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SUPREME COURT OF MARYLAND

Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Tristan W. Gillespie, AG No. 27, September Term 2024, filed November 21, 2025. Opinion by Biran, J.

https://www.mdcourts.gov/data/opinions/coa/2025/27a24ag.pdf

ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE – MARYLAND RULE 19-737(f) – RECIPROCAL DISCIPLINE

Facts:

The United States District Court for the District of Maryland (the "district court") found that Tristan W. Gillespie violated Maryland Attorneys' Rules of Professional Conduct ("MARPC") 19-303.3 (candor toward tribunal), 19-303.4 (fairness to opposing party and attorney), and 19-304.1 (truthfulness in statements to others). On August 7, 2024, the district court suspended Gillespie for four months, *nunc pro tunc* from July 5, 2023. Thus, Gillespie's suspension was deemed to have been served at the time it was ordered. However, the district court noted in its order suspending Gillespie that reinstatement to that court was not automatic, and that Gillespie would be required to comply with that court's Local Rule 705.4.

Gillespie's suspension stemmed from his representation of two clients with disabilities in more than 600 "tester" cases around the nation. Testers are individuals who, without an intent to purchase or rent a home or an apartment (or, in the case of Gillespie's clients, a hotel room), pose as purchasers or renters for the purpose of collecting evidence of unlawful practices. *See, e.g., Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman*, 455 U.S. 363, 373 (1982). In those cases, Gillespie filed complaints against hotels for allegedly failing to provide sufficient information through on-line reservation systems regarding hotel and room accommodations for patrons with disabilities, in violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act.

The Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland, acting through Bar Counsel, filed a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action against Gillespie based on his suspension by the district court. Bar Counsel and Gillespie jointly recommended that the Supreme Court of Maryland impose reciprocal discipline on Gillespie in the form of a four-month suspension, effective *nunc pro tun*c, from July 5, 2023.

Oral argument was held before the Court on September 4, 2025.

Held:

The Supreme Court of Maryland concluded that the exceptional circumstance set forth in Maryland Rule 19-737(e)(4) exists in this case, i.e., that "the conduct established … warrants substantially different discipline in this State." Under Maryland Rule 19-737(f), the Court imposed an indefinite suspension with the right to apply for reinstatement: (1) no earlier than one year following the date of issuance of its opinion; and (2) after Gillespie has been readmitted to practice law in the district court.

In reciprocal discipline cases, the Court usually imposes corresponding discipline to the sanction previously imposed in the other jurisdiction. The Court held that, in this case, a four-month suspension would not constitute corresponding discipline in Maryland. An attorney who is suspended in the district court for four months must make a showing of fitness to resume the practice of law to be reinstated in the district court. In contrast, an attorney who is suspended for four months in Maryland is not required to make a showing of fitness to be reinstated. An attorney who is suspended indefinitely in Maryland must make a showing of fitness to be reinstated. The Court held that corresponding discipline in Maryland for Gillespie would be an indefinite suspension with the right to petition for reinstatement after four months.

The Court further held that, given Gillespie's serious and pervasive Rules violations, which involved repeated instances of dishonesty to tribunals in hundreds of cases, corresponding discipline is not appropriate in this case. Rather, substantially greater discipline was warranted.

Several jurisdictions have disciplined Gillespie based on the district court's findings that Gillespie violated MARPC 3.3, 3.4, and 4.1. On February 11, 2025, Gillespie's license to practice law in the State of New York was suspended for one year based on the district court's findings. Since then, 13 federal district and appellate courts have effectively suspended Gillespie from the practice of law for at least one year for the same misconduct.

The Court noted: "[O]f the 14 jurisdictions that have imposed reciprocal discipline based on the district court's findings, only one federal district court and one federal appellate court have suspended Gillespie for four months, with the rest effectively ordering at least one year of suspension. Our decision today echoes the growing consensus that a four-month suspension understates the nature and gravity of Gillespie's misconduct. The protection of the public and the integrity of the legal profession demand more."

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Jeffrey Reyes v. State of Maryland, No. 17, September Term 2025, filed November 24, 2025. Opinion by Killough, J.

https://www.mdcourts.gov/data/opinions/coa/2025/17a25.pdf

CRIMINAL LAW – SENTENCING – MARYLAND RULE 4-345 – SENTENCE IMPOSITION

CRIMINAL LAW – SENTENCING – MARYLAND RULE 4-345 – SENTENCE INCREASE

Facts:

Petitioner, Jefferey Reyes, was found guilty of second-degree assault. At sentencing, the judge announced a sentence of one year imprisonment, suspending all but nine months (to be served under home detention), followed by three years of supervised probation. Later in the same hearing, the judge—realizing she misunderstood the maximum available sentence under the sentencing guidelines—verbally revised the sentence to five years' imprisonment, suspending all but nine months (to be served under home detention), followed by three years of supervised probation. Reyes appealed his sentence to the Appellate Court of Maryland, arguing that the judge illegally increased his sentence after it had already been "imposed." *Reyes v. State*, 264 Md. App. 616, 620-21 (2025). The Appellate Court disagreed and held that Reyes' sentence was not illegally increased because a criminal sentence is not "imposed" until after the sentencing proceeding has concluded. *Id*. at 627–28.

Held: Affirmed

The Supreme Court of Maryland held that the Defendant's sentence was not illegally increased. The trial court increased the Defendant's sentence before the sentence was imposed, thus avoiding Double Jeopardy violations and the confines Maryland Rule 4-345 places on sentence increases and modifications. Rule 4-345 is inapplicable for any modification made in a sentence before the sentencing proceeding has formally concluded.

In *State v. Sayre*, 314 Md. 559 (1989), the Court held that Rule 4-345 did not permit the sentencing court to return the defendant to counsel table to alter his sentence after the hearing had ended, even if the original pronouncement had been a mere "slip of the tongue[.]" *Id*. at 562–65. In *Brown v. State*, 83 Md. App. 24 (1990), the Appellate Court of Maryland distinguished *Sayre* and upheld a mid-hearing adjustment to a sentence. *Id*. at 34–36. And in *Simpkins v. State*, 88 Md. App. 607 (1991), the Appellate Court clarified that finality attaches at the conclusion of the sentencing hearing—marked there by the court's remand of the defendant and its transition to another matter. *Id*. at 623.

In this case, the record showed that the judge was still in the middle of the sentencing colloquy, had not dismissed the matter, and was still addressing Reyes directly. The judge retained full authority to modify, clarify, or even increase an announced sentence so long as she had not ended the proceeding, such as by remanding Reyes into custody or calling the next case.

Requiring absolute finality at the instant a sentence is first announced would impose an unwarranted restriction on judicial discretion and impede a court's ability to ensure that the sentence ultimately imposed is appropriate and lawful. The limits of Rule 4-345 apply only once a sentence has been imposed; a sentence is "imposed" when the sentencing proceeding formally concludes; and until that point, the court may revise its announced sentence. Because the proceeding here had not ended, Rule 4-345 was not triggered, the increase was lawful, and the sentence is affirmed.

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George Bowens v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, No. 10, September Term 2025, filed November 24, 2025. Opinion by Killough, J.

https://www.mdcourts.gov/data/opinions/coa/2025/10a25.pdf

INSURANCE LAW – SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION – UNDERINSURED MOTORIST CLAIM

For purposes of establishing jurisdiction of the District Court of Maryland under § 4-401(1) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings ("CJP") Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland, does the phrase "debt or damages claimed" include sums previously paid to the insured by the tortfeasor's liability insurer or only the amounts the plaintiff seeks to recover from his carrier under an uninsured and underinsured motorist ("UIM") policy?

Facts:

This case arises out of an automobile accident in Prince George's County, Maryland, between Petitioner, George Bowens, and Lisa Daniels, an underinsured motorist. Bowens held a $50,000 UIM policy with the Respondent, State Farm Mutual Insurance Company ("State Farm"). Daniels maintained a UIM automobile insurance policy with a policy limit of $30,000, which was offered to Bowens to settle his claim against Daniels. Pursuant to the Insurance Article ("Ins.") of the Annotated Code of Maryland § 19-511, Bowens notified State Farm of Daniels' insurer's settlement offer, and State Farm consented to the settlement and agreed to waive its subrogation rights against Daniels. Bowens subsequently accepted the settlement offer with Daniels, and then made a UIM claim under his own insurance policy with State Farm seeking payment of his $50,000 policy limits minus the $30,000 he already recovered from Daniels' insurer (*i.e.*, $20,000). State Farm denied that claim, prompting Bowens to file a breach of contract suit in District Court to recover $20,000 under his State Farm UIM policy as permitted by Ins. §§ 19-511(f)(1) and 19-509(g).

State Farm moved to dismiss the lawsuit, arguing that because Bowens would first have to prove total tort damages of $50,000 to recover under its UIM policy, the action was beyond the District Court's threshold jurisdiction amount of $30,000 under CJP § 4-401(1). The District Court granted State Farm's motion to dismiss, which was affirmed on appeal to the circuit court.

Held: Reversed.

The Supreme Court of Maryland held that the District Court of Maryland had jurisdiction to hear Petitioner's claim. Under CJP § 4-401(1), the "debt or damages claimed" is measured by the amount demanded in the pending action. Here, Bowens' complaint sought $20,000 from State Farm—an amount within the District Court's $30,000 jurisdictional limit.

Under CJP § 4-401(1), the "debt or damages claimed" is measured by the amount demanded in the pending action. In UIM cases, courts must read CJP § 4-401(1) together with Ins. §§ 19-509–19-511: CJP § 4-401(1) sets the jurisdictional threshold; Ins. §§ 19-509–19-511 define the UIM carrier's liability exposure and the statutory mechanics for recoverable relief. Read together, the Insurance Article supplies the "debt or damages claimed" to which CJP § 4-401(1)'s $30,000 ceiling applies.

In this case, it was undisputed that the parties followed Ins. § 19-511: Bowens forwarded Daniels' settlement offer to State Farm, and State Farm timely consented to the settlement and waived subrogation against Daniels. Bowens retained the right to pursue the balance of his UIM coverage against State Farm under Ins. § 19-511(f)(1). Because Bowens sought only $20,000 from State Farm for breach of contract, *see Reese v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co*., 285 Md. 548, 552–53 (1979), the complaint fell within the District Court's $30,000 limit.

It is immaterial that a District Court judge may have to find that the tortfeasor caused damages exceeding $30,000 for an insured to recover under his UIM policy with his insurer. Nothing in the jurisdictional statutes bars a District Court judge from determining that a tortfeasor's damages exceed $30,000 and then applying the statutory set-off; what matters for jurisdiction is the net amount the plaintiff seeks from the defendant. *See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Miller*, 315 Md. 182, 188–93 (1989); Ins. § 19-509(g). In *Allstate*, we explained that the factfinder determines tort damages, and the court then adjusts any verdict to reflect settlements and policy limits. *Allstate*, 315 Md. at 193 & n.12.

Finally, the Court observed that concurrent jurisdiction exists under CJP §§ 4-401(1) and 4-402(d)(1)(i) when the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000 but does not exceed $30,000, and where the amount in controversy meets the statutory jury threshold (CJP § 4-402(e)(1)), a party may demand a jury trial and proceed in circuit court. Here, however, Bowens sought only $20,000 and elected the District Court.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court held that "debt or damages claimed" under CJP § 4-401(1) is measured by the amount the plaintiff seeks from the defendant in the pending action. Because Bowens' complaint sought $20,000 from State Farm—within the District Court's $30,000 limit—the District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction. The judgment of the Circuit Court for Prince George's County is reversed, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

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APPELLATE COURT OF MARYLAND

Lakeview Loan Servicing LLC & Nationstar Mortgage LLC v. Tonda M. Baxter, No. 691, September Term 2024, filed November 25, 2025. Opinion by Nazarian, J.

https://www.mdcourts.gov/data/opinions/cosa/2025/0691s24.pdf

CREDIT GRANTOR CLOSED END CREDIT PROVISIONS – CREDIT GRANTORS – LOAN SERVICERS

CREDIT GRANTOR CLOSED END CREDIT PROVISIONS – FEE RESTRICTIONS – CONVENIENCE FEES

Facts:

Three years after Tonda Baxter took out a loan secured by a deed of trust on her home, Lakeview Loan Servicing LLC ("Lakeview") acquired the servicing rights to the loan and retained Nationstar Mortgage LLC ("Nationstar") as its sub-servicer. Ms. Baxter filed a civil complaint that alleged that Lakeview and Nationstar violated the Credit Grantor Closed End Credit Provisions ("CLEC") contained in Title 12 of the Commercial Law Article when they charged and collected convenience fees in connection with the loan. In response to Lakeview and Nationstar's summary judgment motion, Ms. Baxter filed a cross-motion under Maryland Rule 2-502 for the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County to decide CLEC's applicability to the loan, to Lakeview and Nationstar as credit grantors, and to the relationship between the parties. The circuit court granted Ms. Baxter's cross motion and entered a declaration in her favor. Lakeview and Nationstar appealed the court's order and declaration.

Held: Affirmed.

The Appellate Court of Maryland held that a loan servicer who holds rights and obligations under a debt instrument governed by CLEC qualifies as a credit grantor under the statute. The court held further that CLEC regulates a relationship between the credit grantor and the borrower such that the statute's fee restrictions apply through the life of the loan and are not confined to one moment in time. Lastly, the court held that even though CLEC exempts loans secured by a first lien on residential property from its fee restrictions on "loan fees, points, finder's fees, and

other charges," CLEC's remaining fee limitations on service fees, expense reimbursement charges, and loans to consumer borrowers still applied to Ms. Baxter's loan, as a consumer borrower.

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Special Situations Fund III QP, L.P., et al., v. Travel Centers of America Inc., et al., No. 678, September Term 2024, filed November 25, 2025. Opinion by Nazarian, J.

https://www.mdcourts.gov/data/opinions/cosa/2025/0678s24.pdf

BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE

BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE – CONFLICTS OF INTEREST – STOCKHOLDER RATIFICATION

MOTION TO DIMISS – MATTERS OUTSIDE THE PLEADINGS – EXCULPATION CLAUSE

Facts:

BP Products North America Inc. ("BP") entered into an agreement to acquire Travel Centers of America Inc. (the "Company"). After BP and Company agreed to merge, but before Company's stockholders voted to approve the merger, a competitor,

ARKO Corp. ("ARKO"), forwarded a bid to acquire Company. Company's Board of Directors rejected ARKO's proposal and Company's stockholders approved the transaction with BP. Company stockholders Special Situations Fund III QP, L.P., Special Situations Cayman Fund, L.P., and Special Situations Private Equity Fund, L.P. (collectively, "SSF") filed a civil complaint challenging the merger. The Circuit Court for Baltimore City dismissed SSF's complaint and SSF appealed the court's dismissal.

Held: Affirmed.

The Appellate Court of Maryland held that SSF failed to state a claim for a breach of fiduciary duty because the complaint's allegations, taken as true, did not defeat the business judgment rule. Under the business judgment rule, a reviewing court presumes that a company's board of directors acted in good faith and in the best interests of the corporation. Md. Code (1975, 2014 Repl. Vol., Supp. 2024), § 2-405.1(g) of the Corporations & Associations Article. To overcome the business judgment presumption, a claimant must plead facts that demonstrate fraud, bad faith, unconscionable conduct, or a conflict of interest relating to the board of directors' decision.

Further, the Appellate Court concluded that stockholder ratification can cure an alleged breach of fiduciary duty by a company's board of directors where there has been a full disclosure of the potential conflict to the ratifying stockholders. And where SSF's failed to state a claim for breach of fiduciary, its claims of aiding and abetting are likewise extinguished.

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The Appellate Court held also that the circuit court could consider the exculpation clause in Company's charter without converting defendants' motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment because SSF's complaint alleged that board of directors had breached its fiduciary duties, in part, by failing to provide all material information about merger in its proxy statement to stockholders, and same proxy statement incorporated by reference Company's annual report, which included the exculpation clause considered by the circuit court.

Kimery Darren Martin v. State of Maryland, No. 101, September Term 2024, filed November 21, 2025. Opinion by Tang, J.

https://www.mdcourts.gov/data/opinions/cosa/2025/0101s24.pdf

CRIMINAL LAW – REVIEW – PRESENTATION AND RESERVATION IN LOWER COURT OF GROUNDS OF REVIEW – IN GENERAL – PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL IN GENERAL

SEARCH, SEIZURE, AND ARREST – OTHER OFFICERS OR OFFICIAL INFORMATION – COLLECTIVE KNOWLEDGE

CRIMINAL LAW – EVIDENCE – COMPETENCY IN GENERAL – WRONGFULLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE – EVIDENCE ON MOTIONS

CRIMINAL LAW – EVIDENCE – COMPETENCY IN GENERAL – WRONGFULLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE – EXTENT OF EXCLUSION; "FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE" – EXCEPTIONS – INEVITABLE DISCOVERY

Facts:

Officers from the Prince George's County Police Department ("PGPD") responded to a shooting at a liquor store, where a victim was found with gunshot wounds. Surveillance footage showed a masked man exiting a silver Honda Crosstour, shooting the victim, and then returning to the vehicle after being shot in return fire.

The PGPD police were later informed that a man with a gunshot wound to his leg had been dropped off at George Washington University Hospital in Washington, D.C. Upon arriving to investigate, a PGPD detective reviewed the hospital's surveillance footage and confirmed that the vehicle seen pulling up to the hospital appeared to match the vehicle involved in the shooting. In the video, an individual exited the vehicle wearing clothing that matched the masked man seen in the liquor store footage.

By the time the PGPD detective arrived, the individual was already in the operating room. The PGPD detective met with police from the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department ("MPD") "[r]ight in the hallway right outside" the operating room. An MPD officer provided the PGPD detective with a D.C. identification card bearing the appellant's name and address. The MPD officer also told PGPD detective about a bag of clothes and "where they were." The PGPD detective confirmed with the MPD officer that the appellant was the one who had walked into the hospital with the gunshot injury.

The PGPD detective saw the bag of clothing in the hallway outside the operating room. It was a transparent bag marked "biohazard" that contained bloodied clothing. The detective saw that the clothes in the bag matched the clothing the masked man was wearing in the liquor store and

hospital surveillance videos. He did not know who had placed the clothes in the bag or who had placed the bag in the hallway. Based on his conversation with the MPD officer and the fact that the clothing in the bag "matched the clothing description of what [he] saw in both videos," the PGPD seized the bag of clothes and ultimately logged it into evidence.

After identifying the Crosstour in surveillance videos, PGPD officers found that the car had been issued several parking tickets. The parking tickets had been issued in the same block as the address listed on the appellant's identification card, which was less than a mile from the liquor store.

The appellant was indicted for attempted first-degree murder, attempted second-degree murder, first-degree assault, second-degree assault, reckless endangerment, and firearm-related offenses.

The appellant moved to suppress evidence of the identification card and the bag of bloodied clothing because, according to him, the State failed to justify the warrantless seizure of those items. The appellant argued that the MPD officer had initially seized the items, and that the State failed to call him to testify about whether they were legally obtained.

The court denied the motion to suppress on the grounds of the collective knowledge doctrine.

During trial, the identification card and the bloody clothes were not admitted into evidence. However, the PGPD detective testified about how he came to seize these items. Another officer testified to how the police developed a connection between the appellant and the Crosstour by using area databases and checking for parking tickets issued to the Crosstour near the appellant's listed address, as recounted above.

Held: Reversed and remanded.

Preliminarily, the Appellate Court rejected the State's argument that the appellant lacked an expectation of privacy (i.e., standing) in the items seized. This is because the State did not raise the argument at the suppression hearing. As the issue was neither raised before, nor decided by, the circuit court, it was not preserved for appellate review.

On the merits of the Fourth Amendment claim, the Appellate Court held that the circuit court erred in denying the motion to suppress on the basis that the collective knowledge of officers with the PGPD and the MPD justified the seizure of the appellant's identification card and bloodied clothes. First, the evidence did not support the application of the collective knowledge doctrine. Second, the collective knowledge doctrine did not resolve the argument that the State failed to rebut the presumption that the warrantless seizure was invalid; the MPD officer had some involvement with the possible seizure of the items before the PGPD officer arrived and ultimately took the items, and the State did not present evidence to explain the antecedent events.

The Appellate Court rejected the State's alternative argument that the seizure of the items was justified under the plain view exception of the warrant requirement. As it relates to the

identification card, it was handed to the PGPD officer and was not in his plain view. As it relates to the clothing, there was evidence suggesting that the MPD officer was involved in placing it in the hallway where the PGPD officer observed it. There was insufficient evidence to demonstrate that the PGPD officer had a lawful right of access to the clothing in light of the MPD officer's apparent involvement.

The Appellate Court rejected the State's alternative argument that the items would have been discovered inevitably. The Appellate Court declined to apply the doctrine to this case because the State did not raise the theory of inevitable discovery below. In addition, given the factual void presented by the suppression record, making that determination would necessarily involve speculation.

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Michael Pellet v. Tara Pellet, No. 1439, September Term 2024, filed November 21, 2025. Opinion by Graeff, J.

https://www.courts.state.md.us/data/opinions/cosa/2025/1439s24.pdf

CHILD SUPPORT ARREARS – EQUITABLE DEFENSES

Facts: Michael Pellet ("Father") and Tara Pellet ("Mother") divorced in 2009 and have two children. In 2017, the parties entered into a Consent Order, which granted Mother sole legal and physical custody of the children, with Father paying $2,301.00 in child support. According to the Consent Order, the parties agreed to participate in at least one mediation session prior to seeking any redress from the court.

In July 2019, Father lost his job and stopped paying child support. Over the next two years, Father and Mother exchanged emails about modifying child support. Father proposed temporary arrangements, while Mother insisted that any modification be made with the court. Father did not file to modify child support during that period.

On November 9, 2021, Father filed a Petition to Modify Child Support, asserting that his employment status and relocation constituted a material change in circumstances. Mother responded with a counter-complaint, seeking child support arrears for the period beginning August 2019 to August 2021. Father admitted non-payment but raised several equitable defenses, including waiver and unclean hands.

The Circuit Court for Baltimore County granted summary judgment in Mother's favor, concluding that Maryland Code, Family Law § 12-104(b) prohibits retroactive modification of child support prior to the filing of a petition. The court entered judgment against Father for $55,224.00 in arears and awarded pre-judgment interest. Father appealed.

Held: Affirmed.

Pursuant to Md. Code. Ann., Family Law ("FL") § 12-104 (2024 Supp.), a court does not have authority to retroactively modify a child support award prior to the date a motion for modification is filed. The statute contains no exception for a case where equitable defenses are asserted.

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ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE

DISBARMENTS/SUSPENSIONS/INACTIVE STATUS

By an Order of the Supreme Court of Maryland dated November 12, 2025, the following attorney has been placed on disability inactive status by consent:

GERARD PAUL UEHLINGER

*

By an Opinion and Order of the Supreme Court of Maryland dated November 21, 2025, the following attorney has been indefinitely suspended:

TRISTAN WADE GILLESPIE

*

By an Order of the Supreme Court of Maryland dated November 24, 2025, the following attorney has been placed on disability inactive status by consent:

GERARD THOMAS McDONOUGH

*

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JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS

*

On October 27, 2025, the Governor announced the appointment of **BRETT J. ENGLER** to the District Court for Frederick County. Judge Engler was sworn in on November 13, 2025, and fills the vacancy created by the retirement of the Hon. Earl W. Bartgis, Jr.

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On October 27, 2025, the Governor announced the appointment of **RALPH L. SAPIA** to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. Judge Sapia was sworn in on November 24, 2025, and fills the vacancy created by the retirement of the Hon. Nancy M. Purpura.

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RULES ORDERS

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A Rules Order pertaining the 225th Report of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure was filed on November 4, 2025.

http://www.mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/rules/order/ro225th.pdf

*

A Rules Order Pertaining to Court proposed amendments to Rule 16-310 was filed on November 4, 2025.

http://www.mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/rules/order/rorule16-310.pdf

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The full text of Appellate Court unreported opinions can be found online:

https://mdcourts.gov/appellate/unreportedopinions

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