22
32:23 54:17 62:21	43:9 44:5 62:7,8	okay 4:11 8:5 9:18	69:20 73:3,9
63:10	objections 34:8	10:6 14:16 17:20	page 19:1,13 21:8,9
need 19:21 20:22	objectives 5:24	18:11,22 19:5,8	21:11,20 22:13,24
26:7,20 28:16 31:22	objects 30:23	20:12,25 22:1,22	22:25 27:12 41:3,4
32:7 38:8 55:20	observation 41:15	23:2,5,8,21 25:6	43:20 48:6 64.18,20
56:22 65:15 72:6.8	51:9	28:2 33:2 37:15	pages 19:1,9 20:23
needed 24:9 33:23	observations 48.7	42:6.15,19 43:14	papers 18:15 37:6
60:7 63:21	observe 26:24 27:18	44:11 53:12 55:19	42:2 48 5.6 60:2
Nero 1:4 2:8 12:8	obtaining 53:2	57·1 59:23 67:21	paragraph 41:5
13:1,9 14:1,8 19:21	obviously 15:22 24:5	68:1,5,7,8,9,21	43:21 48:6 60:1
21:10 23:25 25:19	51:18 57 10 61:21	69:18 70:4,14 71:11	part 4:4 23:14.15
27:5 45:3 46:7 52:6	63:15 65 7	71:16 72:2,23,25	29:18 37:21 60:3,16
53:13 57:10 58:21	occurred 20:11 23:16	old 16.10	participant 47:2 52:6
59:2 63.20 64:5,10	59:9.11	once 12.4 14·3 17 4	particular 10:25 31:2
64:23 65:4,11 66:5	offensive 46:17 48:2	30.7,10 48:17 51:10	particularly 25:18
66:16 69:11,11	offer 7:9,19	63.9	parties 40:18 42:21
70:11,16,22 74:3	offering 7:18.19 27:4	opinion 49:2	67:5 68:11 69:1,21
Nero's 16:23 70:8	Office 30:2 51:12	opportunity 5:7 8:23	73:4
never 19:22 24:14	officer 3:7 5:3,6 7:1,1	26.24 27:18.19,19	party 35:25 70:24
27:6 34:25 35:3	8:9 12:17,23 13:1,8	31 18,19 48:24 49:7	patience 61:14
43:25 45:21 48:3	13:9,16 14:1,1,22	oppose 43:3	pay 32:19 58:2

		15.10.60.15	
pending 1:1	7:1 8:9 12:17,17	power 17:12 62:17	64:24
people 45:18 48:11	13:16 14:22,24 15:4	72:18,20	problems 8:8 32:1
58:25 63:15 72:20	18:15,25 19:21	powerless 47:21	proceedings 2:1,24
perceived 50:13	21:23 22:3 24:15,23	48:15 50:7	4:1 15:7 36:1 48:9
perfect 11:25	26:2,17,18 27:6	powers 17:18 30:8	62:19 74:2,10
period 10:15	28:4 31:20 32:2	48:16	process 34:20 53:5
perjure 38:19	33:25 34:5 35:1,13	practical 31:13	Proctor 52:12
perjured 47:18	36:22 38:2 39:1	practicalities 61:24	produced 2:25
perjury 38:3,5,16,17	40:14 41:14 43:23	preamble 5:23	profession 5:24
38:18 40:3	44:4,18 45:4,7,11	prejudging 32:22	professional 6:2 7:3
permission 12:18	45:14,15 46:12	prejudice 29:8 64·24	7:22
permitted 12:20	47:14 48:2 50:12	premature 30:21	proffer 14:5 16:21
49:17	52:2,14 53:1,3 54:8	31:2	17:5 44:4 55:5
persistently 49:18	54:10,14,15,15	prepared 56:4,5	62:24 63:2,7 65:18
person 7.8	56:23 57:15 58:18	57:24	66:6
perspective 53:13	61:11 64:1,5,19	prerequisites 14:20	proffered 64:9
66:4	65:11 66:1,10,15	15:2	proffering 19:20
Phone 2:22	Porter's 3:4,6 5:6	prerogative 49 18,20	promptly 62:11
Pillion 2:7 4:17,21	13:8 16:22 20:22	Presbury 58:13	promptness 61:6
12:12	23:16 24:9 26:7	present 4 15 12:25	proof 60:19,21,22
place 20:10.16,18	34:22 35:4 43:4	13:4 58:17,18	prosecute 38:15
21:5 23:7,11,13	44:12 55:8,21 63:21	presented 8:16,18	prosecution 54.9.11
58:13 59:1 64:11	64:13,17,17 65:16	9:1,10 25:10 31 1	54.22 56:23
65:17 66:7	65:19,20	38:22 50:20 51:3	prosecutor 5:21
placed 28:10 66:10	position 14:7 15:11 16:14 18:7 20:14	63:14,16 64:5 65:18 66:6	28:22 33:11,12 62:20
planning 67:9,13	24:22 44:16 54:7,13	President 74:22	1
play 25:17	54:13 66:10		prosecutor's 39:18
playing 65:21 Plaza 2:19		presiding 4:5 presume 52:9	prosecutors 33:21 49:17
pleading 40:23 44:18	positively 34:15,16 possibility 32:12,18		protect 50.15
pleadings 44:17	possible 58:6	presumption 52:1 pretext 44.23 46:16	protected 35:19
47:15	possibly 35:3 59:17	pretext 44.23 40.10 pretextual 47:13	protecting 48:11
please 4:12 35:14	64:23 65:15	49:11 51:23 53:1	51:15
51:14	postpone 31:6 47:13	pretrial 8.19 56:6	protections 48:13
point 14:14 17:9	56:10 64:2 68:3	pretty 62:4	50:21
24.12 34:24 50:5	postponed 52:22	previously 13:15	prove 27:20,23 33:14
58:2,24 59:1,3	70:12,23 71:3	45:2 48:12 49:10	33:16,20
60:18,24 62.10	postponement 45:6	private 36:3	proved 20:16
63:19 67:25 69:25	46:16,20 51:23 52:1	privilege 14:11 38:19	proves 28:15
70:3	52:11,20 53:3 54:2	49:13 50:5,13,14	provide 51:6 60:6,7.9
pointed 64:18	55:18,20,25 56:20	probably 7:15	provided 7:8
pointing 28:14	65:13 66:13 70:24	probative 29:7	proving 20:15
police 49:7.16 58:4	postponements 57:11	problem 38:21 42:17	public 5:19,25 8:7,8
Porter 2:14 3:7 5:3	postponing 68:4	problematic 39:5	14:23 16:19 18:13
	• • • •	•	
		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	·

28:23 29:23 30:3	58:7	15:8,10 46:21 47:6	35:12 62:22
32:3 35:18,21 36:7	reaffirming 57:11	47:20,22 49:6 57:14	reread 41:4
51:4 54:17 62:21	real 29:25 61:25	57:17 60:23 70:15	resources 35:21
63:11	really 13:7 29:16	regarding 55:1	respect 18:5
purpose 13:19 14:3	32:19 46:19 48:1.9	regardless 7:10 40:5	respectful 48:21
27:6 41:11 46:16,19	51:3 55:8 56:24	regulate 5:25	respectfully 10:7,7,9
47:12 48:10 53:2	58:25	related 21:2 31:12	17:24 53:8
56:19 65:13	reason 24:15.19	relates 36:5 44:21	respond 58:8 59:25
pursuant 62:18	34:16 44:14,25	relating 41:14	67:9.13
pursuing 5:24	49:25 65:15	relationship 65:2	response 5:8 34:2
push 49:23	reasoned 16:17,22	relative 58:3	responsive 44:17,18
pushed 50:4	reasons 9:11 26:3.5	relatively 28:21	restraint 49:21
put 13:17 19:17	31:11,14 36:4,5,14	relevance 21:10	result 52:11 61:11
31:14 34:1 48:5	48:12 53:8	relevant 27:14,16	63:18
52:19 64:22	reassessed 63:22.24	29:1,2,3,5,6 59:2,5	retrial 31:20 33:24
putative 16:3	recall 20:13 22:14	59:6 65:16,17,24,25	45:4
putting 26:15 32:1	28:13	relied 20:14	return 42:21 68:11
61:8	receive 51:7	relief 45:9 52:4,15	73:4
	recess 73:7	62:12	returned 61:2
<u>Q</u>	reckless 19:25 20:2	relies 23:14	review 5:7 60:4
quash 13:23 37:10	59:5 60:19	rely 23:15 43:25	Rice 1:16 2:11 12:9
question 10:13 17:11	recklessness 20:2	relying 16:10 40:25	13:3,9 14:8 19:18
17:23 18:9,10 21:9	recognize 61·14,15	41:6,7 43:22	19:21 20:4 21:11
22:7,15,20 25:12	recognized 48:4	renew 14·19	23:25 25:19 27:5
27:13 30:13,22	recollection 21:12,13	repeatedly 61:23	28:4,5 45:3 46:10
37:24 55:24 67:2	21:16	Reports 49:3	53:13 57:24 58:21
questioning 47:23	record 4:2 11:20	represent 4:23	59:3 63:20 64:6,10
questions 37:5 39:3	12:25 13:19 14:3	representation 40:24	64:23 65:5,11 66:5
39:19 40:6,6 48:18	17:1,3 42:12 44:5	41:5,12 43:21 45:19	66:16 74:6
48:23,25	58:10 68:3 73:9	representations	Rice's 14:2 16:24
quick 67:2	74·12	46:18 50:9	ridiculed 45:14
quickly 61:3 66:24	recorded 2:24 74.9	representative 66:23	right 5:4 9:4,16
quite 37:16	red 39:14	represented 15:1	10:24 11:10 12:2,23
R	reference 7 7 13:22	request 11.1.6 13:8	13:5 14:10.15 16:5
R 2:9,12 74:22	14:3 42.16,24	29:21 53:8.9 56:20	16:7 19:23 22:5.7
raining 39:15,16	referenced 45:24	62:12.18 63:25 64:1	25:2,9 26:6 28:1,20
raised 15:4,13	64 12	65:23 66:11,12,14	30:13 31:3 33:18,19
re-examine 61:13	references 60:16	66:15	34:23 37:18,23
reach 70:14	referred 42-13	requested 54:2	38:25 39:4,6 41:18
read 22:21 25:1 41 4	referring 22:11	required 49:20 56:6	50:2,15 51:17 52:13
42.11 53:14 62 19	58:10	63:2,11	53:12 54:6 57:3.11
	reflected 45:12	requirement 63.4.6	58:4 60:15 61:25
reading 41·17		requires 35-12-60.19	62:1,7,16 68:25
reading 44·17 ready 57:20.21.21	refuse 7 9 14:25 regard 11.12 14:1	requiring 28:24	69:23 70:5 71:8,16

	1	1	1
72:7	12:6,11 14:18 15:17	seatbelting 26:7 44:1	short 62:1,2,5
rights 11:22 16:15,16	15:20 16:6,25 17:10	44:21 55:12	shots 71:18
16:16,16 35:19	17:21 18:1,4,7,12	seated 4:9 14:12	show 26:14,23 27:18
57:25 58:7 66:9	18:20,23 19:4,6,9	second 18:14 19:25	27:23,25 28:9 41:13
righty 73:2	19:12,15,23 20:10	20:6,8,9,10,17,22	showed 26:17
rise 4:3	20:13,24 21:1,5,12	21:2 22:12,24 23:6	shows 28:3
risky 60:20	21:16 22:9,19,23	23:6,11 41:3,4 53:4	sic 49:19 59:13
Road 2:20	23:1,3,5,9,20,22	58:24 68:13 69:16	sides 64:3.3,6
room 15:25	24:21 25:5,7,16	secondly 34:4	significant 18:13
row 61:20	26:9,12.21 27:8,10	Section 60:15.17	44:22 60:20,22
rubber 63:9	27:15,25 28:3,12,20	see 7:2 22:5,10 25:15	similar 9:11
rule 29:1,2 51:20	29:13,17,20 30:19	26:19,22 27:1,16,17	simple 26:4,4 31:23
rules 6:2 7:3,6,22	31:8,10 32:8.13,15	38:4,17,22 39:25	63:13 66:4,5
29:1	32:17 33:8,16,19	45:16,23 46:5 52:5	simply 60:24 63:8
ruling 10:3 28:18	34:12,15 35:15	55:8 65.20 68:13	single 10:1 23:24
30:23 50:18,19	36:11,12,14 37:13	71:20	24:16
65:14 71:5	37:16,20,25 38:4,7	seek 51:23 52:3	sir 5:9 6:16 10:13
rulings 11:4 30:16	38:9,12 39:11,21	62:17	sit 6:1 7:2,6 11:19
ruse 17:8 30:4	40:9 41:24 42:2	seeking 40:2 65:11	13:6 34:21
ruses 17:13 44:24	43:10,12,18 44:6,9	seen 5:8 8:10	situation 41.17
- s	45:13 58:9,23 59.12	send 71:21 72:1	situations 15:25
•	59:17,20,24 61.12	sense 5:13 28:25	six 25:23 32:6 35:2
sake 55.5	61:17 62:15 63:22	36:16 46:17	67:7
sand 41:8 save 32:4 71:24	66:18 67:17,25 69:2	separate 29:22 57:17	sixth 20:19 23:14
saw 27:7 64:19	schedule 31:19 69:8	separation 17:18	50:15
saying 6:24 7:12,17	69:24	30:8 48:16	slowly 73:8
7:20 17:21,24 19:19	scheduled 55:25 65:4	September 41:19,20	small 72·19
22:12 27:3 29:18	65:5 69:10,24,25	41:25 42:9 50:10	solely 51 11 53 17
30:14,20 31:1 35:10	72:17	Sergeant 4:23 54:9	somebody 30:23
35:23 39:4,9,9	schedules 62:11	54:12	36:24
41:21 42:13 44:19	scheduling 10:14	serious 61:22	somebody's 42:2
50:3 52:12,18 55:19	37:17 42:7 57:17	seriously 62:10	sorry 20 21 21.8
56:16.22 59:10	70:1 71:21	served 13:24.25	43·16 69:17 sort 29·24 35:9 54:5
60:10 72:16	searching 43:24	service 2:18,18,25	
says 19:9,15 26:22	seatbelt 18:14 20:3,6 20:8 21 3,22,24	session 4:4,6,8 set 13:6 22:16 36:4,5	sought 52:16 53 10 sounds 35:4 55:9
27:16 39:7,14,15,15	27:7 38 1 44:21	57:16	
43:22 48:16 49:15	55:7 58 25 59 7.8	sets 14:19	speak 12:14 52:20 71:6
50:1 63:10 64:20	64:10,20 65.16,21	setting 38:3,18	SPEAKER 67:15,18
scenario 9:10 38:22	66:7	seven 44:15	67:20,22
- 38:23,24	seatbelted 19:10,22	Seventy- 19:6	speaking 8:20 60:3
scenarios 64:4	22:1,6.10 26:22	Sherry 74:22	60:13 65:12 72:19
Schatzow 2:6 4:13,16	27:2,17.20 28:7,8	shifting 41:7	speaks 62:13
4:20 11:12,17 12:3	41:15,16 46:14	shock 72:11	special 8:21 9:7 11:3
	-	•	•

11:16 15:5 25:14,16	62:17,25 63:1,7,20	58:11,12,12,16,16	30:4 37:15,19,25
31:15 34:6 36:2	64:9,12,18,22 65:10	58:20 59:2,8,15,15	61:4 70:9,25 72:9
45:9 50:17,21 52:16	65:19,21 66:7,11	59:19,21,21 60:18	72:10
61:5 62:13 63:4	74:3,4,5,6	stoplight 39:14	surgery 69:25
65:6 71:6	State's 4:16,17 8:11	stops 25:21	suspended 58:2
specific 22:20,24	12:11,12 14:21,24	straight 54:18	system 8:10,12
specifically 48:20	15:11 16:17 17:4,7	strange 35.5	<u>*</u>
speed 61:6	17:16 20:14 23:15	street 28:14	<u>T</u>
speedy 11:22 29:11	30:1,10 35:16,22,24	strike 5:5	table 3:1 4:24 10:21
29:13 53:18 57:11	35:24 45:19 46:2	strong 33:23	46:4
57:25 58:1,6,6,7	51:11 53:1,9 54:7	strongly 30:20	tables 42:21 68:11
60:23 62:9 66:8	54:12 64:1	subject 39:16 45:21	73:4
split 33:9,10	stated 48:13 65:15	47:14,24	tag 55:1
splitting 64:14	71:4	subjected 53:6	taint 32:23
stage 15:7	statement 18:18,20	submit 31:12 37:5	tainted 33:21 35:11
stamp 63:9 71:24	20:23 23:19 24:5,19	subpoena 6:7 13:23	take 8:13,21 20:1
stand 14.10 29:10	26:22 27:1,12,14	13:25 37:12,13	24:22 31:24 39:8,19
30:22 39:18,24 40:3	40:8 41:6 54:24	subpoenas 37:21	47:15 61:21
41:9 66:1 73:8	55:14 64:15,17,19	subscribed 74:16	taken 64:16
standard 59:4	65:19 66:2	subsection 5:17	talk 9:21.23 29:11
standing 4:24 5:12	states 5:17,23 8 6	substance 60:11	57:20 71:17 72:3
6:19,23 12:23 13:4	17:15	substantially 29:7	talked 24:13
15:12.14 19:17	stating 28:21	substantive 36:6	talking 8·1 18:18
53:16	statute 14:20 16:14	60:12	21.8.17 23:18 26 8
stands 46:18	28:21 30:1 37:3	substitute 43:4 49:17	26:17 30:12 32:21
start 4:4 24:2,4 39:23	54:18 60:5	subterfuge 17:8 30:5	32.25 60:5 61:6.7,8
started 8:2 24:7	statutory 15:2	44:23	talks 29:2 60:1
state 1:1,7,13,19 2:6	stay 56:10 68:2	subterfuges 17:13	taser 22:2
4:14,15 5:11,14	staying 11:13,14	successful 56:22	Teal 22.2
6:10,25 7:18 8:9.15	stem 20:6	sufficient 36:25 47:4	team 32:1,23,24,25
11:7 12:7.7,8,9,10	step 31:5 68:6	48:9	33:20,24 34:17,18
13:8,15 14:17 15:21	stepping 28:4,4	suggest 17:12 35:16	35:11
15:22,24 20:15,20	stick 10:19.20	35:17,18,21	tell 15:10 22:19,21
23:10,14 27:6 31:25	stickers 43:8,16	suggesting 46:19	31:9,16,17 38:19
34:11,13 35:25	stipulation 55:6,13	suggestions 47:17	42:3 47:10 57:25 72:21
40:24 41:5 43 2,22	stop 18:14 20:4,6,8	suggests 48.9	1
44:16 45:1.10,14,22	20:17,17,19,19 21:2	Suite 2:20	telling 10.2.4
45:24 46 4.18,23,24	21:18 22.12.24	summing 22·14.15	terms 7:3 16:19 21:1
47:10,13,18,24	23:12,12,13,14,17	22:18	21:5 22:16 29:13 34:4 38:13 58:24
48:16 49.2.4,5,22	26:8,10 27:8,9,22	Supreme 16:10,13	62:1
50:2,8,9,11 51:21	28:7,8 45:11 46:5	17:14 33:5 49:6,14	test 62:9
51:23,24 52 2,9,19	46:15,21 47:1,3,6	63:5	test 62:9 testified 45:21 46:25
53:15 54:1 55:9,19	49:8,9 52:5 54:23	sure 15:9 17:25	testifies 26:25 32:2
56:6,16,22 61:2	54:25 55:7,12,14,16	20:13 25:4 29:10	testifies 20.23 32.2
	l	l	l

			·
38:2 47:1 66:1	45:5,12 47:9 50:7	2:25	55:7,12,15 58:12,12
testify 6:6,8 14:25	52:18 53:14 56:6	Transcriptionist	59:8,15,21,25 60:25
19:21 22:18 24:16	57:16 58:12 60:21	2:15	61:20 64:9
34:8 46:9,24 47:5	60:25 61:1 62:8	transpired 47:4	two-year 61:7
testifying 14:7	63:13	trial 3:7 4:24 5:7,15	
testimony 3:7 5:6.18	thinking 34:2	7:23 8:23 9:14	<u>_U</u>
13:9 14:6,22 16:22	thinks 36:18	10:21 11:14,22	ultimately 25:12
18:12,19,21,23	third 16:10,13 17:15	13:14 15:13,14	31:15 53:5
20:23 23:19 24:9	46:11	16:16 18:19,21,25	Um-hum 12:5 19:11
26:8 27:4 28:22,24	thought 34:25 35:3	23:19 24:18 26:2	21:4 40:20 70:20
29:23 30:19 32:7	three 11:11 12:4,7	29:11,14 30:16	undermines 60:12
33:1,6,12 35:4 36:8	16:9 20:2 31 14,21	34:24 36:22 41:10	understand 6:23
38:15,16 39:13,13	32:16 46:21 53:9	42:21 44:3,20 45:6	7:12 24:20 26:16
39:17,22.23 40:4,5	59:16	45:8,8 46·4 47:17	30:3 37:18 38:11
40:25 41:7,11,13	thrusting 53:3	50:16 53:6,18 57:12	48:15 54:1 56:21
43:23,25 44:3,20	tied 64:1	57:24,25 58:1,7,7	62:6,7
47:22 51:7,8 52:10	time 5:12 9:13,21,23	60:23 62:9,12 64:15	understanding 38:13
53:10 55:8 62:20,22	10:1,14 17:9 22:5,9	64:17,22 65:3,20	39:21 50:25 54:7,12
63:21 64:13.15,15	22:12 26:23 28:10	66:8 68:11 69:7,9	70:17,21 71·1
64:15.18,22 65:16	31:24 34:24 35:1	69:23 72:16 73:4	Understood 72 25
65:20	45:7 51:1 55:4	trials 13:9	undue 29:9 64:25
thank 10:17,22,23	57:19,19 62:4,5	tried 24:22,24 25:1,8	65:2
11:9 12:15 13:11	64:16 65:2 70:22	34:7 36:17 53:4,4	unethical 7:3
14:12 42:18 53:11	times 28:13 41:22	61:3 65:3	unfair 29:8 64:24
53:20,25 54:1 56:13	58:4 62:19	trooper 49:5	unfold 26:2
57:6,7.9 58:8 62:14	today 31:3 51:25	true 15:21 17:14 33:8	United 17:14
62:15 66:17,18,19	52:20 71:22 72:16	51:15 74:12	unlimited 61:14,18
69.3 72:24 73:1.6	today's 43:24	truth 38:20	urge 37:2
Thanks 18 [.] 6 48:19	told 11:18 36:21	truthful 40:4	use 16:11,12 18:1,2
theory 46:2,8	tomorrow 60:25 61:1	try 8:11 25:11 34:22	33:6,12 35:4 38 15
thereof 74:14,15	torture 47:16 53:7	51:21 55:21 61:11	46.2,5 48.21 51.7.8
thing 9:23 15:21	totality 21:18,19	trying 24:23 25:7	60 9,10,13,14
31:13 42:10 59:24	tow 55:1	28:17 35:15.17.18	uses 18.3
61:23	traffic 49:7.9	35:21 45:2 61:18	V
things 5:20 29:3.11	trampling 53:5	69:24 71:10	v 1:2,8,14,20 49:2,4
35:7 36.6 44:23	transactional 16:12	turned 46:12	valid 50:4
59:25 61:8 63:23,23	· -	turns 45:25	value 29:7
think 15 20 17 3	transcribed 74-11	two 13:12,14 14.20	van 26:15,18,19,23
23:25 25:2,17.21,24		18:10 20 7 25:21	27.24 28 1,4,5,6,10
25:25 27:15 28:13	74:1	26:3,9,10 27:8,9	28:11 46:13
29:24 30:8 31:10.12	transcript 2:1,25	28:7,8 29:22,22	version 43:3
32:8.19 35:11 36:7	18:24 22:21 44:8,9	31:10 36:6,15 45:11	versus 4:14 12:7,8,9
36:14,17 38:14	44:20 74:12,14	45:21 46:5,15 47:1	74·3,4,6,7
39:12,15 42.1 44:21	transcription 2:17,18	47:3 52:6 54:23,25	/ 7 3,7,0,7
	l		<u> </u>

			rage oo
video 2:24 19:16	72:8	words 14:20 39:14	11 22:5
26:10,13,17 27:17	we're 10:24 16:1	39:17,25	115141033 1:5 12:9
27:23 28:9,13 74:9	25:3,8 30:11,12	work 37:22	74:4
•		t e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e	115141034 1:11 12:8
videotape 45:24	31:16,17 36:1,1,2	works 38:14	74:5
view 7:2 47:4 58:11	36:17 38:17 40:3	world 61:25	,
vigorously 45:17	44:15 46:6,7,7 52:7	worry 7:14 38:12	115141035 1:17 12:9
violation 17:17 62:9	58:7 61:3,7,7 62:1,2	wouldn't 32:11 39:20	74:6
virtually 34:5,8	64:14 69:12 71:9,10	write 41.23	11514103 6 1:23 4:14
vital 45:20	71:14,18	written 37:9	74:7
VOICE 68:19	we've 58:24 71:11	wrong 10:3.5	13 48:6 60:1
W	week 56:4	wrote 49:1	1301 2:20
	weighing 24:2	x	132 49:3
wagon 19:17,18 55:3	went 28:6 55:2	· - · · · · · · · · · · - · -	13th 40:22,23 43:5
55:3	weren't 32:22 58:21	X 39:6,7	43:17 63:19 64:11
waived 12:18	70:25	l v ·	15th 41:20,25 42:9
want 5:9 9:15 10:19	White 1:22 2:13 4:14	yeah 23:1 26:13 40:1	1
11:21 12:3 13:6,6	4:23 8:17 9:10 11:2	41:21 42:4,4 59:20	
15:9 16:2 17:11	11:7,22 13:13,24	67:8 69:9 71:20	2 3:6 43:20 44:3,12
25:11 28:18 33:5	24:10 37:10 38:24	72:13	2:00 59:12
34:10 35:23 38:3	50:19 54.9.12,21	York 2:20	20 2:4 21·20 74:8
39:3,6,25 46:8	62:23 63:14 64:5	1 TOPK 2:20	2002 49.1
47:15,15 53:17,18	66:3 74:7	Z	2015 40:22,23 50:10
54:6,23 55:10,17,20	White's 5:7 45:8	Zayon 2:8 12:24,25	74:16
55:21 56:18 57:20	wholesale 50:8	57:9.21 67:7.11	2016 2:4 43:5,17
64:3,3 65:14 66:24	Whren 49:5,14	68:5,7 70:15,21	72:17 74:9
68:3 72:4	William 12:17	71:1,7,11,16,24	21093 2:21
wanted 8:24 11:18	Williams 2:3 4:5	72:25	22 60:14
32:7 36:22 37.15,19	59:4	1 - 1 - 1	22nd 57:16 72:17
59:24	willingly 17:2	zealous 48:1	•
wants 39:1	wisdom 52:17	0	3
wasn't 6:6,8 21:25	wishes 5:14 7:1,10	02:06:52 4:2	3.3 6.2
26:19 28:7 29:16	8:11 15:22	02:46:16 40:17	31 4:4
35:16 52:6 60.7	witness 13:17 14:10	02:48:12 42:20	39 19:1,6,9 20:23
70:23	15 22 16:2 30:22	03:18:19 67:4	22.24 64:18
watch 19:14 27:13	39:24 45:11.20 46.3	03:18:51 68:10	
64:21	46.9,15,24 47:5,24	03:19:05 68:15	
watched 25:17 26:2	48:3,4 53:7,11 54:8		4:00 59:12
way 25:22 33:7 34:25	54.21 57:15 74:15	03:19:14 68:22	40 19:13 22:25 64.20
38:2,13,14 39:3	witnesses 47:10	03:19:52 69:20	401 29 1
54:20 56:23 63:16	48:11 51:6,12	03:22:06 73:3	410-466-2033 2:22
64:16 65:21 72:5	woman 68:16,23	03:22:19 73.9	44 3:5,5,7,7
wayside 35:14	wondering 68:21	i _	4th 65:8
we'll 10:14 25:15	Wood 47:7	1 3:4 43:6,7,16 44:12	•
70:10 71:20 72:1,1	word 18:1	1/13/16/3:5	5
		1/13/10 3.3	5 48:6 60:15
	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	·

Page 89 **5-402** 29:2 65:25 **5-403** 29:4 64:24 65:24 **598** 49:3 601 2:20 **70** 21:9,11,17,20 71 19:1,3,4,9 20:23 21:8,11,17 22:13 7th 56:1,2,5 70:1 8th 74:16 9-123 8:7 48:9 62:19 9-204 60:17 9th 69:24 70:2

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MINAL DIVISION BAL

CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY CASE No. 115141033

EDWARD NERO

V.

STATE'S NOTICE OF APPEAL

NOW COMES the State of Maryland, by and through Marilyn J. Mosby, the State's Attorney for Baltimore City; Michael Schatzow, Chief Deputy State's Attorney for Baltimore City; Janice L. Bledsoe, Deputy State's Attorney for Baltimore City; and Matthew Pillion, Assistant State's Attorney for Baltimore City; and pursuant to Section 12-301 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland hereby notes an appeal on behalf of the State from a final judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City entered on January 20, 2016, in the above-captioned case denying the State's Motion to Compel a Witness to Testify Pursuant to Section 9-123 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.

Respectfully submitted, Marilyn J. Mosby

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 4th day of February, 2016, a copy of the State's Notice of

Appeal was mailed and e-mailed to:


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2015 FCB -5 A 11: 41

STATE OF MARYLAND

CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY

EDWARD NERO

v.

STATE'S MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS PENDING APPEAL

Now comes the State of Maryland, by and through Marilyn J. Mosby, the State's Attorney for Baltimore City: Michael Schatzow, Chief Deputy State's Attorney for Baltimore City; Janice L. Bledsoe, Deputy State's Attorney for Baltimore City; and Matthew Pillion, Assistant State's Attorney for Baltimore City; and pursuant to the Court's inherent power requests that this Court issue a stay of the above-captioned proceedings pending resolution of the appeal filed by the State on February 4, 2016, from the final judgment of this Court entered on January 20, 2016, denying the State's Motion to Compel a Witness to Testify Pursuant to Section 9-123 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article ("CJP" hereinafter).

I. Summary of Argument

Despite the Court's good intentions in seeking to avoid delay of the Defendant's trial, the Court's denial of the State's Motion to Compel Officer William Porter's testimony ran contrary to the plain language of CJP § 9-123 and to the Legislature's intent in enacting the immunity statute. It also violated separation of powers principles by appropriating to the Judiciary a discretionary power granted to the Executive Branch. The State is now appealing these errors given their ramifications on the State's ability to prosecute this and other cases here and throughout the State. As outlined below and previously argued, this Court had no authority to engage in judicial review of the State's Attorney's vested exercise of lawful discretion in determining that Officer Porter's testimony may be necessary to the public interest in the State's prosecution of the Defendant for his role in the fatal arrest and custodial transportation of Mr.

Freddie Gray. Instead, this Court had only the power to verify that the State's Motion to Compel complied with the procedural and pleading requirements of Section 9-123. Upon finding such compliance, the Court was required to follow the mandate of the Legislature and issue the immunity order.

Though the Court has disagreed with the State's assessment of the statute's mechanics, the State's arguments about Section 9-123's power distribution are strong. Moreover, the Court acted without any express authority or guidance on this issue from either of Maryland's appellate courts—and in the face of overwhelming precedent from other jurisdictions. If, as the State firmly maintains, this Court was, in fact, wrong in its denial of the State's Motion to Compel, to deny the State any meaningful opportunity for appellate review of that decision would potentially result in a miscarriage of justice in the Defendant's trial. The People of this State deserve that opportunity, and this Court has always demonstrated a commitment to giving both the Defendant and the People a fair trial. That commitment now requires allowing a higher court to review this Court's decision before moving forward in this case. As such, this Court should exercise a discretionary power it unquestionably possesses—the power to stay the proceedings pending the State's appeal.

II. Background

On January 14, 2016, the State filed in the above-captioned case a Motion to Compel a Witness to Testify Pursuant to Section 9-123 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. The witness in question was Officer William Porter. The State's Motion, submitted and signed by the State's Attorney herself, averred that the State may call Officer Porter to testify against the Defendant and set forth her determinations that Officer Porter's testimony may be necessary to the public interest and that he is likely to refuse to testify on the basis of his privilege against

self-incrimination given his similar refusal to testify in the related cases of State v. Caesar Goodson (No. 115141032) and State v. Alicia White (No. 115141036).

On January 15, 2016, the Defendant filed an Opposition to the State's Motion to Compel. The Defendant attacked the State's Motion as lacking an explanation of "why Officer Porter is either necessary or material to the trial of Defendant Nero or how it is necessary to serve the public interest." Def. Opp. at 1. The Defendant argued that Officer Porter's testimony is, in fact, not necessary to the public interest based on his assessment of the State's reasons for filing the motion and his view of the motion's effect on both his and Officer Porter's constitutional rights. Def. Opp. at 2-3. As such, he urged the Court to deny the motion. Likewise, on January 19, 2016, Officer Porter filed an Opposition to the State's Motion in which he too requested that the Court deny the State's Motion on grounds that the Court should find that compelling his testimony would not be necessary to the public interest and would violate his privilege against self-incrimination. Def. William Porter's Opp. at 8.

On the morning of January 20, 2016, the State filed a Response to the Defendant's Opposition, arguing that Section 9-123 granted neither the underlying defendant nor the witness standing to make such objections to the State's request for a grant of immunity and that under the plain terms of that statute, this Court lacked the discretion to deny a motion to compel immunized testimony when presented with a motion that complied with the statute's procedural requirements. Because the State's Motion to Compel unquestionably did comply with Section 9-123, the State urged this Court to follow the statute's mandates and issue the order to compel Officer Porter's testimony under a grant of use and derivative use immunity.

On the afternoon of January 20, 2016, this Court conducted a hearing on the State's Motion to Compel. At that hearing, the State repeated the arguments presented in its Response.

Nevertheless, the Court considered objections from both Officer Porter and the Defendant and then required the Chief Deputy State's Attorney to explain in open court the reasons that prosecutors believed that Officer Porter's testimony may be necessary to the public interest. Though the State maintained that such a judicial inquiry was improper under Section 9-123 and separation of powers principles, the Chief Deputy explained that the State sought to elicit from Officer Porter testimony regarding two important aspects of the charges against the Defendant. Consequently, the State's Attorney had determined that such testimony may be necessary to the public interest. The Court then made its own determination that granting him immunity would not be in the public interest, irrespective of the State's Attorney's contrary determination as properly pled in her Motion to Compel, and the Court denied the Motion. From this denial, the State filed a Notice of Appeal on February 4, 2016.

III. This Court should stay the proceedings pending appellate review of the Court's erroneous denial of the State's Motion to Compel to avoid a miscarriage of justice

A. Denying the State's request for a stay would impermissibly frustrate an appellate court's ability to act

Pending appellate review of this Court's denial of the State's Motion to Compel Officer Porter, the State requests that the Court issue a stay of the proceedings. This Court has the full power to issue such a stay and has granted one in the related case of State v. Alicia White (No. 115141036). As the Court of Appeals has described, when such an appeal is taken, "the trial court retains its 'fundamental jurisdiction' over the cause, but its right to exercise such power may be interrupted by . . . a stay granted by an appellate court, or the trial court itself, in those cases where a permitted appeal is taken from an interlocutory or final judgment." Pulley v. State, 287 Md. 406, 417 (1980). Though this Court retains "fundamental jurisdiction" over this

proceeding, the Court of Appeals has also held that "the propriety of the exercise of that jurisdiction" is a separate matter. In re Emileigh F., 355 Md. 198, 202 (1999). In that regard, "[a]fter an appeal is filed, a trial court may not act to frustrate the actions of an appellate court," and "[p]ost-appeal orders which affect the subject matter of the appeal are prohibited." Id. at 202-03; see also State v. Peterson, 315 Md. 73, 82, n.3 (1989) ("We think that a trial court ordinarily should not proceed with a hearing (when a writ of certiorari has been issued), thereby mooting an issue before an appellate court."); accord Jackson v. State, 358 Md. 612, 620 (2000) (While "a circuit court is not divested of fundamental jurisdiction to take post-judgment action in a case merely because an appeal is pending from the judgment," "[w]hat the court may not do is to exercise that jurnsdiction in a manner that affects either the subject matter of the appeal or the appellate proceeding itself—that, in effect, precludes or hampers the appellate court from acting on the matter before it.") (emphasis in original). Were this Court to order that the Defendant's trial will not be stayed and that the State must proceed to trial without the testimony of Officer Porter, such an order would unquestionably frustrate the actions of an appellate court, effectively mooting the State's appeal and preventing any further review of this Court's denial of the Motion to Compel.

B. Denying the State's request for a stay would needlessly cause irreparable harm

Moreover, a decision by this Court not to stay the proceedings would cause irreparable harm to the State's ability to prosecute this case at no commensurate gain to Officer Porter or the Defendant. Indeed, Officer Porter, the appellee in the appeal, will not be affected by a stay. Despite the State's request to schedule his retrial soon after the December mistrial and before trial of the related cases, Officer Porter's retrial was set for June 13, 2016, due to the asserted unavailability of his counsel prior to that date. Consequently, the State's appeal should be

resolved by then. Regarding the Defendant, he will not be a party to this appeal. As such, granting the stay would cause the Defendant to lose only a legally insignificant short amount of time awaiting resolution of the appeal before starting his trial. On the other hand, denying the stay would cost the State a valuable witness in its case. Officer Porter would provide key evidence regarding the Defendant's alleged misconduct and his alleged recklessness. Once the jury has been sworn in the Defendant's trial, however, the State will be foreclosed from seeking any meaningful remedy to this Court's denial of the Motion to Compel. If the Defendant were acquitted after a trial without Officer Porter's testimony, the damage would be done and could not be undone.

A stay would obviate the risk of such a potentially unfair result, a risk made all the more compelling given the public interest that abounds in this matter. At stake here is not only the outcome of one of the most high-profile criminal trials in Maryland history but also the very fiber of our State's constitutional separation of powers. This Court's denial of the Motion to Compel has deprived prosecutors of both a valuable witness in this case and also an indispensable prosecutorial tool that the Legislature provided to them over twenty-five years ago. Whether this Court's ruling is correct or whether the State's view is proper is a question which an appellate court should be permitted to timely answer. The public interest deserves no less, particularly in light of the strong merits of the State's case on appeal.

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¹ Even assuming that granting a stay would result in a trial delay of several months, the Defendant was indicted less than nine months ago and so would still come to trial on a date that would barely be sufficient to even trigger a legitimate speedy trial challenge, much less actually deprive the Defendant of that right given the complexity of the issues in this case. See Glover v. State, 386 Md. 211, 223 (2002) ("While no specific duration of delay constitutes a per se delay of constitutional dimension, we have employed the proposition that a pre-trial delay greater than one year and fourteen days was 'presumptively prejudicial' on several occasions.") (internal citations omitted).

C. The State will likely prevail on appeal

The merits of the State's appeal will turn on the question of whether CJP § 9-123 requires a court to order compelled, immunized witness testimony after verifying that the statutory pleading requirements of the prosecutor's motion to compel have been met, or whether the statute instead permits a court to substitute its own discretion and judgment as to whether compelling the witness's testimony may be necessary to the public interest such that the court may deny a prosecutor's motion to compel even if the motion otherwise complies with the pleading requirements of the immunity statute. By its terms, CJP § 9-123 squarely answers this question, vesting the decision about whether to seek immunity for a witness squarely within a prosecutor's discretion and granting a court only the role of confirming that the prosecutor's pleadings are procedurally compliant and then issuing the immunity order as statutorily prescribed. In relevant part, § 9-123 states:

(c) Order requiring testimony. --

- (1) If an individual has been, or may be, called to testify or provide other information in a criminal prosecution or a proceeding before a grand jury of the State, the court in which the proceeding is or may be held shall issue, on the request of the prosecutor made in accordance with subsection (d) of this section, an order requiring the individual to give testimony or provide other information which the individual has refused to give or provide on the basis of the individual's privilege against self-incrimination.
- (2) The order shall have the effect provided under subsection (b) of this section.
- (d) Prerequisites for order. -- If a prosecutor seeks to compel an individual to testify or provide other information, the prosecutor shall request, by written motion, the court to issue an order under subsection (c) of this section when the prosecutor determines that:
 - (1) The testimony or other information from the individual may be necessary to the public interest; and
 - (2) The individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide other information on the basis of the individual's privilege against self-incrimination.

Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art. § 9-123(c)-(d) (2015) (emphasis added). This language leaves no ambiguity about the prosecutor's and the judge's respective roles—the prosecutor makes the discretionary determination of the public's interest and then requests immunized testimony, while the judge determines only the request's accordance with the statute and then orders immunized testimony. Nowhere does this language permit the court to inquire into the prosecutor's decision-making, nor does the statute allow the subject of the immunity request or the underlying defendant to object to the manner in which the prosecution has exercised its discretion. The court has no discretion to deny a prosecutor's immunity request properly pled under subsection (d).

The history of § 9-123 confirms that this plain language achieves precisely the result that the legislature intended. As described by the House of Delegates, the immunity statute was intended

FOR the purpose of authorizing certain prosecutors in certain circumstances to file a written motion for a court order compelling a witness to testify, produce evidence, or provide other information; specifying the effect of the order; prohibiting testimony or other evidence compelled under the order or certain information derived from the compelled testimony or evidence from being used against the witness except under certain circumstances; requiring a court under certain circumstances to issue an order requiring a witness to testify or provide other information upon request by a prosecutor; establishing procedures for enforcement of an order to testify or provide other information; defining certain terms; and generally relating to immunity for witnesses in proceedings before a court or grand jury.

1989 Md. Laws, Ch. 289 (H.B. 1311) (emphasis added). The phrase "requiring a court" does not equate with "allowing a court"; rather, the Legislature's purpose was to create a mandatory judicial action.

Moreover, a formal Position Paper contained within the legislative history bill file for HB 1311 similarly describes the procedural mechanism of the proposed new immunity statute:

By far the most significant changes provided by the proposed statute are procedural. Immunity would no longer be conferred automatically or accidentally, but rather only through court order. To ensure coordinated, responsible requests for immunity, the decision to seek a court order requires approval by the State's Attorney, Attorney General, or State Prosecutor. The State's Attorney, Attorney General, or State Prosecutor will thereby have central control and ultimate responsibility for the issuance of grants of immunity.

The judicial role under this statute is ministerial. The judge verifies that:

- 1. The State's Attorney, Attorney General, or State Prosecutor has approved the request for an immunity order;
- 2. The witness has refused or is likely to refuse to testify;
- 3 The prosecutor has determined that the witness's testimony may be necessary to be the public interest [sic].

Once the judge concludes these three requirements are met, he issues a court order compelling testimony and immunizing the witness.

The Judge will not himself determine whether the witness's testimony may be necessary to the public interest. To do so would transform the Judge into a prosecutor and require him to make delicate prosecutorial judgments which are inappropriate. Furthermore, a particular immunity grant may be a very small aspect to a large scale investigation, making it impossible for the judge to make any meaningful evaluation of the public interest.

Position Paper on HB 1311, Witness Immunity, 8-9, 1989 Reg. Sess. (1989) (emphasis added) (attached as State's Exhibit 1).²

Additionally, the legislature's Division of Fiscal Research submitted a Fiscal Note for House Bill 1311, summarizing the proposed immunity statute as follows:

SUMMARY OF LEGISLATION: This amended bill provides for the granting of 'use' immunity to witnesses compelled to testify regarding a criminal matter. Specifically, if a witness refuses to testify on a criminal matter, on the grounds of privilege against self-incrimination, the Court may compel the witness to testify or provide information by issuing a court order to that effect. The court order would only be granted upon the written request of the prosecutor, who has found that the testimony or information of a witness may be necessary to the public interest, and that the testimony or information would not be forthcoming absent the order.

² The Position Paper bears no author but was contained within the microfilm legislative bill history for HB 1311 on file at the Library of the Department of Legislative Services in Annapolis.

Criminal prosecution would be allowed against the witness for the crimes that were testified about; such testimony, however, would not be 'used' against the witness in any criminal case except those involving the failure to comply with the Court's order.

Md. Gen. Assembly Div. of Fiscal Research, Fiscal Note Revised for H.B. 1311, 1989 Reg. Sess. (Apr. 4, 1989) (emphasis supplied) (attached as State's Exhibit 2).

These materials make clear that the General Assembly intended CJP § 9-123 to grant to the Executive Branch the sole power to determine whether giving a witness immunity would in fact be in the public interest and to authorize the Judiciary to serve only the ministerial role of supervising the procedure of granting immunity. Consequently, this Court's attempt—however well intentioned—to limit and appropriate to itself the prosecutor's statutorily vested immunity authority violated Maryland's separation of powers principles. See Md. Decl. of Rights, Art. 8 ("the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial powers of Government ought to be forever separate and distinct from each other "). This plain language and legislative history analysis of CJP § 9-123 by itself makes clear that the State will prevail on the merits of its appeal from this Court's denial of the Motion to Compel.

While Maryland's appellate courts have yet to construe CJP § 9-123's division of power, the statute's legislative history suggests that another ready source of guidance lies in federal law. As the Position Paper on HB 1311 correctly noted at the time § 9-123 was being considered, "[t]he proposed statute is based substantially on the federal immunity statutes: 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-04 (1985)." Position Paper, supra at 2. That federal statutory scheme provides in relevant part:

§ 6003. Court and grand jury proceedings

(a) In the case of any individual who has been or may be called to testify or provide other information at any proceeding before or ancillary to a court of the United States or a grand jury of the United States, the United States district court for the judicial district in which the proceeding is or may be held *shall issue*, in

accordance with subsection (b) of this section, upon the request of the United States attorney for such district, an order requiring such individual to give testimony or provide other information which he refuses to give or provide on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, such order to become effective as provided in section 6002 of this title [18 USCS § 6002].

- (b) A United States attorney may, with the approval of the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, the Associate Attorney General or any designated Assistant Attorney General or Deputy Assistant Attorney General, request an order under subsection (a) of this section when in his judgment--
 - (1) the testimony or other information from such individual may be necessary to the public interest; and
 - (2) such individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide other information on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination.

18 U.S.C. § 6003 (emphasis added). This provision uses a materially identical procedure as that outlined in CJP § 9-123, and federal courts have amassed a substantial body of law construing this provision's distribution of power between the court and the prosecutor in a manner that strongly indicates that the State will prevail on appeal.

At the foundation of these federal precedents lies the Supreme Court's construction of a predecessor immunity statute in *Ullmann v. United States*, 350 U.S. 422 (1956). There the Supreme Court considered the question of whether a witness could properly request a judge to deny an immunity application that otherwise comported with the statutory pleading prerequisites, which at the time required an averment that "in the judgment of a United States Attorney, the testimony of [the] witness . . . is necessary to the public interest" and also required that the United States Attorney obtain "the approval of the Attorney General" before making an application to the court. *Id.* at 423-424. The Government argued "that the court has no discretion to determine whether the public interest would best be served by exchanging immunity from prosecution for testimony [and] that its only function is to order a witness to testify if it determines that the case is within the framework of the statute." *Id.* at 431. The Supreme Court agreed that "[a] fair reading of [the immunity statute] *does not indicate that the*

district judge has any discretion to deny the order on the ground that the public interest does not warrant it"; rather, the court's "duty under [the statute] is only to ascertain whether the statutory requirements are complied with by [prosecutors]." Id. at 432-34 (emphasis supplied).

After Congress enacted the procedurally similar present-day immunity scheme, the federal Circuit Courts of Appeal have uniformly construed those provisions in accordance with *Ullmann*. For example, *In re Kilgo*, 484 F.2d 1215 (4th Cir 1973), involved an appellant who had been held in contempt after refusing to testify despite being immunized and compelled under the federal immunity statute. He claimed, in part, "that the immunity order, on which the contempt citation rest[ed], [was] invalid [because] neither he nor the court was apprised of the basis of the United States Attorney's conclusion that his testimony was necessary to the public interest "

Id. at 1217. The Fourth Circuit found no merit in this contention, explaining

No case interpreting the public interest provision of the 1970 Act [enacting the immunity scheme] has been called to our attention. However, cases construing analogous requirements in earlier immunity statutes establish that the district court is not empowered to review the United States Attorney's judgment that the testimony of the witness is necessary to the public interest. The leading case is Ullmann v United States, 350 U.S. 422, 100 L. Ed. 511, 76 S. Ct. 497 (1956), which construed the Immunity Act of 1954 [18 U.S.C. § 3486] dealing with grand jury inquiries involving national security. That Act also limited grants of immunity to witnesses whose testimony, in the judgment of the United States attorney, was necessary to the public interest. The Court, recognizing the potential constitutional question that would arise if the judiciary reviewed the merits of immunity, construed the statute to withhold from the district court 'any discretion to deny the order on the ground that the public interest does not warrant it.' 350 U.S. at 432. It held that the function of the district court was limited to ascertaining whether the application complied with the statutory requirement -that is, had the United States attorney certified that in his judgment the testimony of the witness was in the public interest [...] The drafters of the 1970 Act left no doubt that the construction given to the public interest provision in previous immunity acts was to be applied to § 6003, and the legislative history confirms the limited role of the court. Because the Act does not authorize the district court to review the United States attorney's judgment that the testimony of the witness may be necessary to the public interest, no evidence pertaining to this judgment need be offered.

Id. at 1218-19.

Similarly, the Third Circuit described the procedural operation of the federal immunity statutes in In re Grand Jury Investigation, 486 F.2d 1013, 1016 (3rd Cir. 1973), saving, "[u]nder the language of [18 U.S.C. § 6003] the judge is required to issue the order when it is properly requested by the United States Attorney," and "[h]e is given no discretion to deny it." Likewise, the First Circuit in In re Lochiatto, 497 F.2d 803, 805 (1st Cir. 1974), construed § 6003 in accordance with Ullmann as using language that "does not indicate that the district judge has any discretion to deny the order on the ground that the public interest does not warrant it." Accord In re Maury Santiago, 533 F.2d 727, 728-29 (1st Cir. 1976) ("The U.S. Attorney filed a letter from a proper official of the Justice Department authorizing him to request immunity for Maury. He stated in open court that Maury's testimony was, in his opinion, necessary to the public interest. The judgment of the U.S. Attorney is unreviewable in this matter . . . and we see no reason to require that this representation be put in affidavit form."); United States v. Levya, 513 F.2d 774, 776 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that the witness was not entitled to notice and a hearing before an immunity order is granted and construing that "since the court's duties in granting the requested order are largely ministerial, when the order is properly requested the judge has no discretion to deny it."); Urasaki v. United States District Court, 504 F.2d 513, 514 (9th Cir. 1974) ("In passing upon an immunity application, the district court is confined to an examination of the application and the documents accompanying it for the purpose only of deciding whether or not the application meets the procedural and substantive requirements of the authorizing statute. [...] Adversary procedure is not a part of the legislative scheme in connection with the district court's performance of its limited duties in granting or denying the application for immunity."). Lastly, in Rvan v. Commissioner, 568 F.2d 531, 541 (7th Cir. 1977), the Court rejected an appellant's

claim that an immunity order was invalid because the record "did not contain facts showing that the prosecutor had any basis for making the judgment that the grant of immunity would be in the public interest." As the Court explained, "[s]ince that judgment is entirely a matter for the executive branch, unreviewable by a court, there is no need for the record to contain any facts supporting the decision of the United States Attorney." *Id*.

In addition to this guidance from the federal courts, the New Jersey Supreme Court has squarely considered the propriety of the judiciary questioning a prosecutor's decision that there exists a public need to grant immunity to a witness. In In re Tuso, 376 A.2d 895 (N.J. 1977), the appellant was a lawyer who had been subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury considering an indictment. When the lawyer asserted his privilege against self-incrimination, the New Jersey Attorney General petitioned the court to compel his testimony under New Jersey's similar use and derivative use immunity statute, which provides that upon such a petition "the court shall so order and that person shall comply with the order." Id. at 896. Before the court could rule on that petition, a different state grand jury indicted the lawyer on charges involving the same subject matter as the testimony that the Attorney General sought to compel. Id. When the court nevertheless granted the petition and ordered the lawyer to testify, the lawyer appealed to New Jersey's intermediate Appellate Division, which reversed the trial court's order as improper. Id. "The principal basis for the conclusion of the Appellate Division was that the State did not need the information it was seeking from Tuso" because the "Attorney General conceded at oral argument he had sufficient information for an inductment against D'Anastasio but wanted Tuso's testimony to assure a conviction." Id. at 896-97. Moreover, though the "Appellate Division conceded that the federal cases uniformly construe the parallel federal immunity statute to withhold any discretionary right in the court to deny an order to testify when the prosecuting

officer has met the prerequisites of the statute... the Appellate Division felt the federal cases were not authoritative where the order sought was 'basically unfair, inequitable or totally unnecessary." *Id.* at 896.

On subsequent appeal to New Jersey's highest court, the Attorney General challenged the Appellate Division's intrusion into his authority, and the Supreme Court agreed with his position. In reversing the Appellate Division, the Supreme Court explained regarding the state's immunity scheme:

[I]t is clear that the statute cited above delegates the function of determining need in such a situation to the Attorney General (or prosecutor, with the approval of the Attorney General), not the court, conformably with the duty of that officer to attend to the enforcement of the criminal laws. Upon request by the Attorney General, the statute directs that the court 'shall' order the witness to testify. [...]

Id. at 896 (emphasis supplied).

In summation, on the question of the State's likelihood to prevail here on appeal as it bears on the issue of whether to grant a stay of the proceedings, every source of authority—from CJP § 9-123's plain text and legislative history to its federal corollary's extensive appellate construction—demonstrates that this Court erred in replacing the State's Attorney's determination of the public interest with its own and that the State will prevail on appeal accordingly. The clear intent of the Legislature was that the Executive Branch, not the Judiciary, should have the discretion to determine whether a particular witness's testimony may be necessary to the public interest under Maryland's general immunity statute.

Wherefore, the State requests that this Court grant the State's Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending Appeal.

Respectfully submitted, Marilyn J. Mosby

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 5th day of February, 2016, a copy of the State's Motion to

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POSTTRO PAPER

WITNESS INDINITY

I. INTRUXETON

A. The Problem

June Me.

ihere are basically two types of immunity: transactional and use and derivative use immunity (hereinafter "use immunity"). Transactional immunity means that once a witness has been compelled to testify about an incident, he may never be prosecuted for offenses arising out of that transaction even if independent evidence of the offense(s) -- from a source other than the witness -- comes to light. Use immunity, a shorthand term for use and derivative use immunity, means that once a witness has been compelled to testify about an offense, neither that testimony nor any evidence derived from that testimony may be used against the witness. If independent evidence is discovered, or has been preserved, the witness theoretically may still be prosecuted for the offense.

Obviously, in situations in which insider information about criminal activity is necessary in order to prosecute criminal activity, the prosecutor is faced with untenable alternatives when only transactional immunity is available.

For example, assume a scenario in which a narcotics network is functioning effectively with a hierarchy in which the first echelon leader is a prosperous, "white collar" professional who has never been convicted of a crime. That individual, who we can refer to as "Kingpin", provides the capital accessary to purchase the narcotics which is distributed to users. He never has his hand on the narcotics and enters only into cash transactions. Kingpin, however, relies upon a certified public account ("A") and an individual who monitors the actual narcotics trafficking network ("B").

Kingpin may never be successfully prosecuted without information from "A" or "B". There may not be enough evidence against "A" or "B" to prosecute them for their role in the

en spirars.

I resourceful prosecutor, who could be insestigating kingpin for narrotics violations or criminal violations of the income tax code would subpoen "A" or "B" before the prand jury at which time "A" and "B" would invoke their privilege against selfincrimination. Under the present law, the prosecutor would then face the dilemma of having to give "A" or "B" transactional immunity or a total exemption from liability for their misdeeds. "A" or "B", then, could conceivably not be prosecuted for their role in the conspiracy on either the state or federal texel. If granted transactional immunity, they also conceivably may not incur civil itability for their involvement. "A" or "H" conceivably may not incur civil tax liability in the form of penalties and "A" conceivably may not face professional discipline in the form of license suspension or revocation by his professional licensing authority. To permit "A" or "H" to walk away from their misdeeds would truly be a miscarriage of justice.

B. The Resolution

The resolution of the dilemna is to provide the prosecutor with use immunity to permit the prosecutor to build a tax prosecution case against Kingpin by immunizing "A" from the use of "A's" testimony against him, or a narcotics case by immunizing "B" from the use of his testimony against him. "A" and "B" could still be prosecuted for their involvement in the conspiracy, could still be forced to pay civil tax penalties and "A" could still be subject to discipline on a professional basis.

Certainly, consideration of appropriate sanctions against "1" and "B" should and must include all possibilities given the magnitude of their involvement in the crime.

11. PROPESED GENERAL IMPORTLY STATUTE

The proposed statute is based substantially on the federal immunity statutes: 18 U.S.C. \$56001-04 (1985). Changes made in the language are primarily those required by the differences

between the organizational structure of law enforcement agencies in the federal and state systems.

The proposed general immunity statute differs substantisely from existing Suryland statutes in three ways:

- It provides for use and derivative use instead of transactional immunity;
- 2. It is generally available rather than timited to specific crimes;
- 3. It has built-in procedural safeguards which must be compiled with prior to its utilization. Generally, the present statutes operate automatically.

The proposed immunity statute would replace the immunity provisions for specific crimes. Presently, Maryland has separate immunity provisions for the following crimes: Article 27, §23, Bribery of Public Officials; 1/Article 27, §24, Bribery of Athletic Participants; Article 27, §39, Conspiracy to Commit Bribery, 2/Gambling or tottery Violations; Article 27, §298, Controlled Dangerous Substances; Article 27, §262, Gambling: Article 27, §371, Lottery Violations; Article 27, §400, Selling Liquor to Minors; Article 27, §540, Sabotage Prevention; Article 33, §26-16, Election Irregularities; Financial Institutions §9-

. <

2/Transactional immunity for conspiracy to commit bribery also would not be affected since it/has constitutional overtones.

THE BASIS FOR USE IMPACT

A. Legal Basis for the immunity

In 1892, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a federal immunity statute which barred the introduction of congested testimony but permitted it to be used to incate other evidence. 4/ The Court reasoned .- correctly .- that such derivative use of the tainted evidence rendered the immunity meaningless. But rather than simply stating that the Constitution required derivative use immunity; i.e., immunity from both the introduction of compelled testimony and exploitation of the testimony to find leads, the opinion spoke in broad language which seemed to require transactional immunity. Consequently, Congress enacted a transactional immunity statute which was upheld by the Supreme Court, 5/ and which become the model for state legislation. In 1970, Congress repealed the transactional lumunity statutes and enacted a new use immunity statule, 18 U.S.C. \$56001-04 (1970). When the Supreme Court reviewed the new statute, it held that the transactional immunity language in Counselman which had been relied on for almost one hundred years was dicta. Thus, the Court held that the new statute which bars the use and derivative use of information obtained under a grant of immunity provides the protection required by the Fifth Amendment.

Maryland's transactional immunity statutes, like the federal

^{3/}Immunity in the savings and loan situation would remain the same since the duration of the immunity accorded to the investigation of the pending matters would be limited to one more extension of the sunset provisions.

^{4/}Counselman v. Illtchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).

^{5/}Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896).

^{6/}Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).

comments statutes repealed in 1970, are based upon an incorrect interpretation of the 1892 decision. It is now clear that use immunity will meet constitutional requirements. Maryland's bass are, therefore, outdated.

B. Practical Bases for Use Immunity

In addition to providing the possibility that a witness given use immunity may be subject to subsequent prosecution for his criminal activity, i.e., the Oliver North prosecution, and would be subject to collateral consequences, use immunity provides for more complete disclosure of evidence than transactional immunity. As Professor G. Robert Blakely stated at the 1974 Seminar of the National Associations of Attorneys General:

With transactional immunity all the witness has to do is mention the transaction; he does not have to fill in the details. So his attorney can tell him to just mention it, and then say, "I don't remember." But with a "use" statute, a smart attorney advises his client to tell all he knows, because the more he tells, the less can be later used against him. So "use" statutes encourage fuller disclosure by witnesses, and that is what they are really all about.

As a result, individuals testifying under a grant of use immunity have greater reason to disclose their involvement. $^{7/}$

Further, a general immunity statute, instead of the present patchwork quilt of immunity statutes for particular crimes, would likewise be more conductive to full disclosure of evidence by an immunized witness. Often testimony about a drug transaction will encompass other crimes, such as violations of criminal lax statutes. Under the present system, a witness subpended to testify pursuant to the immunity provisions of Article 27, 5298

^{7/}Whether transactional or use witness immunity does not proclude prosecution for perjuty or making false statements under eath.

(Controlled Langerous Substances) may not refuse to testify because testimony regarding the controlled dangerous substances transaction would simultaneously implicate bim in the commission of other crimes, e.g., tax perjury. B/ Yet this electionstance presents the possibility of a trap for the unwary prosecutor inquiring into drug violations and inadvertently granting transactional immunity for some previously unknown criminal activity.

Further, there are no procedural saleguards in the present immunity statutes and consequently their operation is triggered hapharardly, without identification of when a witness begins to receive immunity. The statutes also provide an "automotic immunity bath". Across the nation, 9/ witnesses subpoended before the grand jury must either assert the privilege against self. incrimination or else notify the prosecutor that it is their intention to do so. The prosecutor them asks the court to order testimony and certifies that the immunity conferred thereby is in the public interest. This is the procedure set out in this proposed statute and is the procedure incorporated in the recently adopted savings and loan immunity legislation. In sharp contrast, most present Maryland statutes immunize everyone who answers questions in the grand jury. 10/ No assertion of the privilege is required, nor is there any requirement of a certification that the immunity is in the public interest. The uncertainty of when the statute is applicable, compled with the blanket automatic transactional immunity bath, makes Abiryland immunity statutes both haphazard and dangerous. Intess a

^{8/}tm re: Criminal Investigation No. 1-162, 307 Md. 622 (1987).

 $^{^{9}/}w_{\rm t}$ tacks tempority, National Association of Attorneys General, August, 1978.

^{10/}State v. Panagoulis, 253 Md. 699 (1969) (Witness who appeared voluntarily before grand jury to make statement and was then asked questions was "compelled" to testify within meaning of bribery immunity statutes).

prosecutor is very conversant in the vagarles of investigative grand jury law, he or she accidentally may immunize potential targets. As a consequence of the risks arising from the broad automatic immunity received by anyone subpoenaed before a grand jury investigating drugs, gambling and election laws, the grand jury frequently becomes unusable as an investigative tool in these areas. The result is that the financial aspects of large drug operations cannot be investigated by Maryland grand juries

Finally, despite the broad brush immunization the present statutes provide, they may ironically deprive potential defendants of the opportunity to provide exculpatory evidence to a grand jury. A prosecutor who might otherwise consent to the appearance of a defendant who want to testify before an investigative grand jury or -- the more common occurance - a prosecutor who is willing to call a witness supportive of the defense, may decline to do so because he fears automatic immunization. There are no immunity waiver statutes and the question of whether the automatic immunity can be waived has jet to be resolved by the appellate courts.

IV. PROPOSED STATUTE

The proposed statute substitutes use for transactional immunity!!/ because of the additional fact-finding utility that use immunity provides. It would automatically bring the Maryland law into accord with the Supreme Court's current view of the breadth of the Fifth Amendment.

The proposed statute is made generally applicable primarily for two reasons. It assures the compellability of the textimony regarding a transaction which may involve a variety of interrelated crimes and thus circumvents any constitutional

^{11/}Transactional immunity for the crime of bribery is retained because of its constitutional underpinning and for the savings and loan investigation because of its limited duration.

problem which was presently exist, 127 Geometry, it is now apparent that a grand jury may be an imperopriate forum for the investigation of a variety of crimes, particularly large scale drug operations, money laundering, and tax perjury. The existence of a generally available but limited immunity statute would remedy the dual problems of no immunity for most crimes and two much immunity for drugs, gambling and elections offenses.

By far the most significant changes provided by the proposed statute are procedural. Immunity would no longer be conferred automatically or accidentally, but rather only through court order. To ensure coordinated, responsible requests for immunity, the decision to seek a court order requires approval by the State's Attorney, Attorney General or State Prosecutor. The State's Attorney, the Attorney General or State Prosecutor will thereby have central control and ultimate responsibility for the issuance of grants of immunity.

The judicial role under this statute is ministerial. The judge verifles that:

- 1. The State's Attorney, the Attorney General, or State Prosecutor has approved the request for an immunity order;
- 2. The witness has refused or is likely to refuse to testify;
- 3. The prosecutor has determined that the witness's testimony may be necessary to be the public interest.

Once the judge concludes these three requirements are met, he issues a court order compelling testimony and imminizing the witness.

The Judge will not himself determine whether the witness'

 $^{^{12}/\}mathrm{Cf}$. In re-Criminal Investigation No. 1-162, supra. n.6, (witness must reasonably fear prosecution for one of enumerated offenses).

testimony may be necessary to the public interest. To do so would transform the Judge Into a prosecutor and require him to make delicate prosecutorial Judgments which are inappropriate. Furthermore, a particular immunity grant may be a very small aspect to a large scale investigation, making it impossible for the Judge to make any meaningful evaluation of the public interest.

MARYLAND GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEPARTMENT OF FISCAL SERVICES DIVISION OF FISCAL RESCARCH JOSEPH M. CODLE, DIRECTOR

FISCAL MOTE

MB 1311

House Bill 1311 (The Speaker, et al) (Delegate Menes, Chairman, Special Committee on Drug and Alcohol Abuse)

Judiciary

Referred to judicial Proceedings

SUBDORY OF LEGISLATION: This amended bill provides for the granting of "use" immunity to witnesses compelled to testify regarding a criminal matter. Specifically, if a witness refuses to testify on a criminal matter, on the grounds of privilege against self-incrimination, the Court may compel the witness to testify or provide information by issuing a court order to that effect. The court order would only be granted upon the written request of the prosecutor, who has found that the testimony or information of a witness may be necessary to the public interest, and that the testimony or information would not be forthcoming absent the order.

Criminal prosecution would be allowed against the witness for the crimes that were testified about; such testimony, however, would not be "used" against the witness in any criminal case, except those involving the failure to comply with the Court's order.

STATE FISCAL IMPACT STATEMENT: No effect.

LOCAL FISCAL IMPACT STATEMENT: No effect.

STATE NEVERNES: No effect.

STATE EXPENDITURES: The Administrative Office of the Courts advises that the cost of any additional Court orders necessary under this legislation could be absorbed within existing resources. State expenditures are not affected by this change in procedural requirements for compelling testimony from witnesses claiming self-incrimination privileges.

LOCAL REVERNES: No effect.

LOCAL EXPENDITURES: No effect.

INFORMATION SOUNCE: Administrative Office of the Courts, Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services (Division of Correction), Department of Fiscal Services

ESTIMATE BY: Department of Fiscal Services Fiscal Mote Mistory: First Reader - February 20, 1909 Revised - Mouse Third Reader - April 4, 1909 Per: Camille Infussi Dobson William R. Miles, Supervising Analyst Division of Fiscal Research .d House 8111 [3]] Page Two

STATE OF MARYLAND

V.

- * IN THE
- * CIRCUIT COURT
- * FOR
- * BALTIMORE CITY

OFFICER EDWARD NERO

CASE NO. 115141033

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO STATE'S MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS PENDING APPEAL

NOW COMES Defendant Edward Nero, by undersigned counsel and files this Response to the State's Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending Appeal and for reasons states:

- Officer Edward Nero is pending second degree assault and related charges. The trial is currently scheduled to begin on February 22, 2016.
- On January 13, 2016 the State filed a Motion to Compel Testimony of Officer William Porter.
- On January 15, 2016, the State sent a letter to the Court expressing its intent to request a
 postponement of the trial date.
- On January 20, 2016 this Court conducted a hearing on the State's dual requests. The Court denied both requests.
- On February 4, 2016 the State filed a Notice of Appeal.
- 6. On February 5, 2016 the State filed a Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending Appeal. This Motion to Stay is yet another transparent subterfuge on the part of the State to obtain a postponement, in order to avoid trying the most legally and factually tenuous cases next.
- 7. The State does not cite to any Rule that enables the State to seek a stay of the proceeding, NOISIAID TVNIMIDO an extraordinary request at this stage of the proceedings. The Maryland Rules include 11:21 d 8-831910

RECEIVED FOR RECORD CHACULT COURT FOR provisions to seek a stay pending an appeal in a civil matter. It is instructive, however, that the Rules governing criminal proceedings are silent on this process. The State is relying on CJP §12-301 which allows an appeal only from a *final judgment*. The statute does not include any direction regarding a stay as this would be unnecessary after a final judgment has been rendered.

- 8. In addition, the filing of a Notice of Appeal does not divest this Court of jurisdiction to continue the proceedings. See e.g. Pulley v. State, 287 Md. 406 (1980). In that this Court does retain jurisdiction, "[w]hether to grant or deny a stay of proceedings in a matter is within the discretion of the trial court, and only will be disturbed if the discretion is abused." Vaughn v. Vaughn, 146 Md. App. 264, 279 (2002).
- 9. The trial court is best equipped to decide if the trial should be stayed pending the State's efforts to appeal. The trial court is quite familiar with the facts of this case and all of the issues arising from the litigation. The trial court is uniquely situated to assess the legitimacy of the State's bald allegation that the ruling at issue is a final judgment.
- 10. This Court "shall consider the same factors that are relevant to the granting of injunctive relief by a circuit court." Md. Rule 8-425. The four factors relevant to the issuance of an injunction are "(1) the likelihood that the plaintiff will succeed on the merits; (2) the 'balance of convenience' determined by whether greater injury would be done to the defendant by granting the injunction than would result by its refusal; (3) whether the plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury unless the injunction is granted; and (4) the public interest." Schade v. Maryland State Board of Elections, 401 Md. 1, 36 (2007). It is the moving party's burden to establish these four factors and "failure to prove the existence

- of even one of the four factors will preclude the grant of preliminary injunction relief."

 Id.
- 11. With regard to the first factor, the State cannot win on the merits because the issue they seek to be reviewed is not a final judgment. This Court's ruling is just one of many pre-trial rulings that have occurred in this case. In its Motion to Stay, the State outlines its underlying complaints about this court's ruling but utterly fails to articulate the basis for its entitlement to file for an appeal at this stage of the proceedings.

 Simultaneously with the filing of this pleading, the defense has filed a Motion to Dismiss the Notice of the Appeal with the Court of Special Appeals. See Exhibit 1. In addition to the fact that this appeal has been filed without any legal authority, the trial court has already made a factual determination that the State's Motion to Compel was without merit and should be denied. For all of the reasons already litigated, the trial court's determination was correct and there is little to no likelihood that the appellate court would disturb this ruling.
 - 12. It is the Defendant's position that this court's denial of the State's Motion to Compel is not a final judgment and therefore the State has no chance to succeed on the merits of its appeal. The inquiry need go no further than here. However, with regard to the second and third factor, the State cannot show that it will suffer greater and irreparable injury if the stay is denied than the defendant will suffer if it is granted. The State claims that Officer Porter is a "valuable witness" in its case and that without him it "would cause irreparable harm to the State's ability to prosecute this case." The State has identified no less than 75 witnesses that it intends on calling in its prosecution of Officer Nero. The first time that the State indicated that it intended on calling Officer Porter was on January 13, 2016.

Certainly, the State's late recognition of Officer Porter's "value" undercuts its contention that the State would be irreparably harmed in its ability to prosecute Officer Nero for the pending misdemeanor charges. Additionally, this Honorable Court found the value of Officer Porter's testimony questionable at best after hearing the State's proffer of his "needed" testimony at the hearing on the Motion to Compel.

- On the other hand, granting a stay in this case would delay Officer Nero's trial well beyond acceptable speedy trial dimensions. The State has consistently argued that any speedy trial violations are insignificant, that any delay in Officer Nero's trial would be a "legally insignificant short amount of time awaiting resolution of the appeal." This assertion ignores the real possibility that any ruling by the Court of Special Appeals would then be reviewed by the Court of Appeals. The State is asking that Officer Nero's trial be put back in the original line-up of cases which would arguably result in the case being scheduled in September, 2016, at the earliest.
- 14. The State suggests that the fact that this is "one of the most high-profile criminal trials in Maryland history" should figure into the public interest factor. The public interest is best served by the process continuing in the ordinary course of criminal litigation. The State has taken an extraordinary step in seeking to appeal in the midst of litigation, a decision that is not supported by the law. The public should be able to trust that each case prosecuted by this State's Attorney will be tried in a speedy and predictable manner, in accordance with the rules and the law.

WHEREFORE, the Defendant respectfully requests that this Honorable Court deny the State's Motion for Stay Pending the Appeal.

Respectfully submitted,

Marc L. Zayon

Allison Levine

Roland Walker and Marc L. Zayon, P.A.

201 North Charles Street

Suite 1700

Baltimore, Maryland 21201

Marc L. Zayon Jayon

410-727-3710

CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 8th day of February 2016, a copy of the foregoing

Motion was hand-delivered to Janice Bledsoe, Deputy State's Attorney for Baltimore City, 120

E. Baltimore Street, 9th Floor, Baltimore, Maryland 21202.

E. 199

ORDER

HAVING READ AND CONSIDERED the Defendant's Response to the State's Motion to Stay the Proceedings Pending Appeal, it is hereby

ORDERED, that the State's Request for a Stay is DENIED.


Judge, Circuit Court for Baltimore City

STATE OF MARYLAND	*	IN THE COURT OF			
Appellant	*	SPECIAL APPEALS			
V.	*	OF MARYLAND			
EDWARD NERO	*	SEPTEMBER TERM, 2015			
Appellee	*	NO.	(115141033)		

APPELLEE'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE STATE'S NOTICE OF APPEAL

The Appellee, Edward Nero, through his counsel, Marc L. Zayon and,
Roland Walker and Marc L. Zayon, P.A., hereby files this Motion to Dismiss the
Notice of Appeal filed by the State, and in support thereof states:

- On May 1, 2015 Officer Edward Nero was charged in a Four Count
 Indictment alleging the misdemeanor charges of second degree assault,
 misconduct in office and reckless endangerment.
- The trial was originally scheduled for October 13, 2015. That trial date was postponed at the State's request to February 22, 2016.
- On January 13, 2016 the State filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, a Motion to Compel Testimony of Officer William Porter and by letter dated January 15, 2016 the State indicated an intent to request a postponement from the trial judge, the Honorable Barry G. Williams.
- On January 20, 2016, the Court conducted a hearing to consider the State's motion. After hearing a proffer of the anticipated testimony and



- argument from the State, the trial court denied the State's request for the Motion to Compel and denied the State's request for postponement.
- In denying both of the State's requests, the Court found the State's sudden need for Officer Porter's testimony and the timing of the request, "questionable" and believed at minimum, a partial purpose of the request was to create grounds for a postponement of Officer Nero's trial. In addition, the Court found that the testimony would most likely not be admissible pursuant to Maryland Rule 5-403.
- On February 1, 2016 the parties filed pre-trial motions, pursuant to the court's scheduling order. These motions included evidentiary motions and proposed voir dire.
- 7. On February 4, 2016, fifteen days after the hearing, the State filed a Notice of Appeal in the above captioned matter. Exhibit 1. The State tethered its alleged right to appeal this evidentiary ruling on Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article §12-301 which provides:

Except as provided in §12-302 of this subtitle, a party may appeal from a final judgment entered in a civil or criminal case by a circuit court. The right of appeal exists from a final judgment entered by a court in the exercise of original, special, limited, statutory jurisdiction, unless in a particular case the right of appeal is expressly denied by law. In a criminal case, the defendant may appeal even though imposition or execution of sentence has been suspended. In a civil case, a plaintiff who has accepted remittitur may cross-appeal from the final judgment.

- 8. The Appellate Courts of Maryland have unequivocally and consistently found that a ruling on a pre-trial evidentiary motion is clearly not a final judgment under CJP §12-301.
- On January 27, 2016, in Seward v. State, No. 12, 2016 Md. LEXIS 11, (Jan. 27, 2016). the Court of Appeals reiterated the definition of a final judgement as follows:

one that "either determine[s] and conclude[s] the rights of the parties involved or den[ies] a party the means to 'prosecut[e] or defend[] his or her rights and interests in the subject matter of the proceeding." Important is whether "any further order is to be issued or whether any further action is to be taken in the case."

Id. at 171, 31 A.3d at 259 (citations omitted). An interlocutory order, on the other hand, exists when "'there are pending proceedings in which issues on the merits of the case remain to be decided.' "Id. at 172, 31 A.3d at 260 (citation omitted). Moreover, the purpose of CJP § 12–301 is to permit appeals only from final judgments "to 'prevent piecemeal appeals and ... the interruption of ongoing judicial proceedings.' "Id., 423 Md. 156, 31 A.3d at 259 (citations omitted)(emphasis added).

10. The trial court's order was simply one of a multitude of pre-trial evidentiary rulings in this case which is not immediately subject to appeal and is interlocutory in nature, "a final judgment exists when the rights of litigants have been established conclusively at the trial level.

The general rule in criminal cases is that no final judgment exists until after conviction and sentence has been determined, or, in other words, when only the execution of the judgment remains." Sigma Reproduction Health Center v. State, 297 Md. 660, 665 (1983).

- 11. The Sigma Court further stated, "[o]rdinarily, therefore, an appeal from a pretrial or trial order will not be heard where there are pending proceedings in which issues on the merits of the case remain to be decided. Such orders are interlocutory, not final, and nonappealable until after entry of a final judgment." Id. At 666.
- 12. Generally the State's right to appeal is very limited and is governed by Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article §12-302 which specifies the parameters of the State's right to appeal a trial court's evidentiary ruling. This ruling does not fall under any of the parameters that would allow an interlocutory appeal under that section.
- 13. On February 5, 2016 the State filed a Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending Appeal in the Circuit Court, in an attempt to divest the Circuit Court of its fundamental jurisdiction of this case.
- 14. As the Court emphasized in Pulley v. State, 287 Md. 406 at 418 (1980),

"If fundamental jurisdiction was lost, it would be unnecessary to require stays since the court could not act in any event. Moreover, particularly with regard to what may be termed as appealable interlocutory orders, a policy contrary to that which we announce today could play havoc with the trial of cases in this State. What we said nearly fifty years ago in support of the then policy against allowing piecemeal appeals applies with equal force in preventing abuse with regard to those that are presently permitted:

If, on a question left to the court's discretion, upon a suggestion for removal, a prisoner (or other party) is permitted to take an immediate appeal, then proceedings in every criminal (or civil) case, great or small, may be stopped and delayed while the (party) prosecutes an appeal on this preliminary matter . . . And this would add just so much to

the resources of those who might find vexatious delays advantageous, and would multiply appeals in criminal (and civil) cases, often when (a judgment in the appealing party's favor), in the end, would render them profitless. (Lee v. State, supra, 161 Md. at 434, 157 A. at 724.)

15. The State's right to appeal is a statutory right, and as previously stated is detailed in Courts and Judicial Proceedings §12-302:

Appeals by State in criminal cases

- (c)(1) In a criminal case, the State may appeal as provided in this subsection.
- (2) The State may appeal from a final judgment granting a motion to dismiss or quashing or dismissing any indictment, information, presentment, or inquisition.
- (3) The State may appeal from a final judgment if the State alleges that the trial judge:
- (i) Failed to impose the sentence specifically mandated by the Code; or
- (ii) Imposed or modified a sentence in violation of the Maryland Rules.
- (4)(i) In a case involving a crime of violence as defined in § 14-101 of the Criminal Law Article, and in cases under §§ 5-602 through 5-609 and §§ 5-612 through 5-614 of the Criminal Law Article, the State may appeal from a decision of a trial court that excludes evidence offered by the State or requires the return of property alleged to have been seized in violation of the Constitution of the United States, the Maryland Constitution, or the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
- (ii) The appeal shall be made before jeopardy attaches to the defendant. However, in all cases the appeal shall be taken no more than 15 days after the decision has been rendered and shall be diligently prosecuted.
- (iii) Before taking the appeal, the State shall certify to the court that the appeal is not taken for purposes of delay and that the evidence excluded or the property required to be returned is substantial proof of a material fact in the proceeding. The appeal shall be heard and the decision rendered within 120 days of the time that the record on appeal is filed in the appellate court. Otherwise, the decision of the trial court shall be final.
- (iv) Except in a homicide case, if the State appeals on the basis of this paragraph, and if on final appeal the decision of the trial court is affirmed, the charges against the defendant shall be dismissed in the case from which the appeal was taken. In that case, the State may not prosecute the defendant on those specific charges or on any other related charges arising out of the same incident.

- (v) 1. Except as provided in subsubparagraph 2 of this subparagraph, pending the prosecution and determination of an appeal taken under this paragraph or paragraph (2) of this subsection, the defendant shall be released on personal recognizance bail. If the defendant fails to appear as required by the terms of the recognizance bail, the trial court shall subject the defendant to the penalties provided in § 5-211 of the Criminal Procedure Article.
- 2. A. Pending the prosecution and determination of an appeal taken under this paragraph or paragraph (2) of this subsection, in a case in which the defendant is charged with a crime of violence, as defined in § 14-101 of the Criminal Law Article, the court may release the defendant on any terms and conditions that the court considers appropriate or may order the defendant remanded to custody pending the outcome of the appeal.
- B. The determination and enforcement of any terms and conditions of release shall be in accordance with the provisions of Title 5 of the Criminal Procedure Article.
- (vi) If the State loses the appeal, the jurisdiction shall pay all the costs related to the appeal, including reasonable attorney's fees incurred by the defendant as a result of the appeal.
- 16. It is clear that the statutory scheme strictly limits the circumstances under which the State may appeal and affirmatively requires a certification that "the appeal is not taken for purposes of delay." Courts and Judicial Proceedings §12-302(c)(3)(iii).
- 17. In this case, the provisions of §12-302(c)(3)(i) do not apply as the crimes charged are neither crimes of violence nor narcotics crimes.
- 18. The State has no legal recourse available to appeal this non-final judgment, and therefore, the purpose of this appeal is a veiled attempt to obtain a postponement which the State has been unable to obtain despite their continuous efforts.

For the aforegoing reasons, the Appellee respectfully requests that this
 Honorable Court Dismiss the State's Notice of Appeal.

WHEREFORE, Appellee Officer Edward Nero requests that this Honorable Court Dismiss the State's Notice of Appeal.

Respectfully submitted,

Marc L. Zayon, Esquire

Law Office of Roland Walker & Marc L. Zayon

201 North Charles Street, Ste. 1700

Baltimore, Maryland 21201

410-727-3710

410-727-4955 (Fax)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of February 2016, a copy of the foregoing Motion was hand-delivered to Janice Bledsoe, Deputy State's Attorney for Baltimore City, 120 E. Baltimore Street, 9th Floor, Baltimore, Maryland 21202 and mailed to Joseph Murtha, Murtha, Psoras, & Lanasa, LLC, 1301 York Road, Suite 200, Lutherville, Maryland 21093

MAROL. ZAYON

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410-727-4955 (Fax)

RECEIVED FOR RECORD CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY

STATE OF MARYLAND

2016 FEB * 41 A 11: 29N THE

CREMINAL DIVISION BALTIMORE CITY

* CASE No. 115141033

EDWARD NERO

v.

STATE'S NOTICE OF APPEAL

NOW COMES the State of Maryland, by and through Marilyn J. Mosby, the State's Attorney for Baltimore City; Michael Schatzow, Chief Deputy State's Attorney for Baltimore City; Janice L. Bledsoe, Deputy State's Attorney for Baltimore City; and Matthew Pillion, Assistant State's Attorney for Baltimore City; and pursuant to Section 12-301 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland hereby notes an appeal on behalf of the State from a final judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City entered on January 20, 2016, in the above-captioned case denying the State's Motion to Compel a Witness to Testify Pursuant to Section 9-123 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.

Respectfully submitted, Marilyn J. Mosby

Michael Schatzow (#717876) Chief Deputy State's Attorney

120 East Baltimore Street The SunTrust Bank Building Baltimore, Maryland 21202

(443) 984-6011 (telephone) (443) 984-6256 (facsimile)

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1



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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 4th day of February, 2016, a copy of the State's Notice of

Appeal was mailed and e-mailed to:

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Attorney for Officer William Porter

Respectfully submitted, Marilyn J. Mosby

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ibledsoe@stattorney.org

STATE OF MARYLAN	ND		*	IN T	HE C	OURT	OF	
Appellant			*	SPECIAL APPEALS				
v.			*	OF MARYLAND				
EDWARD NERO			*	SEPTEMBER TERM, 2015				
Appellee			*	NO.		(115	141033	3)
* * *	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
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day of	, 201	6 here	by ORI	DERE	D that	the Ap	pellee'	s Motion
to Dismiss Appeal is Gl	RANTE	D.						
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STATE OF MARYLAND

- * IN THE
- * CIRCUIT COURT FOR
- * BALTIMORE CITY

EDWARD NERO

* Case No. 115141033

* * * * * * * *

ORDER

On September 15, 2015, the State notified this Court that it intended to try the above-captioned case and related cases in a certain order. The State indicated that the order was preferable because Officer William Porter was a material witness in the cases against Sergeant Alicia White and Officer Caesar Goodson. On December 16, 2015, Officer Porter's trial ended in a mistrial. His retrial is currently scheduled for June 13, 2016.

On January 7, 2016, this Court granted the State's Motion to Compel Officer Porter to testify in the *Goodson* and *White* trials. Officer Porter appealed this Court's decision and the *Goodson* and *White* trials are stayed pending a decision by the Court of Special Appeals.

Shortly after the *Goodson* and *White* trials were stayed, this Court notified all parties that it planned to proceed with the *Nero*, *Miller*, and *Rice* trials, with Nero's scheduled to begin on February 22, 2016. It was only then, four months after the State identified Officer Porter as a material witness in two other trials, and one month after Officer Porter's mistrial, that the State notified this Court, in a January 16, 2016 letter, that Officer Porter may be a material witness in the *Nero*, *Miller*, and *Rice* cases and that it wished to postpone all five cases until after Officer Porter's retrial. One of the reasons

the State requested the Court grant the postponement was so that the State could avoid a Kastigar hearing and the need to put together a "clean team."

On January 20, 2016, this Court heard arguments on the State's Motion to

Compel the testimony of Officer Porter in the *Nero*, *Miller*, and *Rice* trials and denied the

State's motion. This Court found that the State was using Md. Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc. §

9-123 in an attempt to control the schedule and order of the trials and to circumvent this

Court's ruling that postponement in these cases was not appropriate.

This Court agrees that its role is not to impose its opinion upon the State's determination that a witness' testimony is in the public interest. This Court believes, however, that rather than become a rubber-stamp for the State's Attorney, there should be a two-step process in granting immunity under § 9-123 when, and only when, the motives of the requesting party are called into question. The denial of the State's motion to compel was not based upon an imposition of the Court's opinion on the State's determination that a witness' testimony was in the public interest under § 9-123, but rather based upon the Court finding that the State's motion was simply an attempt at subterfuge because they did not agree with the Court's order to continue with the other trials. It is this action of the State that this Court found was not in the public interest.

For these reasons, this Court finds that its denial of the State's motion to compel was appropriate. Therefore, it is this day of February, hereby

ORDERED that the State's Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending trial in the above-captioned case is **DENIED**.

Judge Barry G. Williams

Judge's Signature appears on the original document

> BARRY G. WILLIAMS JUDGE, CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY

Clerk, please mail copies to the following:
Marc Zayon, Attorney for Edward Nero
Janice Bledsoe, Deputy State's Attorney, Office of the State's Attorney for Baltimore
City

9215:56 Monday, February 08, 2016

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9615.56 Monday, February 08, 2016

02/08/16 CRIMINAL COURT OF BALTIMORE CASE INQUIRY 09: CASE 115141033 ST A NERO, EDWARD MICHAEL OFC A32383 COD Y DCM C 090215 CASE INQUIRY 09:15 004 000 A USER RECKL CODE 1 1425 RECKLESS ENDANGEPMENT DISP ARREST/CITATION NO 0 VERDICT DATE PLEA DATE SUSP TIME BEG SENTENCE TYPE DATE PROBATION TIME TYPE COST FINE CPER PART TIME ROOM REAS / EVENT COMMENT EVENT DATE 101415 P31 09:30 528 PMOT P31 09:30 528 JT 022216 CKW CASE ADDED THROUGH ON-LINE ON THIS DATE 20150522 CASI 052115 CKW INDICTMENT FLD COMM 052115 COMM 052115 CKW FILED ASA - BLEDSOE, JANICE L , ESŲ 68776 SCB CC# 7150400000 COMM 052115 MOTE 052715 SCY MOTION FOR SPEED! TRIAL MOTE 052715 SCY MOTION TO PRODUCE DOCUMENTS SOY REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY MOTF 052715 SCY MOTION TO SUPPRESS PURSUANT TO MD 4-252 AND 4-253 MOTE 052715 MOTE 052715 MOTE 052715 MOTE 052715 SCY MOTION FOR GRAND JURY TESTIMONY SCY DEMAND FOR CHEMIST SCY DEFENDANT NERO'S DEMAND FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS COMM 052715 COMM 052715 SCY JOINT MOTION TO DISMISS FOR PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT, P/N PAGE 002 NEXT PAGE

9-15:57 Monday, February 08, 2016

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COMM 052715 SCY APPENDIX TO DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MCTION	
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COMM 052715 SCY JOINT MOTION FOR RECUSAL OF BALTIMORE CITY STATE'S	
COMM 052715 SCY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE CC: PETERS, J	
FILE 052715 SCY FILED ADF - ZAYON, MARC L , ESQ 917967	
COMM 032915 CHH CSET ARRG; F08; 07/02/15; CHH	
COMM 060115 SCB STATE'S MOTION TO EXTEND TIME REQUIREMENTS TO RESPOND TO	
COMM 060115 SCB DEF'S MOTIONS FILED; CC: JUDGE PETERS	
COMM 060315 SCB DEF'S JOINT RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO STATE'S MOTION	
COMM 060315 3CB FOR EXTENSION OF TIME FLD (DISK INCLUDED); CC: JUDGE PETERS	
COMM 060415 SCY DATE STAMPED & ORDERED 6/4/15, STATE'S MOTION TO EXTEND TIME	,
COMM 060415 SCY REQUIREMENTS TO RESPOND TO DEFT'S MOTIONS, & THE DEFT'S JOINT	
COMM GEC415 SCY RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO STATE'S MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF	
COMM 060415 SCY TIME, & HAVING FOUND CAUSE AS REQUIRED BY RULE 1-204(A), IT	
COMM 060415 SCY IS ORDERED THAT THE STATE SHALL RESPOND TO DEFT'S MOTION FOR	Ĺ
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9-15:57 Monday, February 08, 2016

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COMM 060415 SCY 2015; & IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT THE DEFT MAY FILE THE	
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COMM 060415 SCY AFTER THE EARLIER OF THE APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL OR THE FIRS	T
COMM 060415 SCY APPEARANCE OF THE DEFT BEFORE THE COURT FURSUANT TO RULE	
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COMM 060515 CPR DEFENDANT'S PRELIMINARY RESPONSE TO THE STATE'S MOTION FOR	,
COMM 060515 CPR ISSUANCE BANNING EXTRAJUDICIAL STATEMENTS AND DEFENDANT'S	
COMM 060515 CPR RESPONSE TO THE NEWS MEDIA INTERVENORS MOTION TO INTERVENE	
COMM 060515 CPK AND OPPOSE THE STATE'S MOTION FOR ISSUANCE OF ORDER BARRIN	G
COMM 060515 CPR EXTRAJUDICIAL STATEMENTS: CC:JUDGE PETERS	
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COMM 060815 SCB CC: JUDGE PETERS	
COMM 060915 SCY SUPPLEMENTAL TO DEFENDANT'S JOINT MOTION FOR RECUSAL OF	
COMM 060915 SCY BALTIMORE CITY STATE'S ATTORNEY'S OFFICE CC: PETERS, J	
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02/08/16 CRIMINAL COURT OF BALTIMORE CASE 115141033 ST A NERO, EDWARD MICHAEL OFC CASE INQUIRY 09:15 A3.383 COD Y DCM C 090215 EVENT DATE OPER PART TIME ROOM FEAS / EVENT COMMENT CKW (M), MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT THEREOF, AND REQUEST FOR COMM 061515 CKW EXFEDITED HEARING FLD COMM 061515 ;T1CKLE DATE= 20150703 MPRC 061515 CKW MUTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER , ESQ 717876 COMM 061715 CKW FILED ASA - SCHATZOW, MICHAEL CKW OFFICE OF THE STATE'S ATTOPNEY FOR BALTIMORE CITY'S COMM 061715 CKW OPPOSITION TO DEFS JOINT MOTION FOR RECUSAL OF BALTIMORE COMM 061715 COMM 061715 CKW CITY STATE'S ATTORNEY'S OFFICE FLD CMS ORDER OF COURT DATE STAMPED 6-22-15, THE COUPT COMM 062215 COMM 062015 CMS HAVING DETERMINED THAT THE ASSIGNMENT OF THESE CASES TO CMS SINGLE JUDGE IS APPROPRIATE, IT IS THIS 19TH DAY OF COMM 062215 COMM 062215 CMS JUNE, 1015, ORDERED THAT THESE CASES ARE ASSIGNED TO COMM 062215 CMS JUDGE BARRY WILLIAMS FOR ALL FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. COPIES CMS OF ALL PAPERS FILED WITH THE CLERK SHOULD BE SIMULTANEOUSLY COMM 062215 CMS SENT TO JUDGE WILLIAMS' CHAMBERS. W. MICHEL PIERSON J. COMM 062215 COMM 062215 CMS ORDER OF COURT DATE STAMPED 6-22-15, UPON CONSULTATION CMS WITH THE FARTIES TO THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED CASES THROUGH COMM 062215 CMS COUNSEL, IT IS THIS 19TH DAY OF JUNE, 2015, ORDERED THAT COMM 062215 CMS A MOTIGPS HEARING IS SCHEDULED FOR SEPTEMBER 2, 2015, AT COMM 062215 CMS 9:30 A.M AND FURTHER ORDERED THAT THE TRIALS IN EACH OF COMM 062215 NEXT PAGE P/N PAGE 005

02/08/16 CR	IMINAL COURT OF	BALTIMORE		CASE INQUIRY 09:15
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COMM 062215				IGNMENTS SCHEDULED
COMM 062215	CMS FOR JULY 2,			
COMM 062215				IN WRITING PURSUANT
COMM 062215	CMS TO RULE 4-24	12 (B) ON OR E	EFORE JUNE 26,	2015.
COMM 062215	CMS W. MICHEL P.	ERSON J.		
COMM 062215	CMS COPY OF ORDI	ERS MAILED TO	ALL COUNSEL	
COMM 062215	CNN PLEA AND REG			
COMM 062315	CKW SUPPLEMENT			
COMM 062315	CKW BALTIMORE C			
COMM 062315	CKW RECUSAL OF I	BALTIMORE CIT	Y STATE'S ATTOR	NEY'S OFFICE FLD;
COMM 062315	CKW CC: JUDGE W			
COMM 062315	CKW OFFICE OF TH			
COMM 062315	CKW OPPUSITION '			
COMM 062315	CKW PROSECUTORIA	AL MISCONDUCI	, OR IN THE ALT	ERNATIVE, FOR
COMM 062315	CKW SANCTIONS F			
COMM 062415	SCY DATE STAMPE	ે હ ંRDERED (5/24/15, THIS CO	OURT IS IN RECEIPT OF
COMM 062415				SUANT TO RULE 4-263
COMM 062415	SCY (M) FILED OF	N JUNE 15, 20	15. FURSUANT 1	CO RULE 1-203(C) AND
NEXT PAGE			P/N	PAGE 006

02/08/16 CPIMINAL COURT OF BALTIMORE CASE 115141033 ST A NERG, EDWARD MICHAEL OFC CASE INQUIRY 09:15 A32383 COD r DCM C 090215 EVENT DATE OPER PART TIME ROOM REAS / EVENT COMMENT SCY 4-252(F), ANY DEFENSE RESPONSE IS DUE ON OR BEFORE JULY 6, COMM 062415 SCY 2015. THIS COURT NOTES THAT IN THE MOTION THE STATE COMM 062415 SCY REQUESTED AN EXPEDITED HEARING BUT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH COMM 062415 SCY RULE 1-204(A), WHICH PERMITS A COURT TO SHOPTEN TIME FOR COMM 062415 SCY A RESPONSE. HAVING FAILED TO SHOW THIS COURT THAT THE COMM 062415 SCY CONDITION UNDER WHICH A MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME SHOULD BE COMM 062415 SCY GRANTED, & IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT THE STATE'S REQUEST FOR CCMM 062415 SCY AN EXPEDITED HEARING, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO SHORTEN SCY THE TIME FOR RESPONSE, IS DENIED. WILLIAMS, J (COPIES CCMM 062415 CCMM 062415 CCMM 062415 SCY SENT BY CHAMBERS) 191 SUPPLEMENT TO OFFICE OF THE STATE'S ATTORNEY FOR BALTIMORE COMM 062415 19) CITY'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER COMM 062415 , ESQ 68776 COMM 062415 193 FILED ASA - BLEDSOE, JANICE L 1DM CASE PEMOVED FROM ARRG. DOCKET AS PER JUDGE PETERS JICCR COMM 062515 CKW STATE'S RESPONSE TO DEFS MOTION FOR REMOVAL FLD SCB STATE'S MOTION FOR JOINT TRIAL OF DEFENDANTS FLD COMM 062615 COMM 062615 SCB STATE'S INITIAL DISCLOSURES, NOTICES, AND MOTIONS FLD COMM 062615 SCB STATE'S INDEX OF INFORMATION PRODUCED IN DISCOVERY FLD COMM 062615 CZC DEF'S JOINT MOTION IN OPPOSITION TO STATE'S MOTION FOR COMM 063015

NEXT PAGE P/N PAGE 007

9:15:59 Monday, February 08, 2016

02/08	1/16 CPI	OPERATOR TOWNS AND CONTRACT OF	: 15
CASE	1151410	ST A NERO, EDWARD MICHAEL OFC A32383 COD Y DCM C 090219	ċ
	DATE	PER FART TIME ROOM REAS / EVENT COMMENT	
COMM	063015	CZC PROTECTIVE GROER FURSUANT TO RULE 4-263 (M), MEMORANDUM	
COMM	063015	CC IN SUPPORT , AND REQUEST FOR EXFEDITED HEARING FLD.	
HCAL	070215	DM PO0;0930;509 ;ARRG; ;POST;OTH;PETERS, CHARLES;8E3	
HCAL	070215	SCB PO8:0930:509 ;ARRG; ;OTHR; ;3FEKAS, STEPHEN:8E4	
COMM	070215	SCB SET IN ERROR; NO FILE IN COURT	
	070215	DM P08;0930;509 ;ARRG; ;TSET; ;WILLIAMS, BARRY;8C9	
	070615	KW DEFS PEPL! TO STATE'S RESPONSE TO DEFS MOTION FOR REMOVAL	
-	070£15	KW AND REQUEST FOR HEARING FLD; CC. JUDGE WILLIAMS	
	070715	SCB CSET ARPS; P08; 07/02/15, SCB	
	070815	CC DEFENDANT'S JOINT MOTION IN OPPOSITION TO STATE'S MOTION	
	070815	CC FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 4-263(M),	
	070815	CC MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT, AND REQUEST FOR EXPEDITED HEARING	
	070815	CZC WHICH WAS FLD. 6-30-15, HAND DELIVERED TO JUDGE WILLIAMS'	
	070815	CZC CHAMBERS.	
	070815	CZC STATE'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' JOINT MOTION IN OPPOSITION	N
	070815	TEC TO STATE'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER STATE'S RENEWED	
	070815	CEC REQUEST FOR HEARING FLD.	
	070915	CZC STATE'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' JOINT MOTION IN OPPOSITION	N
COMM	070915	CZC TO STATE'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER STATE'S RENEWED	
NEXT	PACE	P/N PAGE 0	08

9515:59 Mcnday, Feoruary 08, 2016

02/08/16 0	CRIMINAL COURT OF 11033 ST A NERO, EDI	BALTIMORE		CASE INQUIRY	09:15
CASE 11514	11033 ST A NERO, EDI	NARD MICHAEL C	FC A32383	COD Y DOM C 0	90215
EVENT DATE	OPER PART TIME RO	OM REAS / EVE	INT COMMENT		
COMM 070915	CZC REQUEST FOR	HEARING HAND	DELIVERED TO J	UDGE WILLIAMS'	
COMM 070919					
MTAN 070919					0717
COMM 071015					
COMM 071019	CPR DEFENSE OPP	SITION TO STA	TE'S MOTION FO	R JOINT TRIAL	O E
COMM 071019					
COMM 07131		ENDIX OF EVIDS	MCE IN SUPPORT	OF MOTION FOR	
COMM 071313		PRDER PURUSAN	TO RULE 4-363	(M) CC: WILLIA	MS, J
COMM 07131		FILLION, MAT	HEW	, ESQ 65349	1
COMM 071315					
COMM 071315		. CELL PHONES	AND REQUEST FO	R FRANKS HEARI	NG FLD
MPRO 071615					
COMM 071619					
COMM 07161	•		O JUDGE WILLIA	MS CHAMBERS PE	R
COMM 071619					
COMM 071619		PONSE TO DEFEI	DANT'S MOTION	FOR SUBPOENA F	OR
COMM 07161			LIVERED TO JUL	GE WILLIAMS CH	AMBERS
COMM 071619		•			
COMM 071719	SCB STATE'S SUP	FLEMENTAL DISC	CLOSURE FLD		
NEXT PAGE			P/N	PA	GE 009

9%16:00 Monday, February 08, 2016

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02/08/16 CRIMINAL COURT OF BALTIMORE CASE INQUIRY 09:
CASE 115141033 ST A NERO, EDWARD MICHAEL OFC A32383 COD Y DCM C 090215
                                                                CASE INQUIRY 09:15
EVENT DATE OPER PART TIME ROOM REAS / EVENT COMMENT
COMM 071715
              SCB ORDER DATED AND DATE STAMPED JULY 17, 2015; THAT THE STATE'S
              SCB MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER FURSUANT TO RULE 4-263(M) IS
COMM 071715
COMM 071715
              3CB DENIED; B. WILLIAMS, J
              1g: STATE'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S JOINT MOTION TO SUPPRESS 1g: THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF DEFENDANT'S DEPARTMENTAL CELL
COMM 072115
COMM 072115
              1gg PHONES AND REQUEST FOR FRANKS HEARING
COMM 072115
COMM 072315
              CKW REPLY TO STATE'S RESPONSE TO DEFS MUTION FOR SUBFOENA
             CKW FOR TANGIBLE EVIDENCE FLD; COPY DELIVEPED TO JUDGE
COMM 072315
              CKW WILLIAMS PER LAW CLERK
1T2 WAITING ON PHONE CALL FR JUDGE, WILLIAMS SEC. BEFORE
COMM 072315
COMM 072415
COMM 072415
              1T2 SCHEDULING THIS MATTER/NO TRIAL SUMMARY/7-22-15...TJ
              1g) STATE'S SUPPLEMENTAL DISCLOSURE
COMM 072415
COMM 072415
              loj FILED ASA - BLEDSOE, JANICE L
                                                                  , ESQ 68776
              CPR STATE'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS
COMM 072713
COMM 072715
              CPR STATEMENTS
COMM 072915
               CPR FEPLY TO STATE'S OFPOSITION TO MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE SEARCH
               CPR AND SEIZURE OF DEFENDANTS' DEPARTMENTAL CELL PHONES AND
COMM 072915
COMM 072915
              CPR REQUEST FOR FRANKS HEARING
                                                        ;TICKLE DATE= 20150807
MCOM 073015 1g) MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY
NEXT PAGE
                                                   II\9
                                                                           PAGE 010
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02/08/16 CRIMINAL COURT OF SALTIMORE CASE 113141033 ST A NERO, EDWARD MICHAEL OFC CASE INQUIRY 09:15 A32383 COD Y DCM C 090215 CPER PART TIME ROOM REAS / EVENT COMMENT EVENT DATE 1gj COPIES DELIVEPED TO JUDGE WILLIAM'S CHAMBERS OER L.C. COMM 073015 S8T RESPONSE TO STATE'S MOTION TO QUASH TRIAL SUBPGENA BASED ON COMM 073115 SAT ABUSE OF FROCESS FILED CC: JUDGE WILLIAMS COMM 073115 CKW LINE FILED; COPY DELIVERED TO JUDGE WILLIAMS PER ATTORNEY COMM 080415 COMM 080615 SCB STATE'S SUPPLEMENTAL DISCLOSURE FLD SCB DEF'S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF JOINT MOTION COMM 080615 COMM 089615 SCB FOR RECUSAL OF THE BALTIMORE CITY STATE'S ATTORNEY'S OFFICE SCB COPY DELIVERED TO JUDGE WILLIAMS' CHAMBERS COMM 080615 SCB STATE'S MOTION TO SANCTION THE DEF'S ATTORNEYS FOR COMM 080615 COMM 080615 SCB UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND ABUSE OF COMPULSORY PPOCESS FLD SCB STATE'S MOTION TO STRIKE AS A SANCTION FOR DEF'S VIOLATION COMM 080615 SCB OF PULE 4-263(I) OR, ALTERNATIVELY, STATE'S RESPONSE TO COMM 080615 COMM 080615 SCB DEF'S JOINTLY FILED MOTION TO COMPEL AND FOR SANCTIONS FLD CKW DEFENDANTS WAIVER OF APPEARANCE FLD COMM 061115 CPR STATE'S MOTION TO QUASH HEARING SUBPOENA REQUESTED BY COMM 081415 COMM: 081415 CPR CATHERINE FLYNN AND SERVED ON ASSISTANT STATE'S ATTORNEY COMM 081415 CPR ALBERT FEISINGER CPR STATE'S MOTION TO QUASH HEARING SUBPOENA SERVED ON WAYNE COMM 081415 COMM 081415 CPR WILLIAMS 2/N PAGE C11 NEXT PAGE

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CASE INQUIRY 09:15
02/08/16 CPIMINAL COURT OF BALTIMORE CASE 115141033 ST A NERO, EDWARD MICHAEL OFC
                                                    A32383 COD Y DCM C 090215
EVENT DATE OPER PART TIME ROOM REAS / EVENT COMMENT
             CPR STATE'S MOTION TO QUASH HEARING SUBPOENA SERVED ON AVOID
COMM 081415
COMM 081415
             CPR MACKEL
             CKW STATE'S MOTION TO QUASH HEARING SUBFOENA REQUESTED BY
COMM 081415
             CKW CATHERINE FLYNN AND SERVED ON DEFUTY STATE'S ATTORNEY
CCMM 081415
             CKW ANTONIO GIOIA
CKW MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
COMM C81415
                                                        ;TICKLE DATE= 20150901
MPRO 081415
MPRO 061415
             SCB MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE GRDER
                                                        ;TICKLE DATE= 20150901
                                                        ;TICKLE DATE= 20150901
;TICKLE DATE= 20150901
             SCB MOTION FOR FROTECTIVE ORDER
MPRO 081415
             SCB MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
S8T MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
MPPO 081415
                                                         ;TICKLE DATE= 20150901
MFRO 061415
               SET STATE'S MOTION TO QUASH HEARING SUBPOENA REQUESTED BY
COMM 081415
             S8T CATHERINE FLYNN & SERVED ON STATE'S ATTORNEY MARILYN
COMM 081415
COMM 081415
              S8T MCSBY FILED
                                                         ;TICKLE DATE= 20150901
              CNN MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
MPRO 081415
               CNN STATE'S MOTION TO QUASH HEARING SUBPOENA REQUESTED BY
COMM 081415
               CNN CATHERINE FLYHN AND SERVED ON DR. CAROL ALLEN
COMM (81415
                                                        ;TICKLE DATE= 20150901
               1g1 MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
MPRO 081415
               1g] STATE'S MOTION TO QUASH HEARING SUBPOENA REQUESTED BY
COMM 081415
               1gj CATHERINE FLYINI AND SERVED ON ASSISTANT STATE'S ATTORNEY
COMM 081415
NEXT PAGE
                                                  P/N
                                                                          PAGE 012
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02/08/16 CRIMINAL COURT OF BALTIMORE
CASE 115141033 ST A NERO, EDWARD MICHAEL OFC
                                                            CASE INQUIRY 09:15
                                                  A32383 COD Y DCM C 090215
EVENT DATE OPER PART TIME ROOM PEAS / EVENT COMMENT
             lgj LISA GOLDBERG
COMM 081415
              SCB STATE'S MOTION TO QUASH HEARING SUBFOENA PEQUESTED BY
COMM 081415
              SCB BY CATHERINE FLYNN AND SERVED ON DEPUTY STATE'S ATTORNEY
COMM 031415
              3CB JANICE BLEDSOE FLD
COMM 081415
                                                      ;TICKLE DATE= 20150901
MPRO 081415
              SCB MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
             SCB STATE'S MOTION TO QUASH HEARING SUBPOENA REQUESTED BY
COMM 081415
              SCB CATHEPINE FLYNN AND SERVED ON CHIEF DEPUTY STATE'S
COMM 081415
              SCB ATTORNEY MICHAEL SCHATZOW FLD
COMM 081415
             SCB MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
                                                      ;TICKLE DATE= 20150901
MPPO 081415
              SCY DATE STAMPED & ORDERED 8/17/15, STATE'S MOTION TO QUASH
COMM 081815
              SCY HEARING SUBPOENA REQUESTED BY CATHERINE FLYNN AND SERVED
COMM 081815
              SCI ON DR. CAROL ALLEN. ORDERED THAT THE HEARING SUBPOENA
COMM 081815
              SCY SERVED ON DR. CAROL ALLEN FOR THE SEPTEMBER 2, 2015.
COMM 081815
              SCY HEARING IS QUASHED. (SEE ORDER) WILLIAMS, J (CC: ALL
COMM 081815
              SCY ATTORNEY OF RECORD)
COMM 081815
              SCY DATE STAMPED & ORDERED 8/17/15, STATE'S MOTION TO QUASH
COMM 031915
              SCY HEARING SUBPOENA PEQUESTED BY CATHERINE FLYUN AND SERVED
COMM 081915
              SCY ON ASSISTANT STATE'S ATTORNEY, ALBERT PEISINGER. ORDERED,
COMM 081915
              SCY THAT THE HEARING SUBPOENA SERVED ON ALBERT PEISINGER FOR
COMM 081915
                                                                       PAGE 013
NEXT PAGE
                                                P/W
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9:16:01 Monday, February 08, 2016

02/08/16 CRIM	MINAL COURT OF BALTIMORE CASE IN	QUIRY 09:15
CASE 11514103	33 ST A NERG, EDWARD MICHAEL OFC A32393 COD Y DC	м с 090215
	PER PAPT TIME ROOM REAS / EVENT COMMENT	
	SCY THE SEFTEMBER 2, 2015 HEARING IS QUASHED. WILLI.	AMS, J
	SCY (CC: ALL ATTORNEY'S OF RECORD)	
	SCY DATE STAMPED & ORDERED 8/17/15, STATE'S MOTION TO	O QUASH
	SCY HEARING SUBFOENA REQUESTED BY CATHERINE FLYNN AN	
	SCY ON ASSISTANT STATE'S ATTORNEY LISA GOLDBERG. OR	
	SCY THAT THE HEAPING SUBPOENA SERVED ON LISA GOLDBERG	
	SCY SEPTERMPER 2, 2015 HEARING IS QUASHED. WILLIAMS	
	SCY COUNSEL OF RECORD)	•
	SCY DATE STAMPED & ORDERED 8/17/15, STATE'S MOTION TO	O OUASH
COMM 081915	SCY HEARING SUPPOENA REQUESTED BY CATHERINE FLYNN AN	D SERVED
	SCY ON WAYNE WILLIAMS. ORDERED, THAT THE HEARING SU	
COMM 081915	SCY SERVED ON WA:NE WILLIAMS FOR THE SEPTEMBER 2, 20	15 HEARING
COMM 081915	SCY IS QUASHED. WILLIAMS, J (CC: ALL COUNSEL OF REC	ORD)
COMM 081915	SCI DATE STAMPED & ORDERED 8/17/15, STATE'S MOTION T	OOUASH
COMM 081915	SCY HEARING SUBPOENA REQUESTED BY CATHERINE FLYNN AN	D SERVED
COMM 081915	SCY ON AVON MACKEL. ORDERED, THAT THE HEARING SUBPO	ENA SERVED
COMM 081915	SCY ON AVON MACKEL FOR THE SEPTEMBER 2, 2015 HEARING	IS OUASHED.
	SCY (CC: ALL COUNSEL OF RECORD)	
	SCY DATE STAMPED & ORDERED 8/17/15, STATE'S MOTION T	O CUASH
COURT COLDIN	OCT DITTE DITTE DE VOIDE NO VIETA DE VIETA DE VIETA DE	* * · · · · · · · · ·
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9:16:02 Monday, February 08, 2016

02/08/16 CRIMINAL COURT OF BALTIMORE CASE INQUIRY CASE 115141033 ST A NERO, EDWARD MICHAEL OFC A32383 COD Y DCM C 090.	09:15 215
EVENT DATE OPER PART TIME ROOM REAS / EVENT COMMENT	
CCMM 081915 SCY HEARING SUBPOENA REQUESTED BY CATHERINE FLYNN AND SERVE	D
CCMM 081915 SCY ON CHIEF DEPUTY STATE'S ATTORNEY MICHAEL SCHATZOW. ORD	
COMM C81915 SCY THAT THE HEARING SUBFORNA SERVED ON MICHAEL SCHATZOW FO	
COMM 081915 SCY SEPTEMBER 2, 2015 HEARING IS QUASHED. WILLIAMS, J (CC:	
COMM 061915 SCY COUNSEL OF RECORD)	
COMM 081915 SCY DATE STAMPED & ORDERED 8/17/15, STATE'S MOTION TO QUASH	
COMM 081915 SCY HEARING SUPPOENA REQUESTED BY CATHERINE FLYNN AND SERVE	
COMM 081915 SC1 ON STATE'S ATTORNEY MARILYN MOSEY. GROERED, THAT THE	
COMM 081915 SCY HEARING SUBPOENA SERVED ON MARILYN MUSBY FOR THE SEPTEM	BER
COMM 081915 3C1 2, 2015 HEARING IS QUASHED. WILLIAMS, J (CC: ALL COUNS	
COMM 081915 SCY OF RECORD)	
COMM 081915 SCY DATE STAMPED & ORDERED 8/17/15, STATE'S MOTION TO QUASH	
COMM 081915 SCY HEARING SUBPOENA REQUESTED BY CATHERINE FLYNN AND SERVE	D
COMM 081915 SCY ON DEPUTY STATE'S ATTORNEY JANICE BLEDSOE. ORDERED, TH.	AT
COMM 081915 SCY THE HEARING SUBPOENA SERVED ON JANICE BLEDSDE FOR THE	
COMM 081915 SCY SEPTEMBER 2, 2015 HEARING IS QUASHED. WILLIAMS, J (CC:	ALL
COMM 081915 SCY COUNSEL OF RECORD)	
COMM 081915 SCY DATE STAMPED & ORDERED 8/17/15, STATE'S MOTICN TO QUASH	
COMM 081915 SCY HEAPING SUBPOENA REQUESTED BY CATHERINE FLYNN AND SERVE	
NEXT PAGE P/N PAGE	015

02/08/16 CRIMINAL COURT OF BALTIMORE CASE 115141033 ST A NERO, EDWARD MICHAEL OFC CASE INQUIRY 09:15 A32383 COD Y DCM C 090215 EVENT DATF. CPER PART TIME ROOM REAS / EVENT COMMENT SCY ON DEPUTY STATE'S ATTORNEY ANTONIO GIGIA. ORDERED, THAT COMM 081913 SCY THE HEARING SUBPOENA SERVED ON ANTONIO GIOIA FOR THE COMM 081915 SCY SEPTEMBER 2, 2015 HEARING IS QUASHED. WILLIAMS, J (CC: ALL COMM 081915 SCY COUNSEL OF RECORD) COMM 081915 CPR STATE'S SUPPLEMENTAL DISCLOSURE COMM 081915 MPRO 082415 ;TICKLE DATE= 20150911 SCB MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER SCB STATE'S MOTION TO QUASH HEARING SUBPOENA SERVED ON CCMM 082415 SCB MAJOR SAM COGAN FLD COMM 082415 SCB MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER ;TICKLE DATE= 20150911 MPRO 082415 SCB STATE'S MOTION TO QUASH HEARING SUBFOENA SERVED ON THE COMM 082415 SCB CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS FOR THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF MEDICAL COMM 082415 COMM 082415 SCB EXAMINER FLD MPRO 082415 SCB MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER ;TICKLE DATE= 20150911 ;TICKLE DATE= 20150911 SCB MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER MPPO 092415 SCB STATE'S RESPONSE TO DEF'S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN SCB SUPPORT OF JOINT MOTION FOR RECUSAL OF BALTIMORE CITY COMM 082415 COMM 082415 SCB STATE'S ATTORNEY OFFICE FLD COMM 082415 CKW MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER ;TICKLE DATE= 20150912 MPRO 082515 CMS ORDER OF COURT DATED AUGUST 26, 2015, SECURITY/MEDIA COMM 082615 PAGE 016 NEXT PAGE F/N

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02/08/16 CRIMINAL COURT OF BALTIMORE
CASE 115141033 ST A NERO, EDWARD MICHAEL OFC
                                                            CASE INQUIRY 09:15
                                                 A32383 COD Y DCM C 090215
EVENT DATE OPER PART TIME ROOM REAS / EVENT COMMENT
             CMS PROTOCOL ORDER FILED. ORDER IS SUBJECT TO MODIFICATION
COMM 082615
              CMS BY THE COURT AT ANY TIME. W. MICHEL PIERSON J
COMM 082615
              CMS COPIES MAILED TO ALL COUNSEL
COMM 082615
              SCB ORDER DATED AUGUST 25, 2015 AND DATE STAMPED AUGUST 26, 2015
COMM 082615
              SCB THAT THE SUBFORMA SERVED ON DETECTIVE DAWNYELL TAYLOR FOR
CCMM 082615
              SCB THE SEPTEMBER 2, 2015 HEARING IS QUASHED; WILLIAMS, J
COMM 082615
              CKW DATE STAMPEE AND UNDEPED AUGUST 25TH 2015 THAT THE HEARING
COMM 082615
             CKW SUBPOENA SERVED ON MAJOR SAM COGAN FOR THE SEPTEMBER 2 2015
COMM 082615
COMM 082615
             CKW HEARING IS QUASHED
              SCB ORDER DATED AUGUST 25, 2015 AND DATE STAMPED AUGUST 26, 2015
COMM 082615
              SCB THAT THE HEARING SUBPOEMA SERVED ON THE CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS
COMM 082615
              SCB FOR THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF MEDICAL EXAMINER FOR THE
COMM 082615
              SCB SEPTEMBER 2, 2015 HEARING IS QUASHED FLD: WILLIAMS,
COMM 082615
              CKW STATE'S MOTION TO QUASH HEARING SUBPOENA SERVED OU
COMM 082613
              CKW COLONEL STANLEY BRANFORD FLD
COMM 082615
                                                      ;TICKLE DATE= 20150913
MPRO 082615
              CKW MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
              CKW STATE'S MOTION TO QUASH ALL HEARING SUBFOENAS ISSUED BY
COMM 082615
COMM 082615
              CKW THE DEFENSE FOR THE SEPTEMBER 2, 2015, MOTIONS HEARING FLD
              CPR ORDER DATE STAMPED 8/27/15; ORDERED THIS 26TH DAY OF AUGUST
COMM 082715
                                                F/N
                                                                      PAGE 017
NEXT PAGE
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02/08/16 CRIMINAL COURT OF BALTIMORE CASE INQUIPY 09:1	5
CASE 115141033 ST A NERO, EDWARD MICHAEL OFC A32383 COD Y DCM C 090215	
EVENT DATE OPER PART TIME ROOM REAS / EVENT COMMENT	
COMM 082/15 CPR 2015 THAT THE HEARING SUBPOENA SERVED ON COLONEL STANLEY	
COMM 092715 CPR BRANFORD FOR THE SEFTEMBER 2, 2015 HEARING IS QUASHED	
COMM 082715 CPF JUDGE B. WILLIAMS	
COMM 082715 CPR COPY MAILED TO STATE ATTORNEY(S) AND DEFENSE ATTORNEY(S)	
COMM 082715 1gj SECOND REQUEST FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON THE	
COMM 082715 191 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF JOINT MOTION FOR	
COMM 082715 1g) RECUSAL OF THE BALTIMORE CITY STATE'S ATTORNEY'S OFFICE	
COMM 083115 S8T STATE'S PESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S "SECOND REQUEST FOR AN	
COMM UB3113 S8T EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON THE SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN	
COMM 083115 S8T SUPFORT OF JOINT MOTION FOR RECUSAL OF THE BALTIMOPE CITY	
COMM 083115 S8T STATE'S ATTORNEY'S OFFICE" FILED BY MICHAEL SCHATZOW	
COMM 083115 1T2 CSET PMOT; P31; 09/02/15; 1T2 (PER COMPUTER/ORDER)	
COMM 083115 SET STATE'S SUPPLEMENTAL DISCLOSURE FILED BY JANICE BLEDSCE	
COMM 09911; Set STATE 3 SOFFEDMENTAL DISCLOSORS TIEDS 51 STATES 2220005	
COMM 090215	
TRAK 090215 1DM ASSIGNED TO TRACK C - 120 DAYS ON 09/01/2015	
COMM 090215 1T2 CONSENT WAIVER OF PRESENCE OF DEFT'S "GRANTED" (JUDGE	
COMM 090215 1T2 WILLIAMS)	
COMM 090215 1T2 JOINT MOTION TO DIEMISS ON JUDICIAL STATEMENTS HEARD AND	
NEXT PAGE P/N PAGE 018	l

9:16:03 Monday, February 08, 2016

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02/08/16 CF	IMINAL COURT OF BALTIMORE CASE INQUIRY 09:15 033 ST A NERO, EDWARD MICHAEL OFC A32353 COD Y DCM C 090215
	OPER PAPT TIME ROOM REAS / EVENT COMMENT
	1T2 "DENIED" (JUDGE WILLIAMS)
	112 JOINT MOTION FOR SANCTIONS HEARD AND "DENIED" (JUDGE
COMM 090215	112 WILLIAMS)
COMM 090215	1TO DEFT'S REQUEST FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING HEARD AND
COMM 090215	1T2 "DENIED" (JUDGE WILLIAMS)
COMM 090215	1T2 JOINT MOTION TO RECUSE BALTIMORE CITY ASA AND OFFICE
COMM 090215	1T2 HEARD AND "DENIED" (JUDGE WILLIAMS)
COMM 090215	1TO STATE'S MOTION FOR JOINT TRIAL OF DEFT (NERO) HEARD
COMM 090315	1T2 AND "DENIED" (JUDGE WILLIAMS)
HCAL 090215	SCY P31:0930:528 ; PMOT; ; OTHR; ; WILLIAMS, BARRY:8C9
COMM 090215	S8M STATE'S MOTION FOR JOINT TRIAL OF DEFENDANTS CD'S SEALED
COMM 090815	13) DEFENDANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION
COMM 090815	1gj for removal
COMM 090913	SET STATE'S SUPPLEMENTAL DISCLOSURE FILED BY JANICE BLEDSOE
COMM 091015	CPR FILED ASA - MOSBY, MARILYN J , ESQ 589290
COMM 091015	CPP DEFENSE MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE IS HEREBY HEARD & "DENIED"
HCAL 091015	SCB P31;0930;528;HEAR; ;OTHR; ;WILLIAMS, BARRY;8C9
COMM 091015	SCB CSET HEAR; P31; 09/10/15; SCB
COMM 091015	SCB DEF'S MOTION FOR SUBPEDNA TO TANGIBLE RECORDS OF POLICE DEPT
NEXT PAGE	P/N PAGE 019

02/08/16 CRIMINA	L COURT OF BALTIMORE CASE INQU	IRY 09:15
CASE 1151/1033 S	T A NERO, EDWARD MICHAEL OFC A32383 COD Y DCM	C 090215
	PART TIME ROOM REAS / EVENT COMMENT	
	TRAINING RECORDS AT THE ACADEMY HEARD AND IS HEREB	Y DENIED
•	WITH LEAVE TO REFILE; DEF'S MOTION FOR SUBPEONA TO	
COMM 091015 SCB		
	WITHDRAWN; DEF'S MOTION FOR SUBPECHA TO TANGIBLE R	
	OF CENTRAL BOOKING FOR FREDDIE GRAY WITHDRAWN, DEF	
COMM 031015 SCB	FOR SUBPEONA TO TANGLIBLE RECORDS FOR JANUARY 1, 2	012 TO
	APRIL 2012 OF POLICE ACADEMY TRAINING ON LEGAL ISS	
	AND DENIED; DEF'S MOTION FOR SUBPEUNA TO TANGIBLE	
COMM 091015 SCB	OF STATE'S ATTY'S OFFICE INVESTIGATION RECORDS FOR	
COMM 091015 SCB	APRIL 12, 2015 THRU MAY 1, 2015 HEARD AND DENIED	
COMM 091115 SCB	STATE'S SUPPLEMENTAL DISCLOSURE FLD	
COMM 091115 SCY	MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO CHARGE A CRIME	
COMM 091615 SCB	STATE'S NOTICE OF INTENT TO USE DNA FLD	
COMM 091615 SCB	STATE'S SUPPLEMENTAL DISCLOSURE FLD	
COMM 091815 101	DEFENDANTS' JOINT MOTION FOR RECORDATION OF	
	SEPTEMBEP 24,2015 SCHEDULING CONFERENCE	
	STATE'S SUPPLEMENTAL DISCLOSURE OF EXFERT WITNESS	
MCOM 092115 SCB	MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY :TICKLE DATE= 2	0150929
COMM 092115 SCB	DET'S MOTION TO PRODUCE RECORDS REGARDING DNA ANAL	YSIS FLD
CO C		
NEXT PAGE	P/N	PAGE 020
MENI LUGE	*/	

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02/08/16 CRIMINAL COURT OF BALTIMORF
CASE 115141033 ST A NERO, EDWARD MICHAEL OFC
                                                              CASE INQUIRY 09:15
                                                   A32383 COD Y DOM C 090215
EVENT DATE OPER PART TIME ROOM REAS / EVENT COMMENT
COMM 092215
             CKW STATE'S SUPPLEMENTAL DISCLOSURE FLD
              SCY DATE STAMPED & ORDERED 9/22/15, THAT THE DEFT'S REQUEST FOR
CCMM 092315
              SCY SEPTEMBER 24, 2015 SCHEDULING CONFERENCE TO TAKE PLACE ON
COMM 092315
              SCY THE RECORD, IS DENIED. WILLIAMS, J (CC: MARC ZAYON, SCY ATTORNEY FOR DEFT, JANICE BLEDSOE, DEPUTY STATE'S ATTORNEY,
COMM 092315
COMM 092315
              SCY OFFICE OF THE STATE'S ATTORNEY FOR BALTIMORE CITY)
COMM 092315
                                                        ;TICKLE DATE= 20151001
MCOM 092315
              CPR MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY
              CPR STATE'S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY
COMM 092315
              CPR STATE'S SUPPLEMENTAL DISCLOSURE
COMM 092315
              CHN STATE'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO PRODUCE RECORDS
COMM 092315
              CNN REGARDING DNA ANALYSIS
COMM 092315
              1T2 CSET HEAR; P31, 09/29/15; 1T2 (ADD-ON/LAW CLK/JUDGE
COMM 092815
                      WILLIAMS CALLING PT. 46 DKT. IN RM. 234 EAST)
COMM 092815
              1T2
              SCY DATE STAMPED 9/28/15, & ORDERED 9/25/15, THAT ALL PROVISIONS
COMM 092815
               SCY OF THE SECURITY/MEDIA PROTOCOL ORDER DATED AUGUST 26, 2015
COMM 092815
               SCY SHALL APPLY TO THIS HEARING. IN ADDITION, FOR THIS HEARING,
COMM 090815
               SCY MEMBERS OF THE MEDIA SHOULD ARRIVE AT THE COURTHOUSE AT 1:00
COMM 092815
COMM C92815
               SCY F.M. PIERSON, J
              CKW STATE'S RESPONSE TO DEFS MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO
COMM 092815
NEXT PAGE
                                                  F/N
                                                                          PAGE 021
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9:16:04 Monday, February 08, 2016

NEXT PAGE

CASE INQUIRY 09:15 02/08/16 CRIMINAL COURT OF BALTIMORE CASE INQUIRY 09-CASE 115141033 ST A NERG, EDWARD MICHAEL OFC A32383 COD Y DCM C 090215 EVENT DATE OPER PART TIME ROOM PEAS / EVENT COMMENT CKW CHARGE A CRIME FLD COMM 092815 CYH CSET JT ; F31; 02/22/16; CYH COMM 092915 SCB P31;0200;528 ;HEAR; ;POST;CAN;WILLIAMS, BARRY;8C9 HCAL 092915 SCB POSTPONED TIL 2/22/2016 PART 31 AT 9:30AM; DEF SERVED COMM 092915 COMM 092915 38T DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE DENIAL OF 38T DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE DENIAL OF S8T MOTION FOR REMOVAL & REQUEST FOR HEARING FILED S8T SUPPLEMENT TO DEFENDANT'S JOINT MOTION TO COMPEL AND FOR COMM 092915 COMM 092915 COMM 092915 S8T SANCTIONS FILED HWHO 092915 S8T POSTPONEMENT FORM FILED; HICKS (MD RULE 4-271) NOT WAIVED COMM 093015 SCY DATE STAMPED & ORDERED 9/30/15, DEFT'S REQUEST FOR THE COMM 093015 SCY SUPPRESSION OF THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF DEFT'S DEPARTMENTAL COMM 093015 SCY CELL PHONES AND FOR A FRANKS HEARING IS DENIED. WILLIAMS, J SC1 (CC: MARC ZAYON, ATTORNEY FOR EDWARD NERO, JANICE BLEDSOE, COMM 093015 COMM 093015 SCY DEPUTY STATE'S ATTORNEY, OFFICE OF THE STATE'S ATTORNEY COMM 093015 SCY FOR BALTO. CITY) CNN STATE'S SUPPLEMENTAL DISCLOSURE SCY DATE STAMPED & ORDERED 10/2/15, THAT DEFT'S REQUEST FOR SCY RECONSIDERATION OF THE DENIAL OF MOTION FOR REMOVAL AND COMM 093015 COMM 100215 COMM 100215 COMM 100215 SCY DEFT'S PEOUEST FOR A HEARING IS DENIED WILLIAMS, J P/N PAGE 022

02/08/16 CRIMINAL COURT OF BALTIMORE CASE 115141033 ST A NERC, EDWARD MICHAEL OFC CASE INQUIRY 09:15 A32383 COD Y DCM C 090215 OPER PART TIME ROOM REAS / EVENT COMMENT EVENT DATE COMM 100215 SCY (CC: MARC ZAYON, ATTORNEY FOR EDWARD NERO, JANICE BLEDSOE, SCY DEPUTY STATE'S ATTORNEY, OFFICE OF THE STATE'S ATTORNEY FOR COMM 100215 COMM 100215 SCY BALTO. CITY) SCY DATE STAMPED 10/5/15, & ORDERED 10/2/15, UPON CONSULTATION COMM 100515 SCY WITH THE PARTIES TO THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED CASE THROUGH COUNSEL COMM 100515 COMM 100515 SCY ORDERED THAT A MOTIONS HEARING IS SCHEDULED FOR OCTOBER 13, COMM 100515 SCY 2015 AT 9:30 A.M., AND FURTHER ORDERED THAT A MOTION HEARING SCY IS SCHEDULED FOR OCTOBER 14, 2015 AT 9:30 A.M. WILLIAMS, J COMM 100515 SC! (CC: MARC ZAYON, ATTORNEY FOR EDWARD NERO, JANICE BLEDSOE, COMM 100515 SCY DEPUTY STATE'S ATTORNEY, OFFICE OF THE STATE'S ATTORNEY FOR COMM 100515 COMM 100515 SC! BALTO. CIT1) SCY DATE STAMPED 10/5/15, & ORDERED 10/2/15, UPON CONSIDERATION COMM 100515 SCY OF THE MOTION AND RESPONSE IN THIS INSTANCE, & HAVING FOUND COMM 100515 SCY THE STATE'S RESPONSE IN PARAGRAPHS C, D, E, I, AND P IS COMM 100515 SCY INSUFFICIENT, IT IS ORDERED THAT THE STATE DISCLOSE THE COMM 100515 SCY DOCUMENTS REQUESTED BY THE DEFENDANT IN PARAGRAPHS C, D, E, COMM 100515 SCY I, AND F. (SEE ORDER FOR DETAILS) WILLIAMS, J COMM 100513 COMM 100515 SCY (CC: MARC ZAYON, ATTORNEY FOR EDWARD NERO, JANICE BLEDSOE, SCY DEPUT! STATE'S ATTORNEY, OFFICE OF THE STATE'S ATTORNEY FOR COMM 100515 NEXT PAGE P/N PAGE 023

9'16:05' Monday, February 08, 2016

NEXT PAGE

02/08/16 CRIMINAL COURT OF BALTIMORE CASE INQUIRY 09: CASE 115141033 ST A NERO, EDWARD MICHAEL OFC A32383 COD Y DCM C 090215 CASE INQUIRY 09:15 EVENT DATE OPER PART TIME ROOM REAS / EVENT COMMENT COMM 100515 SCY BALTO, CITY) SCB STATE'S SUPPLEMENTAL DISCLOSURE FLD COMM 100515 VGI CSET PMOT; P31; 10/14/15, VGI (FR ADD ON PER LW CK GI) VGI CSET PMOT; P31; 10/13/15; VGI (FR ADD ON PER LW CK GI) SCY DATE STAMPED & ORDERFD 10/8/15, HEARING UPON PRE-TRIAL COMM 100315 COMM 100815 COMM 100815 SCY MOTIONS IN THESE CASES IS SCHEDULED TO OCCUR ON OCTOBER 13, COMM 100815 SCY AND OCTOBER 14, 2015 AT 9:30 A.M. IT IS OPDERED, THAT ALL COMM 100815 SCY PROVISIONS OF THE SECURITY/MEDIA PROTOCOL ORDER DATED AUGUST COMM 100815 SCY 26, 2015 SHALL APPLY TO THIS HEARING. PIERSON, J COMM 100815 38T STATE'S SUPPLEMENTAL DISCLOSURE FILED BY JANICE BLEDSOE COMM 100815 CNN STATE'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S SUPPLEMENT TO DEFENDANTS' COMM 100915 COMM 100915 CNN JOINT MOTION TO COMPEL AND FOR SANCTIONS HCAL 101315 CYH 231;0900;528 ;JT ; ;POST;PAV;WILLIAMS, BARR!;8C9 SCY REPLY TO STATE'S RESPONSE TO DEFT'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR COMM 101315 SCY FAILURE TO CHARGE A CRIME FLD COMM 101315 CKW P31;0930;528 ; PMOT; ; CONT; ;WILLTAMS, BARRY;8C9 HCAL 191315 CKW DEFENSE MOTION TO POSTPONE FROM MOTIONS HEARING IS COMM 101315 CKW HEREBY HEARD AND DENIED; DEFENSE MOTION TO SUPPRESS COMM 101315 CKW STATEMENTS IS WITHDRAWN; CONTINUE ON 2/22/16 PT31 COMM 101315

P/U

PAGE 024

3:16:06 Monday, February 08, 2016

02/08/16 CRIMINAL COURT OF BALTIMORE CASE INQUIRY 0 CASE 115141033 ST A NERG, EDWAPD MICHAEL OFC A32383 COD Y DCM C 0902	9:15
CASE 115141033 ST A NERG, EDWAPD MICHAEL OFC A32383 COD Y DCM C 0902	15
EVENT DATE OPER PART TIME ROOM REAS / EVENT COMMENT	
FILE 101315 CKW FILED ADF - WALKER, ROLAND , ESQ 862038	
COMM 101415 1g) DATE STAMPED AND ORDERED ON 10/14/15 THAT IN CONSIDERATION	ON
COMM 101415 193 OF DEFENDANT'S 07/30/15 JOINT MUTION TO COMPEL AND FOR	
COMM 101415 193 SANCTIONS, THE COURT HAVING FOUND THAT THE STATE HAS FAI	
COMM 101415 1gj TO PRODUCE INFORMATION THIS COURT DEEMS EXCILPATORY, IT	IS
COMM 101415 1gg THIS 14TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2015 HEREBY ORDERED THAT DEF'S	
COMM 101415 1g; MOTIONS IS GRANTED IN PART AND HEREBY ORDERED THAT THE S	TATE
COMM 101415 1gj on or before 10/28/15 PROVIDE COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT'S WI	TH
COMM 101415 193 COPIES OF ANY AND ALL DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE	
COMM 101415 193 INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF DEFENDANTS; ALL OTHER	_
COMM 101415 193 REQUEST BY THE STATE AND THE DEFENDANTS FOR SANCTIONS AR	E
COMM 101415 1gg HEREBY DENIED PER JUDGE BARRY G.WILLIAMS (SEE ORDER) CC:	
COMM 101415 1g) ADF MARC ZAYON AND ASA JANICE BLEDSOE	0415.M
COMM 101515 SCY DATE STAMPED & ORDERED 10/14/15, ON MAY 14, 2015, THIS C	
COMM 101515 SCY RECEIVED THE STATE'S MOTION FOR ISSUANCE OF ORDER BARRIN	G
COMM 101515 SCY EXTRAJUDICIAL STATEMENTS. ON SEPTEMBER 29, 2015, THIS CO	
COMM 101515 SCY RECEIVED THE DEFT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE DE	
COMM 101515 SCY OF MOTION FOR REMOVAL & REQUEST FOR HEARING. THE DEFT'S	
COMM 101515 SCY MOTION NOTED HIS CONCERN FOR THE ACCUMULATION OF PRETRIA	P
NEXT PAGE P/N PAGE	025

CASE INQUIRY 09:15 02/08/16 CRIMINAL COURT OF BALTIMORE CASE INQUIRY 09: CASE 115141033 ST A NERO, EDWARD MICHAEL OFC A32383 COD Y DCM C 090215 EVENT DATE OPER PART TIME ROOM REAS / EVENT COMMENT SCY PUBLICITY, INCLUDING THE DISCLOSURE OF EVICENCE NOT IN THE COMM 101515 SCY PUBLIC RECOPD, & THE EFFECT OF SUCH ON THE VIOR DIRE PROCESS COMM 101515 SCY & HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL. ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY COMM 101515 SCY ORDERED THAT: 1.) THIS ORDER IS BINDING ON THE DEFT, ALL SCY ATTORNEYS FOR THE DEFT & THE STATE, & ON ALL EMPLOYEES, COMM 101515 COMM 101515 SCY REPRESENTATIVES, OR AGENTS OF SUCH ATTORNEYS. IT SHALL COMM 101515 COMM 101515 SCY FEMAIN IN FORCE UNTIL THE CONCLUSION OF THIS CASE OR UNTIL SEY FURTHER ORDER OF THIS COURT. 2.) NO PERSON COVERED BY THIS COMM 101515 SCY ORDER SHALL MAKE OR ISSUE ANY EXTRAJUDICIAL STATEMENT, COMM 101515 SCY WRITTEN OR ORAL, CONCERNING THIS CASE FOR DISSEMINATION BY SCY MEANS OF FUBLIC COMMUNICATION. 3.) COUNSEL ARE REMINDED OF COMM 101515 COMM 101515 SCY THEIR ETRICAL DUTIES & OBLIGATIONS AS SET FORTH IN THE COMM 101515 SCY MD RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, PULE 3.6, TRIAL PUBLICITY. COMM 101515 COMM 101515 SCY 4) NO PEPSON COVERED BY THIS ORDER SHALL AVOID OR SCY CIRCUMVENT ITS EFFECT BY ACTIONS THAT INDIRECTLY, BUT COMM 101515 SCY DELIBERATELY, BRING ABOUT A VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER. 5.) COMM 101515 SCY IF ANY PERSON BELIEVES THAT EVENTS HAVE OCCURRED THAT SHOULD COMM 101515 SCY RESULT IN A MODIFIATION OF THIS ORDER, SUCH PERSON MAY SEEK COMM 101515 SCY RELIEF FROM THE COURT. 6.) THE PROHIBITION ON MAKING EXTRA COMM 101515 NEXT PAGE P/N PAGE 026

02/08/16 CRIMINAL COURT OF BALTIMORE CASE 115141033 ST A NERC, EDWARD MICHAEL OFC CASE INQUIRY 09:15 A32383 COD Y DCM C 090215 EVENT DATE OPER PART TIME POOM REAS / EVENT COMMENT SCY JUDICIAL STATEMENTS APPLIES TO THE REPOSTING OR REPUBLICA-COMM 101515 SCY TION OF ANY STATEMENTS MADE PRIOR TO THE ENTRY OF THIS ORDER COMM 101515 SCY THAT WOULD NOW CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER. & 7.)
SCY NOTHING IN THIS ORDER SHALL BE CONSTRUED TO LIMIT ANY RIGHTS COMM 101515 COMM 101515 SCY OF THE MEDIA OR THE PUBLIC PURSUANT TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT CCMM 101515 SCY OR TO LIMIT PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT PROCEEDINGS AS ALLOWED CCMM 101515 SCY BY STATUTE, RULE OR COURT ORDER. WILLIAMS, J (CC: MARC SCY ZAYON, ATTORNE) FOP EDWARD NERO, JANICE BLEDSOE, DEPUTY COMM 101515 COMM 101515 SCY STATE'S ATTORNEY, OFFICE OF THE STATE'S ATTORNEY FOR BALTO. SCY CITY) (SEE ORDER FOR GOOD CAUSE SHOWN) COMM 101515 COMM 101515 SCB STATE'S SUPPLEMENTAL DISCLOSURE FLD COMM 102115 1gj STATE'S SUPPLEMENTAL DISCLOSURE OF EXPERT WITNESS COMM 010416 SC! MOTION TO INTERVENE TO SEEK ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS AND COMM 010516 SCY PROCEEDINGS AND REQUEST FOR HEARING FLD COMM 010516 SCB STATE'S MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS PENDING APPEAL FLD COMM 010516 SCY DATE STAMPED & CPUERED 1/13/16, UPON CONSULATION WITH THE COMM 011416 SCY PAPTIES TO THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED CASE THROUGH COUNSEL, IT 1S COMM 011416 SCY ORDERED THAT A HEARING IS SCHEDULED FOR JANUARY 20, 2016 COMM 011416 SCY AT 2:00 P.M. WILLIAMS, J (CC: MARC ZAYON, ATTY FOR EDWARD COMM 011416 PAGE 027 NEXT PAGE P/N

ਤੇ:16:07 Monday, February 08, 201€

CACE THOUTEN AND THE PARTITIONS OF THOUSE WAS IN	
02/09/16 CRIMINAL COURT OF BALTIMORE CASE INQUIRY 09:15	,
CASE 115141033 ST A NERO, EDWARD MICHAEL OFC A32383 COD Y DCM C 090215	
EVENT DATE OPER PART TIME ROOM REAS / EVENT COMMENT	
COMM 011416 SCY NERO, JANICE BLEDSOE, DEPUTY STATE'S ATTY, OFFICE OF THE	
COMM 011415 SCY STATE'S ATTY FOR BALTO. CITY)	
COMM 011416 S8T STATE'S MOTION TO COMPEL A WITNESS TO TESTIFY PURSUANT TO	
COMM 011416 S8T SECTION 9-123 OF THE COURTS & JUDICIAL PROCEEDING ARTICLE	
COMM 011416 S8T FILED BY MARILYN MOSBY	
COMM 011516 SCY DEFT EDWARD NERO'S OPPOSITION TO THE STATE'S MOTION	
COMM 011516 SCY TO COMPEL A WITNESS TO TESTIFY PURSUANT TO SECTION 9-123	
COMM 011516 SCY OF THE COURTS AND JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS ARTICLE FLD	
COMM 011516 CPR SECURITY/MEDIA PROTOCOL ORDER	
COMM 011916 CNN DEFENDANT WILLIAM PORTER'S OPPOSITION TO THE STATE'S	
COMM (11916 CNN MOTION TO COMPEL A WITNESS TO TESTIFY PURSUANT TO SECTION	
COMM 011916 CNN 9-123 CF THE COURTS AND JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS ARTICLE	
COMM 012016 CNN STATE'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT EDWARD NERO'S OPPOSITION	
COMM (12016 CNN TO THE STATE'S MOTION TO COMPEL A WITNESS TO TESTIFY	
COMM 012016 CNN PURSUANT TO SECTION 9-123 OF THE COURTS AND JUDICIAL	
COMM 012016 CNN PROCEEDINGS ARTICLE	
HCAL 012016 1 SCB F31;0930;528 ;HEAR; ;CONT; ;WILLIAMS, BARRY;8C9	
COMM 012016 SCB CSET HEAR; P31; 01/20/16; SCB	
COMM 012016 SCB STATE'S MOTION TO COMPEL PORTER'S TESTIMONY DURING TRIAL	
NEXT PAGE P/N PAGE 028	

9:16:07 Monday, Feoruary 08, 2016

02/08/16 CRIMINA	L COURT OF BALTIMORE CASE INQUIP: 09:15
CASE 115141033 S	T A NERO, EDWARD MICHAEL OFC A32383 COD Y DCM C 090215
EVENT DATE OPER	FART TIME FOOM REAS / EVENT COMMENT
	IS HEREBY HEARD AND DENIED
COMM 012016 SCB	DEF'S MOTION FOR SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHT IS DENIED; CONTINUE ON
	ORIGINAL SCHEDULE
	DATE STAMPED 1/21/16, & ORDERED 1/20/16, THE TRIAL IN THIS
	MATTER IS SCHEDULED TO BEGIN FEBRUARY 22, 2016. THE DEFT
	AND STATE SHALL FILE ANY OUTSTANDING PRE-TRIAL MOTIONS FOR
	THIS MATTER BY JANUARY 28, 2016. RESPONSES TO THESE MOTIONS
	SHALL BE FILED BY FEBRUARY 12, 2016. A COURTESY COPY OF
	ANY MOTION AND RESPONSE SHALL BE DELIVERED TO THE CHAMBERS
	OF JUDGE BARRY G. WILLIAMS ON OR BEFORE THE FILING DATES.
	SO ORDERED. WILLIAMS, J (CC: MARC ZAYON, ATTY FOR EDWARD
	NERO, JANICE BLEDSOE, DEPUTY STATE'S ATTY, OFFICE OF
	STATE'S ATTY FOR BALTO. CITY)
	DEFENDANT'S DISCOVERY DISCLOSURES FILED
	STATE'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO PRECLUDE THE DEFENDANT FROM
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	STATE'S SUPPLEMENTAL DISCLOSURE
	MOTION IN LIMINE TO PRECLUDE REFERENCE TO OR AGUMENT ABOUT
	THE LEGALITY OF THE KNIFE RECOVERED FROM MR. GRAY IN THE
COMM 020116 SCY	COURSE OF HIS DETENTION AND ARREST FLD
NEXT PAGE	P/N PAGE 029

9:16:08 Monday, February 08, 2016

02/08/16 CRI	MINAL COURT OF BALTIMORE CASE INQUIRY 09:15
	33 ST A NERO, EDWARD MICHAEL OFC A32383 COD Y DCM C 090215
EVENT DATE	OPER PART TIME POOM REAS / EVENT COMMENT
COMM 020116	SCY MOTION IN LIMINE PRECLUDE REFERENCE TO OR ARGUMENT ABOUT
COMM 020116	SCY EXCESSIVE FORCE BEING USED ON MR. GRAY IN THE COURSE OF HIS
COMM 020116	SCY DETENTION OR ARREST FLD
CCMM 020116	SCY DEFT'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE VIDEO EVIDENCE RELATING
COMM 020116	SCY TO MR. GRAY'S ARREST OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO EXCLUDE AUDIO
COMM 02011€	SC / EVIDENCE ACCOMFANYING VIDEO EVIDENCE FLD
COMM 020116	SCY DEFT'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO CHARGE A CRIME FLD
COMM 020116	SCY MOTION IN LIMINE PRECLUDE REFERENCE TO OR ARGUMENT ABOUT MP.
COMM 020116	SCY FFEDDIE GRAY'S INITIAL DETENTION NOT BEING SUPPORTED BY
COMM 020116	SCY PEASONABLE SUSPICION, MR. GPAY'S ARPEST NOT BEING SUPPORTED
COMM 020116	SCY BY PROBABLE CAUSE, OR MR. GRAY'S SEIZURE NOT BEING OTHERWISE
COMM 020116	SCY LEGALLY JUSTIFIED FLD
COMM 020116	SCY DEFT EDWARD NEPO'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO PRECLUDE INTRODUCTION
COMM 020116	SC: OF EVIDENCE, OR ARGUMENT, OF MR. GRAY'S INJURIES FLD
COMM 020116	CKW STATE'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO ALLOW JUPORS TO VIEW AND EXAMINE
COMM 020116	CKW THE POLICE WAGON THAT TRANSPORTED THE VICTIM FLD
COMM 020116	CKW ATTEMPTING TO CALL PROSECUTORS IN THIS CASE AS TRIAL
COMM 020116	CKW WITNESSES AND FROM ATTEMPTING TO CONTROVERT CERTAIN
COMM 020116	CKW ASPECTS OF OR TO RAISE BASELESS ACCUSATIONS ABOUT THE
NEXT PAGE	P/N PAGE 030

9:16:00 Monday, February 08, 2016

02/08	/16 CRIM	1I NAL	. COURT OF BALTIMORE CASE INQUI	RY 09:15
CASE	11514103	3 ST	A BERG, EDWARD MICHAEL OFC A32383 COD Y DCM C	090215
			PART TIME ROOM REAS / EVENT COMMENT	
			STATE'S ATTORNEY'S PREINDICTMENT ACTIONS IN THIS CA	SE FLD
			STATE'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO PRECLUDE EVIDENCE OF,	
			ARGUMENT ABOUT, OR REFERENCE TO CERTAIN INFORMATION	1
			REGARDING THE VICTIM FLD	
			STATE'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO ALLOW THE STATE TO PRES	. CNT
	•			
			MEDICAL EXPERT TESTIMONY TO PROVE THAT THE DEFENDAN	
			CONDUCT CREATED A SUBSTANTIAL RISK OF DEATH OR SERI	.005
•	020116		PHYSICAL INJURY FLD	
MMCO	020116		STATE'S MOTION IN LIMINE REGARDING THE DEFT'S PROPO	DSED
COMM	020116	SCY	EXPERT TESTIMONY AND REQUEST FOR HEARING FLD	
COMM	020116	SCY	STATE'S MOTION TO SEAL THE STATE'S MOTION IN LIMINE	3
COMM	020116	SCY	REGARDING THE DEFT'S PROPOSED EXPERT TESTIMONY AND	
	020116		REQUEST FOR HEARING FLD	
-	020216		DATE STAMPED & ORDERED 2/2/16, ORDER FILED UNDER SE	EAL.
	020216	SCY	WILLIAMS, J (CC: MARC ZAYON, ATTY FOP EDWARD NERO,	JANICE
	020216	SCA	BLEDSOE, DEPUTY STATE'S ATTY, OFFICE OF THE STATE'S	S ATTY
			FOR BALTO. CITY)	
	020216			דתי
	020216	SCY	DATE STAMPED & ORDERED 2/2/16, ORDER FILED UNDER SE	TANTOR
COMM	020216	SCY	WILLIAMS, J (CC: MARC ZAYON, ATTY FOR EDWARD NERO,	DANICE
NEXT	PAGE		P/N	PAGE 031

9:16:08 Monday, February 08, 2016

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02/03/16 CRIMINAL COURT OF BALTIMORE
CASE 115141033 ST A NERG, EDWARD MICHAEL OFC
                                                           CASE INQUIR: 09:15
                                                A32383 COD Y DCM C 090215
EVENT DATE OPER PART TIME ROOM REAS / EVENT COMMENT
             SCY BLEDSOE, DEPUTY STATE'S ATTY, OFFICE OF THE STATE'S ATTY
COMM 020116
              SCY FOR BALTO. CITY)
COMM 020216
COMM 020216
              SCY DATE STAMPED & ORDERED 2/2/16, ORDER FILED UNDER SEAL.
              SCY WILLIAMS, J (CC: MARC ZAYON, ATTY FOR EDWARD NERO, JANICE
COMM 020216
              SCY BLEDSOE, DEPUTY STATE'S ATTY, OFFICE OF THE STATE'S ATTY
COMM 020216
            SCY FOR BALTO. CITY)
COMM 020216
COMM 020316
            SCI DATE STAMPED & ORDERED 2/2/16, THE STATE'S MOTION TO SEAL
            SCY THE STATE'S MOTION IN LIMINE REGARDING THE DEFT'S PROPOSED
COMM 020316
             SCY EXPERT TESTIMONY AND REQUEST FOR HEARING IS DENIED.
SCY WILLIAMS, J (CC: MARC ZAYON, ATTY FOR EDWAPD NERO, JANICE
COMM 020316
COMM 020316
             SCY PLEDSGE, DEPUTY STATE'S ATTY, OFFICE OF THE STATE'S ATTY
CCMM 020316
COMM 02031€
             SCY FOR BALTO. CITY)
            CSU STATE'S NOTICE OF APPEAL FLD. ON DENIAL OF MOTION TO
COMM 020416
            CSU COMPEL FLD. PER MICHAEL SCHATZOW, ASA CHECK #1473 IN THE
COMM 020416
             CSU AMOUNT OF $61.00. DUE TO TRANSMIT 04-04-16.
COMM 020416
             COMM 020416
COMM 020516 SCB STATE'S MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS PENDING APPEAL FLD
                             IDENT ADD/FILE STREET/CITY STATE ZIPCODE V/W
CON FULL NAME/PHONE NUMBER
                                  862038 101415 201 N CHARLES ST #1700
ADF WALKER, ROLAND
                                          101315 BALTIMORE MD 21201
   410-727-3710
                                                                     PAGE 032
NEXT PAGE
                                               P/II
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9:16:0 Monday, February 08, 2016

02/08/16 CRIMINAL COURT	OF BALTIMORE	CASE INQUIRY 09:15
CASE 115141033 ST A NERO,	EDWARD MICHAEL OFC	A32383 COD / DCM C 090215
CON FULL NAME/PHONE NUMBER	IDENT ADD/FILE	STREET/CITY STATE ZIPCODE V/W
ADF ZAYON, MARC L	917967 052915	201 N CHARLES ST #1700
410-727-3710	052715	BALTIMORE MD 21201
ASA MOSBY, MARILYN J	589290 091015	120 E BALTIMORE ST
	091015	BALTIMORE MD 21202
ASA PILLION, MATTHEW	653491 071415	120 E BALTIMORE STREET
	071315	BALTIMORE MD 21202
ASA BLEDSOE, JANICE L	68776 052215	120 E BALTIMORE ST 10TH FL
443-984-2966	072415	BALTIMORE MD 21202
ASA SCHATZOW, MICHAEL	717876 061815	120 E BALTIMORE ST 10TH FL
	061715	BALTIMORE MD 21202
PO TALLOR, DAWNYELL S	G932 052215	DET DIV HOMICIDE SECTION

NEXT PAGE P/tl PAGE 033

9:16:09 Monday, February 08, 2016

02/08/16 CRIMINAL COURT OF BALTIMORE CASE INQUIRY 09:1
CASE 115141033 ST A NERO, EDWARD MICHAEL OFC A32383 COD Y DCM C 090215
UPDATED ON 05/22/15 BY CKW 0 CASE INQUIRY 09:15 AMOUNT 25000 TOTAL 0 PROPERTY VAL 0 MORTGAGE
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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY, MARYLAND

STATE OF MARYLAND

vs.

Case Number: 115141037

WILLIAM PORTER,

DEFENDANT.

REPORTER'S OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS (Excerpt - Testimony of William Porter)

Baltimore, Maryland

Wednesday, December 9, 2015

BEFORE:

HONORABLE BARRY G. WILLIAM, Associate Judge (and a jury)

APPEARANCES:

For the State:

JANICE L. BLEDSOE, ESQUIRE
MICHAEL SCHATZOW, ESQUIRE
MATTHEW PILLION, ESQUIRE

JOHN BUTLER, ESQUIRE

For the Defendant:

JOSEPH MURTHA, ESQUIRE

GARY E. PROCTOR, ESQUIRE

* Proceedings Digitally Recorded *

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

VOIR
STATE'S WITNESSES:
DIRECT CROSS REDIRECT RECROSS DIRE
William Porter
4 91 154 175 --

<u>DEFENDANT'S EXHIBITS</u> :	<u>IDENTIFICATION</u>	EVIDENCE
9 (Photograph of Bruce and Presbury Street)		23
10 (CCT Image of Mount Street)	37	38
11 (Photograph of Western Distric	ct) 77	77

STATE'S EXHIBITS:	<u>IDENTIFICATION</u>	EVIDENCE
34-A (Transcript of William Porter's Police Interview on April 17 th , 2015)	104	
77 (Disc of CCTV footage from North and Pennsylvania)	144	144

1	<u>PROCEEDING</u> S
2	(Excerpt - Testimony of Officer William Porter
3	began at 10:48 a.m.)
4	MR. PROCTOR: At this time, the Defense will
5	call Officer Porter.
6	THE COURT: All right. Very well.
7	MR. MURTHA: Your Honor, just is there any
8	way that get turned off?
9	(Brief pause.)
10	MR. MURTHA: Thank you.
11	THE COURT: Swear the witness in.
12	THE CLERK: Sir, raise your right hand, sir.
13	Whereupon,
14	WILLIAM PORTER,
15	the Defendant, having first been duly sworn, was examined
16	and testified on his own behalf as follows:
17	THE CLERK: Thank you, sir.
18	Have a seat, and state your name.
19	THE WITNESS: William Porter.
20	THE COURT: You may proceed.
21	Ladies and gentlemen, you'll note in a few
22	seconds that Mr. Proctor seems to have a cold that has
23	been going around this courthouse for the last couple of
24	months, just bear that in mind.
25	MR. PROCTOR: Thank you, sir.
	3

If anyone can't hear, put a hand up. 1 2 DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. PROCTOR: 3 Officer Porter, did you know Freddie Gray? Q. 4 Yes, I did know Freddie Gray. I saw Freddie Gray on a daily routine. Every 6 7 day, I saw Freddie Gray out. I worked foot -- on our 8 foot patrol in the Gilmor Homes up at North and Carey and Pennsy and North. He was a regular fixture up there. 9 And if he wasn't dirty, he'd come over and talk 10 11 to me. 12 What do you mean? Ο. Dirty means, you know, that you have drugs, you 13 Α. 14 have, like, a pack of drugs on you. 15 If he wasn't, he'd come over and talk to me. And I'd talk with Brandon Ross and to Davonte Roary. I 16 17 talked to all the guys up there. Did you have a problem with him? 18 Ο. Not at all, no. 19 Α. 20 Ο. So then when he said he needed a medic, why didn't you call for one? 21 Well, I didn't call for a medic because after 22 23 talking to Freddie Gray, Mr. Gray, he was unable to give me any reason for -- for any kind of medical emergency. 24 Just talking with him, I didn't see anything externally, 25

any cuts or wounds or anything.

And the medic usually takes a while to come -come to a scene. Where we were Mr. -- the transport
would have transported Mr. Gray to the hospital in 10
minutes. It usually takes a little bit longer for them
to get to us, and for them to assess the scene, and take
him to a hospital.

- Q. And why didn't you seatbelt him at Druid Hill and Dolphin?
- A. Just prior training and experience, as everyone has said, that wagon back there is pretty tight. You know, it becomes a -- when I'm walking in, my gun side -- I'm right handed, so my gun side is on the right. So going into the wagon, my gun is always presented to the prisoners who are sitting along the wall. So it always presents a problem getting into the wagon.

It's just -- throughout all of my training,

I've seatbelted people inside my vehicle, but I -- my

personal cruiser, but never the wagon.

- Q. At Druid Hill and Dolphin, did Mr. Gray tell you he couldn't breathe?
 - A. Absolutely not.
- Q. So why does Detective Teel's report say differently?
- A. Detective Teel's report. She called me on my

way down to Virginia. I was on my way -- I answered the phone just because I knew it was a Baltimore City number. She asked me, you know, could I explain to her what happened.

And assuming that she had known -- that she had investigated the case, that she had known that I had been all of the stops from one to -- well, with the exception of one, but one to six I had been at all the stops from the beginning. So I started from the beginning, which was Presbury and Mount, in which Mr. Gray had been hurt, saying he couldn't breathe, and that he needed an asthma inhaler.

- Q. Okay. Now let's start at the beginning.
 Where did you grow up, sir?
- A. I grew up in Baltimore City, West Baltimore more specifically. Within the -- in the Western

 District, various areas. Carey and Edmondson Avenue is where I lived. I lived on Braddish, 1800 block of Braddish. The 1700 block of Ashburton. I lived on -- then on Riggs. So a lot of areas in the Western.
- Q. And other than being a police officer, have you had any other jobs?
 - A. Yes, I have.
 - O. And what are those?
 - A. Other than being a police officer, I worked at

Towson Commons Movie Theater when it was still there. 1 2 also worked at a computer company with one of my mentors. What high school did you graduate from? 0. 3 I graduated from National Academy Foundation. Α. 4 5 Ο. And what did you do after that? After that I -- I went to Villa Julie 6 7 University -- started Villa Julie College, which is now 8 known as Stevenson University. I attended there for two to three years. 9 10 Ο. And when did you start coming into regular contact with police officers? 11 Very young. Being young, my mom didn't have a 12 -- or my family didn't have much money. So she couldn't 13 14 pay for summer camp; she needed to work during the day. 15 So I joined the Police Athletic League. At the Police Athletic League, I came into regular contact with --16 17 contacts -- I'm sorry -- with officers every day. Okay. And how would you describe that contact? 18 Ο. It was always positive. You know, it was like 19 20 a camp setting, so I -- you know, we came in. They gave us a little breakfast. We'd do activities throughout the 21 22 day. They'd give us lunch. 23 If you had gone to the PAL Center during school time, they'd -- they'd help you with school -- I mean 24

with your homework.

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Every Friday, they would take us out to various places in Baltimore City, like the Baltimore Aquarium, the zoo, things like that. Did you ever think about joining the military? 0. I did think about joining the military, specifically the Air Force. My dad and my grandfather were both in the Air Force. Unfortunately, I'm color blind, so I was unable to do the Air Force. What does your mom do for a living? Ο. Α. My mom is a nurse. So when did you decide to join the police Ο. force? I decided to join the police force just from the experiences I had with the Police Athletic League. And about 2010 is when I decided. And even then, we were -- the society was having a negative image of police. There were certain police cases that were coming up, and people were having just a negative interpretation of police. And so I decided that I would become a police officer, and give someone -- give -- give the people a different view to police. And what kind of a cop would you describe Ο. vourself as? I was always fair. I -- I had little things

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that would annoy me, such as, like, littering. Littering would annoy me because you should be proud of where you come from, so you shouldn't litter.

I mean, like, Gilmor Homes in the Western

District is filthy. It's filled with, like, trash all

over the place. There's some people that walk out just,

you know, whatever they eat and whatever they're

drinking, they'll just drop on the ground. So, you know,

I would get on them, and say, you know, you should be

proud of where you come from.

I always tell the guys up at Pennsy and North that -- you know, Pennsy and North was like a pivotal place where black people, in like the 1950s, Cab Calloway would go there, and Lena Horn would go there. And -- and it's become the heroin capital of the East Coast up at Pennsy and North.

- O. Did you write tickets for minor infractions?
- A. I wrote tickets for, like I said, littering.

And sometimes I would have write tickets for loitering. It's just a problem, loitering. A lot of -- you know, we have 300 plus murders here in the City. A lot of those guys are just sitting outside loitering, whether it be a corner store or a liquor store.

Q. So what do you remember about your training at the academy, sir?

Okay. So did you receive a copy of the General

25

Q.

A. I wasn't -- I have never ever had a physical copy of the entire General Order. I know that I signed for a piece of paper. But coming from the civilian side, when -- when someone says we're going to hand you something called the General Orders, I had no idea what that was. So, yes, I did sign for it.

But during the academy, I was given a flash drive, and I was -- I'm sorry -- the General Orders were put on that flash drive.

- Q. After the police academy, what's the next thing that happens?
- A. After the police academy, you do field training. It's supposed to be 10 weeks. Unfortunately, our class had done six weeks of field training. You just go under a field training officer, who's trained to train officers.
- Q. And during your field training, was anyone arrested?
 - A. Yes. Yes. Lots of arrests.
- Q. And with your -- what do you call the person responsible for supervising you?
 - A. He's called an FTO or Field Training Officer.
- Q. Okay. So people were arrested during your six weeks of field training; is that correct?

1 Α. Yes, sir. 2 Were they put in a wagon? Q. They were put in a wagon, yes. 3 Α. 4 Q. Were they seat belted? 5 Α. They were not seat belted. 6 Q. How many arrests have you been present at? 7 Α. I have an approximate number, probably 110 8 arrests for two years, but I've probably been a part of 200 arrests. 9 And of those 200 arrests, how many left in a 10 Q. 11 wagon? Probably around 150. 12 Α. And of those 150, how many were seat belted? 13 Q. 14 Α. None. 15 What is your understanding of, when a detainee Q. 16 gets in the wagon, whose responsibility are they? 17 I think any officer would tell you it's the responsibility of the -- the wagon driver to get the 18 19 prisoner from Point A to Point B, whatever that Point B 20 may be. 21 So you've heard testimony about a PocketCop. Q. What is a Pocketcop? 22 23 A PocketCop is actually an application that, you know, the police department and various police 24 25 departments have. It's placed on the departmental phone

so that civilians can't access that PocketCop app, and 1 2 it's distributed throughout the police department. Did you have one? 3 Q. 4 I did not have PocketCop 5 So if you wanted to check your email, how would Q. 6 you do it, sir? 7 Α. I would need to go in early or stay late, and 8 get on one of those antiquated computers that we talked about earlier. 9 Your shifts, how many hours are they? 10 Q. 11 Α. Well, it just recently turned into -- well, when I was there, it had recently turned into 10-hour 12 shifts. 13 And of those 10 hours, what are you expected to 14 Ο. 15 be doing? I need to be patrolling, actively engaging the 16 Α. 17 public. So of your 10 hours, how much time did you 18 Q. 19 physically spend at the District? Just roll call, which I think it's 27 minutes 20 or something like that. And then we would go on the 21 street. We're expected not to come into District unless 22 23 you need to come into the District. And you're out to stay our and patrol. 24 25 The Western District is a pretty -- pretty

violent place. You know, I had plenty to do.

- Q. So tell me what the average day in the life of a Western District patrol officer, like yourself.
- A. I can tell you about my first day of field training. First day of field training, we get a call to Club International. At Club International, we were just doing some crowd control. I'm with my field training officer, the crowd was moving. And I hear about seven gun shots rang out.

I then pull my service weapon, and I go into the direction of the gun -- the gun fire. There, I meet up with my field training officer. We located a number one -- I'm sorry, a black male who had been shot. I'm not -- an unknown amount of times.

I could actually see the -- a suspect running down the street. And my field training officer advised me not to run after him, but to give his -- his -- what he looked like, his appearance, and call it out on the radio.

Then we called for an ambulance to -- the gentleman on the ground. He was taken away. And we then did the area canvass. From there, we cleared out from the scene, you know, did regular patrol.

But at the end of that night, about six o'clock in the morning, I received a call of alarm of fire. From

there, I witnessed a fire at a church that had been started by -- it was an electrical fire. But, you know, that's a pretty exciting first day at work.

Q. And what's a typical day look like?

A. A typical day looks like that. It depends on what shift you're on. Baker -- I'm sorry, baker shift, which is their earliest shift, tends to be a little bit slower.

But Charlie shift is you're going from beginning. You can go to domestic calls, to a missing person's report, to shoplifting, you know.

- Q. Okay. Now, talk a little bit about a PocketCop. If you wanted to check your email, sir, how would you do that?
- A. Like I said before, I'd -- I'd either go in early or stay late and get on one of the antiquated computers. And there were only two available. So there would be other people on the computers, and I'd just have to wait and check those emails.
- Q. And if, for your shift, something was important, how would you learn about it?
- A. It's typically read out at roll call. There would be -- during roll call, they tell us about the areas that we need more police presence in. They tell us about BOLOs, be on the look out for persons and wanted

1 And it's typically read out during roll call. persons. 2 And whenever they have policy changes, they're read out during roll call. 3 4 Q. Did you ever receive anything critically 5 important by email? 6 Α. We did, yes. 7 Q. What kind of things? 8 Α. Like I said, the wanted persons, the BOLOs. They sent out emails every day for -- for anything. I 9 mean, but your email could also contain something about, 10 11 you know, a retirement dinner from someone at the Southern District. 12 So in the month of April, do you know how many 13 emails you received? 14 15 Α. It's approximately 1300 emails, over 1300. 16 And did you ever send emails from Baltimore Q. 17 City Police Department? I didn't really send emails, no. 18 Α. 19 So -- and April 9th. April 9th, the day that Q. Lieutenant Quick sent out that email; are you familiar 20 with that? 21 I am familiar with that, yes. 22 Α. 23 How many emails did you get that day? Ο. 44 emails that day. 24 Α. 25 If you were present at an arrest, and drugs Q.

were recovered, what would you do with them? 1 2 If I were the arresting officer, I would have to, you know, place them in my pocket until I get to the 3 4 District where I could package them. 5 Q. You were provided with evidence bags? 6 Α. They're located at the District. But, no, on 7 the street, I'm not provided with evidence bags, no. 8 Ο. So in your day-to-day responsibilities, right, 9 how much of that, what you do every day, did you learn at the academy? 10 11 Α. Probably about 20 percent. So where did the other 80 percent come from? 12 Q. On the street training and experiences. 13 Α. 14 Q. By whom? 15 Senior officers and field training officers. Α. Now, what's use of force? 16 Q. Use of force is -- is -- you know, if I were to 17 use my baton to hit -- strike someone, that's a use of 18 19 If I were to use a taser, that's a use of force. If I were to deploy mace, that's a use of force. 20 Did you ever have any findings that you used 21 Q. force? 22 No. No findings that I used force. 23 So --24 Q. 25 I was -- I was always able to --Α.

1	THE COURT: You need a question.
2	THE WITNESS: I'm sorry.
3	BY MR. PROCTOR:
4	Q. So how could you de-escalate the situation
5	without using force?
6	A. I was always able to use my rapport to kind of
7	talk the guy into cuffs, and not have to strike him or
8	anything.
9	Q. Other than at the range, did you ever fire your
10	gun?
11	A. No, sir.
12	Q. What's officer safety?
13	A. Officer safety is just, you know, as I said,
14	officer safety, you you want to make sure your
15	officers are safety and yourself is safety I mean,
16	your safety. That's basically it.
17	Q. And how important was that to you as a police
18	officer?
19	A. It was paramount. You know, as a police
20	officer I became a police officer to protect life and
21	property. And before property, comes life. So it was
22	pivotal. It was paramount.
23	Q. You weren't trained on officer safety at the
24	academy?
25	A. I can't say that there's specific training, but

1 it's just ingrained to protect life. Your life, the public's life, and also your fellow officer's life. 2 3 How did every roll call end? Q. 4 Α. They would typically say make sure you, you 5 know, back each other up. Okay. Now, let's talk about April 12th. April 6 Q. 12th's a Sunday; right? 7 8 Α. It is, yes. 9 So what's the first thing you do every Sunday Q. morning? 10 11 Α. On Sunday, we have inspections. So that's a gun inspections. You get inspected as far as your 12 uniform and your appearance. You also have vehicle 13 inspections every Sunday. 14 15 Q. Okay. So did you do a vehicle inspection that 16 morning? 17 I did do a vehicle inspection that morning. What, if anything, significant happened during 18 Q. 19 your vehicle inspection? 20 While -- while waiting to wash my car, Lieutenant Rice comes over the air and says that he's in 21 a foot pursuit. 22 23 Okay. Now, let's step back a little. You're Ο. title as a police officer is what? 24 25 Α. Police officer.

1 Q. Who's your direct supervisor? 2 My direct supervisor would be a sergeant. Α. 3 And on that morning who's the sergeant? Q. 4 Α. Sergeant Alicia White. 5 Q. And who's her supervisor? Her supervisor is Lieutenant Rice. 6 Α. 7 Q. And so when you say Lieutenant Rice called a foot pursuit, that's your boss' boss? 8 9 Α. In a way, yes. And the -- explain, in case it's not clear, is 10 Q. 11 Baltimore broken into separate divisions? Yes. We have nine different districts. 12 Α. 13 Southeast, Northwest, that sort of thing? Q. 14 Yes, sir. Α. 15 Q. And you're in the Western; right? I'm in the Western. 16 Α. 17 On that Sunday morning who's in charge of Ο. Western District? 18 Lieutenant Rice is the shift leader. He's the 19 shift commander. He's the commander for the District 20 that morning. 21 22 Okay. So Lieutenant Rice calls out a foot Q. 23 pursuit; right? 24 Α. Yes, sir. 25 Does he use any codes? Q.

I can't say for certain. But, you know, the 1 Α. 2 typical code would be, you know, 10-16. 3 Let's talk about that a little, sir. Q. 4 Q. What's a 10-16? 5 Α. A 10-16 is urgent backup. 6 Q. Are you free to disregard that? 7 Α. There are very rare occasions. You know, if I'm protecting life, then yes, I'm free to. But if I'm 8 9 just washing my car, then no I'm not free to disobey a 10-16. 10 11 Ο. So he says 10-16, what do you do? I immediately run out to my vehicle and respond 12 Α. to the areas in which he called out. 13 And where is that area? 14 Ο. 15 He may have said Gilmor Homes or -- or, you know, Mount Street and Westwood because I responded over 16 17 to Westwood and Bruce Street. Okay. And when you get there, what do you do? 18 Q. 19 When I get there, I exit my vehicle. I walk Α. 20 southbound on Bruce Street where I can -- where I locate Lieutenant Rice. 21 MR. PROCTOR: May I just retrieve one of these? 22 23 Thank you. Judge, I'm not sure if the jury can see. Could 24 25 Officer Porter get off the stand, and just have him point

1	to the map?
2	BY MR. PROCTOR:
3	Q. Officer Porter.
4	Now, I'm the wrong person to be saying this
5	sir, but you have to keep your voice up.
6	Okay. Can you see on this map where you parked
7	your vehicle?
8	A. My vehicle was in Bruce and
9	THE COURT: The witness needs to move to the
10	right of it so all the jurors can see.
11	THE WITNESS: I'm sorry.
12	My vehicle
13	THE COURT: No, no. Let
14	MR. PROCTOR: How's that?
15	THE WITNESS: My vehicle would have been here.
16	BY MR. PROCTOR:
17	Q. Okay. And what direction did you walk in?
18	A. Southbound. In this direction, down.
19	Q. And who did you see as you walked that way?
20	A. Lieutenant Rice was (indiscernible at
21	11:11:30 a.m.)
22	Q. And as best as you can point out on Defendant's
23	Exhibit 1, where was Lieutenant Rice?
24	A. Let's see.
25	THE COURT: You need to move out the way of the
	22

1		
2		THE WITNESS: I'm sorry.
3		It may be covered up. Somewhere in here.
4		BY MR. PROCTOR:
5	Q.	Okay. You can take the witness stand again.
6		So when you see Lieutenant Rice, do you have a
7	discussion	n with him?
8	Α.	Yes.
9	Q.	And based on that, what do you do?
10	Α.	From there, I began searching for a second
11	suspect t	hat he said was in this area, general area.
12	Q.	Okay. I'm showing you what's about to be
13	marked	
14		MR. MURTHA: 9. 9; is that correct?
15		MR. PROCTOR: As a defendant's exhibit.
16		THE CLERK: Number 9.
17		MR. PROCTOR: 9.
18		(Defendant's Exhibit Number 9
19		was received in evidence.)
20		THE COURT: Is it for ID or for entry?
21		MR. PROCTOR: It's for entry.
22		THE COURT: Any objection?
23		MR. SCHATZOW: No objection.
24		BY MR. PROCTOR:
25	Q.	I'm showing you what's been marked as
		23

1	Defendant's Exhibit 9, and ask you if you recognize that?
2	A. Yes. That looks familiar.
3	Q. What is it?
4	A. That's going to be Bruce Street, and that is
5	Presbury.
6	Q. Okay. And does that fairly and accurately
7	depict the area where you were looking for the second
8	suspect, part of it?
9	A. I yes. I would have been behind these
10	houses here.
11	Q. Okay. And you're pointing to the top right
12	corner of the screen, to the right of where the person on
13	the bicycle is?
14	A. Yes.
15	MR. PROCTOR: I'd ask that be published to the
16	jury.
17	THE COURT: Very well. It's entered and
18	published.
19	(Brief pause.)
20	THE COURT: Excuse me one moment.
21	(Brief pause.)
22	THE COURT: You can retrieve it.
23	MR. PROCTOR: Thank you, sir.
24	BY MR. PROCTOR:
25	Q. So, Officer Porter, as you're searching for the
	24

1	second suspect, do you hear anything?
2	A. Yes, sir. While searching for the second
3	suspect, I can hear a gentleman, I didn't know at the
4	time, but I know now, to be Mr. Gray. He was just
5	yelling inaudible stuff. At some point in time, he said
6	I can't breathe, I need an asthma inhaler. He also said
7	something about his legs. I could hear I was just a
8	block over, and I could hear what he was yelling.
9	Q. So you can hear it, but can you see it?
10	A. I cannot see it, no. I'm behind houses.
11	Q. So approximately how long do you spend
12	searching for a second suspect?
13	A. I don't have a good it was it wasn't
14	it was a short time. It wasn't very long.
15	Lieutenant Rice walks back over walks back
16	to me and, you know, tells me to 10-6, don't continue
17	that search any longer.
18	Q. Okay. So again
19	THE COURT: Excuse me one second. I need
20	Defense 9. I need it over here with the exhibits
21	until
22	MR. PROCTOR: Absolutely, sir.
23	THE CLERK: Thank you.
24	THE COURT: Thank you.
25	BY MR. PROCTOR:

Q. 1 What's a 10-6, sir? 2 A 10-6 just means to stand by. Α. 3 It means -- okay. Q. 4 So after Lieutenant Rice says 10-6, where do 5 you go? 6 Α. From there I just do some -- some crowd control 7 over -- I'm on Mount Street and Presbury. Just standing at that corner, there was some -- some citizens there 8 9 just expressing that they didn't like the way Mr. Gray was arrested. 10 11 Ο. At stop one, the -- with all -- you've been present for testimony; right? 12 13 Α. Yes. And you've heard people describe the six stops; 14 Ο. 15 right? 16 Α. Yes. 17 And what we're talking about at the moment is Ο. Stop 1; is that true? 18 19 Α. Yes. That is the moment -- that's what we're 20 talking about at the moment, yes. 21 Do you ever see the wagon at Stop 1? Q. The wagon just may be pulling away, but no I 22 Α. 23 don't see the wagon. Do you ever see it with the doors open? 24 Q. 25 Α. No. No.

1 Q. Did you ever see anyone inside it? 2 I never saw anyone get inside it. Α. Did you ever see anyone getting lifted up into 3 Q. 4 it? 5 Α. No. So you're talking about crowd control in Gilmor 6 Q. 7 Homes? 8 Α. Yes. 9 In your experience, how many of the arrests Q. you've been present at happened at Gilmor Homes? 10 11 Α. A large number happened in Gilmor Homes. Gilmor Homes -- yes, a lot. 12 So in your experience, when someone gets 13 arrested at Gilmor Homes, what happens? 14 15 Α. When someone gets arrested in Gilmor Homes -it's a housing project. Typically, people tend to come 16 out and start -- a crowd starts to gather, and they --17 they just start to yell things at us. 18 19 So why did you feel it necessary to do crowd Q. 20 control? Just because I -- I -- during my shifts, I 21 Α. frequently walk foot in Gilmor Homes, and I'm a familiar 22 23 face, and I know people by first names, and I talk to them a lot. So, you know, I can typically get people to 24 25 calm down in -- in the Gilmor Homes.

Did you see the -- the video that was shown, I 1 Q. 2 think it was Mr. Moore recorded. Did you see that video? I saw that video in court, yes. 3 Α. 4 Q. And there were people screaming and hollering? 5 Α. There are, yes. Is that a frequent occurrence? 6 Q. 7 Α. Absolutely, in Gilmor Homes, yes. So after the -- how long do you spend, roughly, 8 Ο. doing crowd control? 9 Not long at all. Lieutenant Rice instructed 10 11 everybody to clear out and get out of Gilmor Homes pretty -- pretty quickly. 12 13 So what did you do? Ο. I then walked back to my vehicle and controlled 14 15 -- I mean, continued my regular patrol duties. Okay. Roughly, do you recall what direction 16 Q. 17 you drove in? From Westwood, I probably went northbound on 18 Α. 19 Fulton and then went eastbound on North Avenue. 20 And what's the next thing of any significance that happens? 21 I -- I hear someone call for the wagon to go to 22 23 Mount and Baker so that it could place shackles on, I know now to be Mr. Gray, and fill out the Central Booking 24

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Bin Number thing.

1 Q. Is that commonly called the toe tag? 2 It is commonly called the toe tag, yes. Α. Tell the jury what a toe tag is. 3 Q. 4 A toe tag is just, you know, we place --Α. 5 there's identification numbers when you take people into 6 Central Booking. We call it the Bin Number. You just 7 write down the Bin Number from the bracelet that we place on the prisoner. 8 9 And you just write on a piece of paper and the wagon driver or the transport driver hands it over to the 10 11 people over at Central Booking. And that's how you -that's the receipt for the prisoner. 12 13 Okay. So you hear someone say they're going to 14 toe tag him. 15 Α. Yes. 16 Does anyone request for assistance? Q. 17 After -- after they -- after the wagon -- I guess after the wagon heads back there, there's another 18 19 call on the radio, just for one more unit I think they 20 said, and I respond. I had just been up the street. I was going to Mount and Baker. 21 Was there a code given? 22 Q. 23 I'm -- I'm not certain. I don't recall. 24 Q. So why'd you go? 25 Just that's what I do. That's my sector. I Α.

1 work in Sector 4. And that's my responsibility. And, by the way, we talked about the hierarchy, 2 Ο. 3 okay. And your shift is Baker shift? 4 Α. At that time it would have been Baker shift, 5 yes. 6 Q. How many people are supposed to be working on a Baker shift? 7 17 officers. 8 Α. 9 How many were there that day? Q. It may have been 10 to 11 officers there. 10 Α. 11 Ο. How many sergeants are you supposed to have in a shift? 12 Three sergeants, or it should be four sergeants 13 Α. for every sector, but three to four sergeants. 14 15 Q. How many on a shift? On a shift? Like I said, three to four 16 17 sergeants, depending on how many sectors there are in the District. 18 19 Q. How many were there that day? 20 Just one. Α. 21 Q. How many wagons are you supposed to have on a shift? 22 23 There's supposed to be two wagons for my District. 24 25 And how many were working that day? Q.

Okay. And did you see Mr. Gray get lifted up

24

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Q.

I think he began to go before I turned around. 1 Α. 2 I'm sorry. Can you repeat that? Q. 3 I'm not certain. He may have been -- well, he 4 may have been just getting into the wagon. I think I 5 said something about his feet were kicking, and the other 6 two officers grabbed his feet, and placed him in the 7 wagon. So then within a few seconds, I think I heard 8 Ο. 9 you say that you turned away from the wagon; right? Yes. I turned around to the wagon to -- just 10 11 to do more crowd control. We want to make sure someone 12 doesn't come up to the back of the wagon and, you know, do something, honestly. 13 Why didn't you assist them in lifting Mr. Gray 14 Ο. 15 into the wagon? Why did I or why didn't I? 16 Α. 17 Why did you not? Ο. I did not because there were enough officers 18 Α. There was three officers and one detainee. 19 there. There's only --20 Who was handcuffed? 21 Q. Who was handcuffed. There was no need for me 22 Α. to go over there. 23 Okay. So I think I heard you say you did crowd 24 Q. 25 control?

1 Α. Yeah. I began walking over to the crowd. 2 What does that entail? Q. Just trying to get them to calm down. And --3 4 and if I can, get them to leave the scene. Just --5 And is that the conversation you had with Ο. 6 Brandon Ross (phonetic)? 7 Α. That's -- that's when Brandon Ross asked me to 8 come over to him. 9 Now, Brandon Ross has testified; right? Q. 10 Α. Yes. 11 Tell the jury what you know about Brandon Ross. Ο. I've -- I've -- Brandon Ross and Freddie Gray 12 Α. hung out a lot. I've seen -- like I said, Sector 4, 13 14 which is the area we're talking about generally, is the 15 sector I'm in. And I'm usually walking foot there. I'm usually talking with Brandon Ross or Freddie Gray or 16 various people in Gilmor Homes. 17 So I've seen him a bunch. I've never actually 18 19 arrested him, but I've been there while he's been arrested also. 20 21 Q. Okay. Have you ever arrested Freddie Gray? 22 Α. I never arrested Freddie Gray, no. So you have this -- tell the jury about your 23 Q. conversation, as you recall it, with Brandon Ross. 24 25 Well, being the type -- being the officer that Q.

1 I am, I built a rapport with Brandon Ross and the other 2 guys in the neighborhood. So Brandon asked me to come over. And he was just explaining to me that he -- he's 3 4 upset with the officers tasing Mr. Gray and beating Mr. 5 Gray. And I'm just explaining to him I had never -- I 6 didn't see anybody tase him or beat him or anything. 7 And he asked for a supervisor. I -- I point 8 out my supervisor on the scene, and let him know that Lieutenant Rice is the highest guy in the District, and 9 he would need to talk to Lieutenant Rice. He said that 10 11 wasn't good enough. I then instructed him to call 911. He didn't 12 think that was a good enough fix. So he said, you know, 13 we got it on video. And I told him, you know, if you've 14 15 got it all on video then, you know, go to the media with it and get it broadcasted. 16

- Q. And he did; right?
- A. I guess so.
- Q. You mentioned the taser.
- A. Yes.

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- Q. Did you have one?
- A. I was not issued a taser. No, I didn't have a taser.
 - Q. Did you see the wagon doors close?
- A. No. I didn't see the wagon doors close. I was

1 talking to Brandon Ross. 2 Do you know what position Mr. Gray was put in inside the wagon? 3 4 Α. I saw him being pushed -- put into the wagon. 5 But no, I didn't -- I don't know what position he ended up in. 6 And do you know if he was seat belted when he 7 Q. 8 put in the wagon? 9 I -- no. I'd be making assumptions about it if 10 I were to say that. 11 Ο. And by the way, you've both put people in a 12 wagon yourself, and assisted other officers doing it; right? 13 Typically, when you arrest people, they 14 15 don't -- they don't want to be arrested. And they tend to fight back sometimes -- or just sort of actively 16 17 resist. Not fighting, not throwing strikes at the officers, but actively resisting and refusing to get into 18 19 the wagon. 20 So yes, I've had instances where I've -- you know, I was hit with a wagon door. Or they kick the 21 door, and the door hit me. 22 23 So --Ο. And I've seen that happen to officers, too. 24 Α. 25 Have you seen other officers get injured Q.

1	Q. And can is there any loud voices happening?
2	A. There's yelling. It's inaudible. He's not
3	saying any specific or distinct.
4	Q. Now, let me show you what's been marked
5	MR. PROCTOR: Let me show Mr. Schatzow first.
6	(Brief pause.)
7	BY MR. PROCTOR:
8	Q. What's been marked as Defendant's Exhibit 10
9	and ask if you recognize that?
10	(Defendant's Exhibit Number 10
11	was marked for identification.)
12	THE WITNESS: Yes. It's CCT footage from
13	that appears to be Mount Street.
14	Q. And what does it depict?
15	A. In the in the picture, I can see Brandon
16	Ross. I also see myself. And there's another officer
17	there. And it looks like there's somebody behind us.
18	MR. PROCTOR: Judge, I'd move Defendant's
19	Exhibit 10 into evidence.
20	MR. SCHATZOW: No objection, Your Honor.
21	THE COURT: So entered.
22	(Defendant's Exhibit Number 10
23	was received in evidence.)
24	MR. PROCTOR: May I just publish it again?
25	THE COURT: You may.
	37

1	MR. PROCTOR: While the jury is looking at
2	that, if I can just reload?
3	THE COURT: Absolutely.
4	(Brief pause.)
5	THE COURT: Actually, Counsel, approach while
6	they're looking at that.
7	MR. PROCTOR: Yes, sir.
8	(Counsel approached the bench, and the
9	following ensued:)
10	THE COURT: (Inaudible at 11:30:00 a.m.)
11	MR. PROCTOR: I'm doing all right. I'd rather
12	keep going, but it's up to you. If you want to take a
13	break, I'll take one.
14	THE COURT: (Inaudible at 11:30:06 a.m.)
15	MS. BLEDSOE: A break?
16	MR. PROCTOR: Well, if it will make your life
17	easier, I won't stand in the way of that.
18	THE COURT: Literally, five minutes. As soon
19	as they finish, we'll break.
20	(Counsel returned to the trial table, and the
21	following ensued:)
22	(Brief pause.)
23	THE COURT: All right. Ladies and gentlemen,
24	we're going to take about not about, we're going to
25	take a five-minute break.

1	Please do not discuss this testimony, even
2	among yourselves.
3	Leave your notepads on the chair.
4	All rise for the jury.
5	(Brief pause.)
6	(Whereupon, the jury was excused from the
7	courtroom at 11:31 a.m.)
8	THE COURT: Thank you. Everyone may be seated.
9	Counsel, approach.
10	(Counsel approached the bench, and the
11	following ensued:)
12	THE COURT: I only need one. I don't need
13	both. I just need one. That's all I need.
14	It's usually a five-minute break (inaudible at
15	11:32:04 a.m.) And then we'll just go until lunch. And
16	lunch (Inaudible at 11:32:08 a.m.) break then.
17	I assume you have a bit more of the officer?
18	MR. PROCTOR: 25-30 minutes probably.
19	THE COURT: So we may be able to begin with
20	cross, but maybe not. We'll see.
21	(Counsel returned to the trial table, and the
22	following ensued:)
23	THE CLERK: All rise.
24	(Whereupon, a recess was taken at 11:32 a.m.,
25	and the matter resumed at 11:42 a.m.)

1	THE COURT: Thank you. Everyone may be seated.
2	You may remind the witness.
3	THE CLERK: You may be seated. Just reminding
4	you you're still under oath. State your name for the
5	record.
6	THE WITNESS: William Porter.
7	THE COURT: You may proceed.
8	MR. PROCTOR: Thank you.
9	BY MR. PROCTOR:
10	Q. Officer Porter, when we left off, we just
11	admitted Defendant's Exhibit 10 into evidence.
12	Is that a captured image of the discussion with
13	Brandon Ross that you've already testified about?
14	A. Yes, sir. It is.
15	Q. And what's Brandon Ross doing? Do you remember
16	that moment in time?
17	A. Vaguely.
18	Q. What's Brandon Ross doing?
19	A. He he was he was very upset. He was
20	yelling. He was very emotional.
21	Q. And where are your hands, sir?
22	A. Just down by my side, and in in we call
23	it the interview stance, just down by your side.
24	Q. Now, what dose the interview stance what
25	does that mean?

You know, just when you're -- I'm trying to 1 Α. 2 show Brandon Ross that I'm not being aggressive with him. 3 I'm just keeping my hands by my side, and just having a 4 conversation with him with hopes that he'll then calm 5 down and have a conversation with me. 6 Q. And he did; right? 7 Α. Well, not really. He kind of just walked away. Okay. So you testified right before the break 8 Ο. 9 about the wagon shaking; is that correct? Α. Yes. Yes. 10 While the wagon was shaking, what were you 11 Ο. 12 doing? I was then talking to Officer Miller. Officer 13 Miller was filling out the toe tag. But he was having 14 15 difficulty because the wagon -- he was filling it out on the side of the wagon. He was having difficulty because 16 17 the wagon was shaking back -- side to side. So I understand and the jury understands, 18 Q. 19 you're saying he was writing on the side of the wagon 20 like this? That's correct. 21 Α. 22 Q. But because the wagon was shaking, his hand wasn't steady? 23 That is correct. 24 Α. 25 And during that conversation -- who is Officer Q.

1	Miller?
2	A. Officer Miller is just a guy that I work with.
3	We were in the academy together. And, unfortunately,
4	he's also a part of the Freddie Gray case.
5	Q. Okay. So at that point, did you learn
6	anything?
7	A. At that point in time, I asked who who this
8	prisoner was because it was causing such a you know, a
9	ruckus in the Gilmor Homes and in the (indiscernible at
10	11:44:31 a.m.)
11	Q. And who was the prisoner?
12	A. The prisoner was Mr. Freddie Gray.
13	Q. And
14	THE COURT: Counsel, approach.
15	(Counsel approached the bench, and the
16	following ensued:)
17	THE COURT: I just got a note from Juror Number
18	8 saying I'm having a difficult time consistently hearing
19	defense counsel.
20	MR. PROCTOR: I'm doing what I can, Judge.
21	THE COURT: I'm sure you are. Your voice does
22	come in and out.
23	MR. MURTHA: Should you stand closer?
24	MR. PROCTOR: I'll stand closer to the jury.
25	As long as Officer if Officer Porter can't

1	hear me, he won't be able to answer the question.
2	MR. SCHATZOW: Can you order him not to breathe
3	in my direction, Your Honor?
4	THE COURT: I understand that. That's fine.
5	(Counsel returned to the trial table, and the
6	following ensued:)
7	BY MR. PROCTOR:
8	Q. Officer Porter, if you can't hear me, let me
9	know; okay?
10	A. I will.
11	MR. PROCTOR: And, Judge, if the jury can't
12	see, can you let me know?
13	THE COURT: Well, maybe it's a difficult
14	position. This is the way the courtroom is set up.
15	If you can't see something, just signal, raise
16	your hand, and I'll be looking for any of you.
17	Backup some anyway. That's forward. Backup
18	and stop.
19	MR. PROCTOR: I'll try over here.
20	THE COURT: That's fine.
21	BY MR. PROCTOR:
22	Q. Officer Porter, you said that you learned from
23	Officer Miller that it was Freddie Gray; right?
24	A. Yes. Yes.
25	Q. What did the name Freddie Gray mean to you?

1	A. Well, I've known Freddie Gray from the
2	neighborhood. I've seen him a bunch of times. But what
3	I said to Officer Miller was that he had done the same
4	thing or similar to the same thing about two weeks
5	earlier where he was arrested in Gilmor Homes, at Mount
6	and Baker again. But this time he was attempting to kick
7	out the windows of an SUV.
8	After being arrested, Sergeant Stevens asked
9	for backup because Gilmor Homes began to empty out again.
10	And I responded there.
11	Q. And what did you see Mr. Gray do?
12	A. I saw him attempt to kick out the windows. And
13	that's when we opened up the door or I didn't open the
14	door, but one of the officers opened the door, and you
15	know, tried to calm him down.
16	Q. Had you I think you already testified that
17	you, yourself, had never arrested Freddie Gray.
18	A. I have never arrested Freddie Gray, no.
19	Q. Had you seen him be taken in police custody on
20	prior occasions?
21	A. Yes.
22	Q. And typically, what would happen?
23	A. He would
24	MR. SCHATZOW: Objection, Your Honor.
25	THE COURT: Sustained.

1	BY MR. PROCTOR:
2	Q. On these prior occasions you've seen him taken
3	into custody, what, if anything, did you see?
4	A. He would use
5	MR. SCHATZOW: Objection, Your Honor.
6	THE COURT: Overruled. As to what he saw, he
7	can testify.
8	THE WITNESS: He would usually act out and yell
9	and feign some type of injury.
10	BY MR. PROCTOR:
11	Q. Okay. Let's take this one on one.
12	He would usually act out how?
13	A. Just yelling and and sometimes he he
14	would, you know, actively resist not not attempt to
15	hurt any officers, but actively, you know, pull away
16	whenever you had him in custody.
17	Q. Okay. Yell?
18	A. Yes, he would yell.
19	Q. And let's go back to Stop 1 for just a second.
20	When you were searching in the back of this
21	in the back of those yards; you remember that?
22	A. Yes.
23	Q. You now know from the video where the wagon is;
24	right?
25	A. Yes.

1 Q. So from where you were searching to where the wagon was, how far is that? 2 It's not far at all. I would have been 3 4 essentially in the backyard of the houses where the video 5 was filmed. Okay. So ballpark? 6 Q. 7 I don't know. I don't know. Α. Okay. But you could hear him yelling from 8 Q. 9 however far away it was? Yes. I could hear him. 10 Α. 11 MR. SCHATZOW: Objection, Your Honor. 12 THE COURT: Sustained. Sustained. 13 14 Again, do not lead. 15 BY MR. PROCTOR: Could you hear -- you could hear someone 16 Q. 17 yelling? 18 I could hear someone yelling, yes. Α. 19 Now, back to Stop 2, over how long that you saw Q. 20 it was the wagon shaking? 21 Probably around five to eight minutes. Α. 22 Okay. And then what happens? Q. 23 Well, then the wagon pulls away, and I continue 24 to have conversation with Officer Miller and Officer 25 Nero.

1 Q. Okay. And ballpark, how long was that conversation? 2 3 It's not long at all. Probably another four 4 minutes or so. And then I get back in my car and 5 continue patrol duties. 6 Q. Okay. So where do you go? 7 I -- I'm just driving around Sector 4. 8 Q. Okay. And what's the next thing that happens, 9 if anything? The next thing that happens is Officer Goodson 10 Α. 11 asks for a 10-11, for someone to meet him over on Druid Hill and Dolphin. 12 What's a 10-11? 13 Q. A 10-11 just to meet -- just means to meet 14 15 someone. Okay. And who responded? 16 Q. 17 I answered up. And I didn't know where Dolphin was. But from working in the Western District, I knew 18 19 where Druid Hill was. So I just took Druid Hill down to 20 Dolphin. 21 Okay. Stop -- we're calling it Stop 5; right? Q. 22 Α. Yes. 23 Which is where? Q. 24 MR. MURTHA: Four. 25 MR. PROCTOR: Four?

1		BY MR. PROCTOR:
2	Q.	I'm sorry, Stop 4. We're calling it Stop 4,
3	which is v	where?
4	Α.	Stop 4 is
5	Q.	Druid Hill and Dolphin?
6	Α.	I thought that was the other stop at
7	Goodson st	copped at by himself.
8	Q.	That's three.
9	Α.	That's three?
10		MR. PROCTOR: Pretty sure. Let me step over
11	here.	
12		It's over here. Thank you.
13		If I may show it to the witness?
14		THE COURT: You may.
15		BY MR. PROCTOR:
16	Q.	So let me just hold that right here.
17		Keep your voice in the microphone.
18		THE COURT: Well, why don't you do the same?
19	There's a	microphone there.
20		MR. PROCTOR: Yes.
21		BY MR. PROCTOR:
22	Q.	So you just testified you left Stop 2; is that
23	correct?	
24	Α.	That was correct.
25	Q.	And you go back to your patrol duties?
		48

1 Α. Yes, sir. 2 And you hear a call over the radio for a wagon Q. 3 check? 4 Α. Yes, sir. 5 Q. And where was that? 6 Α. That was a Druid Hill and Dolphin. 7 Q. Do you see that on this map? 8 Α. There. 9 And that's Stop 4; isn't it, sir? Q. That is labeled as Stop 4, yes. 10 Α. 11 Ο. Okay. Is Stop 4 in the Western District? It is not in the Western District, no. 12 Α. So in your entire police career what District 13 Q. was that spent in? 14 15 Α. From the academy, I went over to the Western District where I walked foot. I'm sorry. Field 16 17 training. From field training, I went to the Western District where I walked foot. And from foot, I became a 18 19 patrol officer in the Western District, all in the Western District. 20 21 So when you hear Druid Hill and Dolphin, do you Q. know exactly where that is? 22 23 No. But I know where Druid Hill is. Α. So then what do you do? 24 Q. 25 At that point in time I was on North Avenue. Α. Ι

From saying help, I say how can I help you; what's wrong with you. And then he says, can you help me up. I think I help him up. Or -- or we're just kneeling, and I'm talking to him.

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1	Q.	Hang on one second.
2		So I just want to make sure I understand. He's
3	lying on h	is chest?
4	Α.	On his chest, yes.
5	Q.	And what's his head facing?
6	Α.	I can't remember what side his head may have
7	been facin	g to, but
8	Q.	It was on one side?
9	Α.	It was on one side or the other, yes.
10	Q.	So his chin was not touching the floor of the
11	wagon?	
12	А.	No.
13	Q.	One cheek or the other was?
14	Α.	One cheek or the other was.
15	Q.	Okay. And when you have this conversation with
16	Mr. Gray,	where is Officer Goodson?
17	Α.	He was just to the rear of the wagon, just
18	standing o	utside the doors.
19	Q.	Could you estimate how far?
20	Α.	I don't have a specific length. But, you know,
21	if I were	to reach back, I couldn't touch Officer
22	Goodson.	
23	Q.	You could not?
24	Α.	Could not touch Officer Goodson, no.
25	Q.	So he was a few feet away?
		51

1	A. Yes.
2	MR. PROCTOR: Judge, can Officer Porter come
3	off the stand? And can I use Mr. Murtha?
4	THE COURT: If you want to sit this way?
5	BY MR. PROCTOR:
6	Q. Officer Porter, could you come off the stand?
7	MR. PROCTOR: Mr. Murtha?
8	And one more thing, Judge.
9	BY MR. PROCTOR:
10	Q. Officer Porter, could you put Mr. Murtha in the
11	position Mr. Gray was when you opened the wagon?
12	MR. PROCTOR: And, Judge, is it could you
13	tell the second row of the jury that they can stand up?
14	THE COURT: Very well.
15	THE WITNESS: All right. This would have the
16	position
17	BY MR. PROCTOR:
18	Q. Keep your voice up, sorry. I know
19	A. This would have been the position that Mr. Gray
20	was sitting in or laying in.
21	THE COURT: When I said everybody, I meant
22	everyone in the jury. Everyone else, sit down, please.
23	BY MR. PROCTOR:
24	Q. Okay. And pretend this chair's the bench. Put
25	the bench in relation to where Mr. Gray was.

Α. 1 Obviously --2 You can hold this. Q. It was expanded -- it was expanded, but it was 3 Α. 4 5 Q. How far? It would have been, you know, just that far. 6 7 Q. Okay. And so -- so the record is clear, the rear of the wagon is where, sir? 8 9 Α. Where you're standing. Okay. So where were you standing? 10 Q. 11 Α. I would have been standing where you're -where you're standing. 12 Okay. Let's trade places then. 13 Q. So the wagon, you had gotten into it? 14 15 Α. Yes. So then just show the jury, and if you could 16 Q. 17 because we're trying to make record here, kind of talk us through it as you do it, what you did? 18 19 All right. Well, at this point in time, he would -- he asked for help. So the wagon is kind of 20 tight. So --21 Is Mr. Murtha's head where Mr. Gray's head was, 22 or should he turn? 23 I don't remember which side his head was turned 24 Α. to, but he wasn't face down. 25

1	Q. Okay.
2	A. All right. And I would have gone on the side,
3	and reached under his arms and tried to brace myself.
4	You know, try to get him this way. That's the way we
5	were. I was just standing behind him this way, and I was
6	talking to him. He was looking at me this way.
7	Q. Okay. And then did there come a time you
8	helped him on the bench?
9	A. Yeah, eventually. Then we, you know, we kind
10	of slid back and he assisted me in sliding back, and he
11	would have been on bench side.
12	Q. Okay. Thank you. If you can you go back to
13	the stand. I just wanted to walk through that.
14	MR. PROCTOR: Judge, would you like to mark Mr.
15	Murtha and take him into evidence, there'd be no
16	objection.
17	THE COURT: That'd be fine.
18	(Laughter.)
19	BY MR. PROCTOR:
20	Q. So let's walk through it one at a time.
21	THE COURT: Hold on a sec. Hold on, hold on.
22	Okay.
23	BY MR. PROCTOR:
24	Q. So you put your arm under his left armpit?
25	A. Yes. My my right arm to under his left

1 armpit. And I should have asked this a moment ago. Did 2 Ο. 3 you have a gun on that day? 4 Α. Yes. Absolutely. 5 And if you could stand up and just show the Q. jury where on your body your gun is placed. 6 7 Α. It was just on the side here. Okay. So on your right hip? 8 Ο. 9 On my right hip, yes. Α. 10 Thank you. Have a seat, please. Q. Okay. 11 So Mr. Gray's hands, were they cuffed? They were cuffed. They were in a -- flex 12 Α. cuffs, but yes, they were cuffed. 13 14 In the rear? Ο. 15 Α. In the rear. So as you're helping Mr. Gray up, how close 16 Q. 17 were his hands to your gun? 18 Α. They're very close. 19 So let me ask you this. I just said as you're Q. 20 helping him up. Did you lift him and pick him up and put 21 him on the bench? How did that work? 22 Α. That would be -- that would be physically 23 impossible to pick up a 150 pound man. I weight 220 24 pounds. To physically pick him up and put him someplace. 25 There's no way I would able to do that.

Q. 1 Okay. So --2 He obviously -- he assisted me in helping himself kneel. And he obviously assisted me in sitting 3 4 on the bench. 5 You've heard testimony at this trial of what --Ο. 6 whether he was stuck; do you remember that? 7 Α. I do. Based on your observations, was he? 8 Ο. I -- I -- I'd be assuming if I were to say 9 that. I have no idea if he were stuck. He just asked me 10 to help him up on the bench, and I helped him on the 11 bench. 12 Okay. So you put him on the bench, what 13 position is he in? 14 15 I assisted him to the bench, and he's just -with his hands behind his back, and he's just leaning 16 against the -- I'm sorry. Just sitting regularly, that 17 you would sit on a bench with handcuffs on. 18 19 And it's hard to see you on that witness stand. Q. Could you just come down for one more minute? 20 21 Could you sit in this chair the way Mr. Gray was sitting on the bench? 22 23 Just sitting like this. And he's leaning against the back of the wall, the east wall. 24 25 Q. Okay. So -- go back to the witness stand,

1 please, sir. 2 Is he supporting his own head? Yes, he is supporting his own head. 3 Α. 4 Q. So do you have any further conversation with 5 him? 6 There -- we talked about the -- you know, I 7 asked him just how we're going to get to jail today 8 because we've already had to stop multiple times. He was 9 acting out. And I'm just like how are we going to get you to jail today, man, you know, it's taking way too 10 11 long. And I was like what do you need, like, go to the 12 hospital, you need a medic or something. Because typically people feign injury or, you know, they just 13 don't want to go to jail. They --14 15 Ο. Let's talk about that a little. Are you familiar with the term jailitis? 16 I'm familiar with jailitis, yes. 17 Α. What is it? 18 Q. 19 Just feigning injury with hopes that, you know -- we're understaffed, so if -- if it's just a petty 20 crime, we call -- like loitering or something like that, 21 the officer will write you a citation or find other means 22 in -- to not taking you to jail. 23

made.

Tell the jury about the first arrest you ever

24

25

Q.

A. The first arrest I ever made was a gentlemen by the name Tyrone Johnson (phonetic). It was in Gilmor Homes, 1400 Mount More Court (phonetic), one of the courts in there. I'm sorry, one of the homes there.

And we had someone watching the CCTV, which we had footage from. Someone was watching the camera, and they see -- see Mr. Johnson smoking marijuana.

Me and Officer Miller attempt to stop Mr.

Johnson. Mr. Johnson then attempts to flee into a house.

Fresh pursuit, we go after him.

After he's in the house, he begins to resist. He puts his hand down by his dip, and he won't move his hands.

And then we're all -- we're just sliding across the floor. By the time we get to a television stand, he then throws his hands up like this, and we were able to cuff him up. And I bring him outside, and I'm talking with him. We're trying to find the marijuana he was smoking.

Officer Miller went into -- or stayed in the house and searched under the TV stand. There, we located CDS. Once Officer Miller came outside and said we have your CDS, then Tyrone Johnson said, oh, I'm having a seizure, and he kind of just shakes and falls to the ground.

Q. Okay. And what did you do? 1 2 We called for a medic. We transported him to the hospital. The doctor said he can't be for certain, 3 4 but they definitely don't think that he had a seizure, 5 especially if he was able to tell me that he was having a 6 seizure. 7 Q. And you said you called for a medic. 8 Α. Yes. Why did you call for a medic? 9 Q. Well, there was a -- he was shaking on the 10 Α. 11 ground. There was an exigent circumstance. And you and I know what exigent means, but --12 Q. This is an emergency -- just it is apparent it 13 Α. 14 is emergent. That's what exigency means. 15 Q. So when Mr. Gray called for a medic, what would 16 it have taken for you to get on the radio right there? 17 I think what you -- what you mean is for me to call for a medic for Mr. Gray. 18 19 Just talking to him, he never made, like, a 20 complaint of injury or pain or anything. And I'm asking 21 him questions, and he's not unresponsive. He's just not responding to the -- to certain questions I'm asking. 22 23 And when I asked him if he wanted to go to the hospital, he said, yes, I want to go to the hospital. 24

25

call a medic or call an ambo, I need age, sex, I need to
tell them my location, and I need a complaint of injury.

If there's no complaint of injury, I have nothing to tell
the medics when they respond to the scene. So -
Q. So when you helped Mr. Gray up to the bench -A. Yes.

Q. Did he appear to be in any pain?

- A. No, he did not appear to be in any pain. No.

 He just, to me, he looked tired. "Lethargic" is the word

 I used. He just looks tired.
 - Q. What's an adrenaline dump?
- A. An adrenaline dump is, you know -- I've had an adrenaline dump chasing a guy for like eight blocks. And once I get to him, it's just he and I, and he wanted to fight with me, so I ended up taking him to the ground.

 And I'm just holding him on the ground until more officers show up. And then they cuff him up, and then I'm just tired.

And, you know, I had run for eight -- eight -- eight blocks. And then I had to wrestle with this guy for, I don't know, 45 seconds until the other officers showed up. I was just tired, and I just, you know, felt like I was going to throw up or something like that.

Q. So when you said in your statement that Mr.

Gray was having an adrenaline dump, what did you mean by

1 that, sir? 2 It appeared to me that he was, you know -- just 3 based on my training and experience, it seemed to me that 4 he was having an adrenaline dump because he was -- it 5 takes some kind of force to make that wagon go side to 6 side, as opposed to back and back, where you're using the 7 shocks. Side to side is a little different. He had been doing it for a while. 8 9 Okay. Was he making eye contact? Q. He was making eye contact, yes. 10 Α. 11 Ο. When he was answering your questions, was he answering them in a normal tone of voice? 12 13 Just a normal tone of voice, yes. Α. Have you ever had a detainee refuse to talk to 14 Ο. 15 you? Absolutely. People -- you know, people 16 Α. exercise their Miranda Rights all the time. 17 And you and I know what that is, but let's talk 18 Q. 19 about a few terms that have just come up. 20 You said he had something in his dip. What's a dip? 21 A dip is just, you know, a front area of your 22 23 pants. Okay. What's CDS? 24 Q. 25 CDS is controlled dangerous substance. Α. It can

1 be drugs. It can be other things. 2 Q. What are Miranda Rights? 3 Miranda Rights are just your right to remain Α. 4 silent. You know, just ask for a lawyer to be present. 5 Q. Okay. And have you had detainees exercise 6 those rights? 7 Α. Absolutely. I have detainees not talk to me all the time. They -- I mean, there's a culture here in 8 Baltimore called no snitching. You know, people don't 9 say anything to police all the time. 10 11 Q. So when Mr. Gray ceases to answer -- he didn't say much; is that fair -- did you testify to that 12 already? 13 Yes. He didn't say much. 14 15 Q. So he's not saying much. What are you thinking? 16 17 I didn't think anything about it. I mean, it happens quite often. Whenever someone's arrested, they 18 19 don't want to talk to police. 20 Did you have any belief that he was under any -- that he was injured beyond tired? 21 A. No, sir. 22 23 Now, you were here when Detective Teel Ο. testified; is that correct? 24 25 Α. Yes, I was present.

And she said, did she not, that at Stop 4, you 1 Q. reported Mr. Gray said he couldn't breathe. 2 She wrote at Druid Hill and Baker that that's 3 4 what I said. 5 Ο. Do Druid Hill and Baker ever intersect? 6 Α. They do not. 7 Q. So at Stop 4, did Mr. Gray discuss anything about his ability to breathe? 8 9 Α. No, he did not. Did you hear him express that he couldn't 10 Q. 11 breathe? No. He was able to have -- to speak words. 12 Α. had a regular tone of voice when he was talking to me. 13 At any point on April 12th, did you hear him say 14 Q. 15 he couldn't breathe? 16 Α. Yes. 17 Where was that? Ο. At the first stop he said he needed an asthma 18 Α. 19 inhaler. 20 And what did you tell Detective Teel? Ο. That's what I told her from the first stop. 21 Α. Like I said earlier, when she called, I assumed 22 23 that she already the information that I had been at the majority of the stops. So once she had told me to tell 24 25 me -- when she said tell me what happened, I started from

1 the beginning. And describe that conversation. 2 3 I -- I can't really remember what that 4 conversation was. 5 Q. So you know it started at Stop 1. She just called and said in reference to April 6 12th, you know, what was my involvement. I explained to 7 her I was -- I was there. And she said tell me what 8 happened. 9 Okay. And let's talk a little bit about Mr. Q. 10 Gray said he needed a medic; right? 11 I offered it to him, and he said, yes. 12 Α. accepted. 13 So after he said that, what did you do? 14 Ο. 15 After then, then I -- I get out of the wagon. And I'm talking with Officer Goodson, and I said that 16 17 guy's asking to go to the hospital. 18 So there's no way he's going to pass medical 19 down at Central Booking because the more he says he wants 20 to go to the hospital, they're going to reject him. 21 Well, let's talk about that for a minute. Q. you transported prisoners to Central Booking? 22 23 I have, yes. Α. And what's the process? 24 Q. 25 Like you hand them the toe tag, the prisoner Α.

1 goes in, then there's a -- there's a nurse on the inside. 2 She asks them various questions, and maybe take his blood If their answers to the questions are correct, 3 pressure. 4 then he's able to serve or be accepted into Central 5 Booking. If not, then he is medically rejected. 6 Q. Okay. And if someone is medically rejected, 7 what do you have to do? We have to take them to the hospital, and they 8 Α. 9 have to get a medical clearance from a doctor. Can a medic provide a medical clearance? 10 Q. 11 Α. They cannot, no. It needs to be a doctor. 12 So let's say you arrest me, and I say my elbow Q. hurts, but I look fine, maybe I'm even waving my hands. 13 In your experience, is Central Booking going to take you? 14 15 If you say those same things that you just said 16 to me right now, and you say that to the nurse, no, they will not accept you. 17 So if I say my elbow hurts, but I look fine, 18 Q. what would you do? 19 20 Just transport you to the hospital. And why would you do that, sir? 21 Q. Just -- we don't have enough officers out on 22 23 the street as it is, just efficiency. We need to be efficient. So it would be a waste of time to have you go 24

And have

down to Central Booking and get rejected.

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1 another wagon have to go down and pick you up, and then 2 take you to a hospital. 3 Have there been occasions when you've called 4 for a medic to the scene? 5 Α. Yes. Why would you do that? 6 Q. 7 Α. Just -- they -- they gave me a complaint of an 8 injury. 9 So in your mind, what's the difference between Q. calling a medic and taking someone straight to the 10 hospital? 11 A medic is like when you call for an ambulance 12 or if you have a medical emergency, and it needs to be 13 taken care of right then and -- like someone has been 14 15 shot, someone has been stabbed, there's -- things of that 16 sort. Okay. And a sore elbow, what do you do in that 17 situation? 18 19 A sore elbow, I could transport you to the -- I could just transport you to the hospital via wagon. 20 Okay. When Mr. Gray is in the back of the 21 Q. wagon -- you with me? 22 I'm with you, yes. 23 -- who is primarily responsible for him? 24 Q. 25 It is -- primary -- it is the wagon driver's Α.

1 job to get the prisoner or detainee from Point A to Point 2 B, or whomever is transporting that -- that detainee. 3 So at Druid Hill and Dolphin, who's primarily 4 responsible for Mr. Gray's safety? 5 Α. Officer Goodson never transferred custody to He is still under the custody of Officer Goodson. 6 7 Q. So Mr. Gray says he needs a medic; right? He -- he says yes to my question, which is do 8 9 you need a medic, do you need to go to the hospital. He says yes. So --10 11 Ο. What do you say to Officer Goodson after he answers that question? 12 I suggest to Officer Goodson to take him to Bon 13 Secours or to a hospital. 14 15 Q. Can you order Officer Goodson to do anything? I cannot order Officer Goodson to do anything, 16 Α. 17 no. Why not? 18 Q. 19 He is my equal. Α. 20 How many years experience does he have? Ο. 21 I believe he has 17. Α. And in April of this year, how many years of 22 Q. 23 experience did you have? 24 Three years. I'm sorry, I had two years. Α. 25 years and a half --

Q. 1 Okay. 2 -- as of April. 3 So as you're having this conversation with Q. 4 Officer Goodson, put in your own words what you suggested 5 to Officer Goodson. My -- just tell him that --6 Α. 7 MR. SCHATZOW: Objection, Your Honor. THE COURT: Sustained. 8 BY MR. PROCTOR: 9 What did you tell Officer Goodson? 10 Q. 11 MR. SCHATZOW: Same objection, Your Honor. THE COURT: Sustained. Asked and answered. 12 13 Next question. 14 MR. PROCTOR: Okay. 15 BY MR. PROCTOR: So after having this conversation with Officer 16 Q. 17 Goodson, does anything come across the radio? 18 Α. Lieutenant Rice asked for a 10-16 up at -- he 19 may have said North and Carey. In that general area of Pennsylvania and North, North and Carey, he asked for a 20 21 10-16. And what's a 10-16? 22 Q. 23 A 10-16 is urgent backup. 24 Okay. And Lieutenant Rice, is he your boss? Q. 25 He -- he is my superior, yes. Α.

1 So when he says 10-16, what's your obligation Q. as a police officer? 2 3 I need to respond to that 10-16. 4 Q. So once you hear "urgent backup," what do you 5 do, sir? I then, you know, walk briskly back to my 6 Α. 7 vehicle, which is across the intersection. I get in, and I radio that I'm going to head up to that scene. 8 9 Q. Okay. And as you walk to your vehicle, where's your back in relation to the back of the wagon? 10 11 Α. My back is to the back of the wagon. 12 So as you're walking to your vehicle, can you Q. see the wagon? 13 14 I can not see behind me, no. 15 When you get in your vehicle, do you look back Q. 16 at the wagon at that point? 17 When I sit down in the vehicle, the -- the wagon is right in front of me, yes. 18 19 Q. And what's going on? 20 I believe Officer Goodson may be closing the door or -- or he's getting into the wagon. I can't 21 recall at this moment. 22 23 After you walked away to get back to your vehicle, do you ever see inside the vehicle again -- the 24

25

wagon again?

1 Α. Up at North Avenue is when I seen the wagon 2 again. 3 We'll get there in a second. Q. 4 But at Druid Hill and Dolphin, do you ever see 5 inside the wagon again? 6 Α. No. 7 Q. Do you know that Mr. Gray was seat belted at Druid Hill and Dolphin? 8 I'd be -- I'd make assumptions if I said yes or 9 Α. 10 no. 11 Ο. So once you get into your car, where do you go? I respond back up to North Avenue and Carey or 12 Α. 13 Pennsylvania. Tell the jury about that. 14 Ο. 15 Α. When I respond up there, there's -- I see Donta There's Nero, Miller and Lieutenant Rice. I can 16 17 see them pulling bags of marijuana out of Donta Allan's pockets, and he's cuffed. 18 19 And what do you do? Q. 20 Just shortly after the wagon shows up, I then go back and just -- just to confirm with Mr. Gray, do you 21 still want to go to the hospital, and he says yes. 22 23 Why do you ask him that? Ο. 24 Just because sometimes, if it takes long Α. 25 enough, people will say they don't want to go to the

1 hospital anymore. They'd rather just go to Central Booking and get it over with. 2 3 Could you explain that? Q. 4 Α. That -- just -- that's -- that's it. Whenever 5 -- sometimes people feign injury just to go to the 6 hospital, but then you realize it's going to take way too 7 long. Sometimes at the hospital they reject any kind of 8 treatment, and just say it's taking way too long, and I'd 9 rather go to Central Booking. So why did you ask Mr. Gray if he still wanted 10 11 to go to the hospital on North Avenue? Just to see if he would, you know, if he had --12 Α. if he had changed his mind. That's all. 13 And again, maybe I could -- well, Mr. Murtha --14 Ο. 15 MR. PROCTOR: Mr. Murtha, can I borrow you for 16 a second? 17 Would you come off the stand, please? BY MR. PROCTOR: 18 19 When you got (inaudible at 12:16:32 p.m.), sir, Q. what position is Mr. Gray in? 20 Well, his hands are behind his back. He's 21 Α. kneeling on this --22 23 THE COURT: Keep your voice up. 24 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. 25 His hands are behind his back. He's kneeling

1 on his feet. And very close to the wagon, kind of like 2 in this position. BY MR. PROCTOR: 3 4 Q. Bench? 5 I'm sorry. The bench, yeah, just kind of in Α. 6 this position. 7 Q. Now, where is the wall of the wagon? The wall would have been where this -- this --8 Α. the back of the chair is. 9 Is Mr. Gray's head touching the wall? 10 Q. 11 Α. No. Is his shoulder touching the wall? 12 Q. No, it's isn't. 13 Α. Thank you. You can go back to the stand. 14 Q. 15 Is his head facing towards the doors or towards the cabin? 16 Towards the cabin is where his head is hitting. 17 Α. So how much of his face can you see? 18 Q. 19 Not much. Just about the side, whenever I Α. walked the side. When I'm standing on the side, I can 20 see just the side of his face. 21 And the totality of your conversation with Mr. 22 Q. Gray, what was that? 23 A. Just, hey -- I said, Freddie Gray -- hey, 24 Freddie, you just want to go back -- hey, Freddie, still 25

1 want to go to the hospital? And he says yes. 2 Ο. And then what do you do? Then Sergeant White was on the scene. I then 3 4 go to her, and let her know that Freddie Gray still says 5 he wants to go to the hospital. And that one of the arresting officers should go with him to the hospital, do 6 7 the hospital detail. 8 Ο. Okay. And totality of your -- did you ever get in the wagon at North Avenue? 9 No, I do not. 10 Α. 11 Ο. The totality of your conversation with Mr. Gray, how long does that last? 12 Seconds. Α. 13 So after your conversation with Sergeant White, 14 Ο. 15 what do you do? From there, I believe she goes and may check on 16 Freddie Gray. 17 I -- there I'm just talking to Nero and Miller, 18 19 again, let them know that Freddie Gray says he wants to go to the hospital and that --20 And let's talk about that for a minute, sir. 21 Q. If you arrest me, and I say I don't feel well, whose job 22 is it to take me to the hospital? 23 24 A wagon would transport you to the hospital. 25 And --

1	Q. A wagon
2	THE COURT: Well, let him answer the question.
3	MR. PROCTOR: I'm sorry, Judge.
4	THE COURT: Don't interrupt him.
5	BY MR. PROCTOR:
6	Q. Continue.
7	A. A wagon would transport you to the hospital.
8	And when you get to the hospital, that wagon driver will
9	wait until the arresting officer gets to the hospital.
10	And then he would pass custody to you, and you would take
11	that detainee into the hospital.
12	Q. So what I think I'm hearing you say is you, as
13	the arresting officer
14	THE COURT: Sustained.
15	Ask a question. I don't need you to restate
16	whatever he said. Just ask him a direct question.
17	BY MR. PROCTOR:
18	Q. So at the hospital, that person is in the
19	arresting officer's custody?
20	A. It
21	THE COURT: Sustained.
22	Ask a question.
23	BY MR. PROCTOR:
24	Q. Whose custody is the arrestee in at the
25	hospital?

1 He's returned back to the arresting officer's Α. 2 custody. 3 Now, had you been at the hospital with Q. 4 arrestees? 5 Α. I have, yes. 6 Q. What's the range of how long you can be there? 7 Α. According to General Order, it says two hours. But I've been there for the entirety of their stay, which 8 can be an hour to 10 hours. 9 Do police officers -- do you call it the 10 11 hospital detail? It's called the hospital detail, yes. 12 Α. Do police officers like that detail? 13 Q. It's not the most fun, no. 14 Α. 15 Q. Why not? The radio doesn't work in the hospital. 16 17 Cellular devices don't work in the hospital. You just have to stand by while somebody gets medical treatment. 18 19 Hospitals tend to go really slow, so it's a really long, 20 monotonous day. 21 So when you're talking to the bike cops; right? Q. The bike cops. 22 Α. Yes. 23 What are you saying to them? Q. I'm just telling them that -- or I'm suggesting 24 Α. 25 that one of them do the hospital detail because they

1	minutes or so.
2	Q. How long was the drive to the Western from
3	North Avenue take?
4	A. Four minutes.
5	Q. And let me show you what I'd like to mark as
6	Defendant's Exhibit 12
7	THE CLERK: Eleven.
8	MR. PROCTOR: Eleven.
9	Let me show it to Mr. Schatzow first.
10	(Defendant's Exhibit Number 11
11	was marked for identification.)
12	BY MR. PROCTOR:
13	Q. And ask you if you recognize that, sir.
14	A. Yes, that's the Western District.
15	Q. Okay. And does it fairly and accurately depict
16	it?
17	A. Yes.
18	MR. PROCTOR: Move Exhibit 11 into evidence.
19	THE COURT: Any objection?
20	MR. SCHATZOW: No, Your Honor.
21	THE COURT: So entered.
22	(Defendant's Exhibit Number 11
23	was received in evidence.)
24	BY MR. PROCTOR:
25	Q. Can you see on this picture where you parked
	77

1	your vehicle?
2	A. Yes. I actually parked my vehicle where that
3	police car
4	Q. Come down off the stand for just one second,
5	sir.
6	And if you could, let's scoot over this way,
7	can you see point on Defendant's Exhibit 11 where you
8	parked your vehicle, if you see it.
9	A. My vehicle would have been where this police
10	car is.
11	Q. Keep your voice up.
12	A. My vehicle would have been where this police
13	vehicle is, just along the parking lot.
14	Q. So on the right side of the picture, next to
15	the "No Entry" sign?
16	A. Yes.
17	Q. Can you see on this picture where the wagon
18	was?
19	A. No. The wagons would be in between this side
20	and this side. And it would go in between that building.
21	Q. Okay. Can you return to the stand, please?
22	When you get to the wagon, sir, what do you do?
23	A. From the wagon, I believe I just they may be
24	pulling Donta Allan out of one side, and I'm opening up
25	the other.

1 Q. Okay. So how far is it from where you parked to where the wagon is, ballpark? 2 3 Α. 50 feet. 4 Q. So you walk over these 50 feet, and the second 5 arrestee is already getting out? 6 Α. I believe he's getting out. I'm -- I'm not 7 certain on that. 8 Q. Okay. And you're opening up the other side? 9 Α. Yes. Why are you doing that? 10 Q. 11 Α. Just to -- I want to put Freddie Gray into --12 I'm sorry, Mr. Gray into the holding cell until we were ready to go to Bon Secours. 13 Why not just leave him in the wagon? 14 Ο. 15 Α. Someone's got to have, you know, custody of that prisoner. You can't just leave them in the wagon. 16 17 Okay. So when you open the door to -- what Ο. side of the wagon, if you remember, was it? 18 19 Α. He's on -- he's on the right side. 20 When you open the door, is -- there are two Ο. sets of doors in the wagon; right? 21 Yes. There's an exterior, and there's an 22 Α. interior door. 23 24 Q. When you get to the Western, are both sides of the right closed? 25

1 Α. No, no, no. The -- the -- both No. 2 exterior doors are open. 3 Okay. So when you -- do you open the interior 4 door? 5 Α. I believe I opened up the interior door. What do you see? 6 Q. 7 Α. I see Mr. -- Mr. Gray there. I'm calling -- I call his name. He doesn't answer me. 8 9 MR. PROCTOR: And for the third and final time, could I borrow Mr. Murtha to show what position Mr. Gray 10 11 was in? 12 BY MR. PROCTOR: Could you put Mr. Murtha -- if I'm standing at 13 the rear of the wagon, and the jury is the cabin, could 14 15 you put Mr. Murtha in position? His hands would have been behind his back. He 16 17 Keep your voice up, please. 18 Q. 19 I'm sorry. Α. 20 His hands would have been down. And from my recollection, it would be a more exaggerated -- it would 21 22 be way more exaggerated than he was up at North Avenue. 23 So at this point, is his shoulder against the Ο. side? 24 25 I can't -- I can't remember that. Α.

1	Q. Is his head against the side?
2	A. Is his head wasn't in the same position it
3	was at North Avenue.
4	Q. Okay.
5	MR. PROCTOR: Thank you, Mr. Murtha.
6	BY MR. PROCTOR:
7	Q. Go back to the stand, please.
8	So when you opened the door, and you see Mr.
9	Gray in that position, is there anyone else around?
10	A. I think Nero is I'm sorry, Novack is coming
11	out.
12	Q. Now, I don't know if we've talked about him.
13	Who is Novak?
14	A. Novak is just another officer in the Western.
15	Q. Okay. And you say he's coming out. Where is
16	he coming out from?
17	A. It would have been the holding cells. The
18	processing where we process people.
19	Q. Okay. And when you see Mr. Gray in the
20	position you just described, what do you do?
21	A. I called out to him. And at this time, he
22	doesn't typically, he would answer me. But he didn't
23	answer me this time. And I call him, and he doesn't
24	answer.
25	So now I climb in, and I pull him back, and

1 there's -- there's a mucus on his mouth. Let's talk about that for a second. At Stop 4, 2 3 was there any mucus in his mouth? 4 Α. At Druid Hill and Dolphin? No. 5 Ο. Yes. 6 Α. No. No mucus on his mouth, no. Did you see any blood, any bumps, any bruises, 7 Q. 8 anything? 9 Α. I didn't see any of that, no. At Stop 5, did you see anything? 10 Q. 11 Α. His head was facing away from me, but no, I didn't. 12 But at the Western, you saw this mucus? 13 Q. Okay. There was some kind of -- there was 14 Α. Yeah. 15 clear mucus around nose and mouth. So when you saw that, what did you do? 16 Q. 17 I think on my testimony I said, oh shit, and I tried to pull Freddie Gray out. And now he's just 18 19 leaning on me. And we're standing at the -- he's not all 20 the way out, he's just -- his upper half is outside of 21 the wagon and I'm holding him. Trying to hold his back straight, trying to clear his airway. 22 23 Novak tries to do a sternum rub. We don't get 24 any response. 25 Let's talk about that for a second. Let me Q.

1	stop there. What's a sternum rub?
2	A. A sternum rub is just something I've seen EMTs
3	do whenever we have a non-responsive person. They do a
4	sternum rub. If they're, like, in an overdose or
5	sleeping or something like that, they'll get an immediate
6	reaction.
7	Q. Okay. So what I've seen you do is with your
8	knuckles rubbing straight across the chest.
9	A. Yep.
LO	Q. And so your testimony is Officer Novak did one
11	of those?
12	A. Yes. He did a sternum rub, yes.
13	Q. And did Mr. Gray react?
L4	A. No. He did not react, no.
15	Q. So based on that, what happened next?
L6	A. From there, I believe Novak then radioed for a
L7	medic to respond to the District.
18	After that he began to hold Mr. Gray's head.
L9	Q. Okay. So you're standing behind him?
20	A. I'm standing behind him, trying to hold his
21	back straight so he can have a clear airway.
22	Q. And what's Officer Novak doing, if you know?
23	A. Officer Novak is just on the side of me, and
24	he's holding his head trying to support his head.
25	Q. Who taught you to do it that way?

1 Α. That was -- that was something that we learned at the academy from our LEMAT (phonetic) class. 2 Okay. Tell the jury what did you learn at the 3 4 academy in regard to how to hold a non-responsive person. 5 Α. I believe they called it the lifesaving 6 position. You would hold the victim's back straight, and 7 try to hold his head straight, so he can have a clear airway and be able to breathe. 8 So after Officer Novak calls for a medic, what 9 Q. 10 happens next? We wait for the medic to show up. 11 Α. How long did the medic take? 12 Q. It felt like an eternity. I don't know. 13 Α. And by the way, at -- let's go back to Stop 4 14 Ο. 15 for a minute, okay? Druid Hill and Dolphin? 16 Α. 17 Q. Yeah. Ballpark -- you've called a medic many times? 18 19 Yes. Α. 20 Ballpark, how long do they take? Ο. They -- it depends on -- all right. So when I 21 Α. radio it goes to my dispatch. From my dispatch, it has 22 23 to go to fire dispatch. From fire dispatch, they have to send it down to the ground units. They then respond. 24 25 And it -- it -- not all the time is it the closest

1 firehouse, it's who answers up. And so it can -- can 2 vary as to how long it takes. 3 Okay. Have you had one take 15 minutes or 4 more? 5 Α. Oh, absolutely. And from Druid Hill to Dolphin on a Sunday 6 Q. 7 morning, how long would it take Officer Goodson --Sunday morning, no traffic --8 Α. 9 MR. SCHATZOW: Excuse me, Your Honor. THE COURT: Sustained. 10 11 BY MR. PROCTOR: To get -- what -- to Druid Hill and Dolphin, 12 Q. what's the nearest hospital? 13 I'm -- I'm not familiar with that part of the 14 15 City. I couldn't tell you. I don't know. Okay. Bon Secours. How far to get to --16 Q. To get to Bon Secours, it would probably take 17 them around 10 minutes. 18 19 I'm sorry. I lost my train of thought. Q. 20 So you -- where we left off is you said it felt like the medic took an eternity; right? 21 Α. That's what it felt like, yes. 22 23 When the medic arrives, what happens next? Ο. She -- she then places her hand on his chest. 24 Α. 25 She says she can't -- she can't -- he's not breathing,

1	something like that.
2	Q. Did you see the medic testify here today?
3	A. I did well, yesterday. Yes.
4	Q. And when she came and walked past the wagon,
5	did you see her?
6	A. No. I didn't see her, no.
7	Q. Where are your eyes while awaiting for the
8	medic to arrive?
9	A. I was looking down at Freddie Gray.
10	Q. So when she locates the prisoner, what happens?
11	A. She puts her hand on his chest, and says he's
12	not breathing. And then we then pull him out of the
13	wagon, the entire the whole way. And they put put
14	the collar on, put him on a backboard, and they put the
15	respirator in his mouth, started to give him air. And
16	then put him into the ambulance.
17	Q. And where do you go?
18	A. I'm standing by because I was instructed to do
19	the hospital detail. So I have to stand by with Freddie
20	Gray.
21	Q. So when he goes to the hospital, where do you
22	go?
23	A. I followed behind Medic 43 to Shock Trauma.
24	Q. And how long do you stay at Shock Trauma?
25	A. It had been a while. Ballpark, six or seven

1 o'clock. And then I had to go and submit Mr. Gray's 2 goods. And where did you submit his clothes and 3 Q. 4 property? 5 Α. I submitted his property at ECU. 6 Q. You have seen, have you not, the statement of 7 Officer Novak? 8 Α. I have not, no. 9 Are you aware that Officer Novak recalls Mr. Q. Gray being in a different position? 10 11 Α. I did. MR. SCHATZOW: Objection, Your Honor. 12 THE COURT: Sustained. Strike the question. 13 BY MR. PROCTOR: 14 15 Q. Are you certain that Mr. Gray was in the 16 position that you just described at the Western? 17 I can't be a hundred percent certain. It was a very traumatic thing for me also, just being the officer 18 19 there, and knowing him in the neighborhood, seeing him 20 every day, and calling his name, and not getting a response, then having to do the hospital detail, and 21 seeing everything they had done to him. I can't be 22 23 certain. The first phone call you had from Detective 24 Q. 25 Teel on April 15th, did you answer her questions?

1	A. Yes. I answered some questions.
2	Q. Did you arrange to meet with her to come in?
3	A. She arranged with me to come in, yes.
4	Q. Did there come a time when you changed the time
5	of that meeting?
6	A. She changed the time.
7	Q. Did you agree?
8	A. I agreed, yes.
9	MR. PROCTOR: Can I have a second please,
10	Judge?
11	(Brief pause.)
12	MR. PROCTOR: Can we approach, please?
13	(Counsel approached the bench, and the
14	following ensued:)
15	MR. PROCTOR: I think I'm just about done. But
16	rather than make the jury wait while I look through my 42
17	pages of notes, can we just break for lunch? And after
18	lunch, I might have a couple of questions?
19	THE COURT: (Inaudible at 12:35:08 p.m.)
20	MR. SCHATZOW: Yes, Your Honor.
21	THE COURT: (Inaudible at 12:35:15 p.m.)
22	MR. PROCTOR: It's 12:35.
23	THE COURT: We will break.
24	MS. BLEDSOE: We can do that, yes.
25	MR. PROCTOR: Thank you.
	88

1	THE COURT: (Inaudible at 12:35:19 p.m.)
2	MR. PROCTOR: Thank you.
3	(Counsel returned to the trial table, and the
4	following ensued:)
5	THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, we're going
6	to take our lunch break.
7	Please do not discuss your testimony even among
8	yourselves.
9	Please leave your notepads on the chair.
10	Court will resume at 1:45.
11	All rise for the jury.
12	(Whereupon, the jury was excused from the
13	courtroom at 12:36 p.m.)
14	THE COURT: Thank you. Everyone may be seated.
15	Again, we'll resume at 1:45.
16	MR. PROCTOR: Thank you, sir.
17	(Whereupon, a luncheon recess was taken at
18	12:36 p.m.)
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1	<u>AFTERNOON SESSION</u>
2	(Excerpt resumed at 1:59:27 p.m. with the
3	testimony of William Porter.)
4	THE COURT: You may remind the witness.
5	THE CLERK: Just reminding you you're still
6	under oath.
7	State your name for the record.
8	THE WITNESS: William Porter.
9	THE COURT: You may proceed, Counsel.
10	MR. PROCTOR: Thank you.
11	<u>DIRECT EXAMINATION</u> (Resumed)
12	Q. Officer Porter, just a few questions.
13	I forgot to ask you earlier, at Stop 4, when
14	you helped Mr. Gray onto the bench, you remember that?
15	A. I do remember that.
16	Q. Why didn't you seat belt him?
17	A. Well, in the academy and then through my
18	experience and training as an officer, even the most
19	docile detainee presents a risk. Any time I am in an
20	altercation with any kind of detainee, there's a gun
21	involved, so there's always an ever present officer
22	safety issue.
23	Q. Okay. And it's are you sorry Freddie Gray's
24	dead?
25	A. Absolutely. Freddie Gray and I weren't

1	friends, but we had a mutual respect for each other, and
2	we built a rapport, you know. He I had a job, and he
3	understood that. And he did things, and I understood
4	that. And
5	MR. SCHATZOW: Objection, Your Honor, to what
6	Mr. Gray understood.
7	THE COURT: Sustained to anything Mr. Gray
8	understood.
9	THE WITNESS: I had a job
10	THE COURT: No, no. Question.
11	BY MR. PROCTOR:
12	Q. Explain your relationship with him.
13	A. I had a job to do, and he did things. And
14	we I built a rapport. And we weren't friends, but we
15	definitely had respect or I had respect for Mr. Gray.
16	And absolutely am sorry to see any kind of
17	loss of life, I'm sorry to see that.
18	Q. Do you like being a police officer?
19	A. Absolutely.
20	Q. Would you do anything to jeopardize that?
21	A. Never.
22	MR. PROCTOR: That's all I have, Judge.
23	THE COURT: You may cross.
24	CROSS-EXAMINATION
25	BY MR. SCHATZOW:
	0.1

1 Did you just say that you didn't seatbelt Mr. Q. 2 Gray because even though he was docile, he was still a 3 risk? 4 Α. I didn't say Mr. Gray specifically, but 5 prisoners -- I mean, there's a reason why the -- the 6 deputies walk with two people or the prisoner through the 7 courthouse, and he's shackled and restrained. They --8 there's an ever present risk. Excuse me. Mr. Goodson, did you understand --9 Q. 10 Α. My name is Porter. 11 Ο. Excuse me. Mr. Porter, did you understand my question to be about the sheriffs in the courthouse? 12 13 Α. Just giving --MR. PROCTOR: Objection. 14 15 THE COURT: Overruled. THE WITNESS: Giving you just -- using my 16 17 training and experience. BY MR. SCHATZOW: 18 19 But the question that your lawyer asked you was Q. 20 at Stop 4, why didn't you seatbelt Mr. Gray. And didn't you say that even though he was docile, you were still 21 concerned about some risk? 22 23 Yes, I did. Α. Now, the vans, the police transport wagons, are 24 Q. 25 equipped with seatbelts; aren't they?

1	A. They are.
2	Q. And you have said that Mr. Gray was docile, and
3	you previously said he was not combative, and that he was
4	calm at Stop 4; correct?
5	A. That is correct.
6	Q. If you weren't going to seatbelt Mr. Gray at
7	Stop 4, I guess that means you would never seatbelt
8	anyone?
9	A. I'm not typically a wagon driver. I the
10	primary responsibility for the wagon driver is to make
11	sure the safety of a detainee from Point A to Point B.
12	Q. Again, Officer Porter, I'm talking about you.
13	My question is about you. You testified that you didn't
14	seatbelt him even though he was docile because you were
15	concerned of a risk.
16	And my question to you is does that mean that
17	you would never seatbelt anyone in a wagon?
18	A. No. That isn't that isn't that's not
19	what that means, no.
20	Q. But you never have?
21	A. I haven't before. I'm not typically a wagon
22	driver.
23	Q. But
24	A. But, no, I haven't before, no.
2425	A. But, no, I haven't before, no. Q. So you haven't. Okay.

1	And you didn't Officer Goodson was standing
2	outside the wagon; correct?
3	A. He was behind the wagon, yes.
4	Q. You didn't hand him your gun when you first
5	went into the wagon; did you?
6	A. That's ridiculous. I would never hand anyone
7	my gun.
8	Q. A fellow officer. If you were concerned about
9	somebody taking your gun, you wouldn't hand it to a
10	fellow officer; is that you're saying what you're
11	saying?
12	A. I wouldn't hand my gun to anyone is what I'm
13	saying.
14	Q. Okay. All right. That's fine.
15	Now, you said you worked at a computer company.
16	What did you do for a computer company?
17	A. I there I built computers, and I reimaged
18	them. That's what reimaged.
19	
19	Q. Okay. And on April $12^{\rm th}$ well, let's take
20	Q. Okay. And on April $12^{\rm th}$ well, let's take the period between April $9^{\rm th}$ of 2015 and April $12^{\rm th}$ of
20	the period between April 9^{th} of 2015 and April 12^{th} of
20 21	the period between April 9 th of 2015 and April 12 th of 2015, did you have a home computer?
20 21 22	the period between April 9 th of 2015 and April 12 th of 2015, did you have a home computer? A. I do have a home computer, yes.
20 21 22 23	the period between April 9 th of 2015 and April 12 th of 2015, did you have a home computer? A. I do have a home computer, yes. Q. Did you have one then?

- I -- I had a cell phone, yes. 1 Α. 2 Now, you don't like hospital details; Q. right? They're long and boring. 3 4 Α. No, I don't like hospital details. No. 5 But when you testified you said that the Ο. 6 General Order provides that when you're on a hospital 7 detail, you only have to be there for two hours; is that 8 correct? There's something in it about that. It also 9 Α. says -- states that there need to be two officers, and 10 11 some other things. Right. And so let's take a look at Exhibit 11, 12 Q. in evidence, which is 11-14 on page 8, "One of the 13 directives is do not quard detainees for more than two 14 15 consecutive hours. When the hospital detail nears or exceeds two hours, notify your supervisor and request a 16 17 replacement member"; is that correct? Α. That is correct. 18 19 Okay. So you're familiar with what 11-14 Q. provides. 20 No, sir. I'm not familiar. That was probably 21 Α. adopted from the previous General Order. 22 23 Here's Exhibit 8, take as much time as you
 - want, tell me where the two hour limitation is in there.
 - A. I don't know. I can't find it in here.

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Q. It's not in there; is it? 1 2 Α. It isn't, no. 3 Now, you deny that you told Detective Teel that Q. 4 Mr. Gray, at the fourth stop, said I can't breathe. 5 Α. Yes, that is true. If he had said I can't breathe, and you heard 6 Q. 7 him say I can't breathe, would you agree that that would be a reason to get medical attention? 8 9 Α. I do agree, yes. You know Detective Teel from when she was at 10 Q. 11 the Western District; correct? 12 Α. I do, yes. When she saw you at Shock Trauma on April $12^{\rm th}$, 13 Ο. 2015, she gave you a hug; didn't she? 14 15 Α. Perhaps. I'm not certain. And when she saw you, when you came down to 16 17 Police Headquarters to give the statement that was video and audio recorded, she gave you a hug then, too; didn't 18 19 she, before the statement? 20 Α. I can't say if she did. 21 You heard her testify she did. Q. I heard her testify, yes. 22 A. 23 You don't deny that she did? Ο. I'm sorry? 24 Α. 25 You don't deny that she did? Q.

That she did what? 1 Α. 2 Gave you a hug. Q. I can't confirm nor deny. 3 Α. 4 Q. She -- you guys were friendly; weren't you? 5 Α. I'm friendly with my fellow officer, yes, I am. Well, with Officer Teel. 6 Q. 7 Α. With the general public, I tend to be friendly with the general public. 8 When Officer Teel called you, on or about April 9 Q. 15th, she called you specifically to talk to you about 10 11 Druid Hill and Dolphin Street, what we've been calling Stop 4; didn't she? 12 13 That's not true. She asked me about the incident. 14 15 Q. She called you because she had seen the KGA that said 43 was responding to Officer Goodson's request 16 17 for assistance to check out the prisoner; isn't that right? 18 19 I can't confirm it nor deny it. I don't know that answer. I don't know why she called me. She could 20 -- she could tell you that. 21 MR. SCHATZOW: Could I have Exhibit 31-D, 22 23 please? BY MR. SCHATZOW: 24 25 You heard her testify about her reason. Q.

Α. I heard her testify. But, you know --1 2 Okay. Didn't you confirm to her that you were Q. 3 the unit that responded to the call for assistance that 4 came from Unit 7B91? 5 Α. I'm sorry. Repeat the question. 6 Q. Didn't you confirm to her that you were the unit on April 12th who responded to the call to assist 7 Unit 7B91? 8 9 Α. That is true, yes. And 7B91 was Goodson as the van driver; 10 Q. 11 correct, Officer Goodson? 12 Α. Officer Goodson was the wagon operator that day, yes. 13 And 7B91 is an identification number; correct? 14 Ο. 15 Α. That is true, yes. And you told her that when you arrived, Officer 16 Q. 17 Goodson got out and responded to the rear of the wagon; correct? 18 19 Α. I -- that's one of the things I told her, yes. 20 Okay. And responded to the rear of the wagon Ο. for people who aren't police officers, simply means he 21 got out and walked to the back of the wagon; is that 22 23 right? That is true. 24 Α. 25 Okay. And you told her that as the doors Q.

- 1 opened, you observed Mr. Gray lying on his stomach, head 2 facing the front of wagon, with his feat towards the doors, saying help; is that what you told her? 3 4 Α. I did tell her that, yes. 5 And then you further advised that you asked Mr. Ο. 6 Gray what he needed, at which time he said he couldn't 7 breathe. 8 Α. No. That's not true, no. 9 She got that wrong? Q. She got that wrong, yes. 10 Α. She --11 Ο. And, Officer Porter, you -- you then told her that you asked Mr. Gray if he needed a medic, and Mr. 12 Gray said -- stated yeah. 13 This is -- that's like -- a condensed version 14 15 of our conversation. It doesn't go in chronological 16 order, but it's a condensed version of what we spoke on 17 the phone. Thank you, Officer. If you could please just 18 Q. 19 listen to my question. 20 Did you tell her that you then asked Mr. Gray again -- excuse me. That you asked Mr. Gray if he needed 21 a medic, and Mr. Gray stated yeah? 22 That's a part of this conversation, yes. 23 And that you then asked -- you then asked Mr. 24 Q.
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Gray again if he needed a medic, and you asked Mr. Gray

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1	to get up; is that what you told her?
2	A. I I don't believe I told her that, no. It
3	wasn't phrased that way.
4	Q. How was it phrased?
5	A. I asked him like I testified to earlier,
6	what do you need, and when he asked me he said can you
7	help me up. I helped him up. And afterwards, I asked
8	him how are we getting to the hospital today? Do we need
9	do you need a medic or do you need a hospital? He
10	responded yes.
11	Q. So he stated I can't get up; didn't he?
12	A. No. He said can you help me up, is what he
13	said.
14	Q. Uh-huh. I see.
15	And
16	MR. MURTHA: Objection.
17	THE COURT: Sustained.
18	MR. SCHATZOW: Oh, to the comment? I'm sorry,
19	Your Honor.
20	THE COURT: Yes. Please let's not have any
21	comments. Just ask questions from both sides.
22	MR. SCHATZOW: I apologize, Your Honor.
23	THE COURT: Apology accepted.
24	BY MR. SCHATZOW:
25	Q. So let me excuse me.
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1	MR. SCHATZOW: Strike that, Your Honor.
2	BY MR. SCHATZOW:
3	Q. Both at Stop 4 and at Stop 5, Mr. Gray never
4	asked you for a medic; did he?
5	A. No, he did not. I I asked him if he wanted
6	
7	Q. I'm sorry.
8	A. I'm sorry.
9	I asked him offered one to him.
10	Q. Right. And at Stop 4 and Stop 5, Mr. Gray
11	never asked you to take him to the hospital; correct?
12	A. No, he didn't. No.
13	Q. You are the one who introduced the term medic
14	to the conversation you were having with Mr. Gray;
15	correct?
16	A. That is true, yes.
17	Q. And you are the one who introduced the term
18	hospital to the conversation you were having with Mr.
19	Gray; correct?
20	A. That is true, yes.
21	Q. Okay. Now, what you've been telling us here
22	today is that you didn't tell Detective Teel that Mr.
23	Gray said I can't breathe at Stop 4, but that she got
24	confused because you told her you heard him saying I
25	can't breathe at Stop 1; isn't that right?

1 Α. When she asked me to begin about my -- when she 2 said can you tell me what happened, I started from the 3 beginning. 4 Q. Well, when you sat for the video and recorded 5 interview on April 17th, 2005, Detective Teel and Detective Anderson were there; correct? 6 7 Α. That is true, yes. And you went down there voluntarily; correct? 8 Ο. I -- well, she asked me to come in. 9 10 She asked you to come, but she didn't force you Q. 11 to come in; did she? No, she didn't. No. 12 Α. 13 She didn't threaten you with anything if you Q. didn't come in? 14 15 Α. She didn't, no. She didn't promise you anything if you would 16 Q. 17 come in? No, sir. 18 Α. 19 She asked you to come in? Q. 20 Α. Yes. 21 And during that interview, she and Detective Q. Anderson asked you questions about all -- everything that 22 23 happened that day insofar as you and Mr. Gray were concerned; is that right? 24 25 Α. Yes, that's true. Yes.

1 Q. And you never told them that you heard Mr. Gray 2 say I can't breathe when you were at Stop 1; correct? That's correct. I did not tell them that, no. 3 Α. 4 Q. You didn't tell that. 5 What you told them, at least three times, was 6 that all you could hear was yelling and screaming; 7 correct? Isn't that what you told them? 8 Α. I'm not certain. Could you produce that for 9 me? Sure. We could. Let's start with page 6. 10 Q. 11 You want to listen to it? 12 No. I don't need to listen to it, no. Α. MR. SCHATZOW: Your Honor, this is the 13 transcript that we used simply as an aid to listening. I 14 15 can use that, or I can play it, Your Honor, whichever you 16 prefer. THE COURT: It's your witness. He said he 17 didn't need to hear but, but that's -- you're crossing. 18 19 MR. SCHATZOW: Thank you. 20 THE COURT: Just identify it for the record. MR. SCHATZOW: Yes, Your Honor. 21 This is a transcript of -- it's entitled "In 22 the Matter of Freddie Gray Investigation, William Porter, 23 April 17th, 2015." It's a transcript prepared of the 24 25 audio and video interview that took place that day.

1	THE COURT: Hasn't it already been marked?
2	MR. SCHATZOW: I don't think it was actually
3	marked, Your Honor.
4	MR. MURTHA: It was used as a demonstrative
5	exhibit.
6	MR. SCHATZOW: It was used as a demonstrative
7	exhibit for the jury during the playing of it.
8	THE COURT: All right. It will be marked as
9	State's 34-A for identification only.
10	(State's Exhibit Number 34-A
11	was marked for identification.)
12	MR. SCHATZOW: Thank you.
13	THE CLERK: You're welcome.
14	BY MR. SCHATZOW:
15	Q. Now, I'm directing your attention to Page 6,
16	and I'm specifically this is line 12. And it's
17	talking about the time that you testified that you were
18	on Westwood and Bruce, and you were looking for someone
19	else.
20	A. All right.
21	Q. And don't you say he was just yelling and
22	screaming?
23	A. That is on the paper, yes.
	i
24	Q. Okay. Isn't that what you told them, or do you
24 25	Q. Okay. Isn't that what you told them, or do you want to hear it?

1	MR. MURTHA: Objection.
2	THE COURT: Sustained.
3	BY MR. SCHATZOW:
4	Q. Are you questioning whether this is
5	A. No. I'm not questioning it. That's that's
6	on the yes.
7	Q. Okay. And then on on Page 12, lines 1 and
8	2, you said, "The entire time I could hear that there was
9	someone one street over just yelling"; is that what you
10	said?
11	A. You can yell, "I can't breathe." That's
12	Q. Did you
13	A. You can yell that. But
14	Q say
15	A. No. I didn't elaborate, no. They didn't ask
16	me to elaborate. But you can yell, "I can't breathe."
17	Q. One can yell, "I can't breathe." But did you
18	ever tell anybody until you came to this court today that
19	Detective Teel was wrong, and you had heard Mr. Gray
20	yelling, "I can't breathe," when you were at Stop 1?
21	A. Had I told anyone before today? Yes, I have.
22	Yes.
23	Q. Well, I don't mean about your I don't mean
24	your attorneys. I had you gone these officers, at
25	the end of this interview

1	MR. MURTHA: Objection.
2	THE COURT: Sustained.
3	BY MR. SCHATZOW:
4	Q. Okay. At the end of this interview
5	THE COURT: Sustained.
6	Get to a question.
7	MR. SCHATZOW: Yes, Your Honor.
8	BY MR. SCHATZOW:
9	Q. You were asked this day, at the end of the
10	interview, whether there was anything you cared to add
11	which may aid in the investigation or clarify anything
12	I've asked of you, or clarifying anything you said;
13	weren't you?
14	A. I was asked that, yes.
15	Q. And you said, "No, sir"; didn't you?
16	A. I think I might have said something about
17	seatbelting afterwards.
18	Q. Well, here's where it is, sir, if you'll direct
19	your attention to Page 79, at the bottom of the page,
20	going up to Page 80, which is
21	A. If I could could I manipulate this?
22	Q. Could you what?
23	A. Manipulate this. Can I
24	Q. No. I'm just I'm asking you about this
25	this section, sir.

- 1 Α. But on my statement --2 This page where you said -- did you -- what the Ο. transcript reflects is that Detective Anderson said, "All 3 4 right. I just want to clarify anything you -- else you 5 care to add at this time, which may aid in this 6 investigation or clarify anything I've asked of you or 7 clarify anything you said"; isn't that what he asked you? 8 Α. He did ask me that. And that's the second time 9 he asked me that. Right. And you said, "No, sir"; correct? 10 Q. 11 Α. Yes. The second time, yes. 12 The second time. Q. And this was at the end of the interview. 13 There's no more interview after that. 14 15 After that part, no, there's no more interview Α. from there. 16 Okay. And then on Page 15 -- at Page 15, you 17 Ο. say, starting on line 18 through line 23, "Because the --18 19 I guess they had called for more units because the crowd 20 was -- was -- I was more concerned with the crowd than I was with whomever they were arresting. I could hear that 21 he was yelling or whatever. But I -- I was trying to 22 keep the crowd back from getting to those officers"; is 23
 - A. I did say that, yes.

that what you said, sir?

24

25

1	Q. When you arrived at Stop 2 you told well,
2	strike that question.
3	When you met with Detectives Teel and Anderson,
4	you told them that when you arrived at Stop 2, you parked
5	about 20 feet away from the van. Stop 2 being the stop
6	at Baker and Mount Street; is that right?
7	A. Yes, that is true.
8	Q. Okay. And you told them that you got about
9	halfway to the van when Mr. Gray was put into the van;
10	correct?
11	A. Perhaps. Yes.
12	Q. And you told them that you couldn't you
13	weren't close enough to see whether Mr. Gray had leg
14	irons on; correct?
15	A. That is correct.
16	Q. And you told them that you couldn't identify
17	the officers who were putting him into the van; correct?
18	A. That is that is not correct, no.
19	Q. Okay. I'm going to direct your attention
20	I'm sorry
21	MR. MURTHA: What page is that, sir?
22	MR. SCHATZOW: I think if we it depends on
23	how much we'll start on 33.
24	MR. MURTHA: Okay.
25	BY MR. SCHATZOW:

1 Detective Anderson says, "So what side was this Q. 2 officer standing on, the right side of Mr. Gray or the 3 left side? I mean, if -- if the wagon was facing south; 4 right?" 5 And you say, "South, right." True. 6 Α. 7 Q. I'm reading accurately; correct? 8 Α. That is accurate. Yes, sir. 9 Okay. And so Detective Anderson says, "So is Q. he -- was he on the, like, the west side of Mr. Gray or 10 11 the east side." And then Mr. Anderson interrupts you and says, 12 "You understand what I'm saying?" 13 And you say, "I don't -- I don't recall. I 14 15 don't know, man." So Anderson -- you then say, "So he's standing 16 17 behind him, is what I thought." And him is Mr. Gray there; right? The officer is standing behind him who is 18 19 putting him in the car; correct? That's what you're 20 talking about? 21 Α. No. 22 Q. No? 23 In the wagon is what I'm talking about. Α. Putting him in the wagon. 24 Q. 25 Α. Yes.

1	Q. Yes.
2	Okay. At Stop 2.
3	A. I I believe this is at Stop 2. I don't know
4	where we're where in reference we're talking about.
5	Q. And he said well, here's where "So you
6	know west would be facing towards, like, the Fulton side;
7	right?"
8	A. That's what it says.
9	Q. So
10	A. No. I didn't say that. Detective Anderson
11	said that.
12	Q. Right. But that helps you orient yourself.
13	He then goes on, you say "Right," and he says,
14	"And East would be toward, like, I guess toward, what,
15	Mount Street?"
16	So doesn't that orient you that we're talking
17	about Stop 2 now?
18	A. That's yes.
19	Q. Okay. And he says you say, "He was behind
20	him."
21	And Detective Anderson says, "Okay. So he was
22	he was more like on on this side of him, or I
23	guess, but if he's facing this way, I guess he'd be on
24	his right side. Was he on the right side of Mr. Gray?"
25	And you say, "He was he was on neither left

1 nor right. He was behind him. He was directly behind 2 him, grabbing him from behind." And Detective Anderson says, "Oh, directly 3 4 behind him." 5 And then he asks you where his feet were 6 positioned, and you tell him that. 7 And then you say -- well, he asked you where 8 the feet were positioned, and you say, "All right. 9 so picture people were at the wagon." This is you 10 talking. 11 Α. That's me. 12 "All right. So you need to get this prisoner, Q. who is facing southbound, and the wagon here facing 13 southbound at the wagon. The officer is behind him. He 14 15 grabs him from behind. The door is already open. He's 16 pushing him and pulling him into the wagon. He pushes him into the wagon. He tries to, like, kick his feet out 17 or whatever. Then the officer goes on the other side of 18 19 him and pulls him into the wagon is what I saw." 20 Detective Anderson, "So the officer got into the wagon and pulls him in." 21 And you say, "Right." 22 That's accurate so far? 23 That is accurate so far. 24 Α. Okay. And Detective Anderson says, "So someone 25 Q.

climbed up in the wagon and pulls him in." 1 2 And you say, "After he had tried to pull him in, he got him halfway in through the doors, and he's, 3 4 like, kicking his feet -- his feet. And the officer goes 5 around him, and then pulls him into the wagon." 6 And Detective Anderson says, "So the officer 7 did it by himself?" And you say, "Right." 8 9 And Detective Anderson says, "You saw all of that, and you don't know which officer it was?" 10 11 And you say, "I don't know. I was back out 12 far, man." Isn't that right? 13 14 That's what it says. Yes, that's what it 15 reads. 16 Okay. And that's what you -- and it reads that way because that's what you actually said; isn't it? 17 Well, you're leaving out parts. But sure, yes. 18 Α. 19 And then it goes on to say that it's a bicycle officer who has the -- who happens to be slender, so it's either 20 Nero or Lieutenant Rice. But, yes, you're leaving out 21 22 things. Well, I'm not leaving anything out in what we 23 just read. 24 25 In what we just read, no. No. Α.

1 Q. And you didn't identify the officer because you told them I was too far back, man. 2 3 It was -- I said it was a white, slender 4 officer, Nero or Lieutenant Rice, is what I said. 5 MR. SCHATZOW: Excuse me one second, Your 6 Honor. 7 BY MR. SCHATZOW: When he said -- when Detective Anderson said 8 Ο. 9 you saw all that and you don't know which officer it was, your response was, "I don't know. I was back out far" --10 11 MR. MURTHA: Objection. 12 THE COURT: Sustained. Sustained. 13 Ask another question. 14 MR. SCHATZOW: Okay. 15 THE COURT: That hasn't already been answered. BY MR. SCHATZOW: 16 17 But the fact of the matter is you wasn't -- you Ο. weren't back out far; were you? 18 19 Α. I -- I don't -- I wasn't back out far? 20 From the wagon? Ο. 21 Α. I walked up to the wagon. 22 Q. You were right up at the back of the wagon; weren't you? 23 24 Α. I walked up to the wagon. 25 Right. Even though you told the officers when Q.

1 they interviewed you you were only halfway back. 2 I'm sorry. It was -- it was about a week ago 3 when I had done that testimony. 4 Q. It was --5 Α. It was a week later. It was -- it was five days later. 6 Q. 7 Α. Oh, I'm sorry. 8 Q. It was on Friday; right? Correct? 9 Α. I can't remember. Perhaps. It was April 17th; wasn't it? 10 Q. 11 Α. All right. Yes. And that's five days after April 12th; can you 12 Q. agree with that? 13 Yes. That is five days after April 12th, yes. 14 Α. 15 MR. SCHATZOW: In fact, if we could see which exhibit number is it, the cell phone video, 25, Your 16 17 Honor? 18 THE COURT: Okay. 19 (Brief pause.) 20 (Whereupon, a portion of Exhibit 25, the cell phone video, was played in open court, but is 21 untranscribed herein.) 22 23 BY MR. SCHATZOW: Stop right there. That's you getting out of 24 Q. 25 the car; isn't it, sir?

Α. 1 That is me getting out of the car. Yes, sir. 2 Q. Okay. 3 MR. SCHATZOW: Would you continue to roll it? 4 (Whereupon, a portion of Exhibit 25, the cell 5 phone video, was played in open court, but is untranscribed herein.) 6 7 MR. SCHATZOW: Stop it. BY MR. SCHATZOW: 8 9 And then, sir, in the -- in the dark blue Q. uniform, back to the camera, something coming out of his 10 11 back pocket, that's you, sir? 12 Α. That is me, yes. Okay. And you're right on back of the camera 13 14 camera. 15 MR. SCHATZOW: If you could keep rolling, 16 please. 17 (Whereupon, a portion of Exhibit 25, the cell phone video, was played in open court, but is 18 19 untranscribed herein.) 20 BY MR. SCHATZOW: You were right there, and you didn't see 21 Q. Lieutenant Rice come out of the wagon? 22 23 At that that point in time, I didn't know it was Lieutenant Rice. I just knew it was a white, slender 24 25 officer.

1 Q. Didn't you have -- but Lieutenant Rice is a shift commander there. 2 He is a shift commander, yes. 3 4 Q. There were only -- I don't know what Mr. 5 Proctor said, 11 people working that day; right? 6 Α. That is true, yes. 7 Q. You'd been there for two years. 8 Α. Yes. 9 Right. But you couldn't identify -- you didn't Q. identify him to the --10 11 Α. I didn't identify him. I said it was one of the bike officers that was present at that arrest. 12 One of the bike officers. Q. 13 14 Sir, were you -- you had talked about, in your 15 testimony in response to a question, you said something about the don't snitch culture in Baltimore; do you 16 remember being asked about that? 17 There was a -- not -- don't -- stop snitching 18 Α. 19 is what it's called. Yeah. 20 Stop snitching. Right. Ο. Is that a culture in the Baltimore Police 21 Department? 22 23 Α. Absolutely not. I'm actually offended that you would say something like that. 24 25 Well, sir, did you not tell the officers who Q.

were investigating this truth the truth about where you 1 2 were standing and what you saw because you didn't want to involve other officers? 3 4 No, that's not true. I -- I identified the Α. 5 officers. I said they were -- I said everyone's name. gave all the officer's names. Lieutenant Rice, Nero, 6 7 I said every officer that was there. 8 Ο. You didn't say the officer who was coming out 9 of the wagon --I -- I --Α. 10 -- right while you were standing at the back of 11 Ο. 12 wagon; did you? I didn't know who it was. I'd be assuming if I 13 -- if I said who -- which one it was. I didn't know. 14 15 Q. And would it be fair to say that, at the time, 16 you were as close to that officer as I am to you now? Possibly. 17 Α. When -- after Mr. Gray went into the wagon, at 18 Q. 19 Stop 2, there came a time when you had a conversation 20 with Brandon Ross; correct? That is true. I -- yes. 21 Α. You say that you told Brandon Ross to call 911? 22 Q. 23 I said to him to call 911 for a supervisor 24 complaint, yes. 25 Did you -- you listened to the cell phone video Q.

1	that was played here in court; correct?
2	A. I I did listen to it, yes.
3	Q. And you've listened to it before then; haven't
4	you? Before today in court and before we played it?
5	A. No. I hadn't seen this video before we got to
6	court, no.
7	Q. Okay. You didn't hear anything on that video
8	about telling Brandon Ross to call 911; did you?
9	A. You can't really hear any other voices other
LO	than Brandon Ross because he's yelling, but I'm having a
11	conversation with him, much like I'm having with you.
12	Q. You didn't hear on the cell phone Brandon Ross
L3	you you didn't hear yourself telling Brandon Ross
L4	to call 911 on the cell phone video; did you?
15	A. You don't hear much on the on the recording
L6	because it's in Brandon Ross' pocket, and he's yelling.
L7	And I'm having a conversation like I'm having with you
18	right now.
L9	Q. Sir, my question is what you heard. You didn't
20	hear on the cell phone video Brandon Ross excuse me,
21	you telling Brandon Ross to call 911.
22	A. You didn't hear much, other than Brandon Ross
23	yelling, because he was yelling. The pocket was in his
24	phone.
25	THE COURT: Sir, answer the question that was

1	posed to you, please.
2	THE WITNESS: No.
3	BY MR. SCHATZOW:
4	Q. And, in fact, when Brandon Ross when you
5	told Brandon Ross the supervisor here is Lieutenant Rice,
6	and Brandon Ross says, in effect, he's the guy who was
7	who's here who's involved; I need somebody else. What
8	you told him to do was go to the media; right?
9	A. That's what I instructed him to do, yes.
10	Q. You didn't tell him to call Internal Affairs,
11	did you, at the police department?
12	A. No, I didn't tell him that. No.
13	Q. No.
14	And your telling him to go to the media was
15	like telling him to go fly a kite; wasn't it?
16	MR. MURTHA: Objection.
17	MR. SCHATZOW: You just wanted to get rid of
18	him.
19	THE COURT: Overruled.
20	Did you?
21	THE WITNESS: No. That is not I didn't want
22	to just get rid of him. No.
23	BY MR. SCHATZOW:
24	Q. You thought you were being helpful to him?
25	A. Yes. Absolutely.
	119

1 this prisoner, is what he said. 2 My question, sir, is you didn't ask him any Ο. questions about why --3 4 Α. No, I didn't. I didn't ask him any questions. 5 No. 6 Q. And when you were interviewed -- let me strike 7 that. When you did the demonstration with your two 8 9 lawyers today about how you got Mr. Gray off the floor of the van at Stop 4 and onto the bench, you said that you 10 11 were just assisting Mr. Gray because he was using his own muscles to get up; is that right? 12 13 Those are the words I said, yes. Α. Okay. But, in fact, when you were interviewed 14 Ο. 15 by Detectives Teel and Anderson on April 17th, you never 16 say that Mr. Gray helped in any way to get from the floor 17 to the bench; did you? I didn't elaborate on how I got him from 18 Α. 19 the floor to the bench. I thought it was obvious. 20 In -- in fact -- but you thought it was obvious to Detectives Teel and Anderson without explaining it to 21 them? 22 23 Α. Yes. Okay. In fact, didn't you repeatedly tell 24 Q. them, "I put him on the bench"? 25

1 Α. Those are my words, yes. But it would be 2 physically impossible for me to place someone onto a bench in that tight of a space. 3 4 Q. You -- you told them you put him on the bench, 5 you placed him on the bench; correct? He was on the bench. 6 7 Α. He was on the bench; that is correct, yes. 8 Ο. And you told them that you put him there? 9 I assisted him there, yes. Α. But you never told them that Mr. Gray played 10 Q. 11 any role in getting himself from the floor to the bench; did you? 12 I apologize. They didn't ask me that question, 13 Α. 14 no. 15 Q. And -- well, they ask you whether you put him 16 on the bench. And when you said yes, or when you said, 17 "I put him on the bench," you never said, "I put him on the bench, but it was really with his assistance. He 18 19 was, you know, actively involved in getting on the 20 bench." You never said anything about that in words or substance; did you? 21 That didn't come into question until today, no. 22 Α. 23 The question, "Did you put him on the bench," Ο. would not have generated that response from you because 24

that's what you were asked; wasn't it?

25

1 Α. No. That would not generate that response, no. 2 You would have had to have been specifically Q. 3 asked, "To what extend did Mr. Gray use his own muscle 4 power to get on the bench?" 5 Α. That didn't come into question until today, 6 sir. Please listen to my question. Let's -- let's 7 Q. 8 get the exact question. 9 If we could go to -- in fact, why don't we just 10 11 MR. SCHATZOW: Your Honor, with the Court's permission, I think it's easier to just play the audio 12 portions. I think -- do we have the video --13 14 THE COURT: It's your witness. 15 MR. SCHATZOW: -- (Inaudible at 2:37:58 p.m.)? THE COURT: What's the -- there's no question. 16 So I don't understand what you mean. 17 18 MR. SCHATZOW: I'm about to ask the question, 19 Your Honor. I apologize. 20 BY MR. SCHATZOW: Weren't -- weren't -- didn't you describe what 21 Q. you did? 22 23 MR. MURTHA: Who -- can I get a page, please? MR. SCHATZOW: Sure. 42, line 5. 24 25 BY MR. SCHATZOW:

1	Q. Page 42, line 5. The question that Detective
2	Teel asks is, "Okay. And what did you take me from
3	that point, what happened?" We're at Dolphin and Druid
4	Hill.
5	And you start talking about what happened.
6	You're giving your own narrative about it. And you say,
7	"And he doesn't say anything. And he's like, help me,
8	help me up. So I was, like, what what's the deal. So
9	I pulled him up"; isn't that what you said?
10	A. If I could if I could go along with you if
11	you don't mind. I'm sorry. I can't see what you're
12	reading. I apologize, sir.
13	Q. Well you haven't you haven't studied this
14	statement
15	MR. MURTHA: Objection.
16	MR. SCHATZOW: when
17	THE COURT: Sustained. Strike the question.
18	Ask a question.
19	BY MR. SCHATZOW:
20	Q. Sir, weren't you weren't you asked by
21	Detective Teel to
22	MR. MURTHA: Line and page?
23	MR. SCHATZOW: from
24	THE COURT: Line and page.
25	MR. SCHATZOW: Page 41.
	124

1	BY MR. SCHATZOW:
2	Q. She said you say that, on 41, line 12, "I
3	think I may have been, like, right at the intersection of
4	Dolphin and Druid Hill"; correct?
5	A. That is what it says, yes.
6	Q. And Detective Teel says, "Were you behind the"
7	and you say, "I was behind, yes"; is that what
8	what's said?
9	A. That's what it says, yes, sir.
10	Q. Okay. And then Detective Teel says, "Okay.
11	And what did you take me from that point, what
12	happened"; isn't that her question?
13	A. That is what happens, yes.
14	Q. And then you proceed to tell her what happened;
15	correct?
16	A. That's yes.
17	Q. And part of what you tell her when it comes to
18	putting Mr. Gray on the bench, you say, "So I pull him
19	up"; correct?
20	A. If you skip everything else I've said, and go
21	there, then yes, that's what it's says.
22	Q. Well, is there is there anywhere where you
23	told them that Mr. Gray played any role in getting on the
24	bench?
25	A. That didn't come into question until today,

1	sir, no.	
2	Q. Well, she asked you what happened; didn't she?	
3	A. She did ask me what happened, yes.	
4	Q. When you were asked today by your lawyers what	
5	happened, you told them that you were merely assisting	
6	Mr. Gray, that he was using his own power to get to the	
7	bench.	
8	A. Because that came	
9	Q. Correct?	
10	A into the question, yes.	
11	Q. No. They just they asked you what happened,	
12	and she asked you what happened, and you gave two	
13	different answers; didn't you?	
14	A. No. I didn't give I further explained my	
15	answer from here.	
16	Q. But you didn't have that explanation anywhere	
17	in this statement; correct?	
18	A. When I made that statement, I was making it as	
19	a witness. I didn't know I was a suspect in the case.	
20	Q. Was that a reason to provide less information?	
21	A. I didn't know I needed to defend myself in that	
22	statement, no.	
23	Q. Because I did you think that you had an	
24	obligation to tell them the truth?	
25	A. Absolutely. I told them the truth.	

1 Q. Did you think you had an obligation to tell them the complete truth? 2 3 Α. Absolutely. 4 Q. So why didn't you tell them about Mr. Gray 5 helping you up -- Mr. Gray helping himself up, as you 6 helped him up? 7 Α. Why didn't I tell them that he was assisting? I thought it was obvious. 8 9 Now, you had -- at Stop 4, you had the Q. opportunity to put that seatbelt around Mr. Gray; didn't 10 11 you? That is true. 12 Α. And you didn't do it; correct? 13 Q. 14 I did not, no. Α. 15 Q. And you didn't call a medic? No, I didn't. 16 Α. 17 And your testimony is that you got this call Q. for an urgent backup, and that's when you got out of the 18 19 van? 20 That's not -- no. No. 21 You were already out of the van? Q. 22 I was already out of the van, yes. Α. 23 All right. And the call for urgent -- it Q. wasn't an urgent backup. It was a call for 10-16. 24 It's 25 just a backup; isn't it?

1	Α.	There was some urgency.
2	Q.	Single 13 is an emergency
3		MR. MURTHA: Objection.
4		THE COURT: Sustained.
5		MR. SCHATZOW: I'm asking a question.
6		BY MR. SCHATZOW:
7	Q.	Isn't single 13 the emergency call?
8		MR. MURTHA: Objection.
9		THE COURT: Overruled.
10		THE WITNESS: That is officer down, send
11	assistanc	e.
12		BY MR. SCHATZOW:
13	Q.	Right. And 10-16 is is I need a backup.
14	And it co	uld be an emergency, or it could not be an
15	emergency	; right?
16	Α.	Would you like for me to explain to you the 10
17	codes, and	d how they go?
18	Q.	I would like
19		THE COURT: No. Probably what he wants you to
20	do is ans	wer the question that he poses, and not ask him
21	a questio	n.
22		THE WITNESS: All right.
23		Can you repeat your question?
24		BY MR. SCHATZOW:
25	Q.	Yes. A 10-16 is the way one calls for backup,
		128

1 whether it's an emergency or non-emergency; isn't it? 2 The way I understand it, in my training and experience, 10-16 is urgent backup. 3 4 Q. Okay. Let's talk about your training a little 5 bit. 6 Do you remember the part of your medical 7 training that Officer Carson-Johnson testified about teaching you involving calling a medic when someone 8 9 requests a medic? I recall her testimony, yes. 10 Α. 11 Ο. No. Do you recall that part of your training? It's not vivid, but I got that training. 12 Α. Hmm. When you say it's not vivid, do you recall some 13 Q. part of it? 14 15 Α. Some parts of it, of the LEMAT (phonetic) class, yes. 16 17 I don't mean parts of the -- I mean part Ο. of you call a medic when somebody requests a medic. 18 19 No. I think what she said -- I'm sorry. No, Α. 20 I -no. You don't recall it? 21 Q. She said you've got to be a detective, I think 22 23 the words that she used. You've got to be a detective and use your discretion is what she said when she 24 25 testified.

You also heard her say, didn't you, that when 1 Q. 2 somebody requests a medic, you get them a medic, and then you ask them questions so you can get information to give 3 4 to the medic? 5 I did hear her say that, yes. 6 Q. Okay. Do you remember that from your training? 7 Α. I -- I remember that here, not necessarily in 8 my training, no. No. 9 But you do remember parts of your medical Q. 10 training; don't you? 11 Α. I do, yes. 12 Just not that part? Q. Just not that part, no. 13 Α. 14 Ο. And also in your training, you were trained to 15 put a seatbelt on anybody you transport unless it would 16 be a safety issue. Dangerous for you; correct? I -- I never -- until Agent Bilheimer 17 (phonetic) got up here, I -- I never heard that. 18 We had 19 no wagon training. There was no such things as a wag -we didn't have a wagon training. 20 Well, he was teaching you vehicle procedures; 21 Q. wasn't he? 22 Yeah. He was teaching you vehicle procedures; 23 wasn't he? 24 25 Yeah. He was -- he was the EVOC (phonetic) Α.

1 teacher; that is true, yes. 2 Right. So you don't recall him teaching what Ο. he said he taught about seatbelts; is that right? 3 4 Α. No. I don't. I'm sorry, I don't. No. 5 But it is what's right in that K-14 order, Ο. 6 which you say you received on flash drive? 7 Α. I received the General Orders on a flash drive, 8 yes. 9 Right. And during the 11 months you were in Q. the academy, did you ever look on the flash drive at any 10 11 of the Orders? Just the specific ones that they asked us to. 12 There's a lot of General Orders. 13 14 0. Well, this one involves persons in custody. 15 Did you think it was important to look at the one called Persons in Custody? 16 I looked at the specific General Orders that 17 they asked us to do for -- as far as our curricular in 18 19 the -- in the academy. 20 My question is did you think it was important to look at an Order called Persons in Custody? 21 There's no way -- I don't know what the General 22 Α. Orders are called until -- until they -- I think I don't 23 -- there's no guide that says Persons in Custody. It 24 says General Order, whatever the number is, and then they 25

	tell us to look it up.
2	Q. So if you you didn't look at the General
3	Orders?
4	A. I looked at the General Orders specifically for
5	the classes in the academy.
6	Q. And let me show you what's in evidence as
7	Exhibit 5, which is a receipt. Is that your signature on
8	the bottom of the receipt?
9	A. That's my signature at the bottom, yes.
LO	Q. And you signed for acknowledging receiving the
11	General Orders; correct, among other things?
12	A. I did sign there, yes.
13	Q. My question, did you sign it acknowledging
L4	receipt of the General Orders, among other things?
15	A. Yes. Yes. I said yes.
L6	Q. Okay. When you were interviewed by Detectives
L7	Teel and Anderson on April 17th of this year, you never
18	said anything about concern about your gun being a reason
L9	why you didn't seatbelt Mr. Gray; did you?
20	A. That is true.
21	Q. When you were at Stop 5 well, excuse me.
22	Before we get to Stop 5, you were at let's go back to
23	Stop 4.
24	You're outside the wagon, and you say you had a
25	conversation with an Officer Goodson about the prisoner

1	and going to the hospital; correct?
2	A. Yes, sir.
3	Q. Okay. And then you say you got called away by
4	the call for backup; is that right?
5	A. Everyone got the call for backup.
6	Q. Okay. There was a call for backup. But, in
7	fact, someone responded to that call before you did;
8	didn't they?
9	A. Yes.
10	Q. And there was a call for a wagon; wasn't there?
11	A. There was. Immediately after the backup, there
12	was a call for a wagon.
13	Q. Right. And then Officer Goodson responded to
14	the call for the wagon before you responded; didn't he?
15	A. Yes.
16	Q. And, in fact, then Lieutenant Rice, who was the
17	one who was making the call, indicated that he didn't
18	need any more back up, and then there was a subsequent
19	call where he asked for somebody to do crowd control at
20	North and Carey; correct?
21	A. I can't say for certain.
22	Q. Okay.
23	MR. SCHATZOW: If we could have the that
24	portion of the KGA played. Do we have Exhibit 30? It's
25	Exhibit 30. Can we have transcript

1	Your Honor, the transcript of this will be on
2	the screen. It's Exhibit 30.
3	BY MR. SCHATZOW:
4	Q. If you'd take a look at this, sir. Can you see
5	it from where you are?
6	A. Kind of.
7	MR. SCHATZOW: Your Honor, may he get closer if
8	he needs to?
9	THE COURT: He may.
10	BY MR. SCHATZOW:
11	Q. Now, at 9:06 and 57 seconds, where it says,
12	"09", that's Lieutenant Rice; correct?
13	A. I'm sorry.
14	Q. First line. Top line.
15	A. Yes. Yes.
16	Q. Okay. And he says 10-16, that's the backup
17	call; correct?
18	A. That is correct.
19	Q. 1600 North is the address; correct?
20	A. That is the address he gave, yes.
21	Q. Okay. Then on the next line, four seconds
22	later, that's the dispatcher; correct? Saying 1600 North
23	need a 10-16; correct?
24	A. That is correct.
25	Q. And the next thing that happens, five seconds
	134

1	after that, is 22, I'm in route; correct?
2	A. That is correct.
3	Q. And that is the officer who is Number 22 that
4	day? That's he's identifying himself, and he's saying
5	he's on route; correct?
6	A. That is 7 Baker 22.
7	MR. SCHATZOW: We're going to play it in just a
8	minute. Well, actually, why don't you why don't you
9	play it, so we can
10	BY MR. SCHATZOW:
11	Q. And then there's a 10-4 from the dispatcher;
12	correct?
13	A. Yes.
14	Q. Okay.
15	MR. SCHATZOW: Why don't you go ahead and play
16	that for him.
17	(Whereupon, the call was played in open court,
18	but remains untranscribed herein.)
19	MR. SCHATZOW: Stop there.
20	BY MR. SCHATZOW:
21	Q. Okay. Then the next thing that happens is
22	about two seconds after the dispatcher says yes, two
23	seconds after the dispatcher says 10-4, the request is
24	for a wagon; correct?
25	A. Umm

1	Q. If you look at the time?
2	A. Yeah, yeah. I see it. Yes, I see it. Sorry.
3	Yes.
4	Q. 9:07:09. You got it?
5	A. I got it, yes.
6	Q. Okay. And there's a request for a wagon;
7	right?
8	A. Yes. It says, "And a wagon and a wagon."
9	Q. And a wagon and a wagon.
10	And then, just about a second after that,
11	there's a call for 91; correct?
12	A. Yes.
13	Q. And seven seconds after that, because there's
14	no response, there's a call Baker 91; correct?
15	A. Yes.
16	Q. Okay. And Baker 91 is Officer Goodson;
17	correct?
18	A. He is.
19	Q. And then about two seconds after that, you hear
20	someone say, "Hang on, I'm going to have to turn around
21	and come back up there, 1600 North"; you see that?
22	A. Yes.
23	Q. Okay. We'll play that for a moment in a
24	minute
25	MR. SCHATZOW: Well, why don't we run it, play
	136

1	it through, and you can tell me whether that's Officer
2	Goodson.
3	(Whereupon, the call was played in open court,
4	but remains untranscribed herein.)
5	BY MR. SCHATZOW:
6	Q. Okay. Then and then you hear the dispatcher
7	say that 1600 North
8	MR. SCHATZOW: Why don't you Joe, play it
9	all the way through for us.
10	(Whereupon, the call was played in open court,
11	but remains untranscribed herein.)
12	BY MR. SCHATZOW:
13	Q. So, sir, what happened was
14	A. Can I take a seat?
15	Q. Yes, please.
16	Lieutenant Rice, who is 09, says we have things
17	contained, but we have a crowd forming, and we need North
18	and Carey covered; correct?
19	A. He does say that, yes.
20	Q. And you're the one who responds to that when
21	the dispatcher says, okay, I need a unit at North and
22	Carey, you identify yourself by saying 43; correct?
23	A. Yes.
24	Q. Because that is who you were that day, that was
25	your number; correct?

1 Α. That is true. 2 Okay. And you say I'm coming behind 91 up Q. there; right? 3 4 Α. Yes. 5 And 91 is the wagon, Officer Goodson; correct? Q. 6 Α. That is true, yes. 7 Q. All right. And you are coming behind him; 8 correct? 9 Α. I -- at the time when I said that, I was behind 10 where the wagon was, yes. Right. And at no time did you call Officer 11 Ο. Goodson, or when you were talking -- well, let me ask you 12 this. Did you hear all of this conversation while you 13 were talking with Officer Goodson behind the wagon? 14 15 Α. I think as a soon as -- I can't really recall, 16 but I'm going -- as soon as it came out 10-16, I would 17 have been heading back to my vehicle at that time. those seven seconds would have been getting in my car. 18 19 At any time, did you radio dispatch or Officer Q. Goodson, wait a minute, you can't go respond to this, 20 you've got a prisoner you've got to take to the hospital? 21 I can't do that. I -- I can't do that. 22 Α. 23 What do you mean you can't do that? Your radio Ο. worked; didn't it? 24 25 There's -- there's a hierarchy. I can't tell Α.

1 Officer Goodson what to do. And -- and -- I can't tell 2 Officer Goodson what to do. 3 Okay. Now, my question is did you ever make an 4 effort to use your radio to contact Officer Goodson and 5 say you're supposed to take this guy to the hospital? 6 No, I didn't. No. There never came a time I 7 did that. All right. And did you -- there are other --8 Ο. 9 there were no other wagons in the Western that day? There were no other wagons in the Western that 10 11 day. 12 But there are other wagons in the City; aren't Q. there? 13 That is true, yes. There are other wagons. 14 Α. 15 Q. And if a wagon is out of service because it's taking someone to the hospital or because it got a flat 16 tire, then the dispatcher can get another wagon from 17 another district; can't they? 18 19 I don't make that decision. 20 Sir, I'm not asking you whether you made the decision. I'm asking you if a dispatcher can ask for a 21 wagon from another district. 22 23 Yes. Yes. A dispatcher can -- has the power 24 to do that, yes. 25 Okay. So did you really have a conversation Q.

1	with Officer Goodson about taking Mr. Gray to the
2	hospital?
3	A. I think I already answered that. And the
4	answer to that is yes, I did have a conversation.
5	Q. But you went to this scene, North and Carey,
6	behind the wagon, knowing full well that the wagon was
7	not going to the hospital; correct?
8	A. I no. That's not true.
9	Q. You did know the wagon was not going to the
10	hospital?
11	A. I got to the scene before the wagon got to the
12	scene.
13	Q. Right. But you left behind the wagon; didn't
14	you?
15	A. I was behind the wagon when I left, yes.
16	Q. Right. And you weren't you said I'm coming
17	behind 91 up there; correct?
18	A. Be be yes. That's what I said, yes.
19	Q. And you said it because you were behind 91;
20	correct?
21	A. My car was parked behind 91, yes.
22	Q. Well, you said, "I'm coming behind 91." You
23	didn't say, "I'm parked behind 91"; did you?
24	A. No. No. I didn't say that, no.
25	Q. And you knew that 91 had just said that he was

1	wagon down to the station?		
2	A. She did tell me to do the hospital detail. She		
3	there she never said anything about the wagon.		
4	Q. When you met with Detectives Teel and Anderson		
5	on April 17 th , 2015		
6	MR. SCHATZOW: At page 47, lines 2 through 7,		
7	Counsel.		
8	Thank you.		
9	BY MR. SCHATZOW:		
10	Q. Weren't you asked the following question, and		
11	didn't you give the following answer?		
12	A. I'm sorry		
13	Q. Detective		
14	A hold on. What where was it?		
15	Q. 47, lines 2 through 7.		
16	Detective Teel: "After she finished to talking		
17	to Mr. Gray what happened?"		
18	Officer Porter: "Uh. Well, she told me that I		
19	would have to take over the hospital detail, and just to		
20	follow the wagon down to the station."		
21	Is that what you said?		
22	A. That's what it says, yes.		
23	Q. But you didn't do that; did you?		
24	A. Yes, I did do that.		
25	Q. Your own testimony this morning was that you		

1	waited two to five minutes
2	A. I
3	Q before you went down to the station;
4	correct?
5	A. That is correct, yes.
6	Q. And and when you went down to the station,
7	you didn't go down Mount Street; you went down
8	Pennsylvania Avenue; didn't you?
9	A. No. No.
10	Q. Okay.
11	MR. SCHATZOW: You've got that?
12	BY MR. SCHATZOW:
13	Q. Your car number I think I already asked you
14	this. Just to be clear, your car number that you were
15	driving that day is 9239; isn't it?
16	A. Mmm.
17	Q. I've handed you Exhibit 5, the run sheet.
18	A. Yes. It says 9239. That's what it says, yes.
19	Q. And on the top of Baltimore Police cars, the
20	number of the car appears, but only the last three
21	digits; correct?
22	A. Yeah. That's true, yes.
23	MR. SCHATZOW: What's our next exhibit number?
24	THE CLERK: 77.
25	MR. SCHATZOW: Your Honor, at this time,
	143

1	pursuant to stipulation, I offer a CCTV disc, which is
2	Exhibit
3	I'm sorry?
4	THE CLERK: 77.
5	MR. SCHATZOW: 77.
6	(State's Exhibit Number 77
7	was marked for identification.)
8	THE COURT: And specifically what?
9	MR. SCHATZOW: This is a this is a scene
10	this CCTV of the wagon and the police cars, the wagon
11	leaving the scene at North and Pennsylvania. And
12	THE COURT: Okay.
13	MR. SCHATZOW: showing the delay the
14	timing and the direction of Officer Porter's car, Your
15	Honor.
16	THE COURT: Okay.
17	Any objection?
18	MR. MURTHA: I believe it's stipulated to, Your
19	Honor. No, Your Honor.
20	THE COURT: I hear it, right, a stipulation.
21	That's fine. Okay.
22	No objection. So entered.
23	(State's Exhibit Number 77
24	was received in evidence.)
25	MR. SCHATZOW: Okay.
	144

1		(Whereupon, the CCTV video was played in open
2	court.)	
3		MR. SCHATZOW: Stop it right there.
4		BY MR. SCHATZOW:
5	Q.	This is the wagon leaving the scene that we've
6	called Sto	op Number 5; isn't it, Officer Porter?
7	A.	Yes. That is, yes.
8	Q.	Okay. And your car was the first car in front
9	of the was	gon; wasn't it?
10	A.	I I can't I don't know. I can't
11	remember.	
12	Q.	Okay. We'll have a shot in a moment that will
13	let you se	ee the numbers.
14		MR. SCHATZOW: Go ahead, please.
15		(Whereupon, the CCTV video was played in open
16	court.)	
17		MR. SCHATZOW: Stop it there for just one
18	second.	
19		BY MR. SCHATZOW:
20	Q.	Sir, what what is this this street here,
21	that we're	e looking down?
22	A.	That's North Avenue.
23	Q.	Okay.
24		MR. SCHATZOW: Go ahead.
25		(Whereupon, the CCTV video was played in open
		145

1	court.)
2	BY MR. SCHATZOW:
3	Q. Excuse me, sir. That's your car, or one of
4	those cars is one of those cars
5	A. One of those cars are mine. Yes, that's true.
6	Q is yours. And that's on North Avenue,
7	facing eastbound; correct?
8	A. That would be westbound.
9	Q. Westbound. I'm sorry. Westbound. Fine.
10	(Whereupon, the CCTV video was played in open
11	court.)
12	MR. SCHATZOW: Stop it there for a second.
13	BY MR. SCHATZOW:
14	Q. Officer, you see that the officer for the first
15	car is now getting into his car?
16	A. I can see that, yes.
17	Q. Okay.
18	MR. SCHATZOW: You can keep rolling.
19	(Whereupon, the CCTV video was played in open
20	court.)
21	BY MR. SCHATZOW:
22	Q. Sir, isn't this your car, 239 get up as
23	close as you need to to see it turning down
24	Pennsylvania Avenue?
25	A. I see nine I see 239, yes.
	146

Turning down Pennsylvania? 1 Q. 2 Yes. He turned onto Pennsylvania; yeah. Α. And that's you. 239 is your car; right? 3 Q. 4 Α. Can I see that again? 5 The run sheet? Sure. Q. 6 Α. Yes. Can I see the run sheet? 7 Q. It's State's Exhibit 29. 8 Α. It says 9239, yep. 9 When you got to the Western District, you Q. opened up the door for Mr. Allan? 10 11 Α. No. 12 You opened up the door for Mr. Gray? Q. 13 Α. Yes. Okay. And when you opened the door at the 14 Ο. 15 Western District, which we've been referring to as Stop 6, you saw Mr. Gray in the same position that you had 16 seen him at Stop 5; correct? 17 As I explained earlier, it was -- it was more 18 Α. 19 exaggerated. 20 When you were interviewed by Detectives Teel and Anderson on April 17th of 2015, you did not indicate 21 that it was more exaggerated. You simply said, "He was 22 in the same position"; didn't you? 23 Yes. I -- I elaborated today. 24 Α. 25 But you didn't elaborate to them on April 17th? Q.

1	A. I did not, no.
2	Q. All you told them was that he was in the same
3	position.
4	And so what your testimony today is is
5	different than the information you gave to Detectives
6	Teel and Anderson; correct?
7	A. Not correct, no. I just elaborated today.
8	Q. Well, isn't that different? Didn't you add
9	something to what you told them?
10	A. I just expounded upon what I said.
11	Q. Well, but all you had told them was the same
12	position. Isn't same position different than same
13	position but more more exaggerated?
14	Q. I think you just said exactly what I've been
15	saying. The same position, but more exaggerated.
16	Q. Could you
17	A. You just said that.
18	Q. Sir, answer the question. What is what
19	when Detective Anderson, on April 17th, asked you, "What
20	did you see," didn't you say the same was he was he
21	was
22	MR. MURTHA: Excuse me.
23	MR. SCHATZOW: still sitting there leaning
24	against
25	MR. MURTHA: Excuse me.

1	MR. SCHATZOW: I'm just going to play it, Your
2	Honor, if you don't mind. I think that will be easier.
3	THE COURT: Well, no.
4	MR. SCHATZOW: Can you get that queued up?
5	THE COURT: Is there an objection?
6	MR. MURTHA: I'm just when he starts
7	reading, I would ask that
8	MR. SCHATZOW: I'm sorry.
9	MR. MURTHA: That's all I'm asking for.
10	MR. SCHATZOW: 62, 11 well, let's go back to
11	line 8.
12	MR. MURTHA: Okay. Thank you.
13	MR. SCHATZOW: Start at 62 on line 8.
14	And, Your Honor, in order to demonstrate what
15	he said, if we could play the video of that portion
16	alone.
17	You've got it? 62, page 8.
18	MR. MURTHA: Line 8.
19	MR. SCHATZOW: I'm sorry. Page 62, line 8.
20	Your Honor, we'll go back to the old tape now.
21	BY MR. SCHATZOW:
22	Q. 62, line 8. Detective Anderson says, "So when
23	you opened the door for Mr. Gray, Officer Porter"
24	You say, "Yeah."
25	Detective Anderson says, "What did you see?"
	149

1	And you say, "The same was he was he was
2	still sitting there leaning against the bench."
3	Isn't that what you say?
4	A. That is that's what I said, yes.
5	Q. Okay.
6	MR. SCHATZOW: Your Honor, if I could have a
7	Court's indulgence for a moment?
8	THE COURT: You may.
9	(Brief pause.)
10	MR. SCHATZOW: I'm sorry, Your Honor. I'm
11	apparently looking at 6 when I should have been looking
12	at 9.
13	And I think, Your Honor, I'm ready to conclude
14	now, if I can.
15	THE COURT: Okay.
16	BY MR. SCHATZOW:
17	Q. Officer Porter, this is State's Exhibit 9. I
18	want to show you what's marked as State's Exhibit 9 on
19	page that's numbered P0677.
20	A. Uh-huh.
21	Q. There's some typed information there, and then
22	there's handwriting; do you see that?
23	A. Yes.
24	Q. Is that your handwriting?
25	A. That is my handwriting, yes.

1 Q. And that's something you wrote when you were in 2 the training academy; correct? That is something I wrote in the training 3 4 academy. 5 And what you wrote when you were in the Q. 6 training academy was, "We do not transport injured 7 people. We rendered aid -- we render aid per our 8 training, and contact the medic. We cannot render aid while driving. There are civil liabilities. We risk 9 bodily fluid exposure." 10 11 Is that what you wrote? 12 That is an answer that I wrote that question, Α. 13 yes. 14 Q. And also, when you were in the academy, you 15 said that you only looked at the General Orders that were referenced in the materials that you had; correct? 16 That is what I said. 17 Α. And, in fact, in State's Exhibit 7, which is 18 Q. 19 the course materials for the vehicle procedure course you took that was taught by Officer Bilheimer (phonetic) --20 THE COURT: Identify for the record. 21 MR. SCHATZOW: Yeah. I'm sorry, Your Honor. 22 Exhibit 7, State's Exhibit 7 in evidence. 23 BY MR. SCHATZOW: 24 25 On page marked 0013013, there's a reference Q.

1 to -- there's an X next to reference documents. And on 2 the next page, under the reference materials, there's a 3 specific reference to K14; isn't there? 4 Α. Yes. 5 Now, finally, you said that what was ingrained Ο. 6 in you as a police officer was to protect life; isn't 7 that right? 8 Α. That is true. That is ingrained in every police officer. 9 But at Stop 4 and Stop 5 on April 12th, 2015, 10 Q. 11 you did not protect Freddie Gray's life; did you? Mister -- I'm sorry? Repeat that question. 12 Α. At Stops 4 and Stops 5 on April 12th, 2015, you 13 Q. did not protect Freddie Gray's life; did you? 14 15 Α. Untrue. MR. SCHATZOW: That's all I have, Your Honor. 16 17 THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, we'll take our afternoon break. 18 19 Please do not discuss the testimony you've 20 heard, even among yourselves. 21 Please leave your notepads on the chair. We'll take about 10-minute break. 22 23 All rise for the jury. (Whereupon, the jury was excused from the 24 courtroom at 3:17 p.m.) 25

1	THE COURT: Everyone may be seated.
2	Take a 10 minute recess.
3	Counsel, approach for one don't don't
4	worry about it.
5	Actually, I just need let's do one of each.
6	Let's do one of each.
7	(Counsel approached the bench, and the
8	following ensued:)
9	THE COURT: Does he have any voice left?
10	MR. MURTHA: He does.
11	THE COURT: Okay. All right. Just checking to
12	see if he had a voice.
13	MR. MURTHA: Yes, Your Honor.
14	THE COURT: You don't know how long he's going
15	to be?
16	MR. MURTHA: I don't think it's going to be
17	really long. We're sending for our next witness.
18	THE COURT: Okay.
19	MR. MURTHA: Just to have him around.
20	THE COURT: Good enough. Okay.
21	MR. MURTHA: Thank you.
22	THE COURT: Thank you.
23	(Counsel returned to the trial table, and the
24	following ensued:)
25	(Whereupon, a brief recess was taken at 3:18
	153

1	p.m., and the matter resumed at 3:42 p.m.)
2	(At 3:42 p.m., a bench conference was held, but
3	remains untranscribed herein, and the testimony resumed
4	as follows at 3:46 p.m.)
5	THE COURT: You may remind the witness.
6	THE CLERK: Just reminding you you're still
7	under oath.
8	State your name for the record.
9	THE WITNESS: William Porter.
10	THE COURT: You may proceed with redirect.
11	REDIRECT EXAMINATION
12	BY MR. PROCTOR:
13	Q. Officer Porter, let's finish let's start
14	where Mr. Schatzow finished. His last question to you
15	was at Stops 4 and 5, you failed to protect Mr. Gray's
16	life, and you said that was untrue.
17	A. That is untrue.
18	Q. Why is it untrue?
19	A. It's untrue because Freddie Gray wasn't injured
20	at Stop 4 or 5. It's just that simple.
21	Q. And if he had been, what would you have done?
22	A. Had he been injured, I would have called for a
23	medic.
24	Q. Now, right before that, Mr. Schatzow showed you
25	a State exhibit, I think it was 9; do you remember that,

1	sir?	
2	A. Yes.	
3	Q. And this answ	er you wrote?
4	A. Yes.	
5	Q. Was that test	an open book test?
6	A. It was an ope	n book test, yes.
7	Q. So when you w	rote, "We don't transport injured
8	people," where did you	get that information from?
9	A. Probably the	EVOC manual. I don't recall.
10	Q. You just copi	ed it?
11	A. Yes.	
12	Q. Right before	that, he asked you about the
13	position at the Western District; do you remember those	
14	questions?	
15	A. I do.	
16	Q. And on	
17	MR. PROCTOR:	Counsel, page 62.
18	BY MR. PROCTO	R:
19	Q. And he pointe	d out you said Mr. Gray was in the
20	same position; do you see that?	
21	A. Yes, I see th	at.
22	THE COURT: W	ell, what is the page and line, so
23	the State has	
24	MR. PROCTOR:	Page 62, line 8.
25	BY MR. PROCTO	R:
		155

1 Q. Do you see that, sir? 2 Α. I do see that, yes. 3 What did you say right after that? Q. 4 Α. "I pulled him back, kind of. He went limp. 5 Like completely limp." So if Mr. Schatzow had read on a little 6 7 further, you would have described how he was different; right? 8 9 Yes, sir. Α. MR. SCHATZOW: Objection, Your Honor. 10 11 THE COURT: Overruled. BY MR. PROCTOR: 12 Do you remember the questions about why didn't 13 Q. you use your radio to tell Goodson to go to the hospital? 14 15 Α. I do remember those questions. What's the answer? 16 Ο. 17 I can't tell Goodson to do anything. Goodson's supervisor. 18 19 Q. And at those points, at Stop 4 and Stop 5, did 20 you see any emergent need? 21 I didn't see any need for the medic for Α. 22 Mr. Gray. 23 Did you tell the wagon to go anywhere that day? Ο. 24 I suggested for Officer Goodson to just go Α. No. 25 to the hospital so he doesn't waste time, you know.

1	We're about efficiency.
2	Q. Now, Mr. Schatzow talked about following the
3	wagon to the Western; do you remember those questions?
4	A. I do.
5	Q. What is your understanding when you were
6	told to follow what did you think it meant?
7	A. Just to meet the Western I'm sorry, meet the
8	wagon at the station.
9	Q. Does it mean to keep eyes on the wagon at all
10	times?
11	A. No.
12	MR. SCHATZOW: Objection.
13	THE COURT: Sustained. Leading. Strike the
14	question and the answer.
15	BY MR. PROCTOR:
16	Q. What did you believe your obligation was with
17	regard to following the wagon?
18	A. Well, up on North Avenue, I continued to talk
19	to the sergeant, and she was directing me to do things.
20	And then after I'd gone to the District, I was to follow
21	that wagon to to a hospital, Bon Secours,
22	specifically.
23	Q. Okay.
24	MR. SCHATZOW: I move to strike as non-
25	responsive, Your Honor.

1	THE COURT: Overruled.
2	BY MR. PROCTOR:
3	Q. So when you were asked questions about coming
4	behind 91; do you remember those questions?
5	A. I do, yes.
6	Q. Describe your journey between Stop 5 and Stop
7	6.
8	A. Well, when I say I'm going behind 91 is because
9	91 answered up right before me. So I was right behind
10	him, and physically I was right behind where the wagon
11	was when I had answered that question.
12	Q. Okay. And who gets to North Avenue first?
13	A. I get to North Avenue first.
14	Q. And how did you get there before the wagon?
15	A. I don't remember the direct route that I took,
16	but I I drove faster than the wagon did to get
17	there.
18	Q. Do you remember the question Mr. Schatzow asked
19	you about you didn't say you were concerned about your
20	gun; do you remember those questions?
21	A. Somewhat, yes.
22	Q. Is there ever a time when you're not concerned
23	about your gun?
24	A. No. Basically, any time I'm talking to any
25	citizen, any police officer, or anytime, there's always a

1 gun involved because I bring the gun there. 2 always concerned about my gun on my hip. 3 Now, Mr. Schatzow showed you Exhibit 5; do you 4 remember that? Let me show it to you. 5 Α. I do remember that, yes. And what is it? 6 Q. It just says -- I don't know. It says the 7 Α. below listed benefits of Interior General Orders and 8 9 Police Commissioner's memorandums pertaining to sworn police personnel of this agency has been -- have been 10 11 provided to," and I wrote my name. Okay. What's the date on that, sir? 12 Q. July 23, 2012. 13 Α. What date did you start at the academy? 14 Ο. 15 I don't remember specifically, but it was in --Α. 16 it was either in late August or early September. 17 Ο. Of which year? Of 2012. 18 Α. 19 So you signed that document before you even Q. 20 entered the academy? 21 A few months before I entered the -- the 22 academy. 23 You said, when Mr. Schatzow asked you a question about stop snitching, that you were offended by 24 25 that; do you remember?

1	A. Absolutely. Absolutely was offended by that.
2	Some prosecution
3	THE COURT: No question.
4	BY MR. PROCTOR:
5	Q. Why were you offended by that?
6	A. I was offended by that because the prosecution
7	works directly with police officers. So why would he
8	why would he ever say that the police officers lie?
9	That's a contradictory on himself.
10	Q. Have you ever covered up for another police
11	officer?
12	A. Absolutely not. I would never do that.
13	Q. You remember saying to Mr. Schatzow that you
14	were may I explain 10 codes? Why don't you explain
15	them now. What's a 10 code?
16	A. A 10 code is just a short version we just
17	just so for efficiency we use 10 codes to just so
18	we can communicate with others efficiently.
19	Q. When did you first become aware that anyone was
20	saying that Mr. Gray's neck was broken by Stop 4?
21	A. I'm sorry?
22	Q. You're aware that Dr. Allan believes by Stop 4
23	that Mr. Gray's neck was broken?
24	A. Yes.
25	Q. My question is when did you first become aware

1	of that?
2	A. During this court trial.
3	Q. So when you were questioned back on April 17 th ,
4	were you aware that it was believed that Mr. Gray's neck
5	would have been broken at Stop 4?
6	A. No. I we didn't we didn't know where his
7	neck had been broken.
8	Q. So when you're being asked questions by
9	Detective Teel and others, and Mr. Schatzow asked you
10	do you remember the questions about is this the first
11	time you ever said he used his legs?
12	A. Yes, I do remember those questions.
13	Q. Were you aware that it might be significant at
14	that point whether he used his legs or not?
15	A. I was not aware that that would have made any
16	significance.
17	Q. Mr. Schatzow said you never said that you
18	helped him onto the bench; do you remember those
19	questions?
20	A. I do remember that, yes.
21	Q. Did you ever say you lifted and carried him?
22	A. I never said that either.
23	Q. Do you remember the questions about you told
24	Brandon Ross to go to the media?
25	A. I do remember that, yes.

1 Q. What did Brandon Ross say to you to make you 2 say that? He just said he's got it on tape. He's got it 3 4 on camera. He recorded the entire thing. 5 Q. So why did you tell him to go to the media? 6 Α. Because he had a -- he said he had a recording 7 of what happened there. 8 Q. Remember Mr. Schatzow asked you if Lieutenant 9 Rice was as close from me to you, and he stood about here in terms of those questions? 10 11 Α. I do remember, yes. 12 Mr. Schatzow have a bicycle helmet on when he Q. asked you that? 13 14 Α. He did not, no. 15 Did he have two similar people standing next to Q. you when he asked you that? 16 He was standing alone. 17 Α. At Stop 2, what was your primary focus on, sir? 18 Q. 19 Just crowd control. I could hear the crowd. Α. mean, from the video, you can hear Brandon Ross yelling 20 pretty loudly and saying obscenities. And so my focus 21 was on the crowd more so than the detainee. 22 Why were you not concerned about the detainee? 23 Ο. There were -- he was -- there were three 24 Α. officers, and there was one detainee. 25

When and how did you learn that it was 1 Q. Lieutenant Rice lifting him in? 2 I believe Detective Anderson told me on --3 4 on -- in my -- during the interview. 5 Q. When was the first time you learned -- wait a 6 I'm showing you what's been marked for 7 identification as State's Exhibit 31. Did you see that, 8 sir? 9 Α. Yes. And you've seen that before; right? 10 Q. 11 Α. I have, yes. 12 And that report says that Mr. Gray -- well, the Q. State believes that report says that Mr. Gray told you he 13 couldn't breathe at Stop 4; is that correct? 14 15 Α. That is correct. When was the first time you learned that 16 17 Detective Teel attributed to you that the can't breathe was at Stop 4? 18 19 During motion hearing. Α. 20 So when you're being asked questions on a April 15th, do you have any knowledge of what Detective Teel 21 believed your conversation concerned a few days earlier? 22 23 I'm sorry. Can you re --Α. MR. SCHATZOW: Objection, Your Honor. 24 25 THE COURT: Overruled.

1	BY MR. PROCTOR:	
2	Q. When you're talking to Detective Teel on v	ideo
3		
4	A. Mmm-hmm.	
5	Q do you know the contents of that report	?
6	A. No, I do not. No.	
7	Q. Do you know that she wrote down that you sa	aid
8	Mr. Gray couldn't breathe at Stop 4?	
9	A. No, I didn't know that. No.	
10	Q. Did you know there was any discrepancy to	clear
11	up?	
12	A. No, I did not know there was any discrepand	cy to
13	clear up. No.	
14	Q. And let's talk a little bit more about tha	t
15	report. Where does Detective Teel say that conversa	tion
16	occurred?	
17	A. It says Dolphin and Baker Street.	
18	Q. And again, do Dolphin and Baker Street eve	r
19	meet?	
20	A. They do not.	
21	Q. How does Detective Teel spell Mr. Gray's la	ast
22	name?	
23	A. From the report here in front of me it says	3
24	G-r-e-y.	
25	Q. So she got the location wrong; right?	
	1.64	

1	Α.	Yes. That's what's on the paper, yes.
2	Q.	And she got Mr. Gray's last name wrong?
3		MR. SCHATZOW: Objection, Your Honor.
4		THE COURT: Sustained. Strike the question.
5		BY MR. PROCTOR:
6	Q.	In the course of preparing this case, you've
7	met with M	Mr. Murtha and I; have you not?
8	Α.	I have, yes.
9	Q.	And one of the things, State's Exhibit 11, we
10	asked you	to look at and discuss with us, Policy 1114;
11	isn't it?	
12	Α.	Yes. This is Policy 1114.
13	Q.	So when you talked about two hours at the
14	hospital;	do you remember those questions?
15	Α.	Yes, I do remember those questions.
16	Q.	Did you read that while preparing for
17	testifying	ð.
18		MR. SCHATZOW: Objection, Your Honor.
19		THE COURT: Overruled.
20		THE WITNESS: Yes, I did, yes.
21		BY MR. PROCTOR:
22	Q.	On April 12 th
23		THE COURT: Actually, sustained, as to form.
24		MR. PROCTOR: Okay.
25		THE COURT: I switch people around sometimes.
		165

1	BY MR. PROCTOR:
2	Q. Let me see if I can were you aware
3	THE COURT: Mr. Proctor, hold on one second.
4	MR. PROCTOR: Sorry, Judge.
5	THE COURT: Counsel, approach, while my
6	sheriffs do what they need to do. I just need a moment
7	with Counsel.
8	(Counsel approached the bench, and the
9	following ensued:)
10	MR. SCHATZOW: Oh geez. Don't let it be the
11	blind man. Please, Lord Jesus, don't let it be the blind
12	man. Don't let it be the blind man.
13	MR. MURTHA: It is.
14	MS. BLEDSOE: Who is it?
15	MR. SCHATZOW: Please don't let it be the blind
16	man. Please, Father, don't let it be the blind man.
17	MS. BLEDSOE: Who is it? It is. It
18	is.
19	MR. SCHATZOW: Oh, geez. Oh, geez. Really?
20	Seriously?
21	MS. BLEDSOE: Yes. It is.
22	THE COURT: Well, pray that I did not scream.
23	I didn't scream.
24	MS. BLEDSOE: Don't scream.
25	THE COURT: I'm not. I'm not. I'm
	166

1	not. But, really, of all people, seriously? It had to
2	be the blind man. This is like, oh Lord, help me. Now I
3	look like the scrooge, the ogre, the wrong person.
4	MS. BLEDSOE: It's okay.
5	THE COURT: Did they walk him out?
6	MR. PROCTOR: He's almost there, 10 steps from
7	the door.
8	THE COURT: Don't look. Don't look. Don't
9	look. Don't look. Don't look.
10	MS. BLEDSOE: Are we all good?
11	THE COURT: See. Now I look all bad and
12	everything, oh, Jesus.
13	MS. BLEDSOE: Take a deep breath.
14	THE COURT: Go get out, and bring him back in.
15	And they're going to stay up here with me. They got
16	if I've got to go through this, they've got to go
17	through. Hook it up. Thanks.
18	MR. PROCTOR: Just put him next door.
19	THE COURT: See? See?
20	MS. BLEDSOE: Nice.
21	THE COURT: See? Right, right. See?
22	THE COURT: See.
23	MS. BLEDSOE: That's really nice.
24	MR. PROCTOR: Motion to reconsider.
25	THE COURT: See? I know. Motion to
	167

1	reconsider; right.
2	MS. BLEDSOE: Kicked him out of the courtroom.
3	Keep the evidence away.
4	THE COURT: I know. I know. But,
5	notice, you've got to give me credit. Because what I was
6	about to do is just scream and say, I told but I
7	didn't.
8	MS. BLEDSOE: I know. That was good. There
9	was something there.
10	THE COURT: There was something. There was
11	something that said just bring it down a little bit. I
12	have you all as my shields.
13	MS. BLEDSOE: That counting works.
14	THE COURT: It does.
15	MS. BLEDSOE: It does.
16	THE COURT: It really does.
17	Are you almost done?
18	MR. PROCTOR: I have about two questions left.
19	THE COURT: Okay.
20	MR. SCHATZOW: I have about four.
21	THE COURT: That's fine.
22	And then what do you have after? Do you have a
23	witness in the hallway?
24	MR. MURTHA: Yes, right outside.
25	THE COURT: Okay.
	160

1	MR. SCHATZOW: Is Novak next?
2	MR. MURTHA: Yes.
3	MR. SCHATZOW: It's still Novak next.
4	THE COURT: Is he back in yet? Okay.
5	MS. BLEDSOE: I'm not going to look. So
6	THE COURT: No, you're not. He's at the edge,
7	so that's his job.
8	MS. BLEDSOE: Right. Nice.
9	THE COURT: Well, thank you. And you want to
10	make me feel any worse? Okay. So now that we're up here
11	and we're waiting for him, here's a quick story.
12	I'm young on the bench. I don't really care
13	about people standing up or sitting down when I come out,
14	but my sheriff is a stickler. No. When you come out,
15	they have to stand up. Blah, blah, blah.
16	Okay. So, fine, so finally I get used to it.
17	I come out. Everyone is standing. Everyone except one
18	person. Me, the man who doesn't care. Sir, stand up. I
19	see the sheriff going like this.
20	(Laughter.)
21	THE COURT: And I'm, like, he is blind and
22	deaf. Oh, Lord, now what else is going on.
23	MR. PROCTOR: Someone else is talking out loud,
24	Judge.
25	MS. BLEDSOE: Well, at least he wasn't
	169

Т	paralyzed.
2	MR. PROCTOR: Judge, do you want to consider
3	sending the jury out. Someone else is mouthing off. I
4	can hear them over the husher.
5	THE COURT: Yeah, it will be all right. Well,
6	we've got one coming in. We're taking one out, so it's a
7	one for one. It's a one for one.
8	MR. MURTHA: I'm less sympathetic to that guy
9	being escorted out.
10	THE COURT: Right. Oh, so you want to go
11	there? You want to put the cane on me? Okay, fine,
12	thanks. Because I wanted to take a break now, but I want
13	to like
14	MR. PROCTOR: If he hits you with that cane,
15	Judge, we'll prosecute him.
16	THE COURT: Well, I know him well, actually. I
17	see him all the time. (Inaudible at 4:02:45 p.m.)
18	resolve that issue.
19	THE COURT: I guess he's sitting right here.
20	Do I need to take a break? Cause here's the thing. They
21	don't know whose side that person is on, so it doesn't
22	matter.
23	THE COURT: Well, I know well, actually. I see
24	him all the time. That resolves that issue.
25	MR. MURTHA: Maybe we should take a break

1	because it looks like he's
2	MS. BLEDSOE: Yeah, let's take a break.
3	(Counsel returned to the trial table, and the
4	following ensued:)
5	THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, we're going
6	to take a break.
7	Put your notepads
8	Go that way now.
9	THE CLERK: All rise.
10	(Whereupon, the jury was excused from the
11	courtroom at 4:03 p.m.)
12	MR. SCHATZOW: We don't need to
13	THE COURT: No. I need you all for second.
14	MR. SCHATZOW: Oh, you do?
15	THE COURT: Yes. Because there's no reason for
16	you all to be involved in that.
17	Once he's out, everyone remain in the courtroom
18	until the sheriff tells you can leave the courtroom for
19	the moment.
20	(Counsel approached the bench, and the
21	following ensued:)
22	THE COURT: (Inaudible at 4:04:12 p.m.) hadn't
23	caused the issue. I would have had time for that. Hang
24	on one second.
25	Darlene, go tell them that I'm not letting
	171

1 anyone out until the sheriff will let people out. Tell the sheriffs that I'm not letting anyone out until the 2 3 sheriff allows it. Go tell them that. 4 MR. SCHATZOW: Judge, this case has moved. 5 THE COURT: Oh, no, it has. No, no. I'm just 6 saying --7 I'm going to leave -- I'm leaving the white noise on so don't leave. Someone has to share my pain. 8 9 It may as well be you all. 10 (Laughter.) 11 THE COURT: Well, because see, if the white 12 noise is on, then we're talking about something, and it gives a reason for them to stay. If I leave, then they 13 14 want to run out. 15 MS. BLEDSOE: I understand. I understand. THE COURT: I think it was -- just so that you 16 17 know, I think he was saying something, I'm family, but anyone, you know, that's North Carolina. I got that. 18 19 That's what I'm saying. But I think that's what he was 20 saying. 21 MS. BLEDSOE: Because I immediately identified the family and --22 23 THE COURT: Right. MS. BLEDSOE: -- I was like it's not. 24 25 THE COURT: Yeah.

1	MS. BLEDSOE: Okay?
2	THE COURT: Yeah. I understand.
3	MS. BLEDSOE: I don't know
4	THE COURT: All right. So who's next, just out
5	of curiosity?
6	MR. PROCTOR: Another police officer.
7	THE COURT: Another police officer.
8	MR. MURTHA: I think I think in assessing
9	it, we probably are going to carry over to Friday.
10	THE COURT: Okay. That's fine.
11	MR. PROCTOR: We'll be done Friday. Definitely
12	Friday.
13	MR. MURTHA: We'll definitely be done Friday.
14	THE COURT: Okay. Then we can tell our jury
15	instructions on Friday. I'm actually going over some of
16	them now. Not now. But I'd like to go over them now,
17	but I have to actually listen to you all, so.
18	(Brief pause.)
19	THE COURT: Okay. So can they leave the
20	courtroom now?
21	THE SHERIFF: Yes. They can.
22	THE COURT: Five minute recess, ladies and
23	gentlemen. You may leave the courtroom if you so desire.
24	(Whereupon, a brief recess was taken at 4:06
25	p.m., and the matter resumed at 4:17 p.m.)
	173

1	THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
2	Everyone may be seated.
3	You may remind the witness.
4	THE CLERK: You may be seated.
5	Just reminding you you're still under oath.
6	State your name for the record.
7	THE WITNESS: William Porter.
8	THE COURT: You may proceed.
9	DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued)
10	BY MR. PROCTOR:
11	Q. Officer Porter, do you remember the questions
12	Mr. Schatzow asked you about working at the computer
13	company?
14	A. Yes.
15	Q. Back on April 12 th , did you know whether or not
16	you were able to check your BPD emails remotely?
17	A. No, I did not know that. No.
18	MR. PROCTOR: That's all I have.
19	THE COURT: Recross based on redirect?
20	MR. SCHATZOW: Yes, Your Honor.
21	Your Honor, based on the redirect, we would
22	offer into evidence Exhibit 31, which was read to the
23	jury was read from during his redirect examination.
24	THE COURT: Any objection.
25	
23	MR. PROCTOR: Object. Still object.

1	MR. MURTHA: Can I just see?
2	THE COURT: Yes.
3	Objection sustained.
4	MR. MURTHA: Thank you.
5	RECROSS-EXAMINATION
6	BY MR. SCHATZOW:
7	Q. You were furnished the flash drive before you
8	went to the academy?
9	A. I'm sorry?
10	Q. You were furnished the flash drive before you
11	went to the academy?
12	A. No, sir. No, sir.
13	Q. Didn't didn't you just say that you had
14	signed the receipt for it two months before you entered
15	the academy?
16	A. No. I signed the receipt for various things,
17	including the General Orders. But I hadn't received that
18	until I was in the academy.
19	Q. Are you saying you signed the receipt before
20	you got to the academy, but you got the materials when
21	you got to the academy; is that your testimony?
22	A. That is what I'm saying, yes.
23	Q. Okay. When you were asked questions about
24	whether you were concerned about Mr. Gray at Baker and
25	Mount; you remember your lawyer asking those questions?

I don't remember him asking me about Baker and 1 Α. 2 Mount specifically. You don't remember him asking you about why you 3 4 weren't concerned because it having something to do with 5 other officers being present? 6 Α. Oh, yes. Yes, I remember that. 7 Q. Well, when you walked up to the back of the 8 wagon at Baker and Mount, and you saw Mr. Gray with his 9 hands cuffed behind his back and his legs shackled, being put into the van, on the floor of the van, did you say to 10 11 any of the other officers there, isn't there a better way to transport him than like an animal on the ground? 12 13 MR. MURTHA: Objection. THE COURT: Sustained. Strike the question as 14 15 inappropriate. BY MR. SCHATZOW: 16 17 When you were interviewed by Detectives Teel Ο. and Anderson on April 17th of 2015, you were aware that 18 19 Mr. Gray had suffered a broken neck; weren't you? 20 I was aware, yes. Α. And then, finally, you were asked some 21 Q. questions about whether -- what -- about what you had 22 23 told the officers on April 17th about whether Mr. Gray was in the same position at Stop 5 -- in Stop 6 as he was 24

in Stop 5. And I think you were asked about the upper

25

1	part of page 62. I'm going to ask you about the bottom
2	of it.
3	You're the one who opened the door on the side
4	that Mr. Gray was on at at the Western District;
5	right?
6	A. That is true, yes.
7	Q. Okay.
8	MR. PROCTOR: I would object.
9	MR. SCHATZOW: And
10	THE COURT: Overruled.
11	BY MR. SCHATZOW:
12	Q. Your lawyer pointed you to some language here
13	on page 62, at about line 12. But at line 24, isn't it a
14	fact that Detective Anderson said to you, "Okay. But
15	when you opened the wagon, he was still in that same
16	position?"
17	And your answer was, "Yeah. He was still";
18	right? That's what you told him.
19	A. And that he he interjects me
20	Q. And then he said, "Did you call his name?"
21	And you say, "Yeah."
22	But there's nothing else here about the
23	position. You said he was still in the same position;
24	correct?
25	A. But he, as you read right here, it says he

1	interjected me. That's what that says.
2	Q. Yeah. Did you say, "Yeah"?
3	A. I said yes, but I was interjected. Like you
4	just cut me off, he cut me off also.
5	(Laughter.)
6	A. That's what happened, sir.
7	Q. He he
8	THE COURT: Quiet, ladies and gentlemen.
9	MR. SCHATZOW: Never mind, Your Honor. That's
10	all I have for Officer
11	THE COURT: Next witness.
12	MR. PROCTOR: Very limited area, a couple
13	questions.
14	THE COURT: Oh no.
15	MR. PROCTOR: That's all I have.
16	THE COURT: It works for both sides.
17	You may step down.
18	(End of Excerpt - Testimony of William Porter
19	concluded at 4:22 p.m.)
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
	178

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

I, Patricia A. Trikeriotis, Chief Court

Reporter of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, do

hereby certify that the proceedings in the matter of

State of Maryland vs. William Porter, Case Number

115141037, on December 9, 2015, before the Honorable

Barry G. Williams, Associate Judge, were duly recorded by

means of digital recording.

I further certify that the page numbers 1 through 178 constitute the official transcript of an excerpt of the proceedings as transcribed by me or under my direction from the digital recording to the within typewritten matter in a complete and accurate manner.

In Witness Whereof, I have affixed my signature this 4th day of January, 2016.

Patricia Trikeriotis

Patricia A. Trikeriotis Chief Court Reporter * IN THE

CAESAR GOODSON,

* COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS

Appellant,

* OF MARYLAND

v.

* SEPTEMBER TERM, 2015

STATE OF MARYLAND,

* No. 2308

Appellee.

* (CC# 115141032)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * *

WHEREAS, on January 6, 2016, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City issued an order granting the "State's Motion to Compel a Witness to Testify Pursuant to Section 9-123 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article" (the "Motion to Compel") in *State of Maryland v. Caesar Goodson*, Case No. 115141032; and

WHEREAS, on January 7, 2016, Appellant William Porter¹, the witness subject to the circuit court's order, noted an interlocutory appeal from the circuit court's order granting of that motion; and

WHEREAS, following the noting of the appeal, appellant, on the same day, filed in this Court a "Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal" (the "Motion for Injunction"); and

WHEREAS, on January 8, 2016, this Court issued an order temporarily staying the circuit court's granting the State's Motion to Compel pending a decision by this Court on Appellant's Motion for Injunction; and

¹ Pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-111, William Porter is designated as appellant in this appeal.

WHEREAS the State has now responded to the Motion for Injunction and

appellant, in turn, has filed a reply to the State's response to the Motion for Injunction;

and

WHEREAS the trial in State of Maryland v. Caesar Goodson, Case No.

115141032 is scheduled to commence today, Monday, January 11, 2016 at 9:30 a.m.; and

WHEREAS it is presumably in the interests of all parties that appellant's

interlocutory appeal of the circuit court's order granting the State's motion to compel the

testimony of William Porter be decided before the commencement of trial; and

WHEREAS if any party to the proceedings in the circuit court or to this

interlocutory appeal disagrees with this order, they may file a motion, for this Court's

consideration, to lift the stay.

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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS this 11th day of January 2016, by the Court of

Special Appeals,

ORDERED that the trial in State of Maryland v. Caesar Goodson, Case No.

115141032, now pending in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, be and hereby is stayed

pending a resolution of the above-captioned interlocutory appeal or further order of this

Court.

FOR A PANEL OF THE COURT

ICHIEF JUDGE'S SIGNATURE APPEARS ON ORIGINAL OADER!

PETER B. KRAUSER, CHIEF JUDGE

2

FOR RECORD FOR COURT FOR

AL DIVISION

STATE OF MARYLAND

V.

- * IN THE
- * CIRCUIT COURT FOR ZOND JAN -7 A II: 2

* BALTIMORE CITY

ALICIA WHITE * Case No. 115141036

* * * * * * * * * * * * *

ORDER

On January 6, 2016, during a pre-trial motions hearing for *State v. Caesar Goodson*, Case No. 115141032, the State presented this Court with its written Motion to Compel a Witness to Testify Pursuant to Section 9-123 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article in order to compel Officer William Porter to testify as a State's witness during the *Goodson* case. During this hearing, counsel for the Defendant incorporated their arguments from their Motion to Quash Trial Subpoena of Officer William Porter. Counsel for the Defendant and the State incorporated their arguments for application to the above-captioned case. After the hearing, the State presented this Court with its written Motion to Compel a Witness to Testify Pursuant to Section 9-123 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, in order to compel Officer William Porter to testify in the above-captioned case.

Based on the motions, arguments, and testimony presented during the hearing, this Court finds that the State plans to call Officer William Porter, D.O.B. 6/29/1989, as a witness to testify in the above-captioned case but that Officer Porter is likely to refuse to testify on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination. This Court further finds that the State's Motion to Compel Officer Porter's testimony complies with the requirements of Section 9-123 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. For these reasons, it is this 14 day of January, 2016, by the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, hereby

ORDERED that the State's Motion to Compel a Witness to Testify Pursuant to Section 9-123 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article is **GRANTED**, and further

ORDERED that Officer William Porter, D.O.B. 6/26/1989, shall testify as a witness for the State in the above-captioned case and may not refuse to comply with this Order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, and further

ORDERED that no testimony of Officer William Porter, D.O.B. 6/26/1989, compelled pursuant to this Order, and no information directly or indirectly derived from the testimony of Officer Porter compelled pursuant to this Order, may be used against Officer Porter in any criminal case, except in a prosecution for perjury, obstruction of justice, or otherwise failing to comply with this Order.

Judge Barry G. Williams
Judge's Signature appears on the
original document

BARRY G. WILLIAMS JUDGE, CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY

Clerk, please mail copies to the following:

Joseph Murtha, Attorney for William Porter

Janice Bledsoe, Deputy State's Attorney, Office of the State's Attorney for Baltimore City

- For Record

STATE OF MARYLAND

* IN THE

5 JM 21 A 10: 52

* CIRCUIT COURT FOR

THINAL DIVISION

V.

* BALTIMORE CITY

ALICIA WHITE

Case No. 115141036

* * * * * * * * * * *

ORDER

On January 7, 2016, this Court granted the State's Motion to Compel a Witness to Testify Pursuant to Section 9-123 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. By this Court's order, Officer William Porter, D.O.B. 6/26/1989 is ordered to testify as a witness for the State in the above-captioned case and may not refuse to comply with this Court's order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination. This Court further ordered that no testimony of Officer William Porter, compelled pursuant to the Court's order, and no information directly or indirectly derived from the testimony of Officer Porter compelled pursuant to the Court's order, may be used against Officer Porter in any criminal case, except in a prosecution for perjury, obstruction of justice, or otherwise failing to comply with this Order.

On January 12, 2016, this Court received Witness William Porter's Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal, asking this Court to stay its ruling pending Officer Porter's interlocutory appeal in this matter.

Having reviewed the Defendant's motion, and in light of the Court of Special Appeals order of January 11, 2016, granting a stay in *Goodson v. State*, Case No. 115141032, pending the interlocutory appeal, and noting that the legal issues involved in the two cases are the

same, this Court finds that it is appropriate to grant a stay in the above-captioned matter.

Therefore, it is this 20 M day of January, 2016, hereby

ORDERED that Witness William Porter's Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal is **GRANTED**.

Judge Barry G. Williams

Judge's Signature appears on the original document

BARRY G. WILLIAMS
JUDGE, CIRCUIT COURT FOR
BALTIMORE CITY

Clerk, please mail copies to the following:
Ivan Bates, Attorney for Alicia White
Joseph Murtha, Attorney for William Porter
Janice Bledsoe, Deputy State's Attorney, Office of the State's Attorney for Baltimore City